SZUYT v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZUYT v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2017] FCCA 174
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application for judicial review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal affirming decision of a delegate of the first respondent not to grant the applicant a protection visa – whether Tribunal’s decision irrational or illogical – whether Tribunal made decision on the basis of no evidence – whether the Tribunal took into account irrelevant considerations or failed to take into account relevant considerations – no jurisdictional error.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 427, 499(1), 499(2A)

ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174
Buchwald v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 101
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611
SZSQL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 294
SZTCV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1309
SZUQZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 1552
Applicant: SZUYT
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 2379 of 2014
Judgment of: Judge Manousaridis
Hearing date: 3 December 2015
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 3 February 2017

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr J Williams
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly
Solicitors for the First Respondent: Minter Ellison Lawyers

ORDERS

  1. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal is substituted for the Refugee Review Tribunal as the second respondent.

  2. The application is dismissed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 2379 of 2014

SZUYT

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. The applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (Tribunal) affirming the decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) not to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa (visa).

Applicant’s claims for protection

  1. In a statement (May statement) that accompanied his application for a Protection visa, the applicant claimed he is a Syrian born Palestinian.[1] He claimed the quality of his life in Syria was unbearable. In 1990 the applicant and his family moved to Jordan where they were able to obtain Jordanian passports through the applicant’s father’s political connections; but “being refugees in Jordan was not much of a better life”. Obtaining a Jordanian passport did not change the perception of people towards the applicant and his family. The applicant was unable to get a job because people refused to employ someone with a Palestinian background. The applicant was even denied the right to obtain a driver’s licence. The authorities did not want the applicant to improve the quality of his life, and they “physiologically tormented and belittled” the applicant.

    [1] CB1-53

  2. In 2008 the applicant married and applied for a Partner Visa. After arriving in Australia, the applicant and his wife lived together until 2011. The applicant’s wife “disappeared from [his] life…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCCA 174
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This decision concerned an application by SZUYT (the applicant) for judicial review of a decision made by the Migration Review Tribunal. The applicant challenged the Tribunal's findings regarding credibility, specifically its rejection of the applicant's explanation for discrepancies between two statements provided to the Tribunal. The court was required to determine whether the Tribunal's findings constituted a jurisdictional error.

The legal issues before the court included whether the Tribunal's rejection of the applicant's explanation for the differing statements was irrational, and whether the Tribunal erred in relying on the applicant's failure to complain about his lawyer's conduct. The court also considered the principles of jurisdictional error in the context of irrationality, drawing on High Court authority, particularly *Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS*, which established that irrationality sufficient to give rise to jurisdictional error must mean a decision that no rational decision-maker could arrive at on the same evidence, and that such error must fix upon the decision-maker's satisfaction regarding the criteria for granting a visa.

The court reasoned that the applicant's submission that he had provided a reasonable explanation for the statement discrepancies merely expressed disagreement with the Tribunal's assessment, thus inviting impermissible merits review. Furthermore, the court found it reasonably open to the Tribunal to rely on the applicant's lack of complaint about his lawyer's conduct as a basis for not accepting his explanation, as it aligns with ordinary human experience that wronged individuals typically complain. The court also held that it was reasonably open to the Tribunal to conclude that claims made in the April statement were concocted, as a person with knowledge of such claims would ordinarily include them in an earlier statement if they were true, absent a reasonable explanation.

The court dismissed the applicant's submissions, finding no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's credibility findings.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

With respect, this passage may be inconsistent with some of the judgments in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS[30] to the extent it suggests that the Tribunal may make a jurisdictional error by making an irrational finding of fact that leads to the end result. In SZMDS, Crennan and Bell JJ said that, in the context of a decision made by the Tribunal, ““illogicality” or “irrationality” sufficient to give rise to jurisdictional error must mean the decision to which the Tribunal came, in relation to the state of satisfaction required under s 65, is one at which no rational or logical decision maker could arrive on the same evidence”.[31] This passage suggests that it is the decision itself that must be irrational, and not only a finding of fact made along the way. That is further supported by their Honours’ observation that “[n]ot every lapse in logic will give rise to jurisdictional error”.[32] Further, Gummow A-CJ and Kiefel J said that the “ascertainment of the relevant jurisdictional error [for irrationality], if there be one, must fix upon the treatment of the requirement mandated by s 65 of the Act that the decision maker be “satisfied” that there is ““satisfied”” the criteria for the granting of a visa.[33] This passage suggests that the illogicality ground of review applies to jurisdictional facts. In the context of a Tribunal’s review of a decision by a delegate of the Minister not to grant a Protection visa, the relevant jurisdictional fact is the Tribunal’s “satisfaction” that an applicant satisfies or does not satisfy the criteria for the granting of a Protection visa.[30] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611[31] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [130] (emphasis added)[32] [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [130] [33] (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [37] I turn, then, to the applicant’s challenge of the Tribunal’s credibility findings. The first challenge relates to the Tribunal’s not accepting the applicant’s explanation for the differences between the May and the April statements.[34] The applicant submits he had provided a reasonable explanation. Counsel for the applicant submitted that it was “a long bow to draw” to rely, as the Tribunal relied, on the applicant’s having made no complaint about the applicant’s lawyer’s conduct in submitting a statement which was not translated to the applicant and whose contents, therefore, were unknown to the applicant.[35] [34] CB241, [47] - [48][35] T9.40 I do not accept the applicant’s submissions. First, the submission that the applicant had provided a reasonable explanation for the May and April statements goes no further than expressing disagreement with the Tribunal’s not accepting that explanation, and, for that reason, impermissibly invites the Court to undertake merits review. Second, the applicant’s not having made any complaint about his lawyer’s conduct was a matter on which it was reasonably open to the Tribunal to rely for not accepting the applicant’s explanation. It is within the ordinary experience of human beings that persons who have been wronged by others usually or, at least, often complain about the wrong done to them. It was reasonably open to the Tribunal to rely on this generalisation not to accept the applicant’s explanation based on his lawyer’s wrongdoing in circumstances where the applicant did not complain about his lawyer. Second, it is within the ordinary experience of human beings that, in the absence of a reasonable explanation, a person who makes a particular claim at a particular point in time, would include all aspects of that claim known to the person at the time the claim is made. It was reasonably open to the Tribunal, therefore, to conclude that the claims the applicant made in the April statement had been concocted because, had they been true, the applicant would have included them in the May statement.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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