BEA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BEA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 639

Appeal from: BEA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 289
File number: NSD 366 of 2017
Judge: BURLEY J
Date of judgment: 11 May 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION - appeal from Federal Circuit Court – whether Court erred in dismissing appeal from Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether primary judge failed to give proper consideration to appellant’s case – whether primary judge gave adequate reasons for dismissing appellant’s case – where primary judge delivered ex tempore judgment – appeal allowed
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1)(d)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 36(2)

Cases cited:

AXL16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 208

COZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 46

DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2

SZVHP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 270

Date of hearing: 6 March 2018
Date of last submissions:  13 March 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 37
Counsel for the Appellant: Ms T Baw
Solicitor for the Appellant: Fragomen
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms J E Davidson
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Minter Ellison
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 366 of 2017
BETWEEN:

BEA15

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BURLEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 MAY 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The orders dated 21 February 2017 made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia be set aside.

3.The application for judicial review dated 25 June 2015 be remitted to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for reconsideration according to law by a Judge of that Court other than the primary judge.

4.The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of and incidental to the appeal and the proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia below.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BURLEY J:

1         INTRODUCTION

[1]

2         THE DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL

[3]

3         THE DECISION OF THE FCCA

[9]

4         THE APPEAL

[12]

4.1      Introduction

[12]

4.2      The relevant law

[15]

4.3      Consideration of ground 3

[16]

5         DISPOSITION

[36]

1.                INTRODUCTION

  1. The appellant is a 24 year old male citizen of Sri Lanka of Tamil ethnicity who arrived in Australia as an illegal maritime arrival in July 2012. He applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa, claiming that he is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations pursuant to s 36(2)(a) and 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act).  On 3 January 2014 a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Minister) refused to grant the appellant the visa.…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 639
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of BEA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, a Sri Lankan national, sought judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) which dismissed his application for a protection visa. The Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) had also dismissed the appellant's appeal against the AAT's decision. The appellant's primary contention was that the AAT erred in its consideration of the evidence and failed to provide adequate reasons for its decision. The appellant argued that the AAT made erroneous findings, failed to consider certain evidence, and did not provide sufficient reasons for its conclusions on credibility and the authenticity of a key document.

The legal issues before the court were whether the FCCA erred in dismissing the appellant's appeal and whether the AAT failed to give proper consideration to the appellant's case and provide adequate reasons for its decision. The court examined the AAT's handling of the evidence, particularly regarding the authenticity of a letter purportedly from the Sri Lankan authorities, and the AAT's assessment of the appellant's credibility. Additionally, the court considered whether the AAT's failure to provide adequate reasons constituted a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction.

The court found that the AAT did not adequately consider several aspects of the appellant's evidence and failed to provide sufficient reasons for its conclusions. The AAT made findings that were inconsistent with the evidence and did not address key aspects of the appellant's case. The court concluded that the brevity and generality of the FCCA's reasons did not adequately address the issues, leading to a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction. Consequently, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the FCCA's orders, and remitted the case back to the FCCA for reconsideration by a different judge.

The court ordered that the appellant's costs of the appeal and the FCCA proceedings be paid by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. This decision underscores the importance of providing adequate and specific reasons in administrative law decisions, particularly in cases involving the credibility of asylum seekers and the authenticity of documents.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders dated 21 February 2017 made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia be set aside.

3. The application for judicial review dated 25 June 2015 be remitted to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for reconsideration according to law by a Judge of that Court other than the primary judge.

4. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of and incidental to the appeal and the proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia below.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ultimately, the Tribunal considered that the appellant was not telling the truth and was making up his story as he went along (T[31]). After hearing the appellant’s evidence, and having regard to country information as to the prevalence of fraudulent documents, the Tribunal considered that the TID letter was not genuine, and placed no weight on it (T[34]). The Tribunal did not accept that the police or the TID were looking for the appellant. It found that the TID would not summons him in 2015 when he had left Sri Lanka in 2012. The Tribunal rejected the appellant’s claim to protection.3. THE DECISION OF THE FCCA The appellant applied to the FCCA for a judicial review of the decision of the Tribunal on three substantive grounds as follows:Grounds of application1. The second respondent (the "Tribunal") failed to comply with its obligation under the Migration Act 1958 to review the decision of first respondent by making erroneous findings or omissions based on a misstatement or miscomprehension of the evidence and/or failing to consider the evidence. The Tribunal expressly relied on those errors to place no weight on a letter that showed the Sri Lankan authorities had summoned the applicant or that they were looking for him, and to make an adverse credibility finding against the applicant (at D(261)).Particularsa. The Tribunal's conclusion (at D[27]) that the applicant gave inconsistent evidence about whether his family had moved addresses does not reflect the evidence as the applicant's evidence was consistent.b. The Tribunal stated (at D[28]) that it had expressed doubt to the applicant that the letter would be addressed to him in English and written in Sinhalese and the applicant is alleged to have said that he did not know the reasons why, but that does not reflect the evidence. In fact, there was never such a question put to the applicant and thus no such response was ever given by the applicant.c. The Tribunal erroneously stated (at D[29]) that the "only" way that his family would have known that the letter was in Sinhalese would have been to open it, but the Tribunal failed to consider that the front of the envelope may have been in Sinhalese, except for the applicant's name, which is consistent with the applicant's evidence. Further, that conclusion was never put to the applicant.d. The Tribunal expressed the concerns it had about the authenticity of the document itself (at D[33]). However, those concerns were never put to the applicant at the hearing.e. The Tribunal did not give consideration to the applicant's evidence that these kinds of messages from the authorities were the norm in the North and East of the country.f. The Tribunal did not give consideration to the applicant's insistence that if the Tribunal thought the document was fraudulent he gave his permission to check with the Sri Lankan authorities, when drawing its conclusion on his credibility and the authenticity of the letter.2. The Tribunal failed to comply with s.424A and/or s.424AA of the Migration Act (1958) and/or a denial of procedural fairness in the way the Tribunal dealt with the letter; and further or in the alternative, the applicant did not have a meaningful opportunity to participate in the hearing as required by s.425 of the Migration Act (1958) Cth.ParticularsRepeat particulars 1.b to f. above.3. The Tribunal relied substantially on DFAT country information about the treatment of failed asylum seekers and returnees who had illegally departed Sri Lanka. However, the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by failing to consider the other sources of country information contrary to the DFAT information provided by the applicant in written submissions, and/or the Tribunal failed to provide reasons for rejecting the applicant's contrary evidence and to justify the selective use of the country information that it had before it.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The question of whether or not the failure to provide adequate reasons amounts to a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction has been considered recently in several cases decided in this Court. In COZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 46 Griffiths J conducted a review of the relevant authorities at [31] – [56] which I respectfully adopt. In particular I note the following matters, as summarised by his Honour:·A failure to give adequate reasons may amount to an error of law (at [32]);·The obligation arises as a matter of judicial duty. It arises from the need to maintain public confidence, respect and faith in the judicial system, the need to provide reasons to the unsuccessful party who may otherwise not know or understand why the decision was made, and the need to enable an appeal court to determine whether or not the primary judge’s decision was or was not affected by error or law or an appealable error [32];·The standard required for the provision or reasons, including ex tempore reasons, is not a standard of perfection. Appropriate allowance should be given for the pressures under which judges are placed. Nevertheless, the prospect that ex tempore reasons may not adequately address the issues under consideration should sound a note of warning to the primary judge about the need to reserve a decision for greater consideration ([34]);·Failure to address fundamental aspects of a party’s case may give rise to procedural unfairness or, in an appropriate case, be characterised as a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction ([38]). ·Each case will necessarily turn on its own particular facts and circumstances. An important matter to be taken into account in considering the application of this ground relates to the nature of the jurisdiction being exercised by both the trial court and the appeal court ([46]); ·Where a case, such as the present, is brought under s 24(1)(d) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) the issue is whether the primary judge fell into appealable error in exercising the FCCA’s original jurisdiction under s 476 of the Act in dismissing the appellant’s claim that the Tribunal had fallen into jurisdictional error . It is relevant to take into account the fact that, because the FCCA was exercising a judicial review jurisdiction, it was not a matter for that Court to make findings of fact. Generally speaking that is the province of the administrative body whose decision is being judicially reviewed ([46]); ·However, that is not to deny that the Tribunal’s fact finding may itself be amenable to judicial review on various grounds ([46]). In the present case, there is no dispute as to the principles applicable in the event that the Tribunal was in error as to it findings of fact.·The brevity of a primary judge’s reasons can form the basis for finding a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction. As the Full Court found in DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2 at [48], to state a conclusion at such a high level of generality that the basis for the conclusion is not exposed (for example, by stating that adverse findings were open and cannot be said to lack an evident and intelligible justification) is not likely to be sufficient.4.3 Consideration of ground 3