SZUUH v Minister for Immigration
[2016] FCCA 2017
•10 August 2016
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZUUH v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2016] FCCA 2017 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal) – whether Tribunal acted irrationally by not accepting an aspect of the applicant’s evidence and by finding that documents on which the applicant relied were not genuine or reliable – whether the Tribunal ought to have given notice to the applicant of a matter that arose in the course of the Tribunal’s hearing and whether in any event the Tribunal did give the applicant notice – no jurisdictional error. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.425 |
| Cases cited: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLSP [2010] FCAFC 108 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611 NAKD v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 321 Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; (2003) 77 ALJR 1165 Velauther Selvadurai v the Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and J Good (Member of the Refugee Review Tribunal) [1994] FCA 1105 |
| Applicant: | SZUUH |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 2042 of 2014 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Manousaridis |
| Hearing date: | 4 August 2015 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 10 August 2016 |
REPRESENTATION
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Mr M Jones of Parish Patience Immigration Lawyers |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Mr L Dennis of Sparke Helmore |
ORDERS
The application is dismissed.
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal is substituted for the Refugee Review Tribunal as the second respondent.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 2042 of 2014
| SZUUH |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
In this application for judicial review the applicant, a citizen of Bangladesh, claims the second respondent (Tribunal), in affirming the decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) not to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa (Protection visa), made two irrational findings of fact and, in relation to one of those findings, failed to give the applicant reasonable notice of its intention to make the finding.
Before I consider the applicant’s claims, it will be necessary to set out the applicant’s claims for protection that were before the Tribunal, and the reasons for which the Tribunal rejected those claims.
Applicant’s claims for protection
The applicant’s claims for protection, as set out in a statutory declaration he made in support of his application for a Protection visa, were as follows. In 1993, after he was admitted into a college to complete the Higher Secondary School Certificate, the applicant was elected the Vice-President of the Jatiyatabadi Chatradal student wing of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).[1] In 1994 he became an executive member of the Khashmal Balur Char Union Parisad of the BNP.[2] During that time Sheikh Hasina, the head of the Bangladesh Awami League, raised a political movement to oust Begum Zia from power.[3] When this movement reached its peak, Begum Zia transferred power to a caretaker government to hold a parliamentary election.[4] The election was held in June 1996, when the applicant worked for a central leader of the BNP, Mr S.[5] Their main opponent was a candidate from the Bangladesh Awami League.[6] The applicant’s duties were to motivate the youth of Ghasmahal Balur Char Union and the Lotufdia Union.[7] Although Mr S won the election, the Awami League won a majority of the seats in the Parliament, and formed the government of Bangladesh.[8]
[1] CB28, [2]
[2] CB28, [3]
[3] CB28, [3]
[4] CB28, [3]
[5] CB28, [3]
[6] CB28, [3]
[7] CB28, [3]
[8] CB28, [3]
After the Awami League came to power, the applicant became one of their targets in the local area.[9] On 27 February 1997 the applicant was attacked by a group of Awami League goons while passing a bazaar.[10] The applicant was beaten and attacked with a knife aimed at his chest, but landed in the applicant’s back when he turned his body.[11] The applicant was seriously injured and was admitted into a private medical centre for seven days.[12]
[9] CB28, [4]
[10] CB28, [4]
[11] CB28, [4]
[12] CB28, [4]
In 1999 the applicant became one of the executive members of the thana committee of the Serajdikhan Upa Zila BNP.[13] Awami League activists then subjected the applicant to more oppression.[14] In 2001 a parliamentary election was held in Bangladesh.[15] During that election, the applicant worked again for Mr S where he donated a large amount of money to the election fund and delivered speeches alongside Mr S.[16] BNP won the election in a landslide victory and formed government.[17] The applicant then worked with the government’s initiative to develop the country socially, economically, and politically.[18]
[13] CB28, [5]
[14] CB28, [5]
[15] CB28, [5]
[16] CB28, [5]
[17] CB28, [5]
[18] CB30, [6]
After five years in power, Prime Minister Begum Zia transferred power to a caretaker government to organise a parliamentary election. This caretaker government arrested thousands of leaders and activists of the BNP and tortured them.[19] For the 2008 election, the applicant worked for Mr H, a national leader of Bangladesh that the BNP had nominated.[20] The applicant campaigned door to door for Mr H,[21] but Awami League goons warned the applicant not to proceed further.[22] The Awami League won a majority of the seats in the Parliament and formed the government of Bangladesh.[23]
[19] CB30, [7]
[20] CB30, [8]
[21] CB30, [8]
[22] CB30, [8]
[23] CB30, [8]
On 2 January 2009 the applicant was attacked by a group of Awami League cadres at 9.00 pm at a bazaar.[24] The applicant was beaten with iron bars, punched in his head, and kicked on his body. He became unconscious and taken to a clinic for three days.[25]
[24] CB30, [9]
[25] CB31, [10]
In 2010 the applicant was elected as an executive member of the district committee of the BNP. Awami League goons targeted the applicant, but he was careful to escape.[26] In October 2012 the applicant led a procession against the corruption of the Awami League and the oppression toward the BNP and its leaders and activists.[27] The procession was disrupted and the applicant was seriously beaten to near death.[28] He was admitted to a local clinic for five days.[29]
[26] CB31, [11]
[27] CB31, [11]
[28] CB31, [11]
[29] CB31, [12]
The applicant tried to leave Bangladesh and contacted an agent to obtain a visa for Australia. Meanwhile, police raided the applicant’s house to arrest him, and he was informed that a case had been filed against him.[30] One of the applicant’s relatives helped the applicant through the airport.[31] The applicant claimed that his life was not safe in Bangladesh, and he feared persecution if he were to return to Bangladesh.[32]
[30] CB31, [12]
[31] CB31, [12]
[32] CB31, [13-[14]
The Tribunal’s decision and reasons
The Tribunal found the applicant was not credible in relation to his claimed BNP affiliation.[33] First, the applicant did not relate his motivation for joining the BNP apart from liking the leader,[34] and the applicant’s evidence in relation to his being attracted to the BNP was at best superficial.[35] Second, the applicant claimed to have been an elected member of the BNP, yet he was “unable to articulate the policies, principles and platforms of the party in various campaigns except in the most simple terms.”[36] Third, the applicant had limited knowledge of when general elections took place.[37]
[33] CB276, [57]
[34] CB273-274, [49]
[35] CB274, [50]
[36] CB274, [49]
[37] CB274, [50]
The Tribunal found the applicant’s evidence in relation to the harm faced by him in Bangladesh not to be credible.[38] First, the applicant’s evidence in relation to the claimed harm suffered by him was found to be inconsistent, contradictory, and confused.[39] Second, the applicant claimed to have faced no serious harm for many years, including the early period when the Awami League was in power, despite claiming to have been a BNP activist and holding executive positions.[40] Third, the applicant was unable to relate what led to the second claimed attack, and he was unable to indicate how soon after the claimed second attack he left Bangladesh.[41]
[38] CB274, [50]
[39] CB275, [52]
[40] CB275, [52]
[41] CB275, [53]
The Tribunal found there were no charges outstanding against the applicant in Bangladesh.[42] The applicant was able to depart the country legally using his own passport in his own name.[43] The Tribunal found implausible the applicant’s evidence that he was able to manipulate his departure through immigration controls at Dhaka airport, a city of over ten million people.[44]
[42] CB275, [53]
[43] CB275, [53]
[44] CB275, [53]
The Tribunal also did not accept the documents submitted by the applicant to be genuine. The Tribunal found they were “filled with typographical errors and contain information at odds with the applicant’s evidence in relation to his claimed affiliation with the BNP”.[45]
[45] CB275, [54]
Grounds of application
The applicant’s challenge to the Tribunal’s decision centres on two findings. The first is that the applicant’s claim he escaped detection when he departed from Dhaka Airport because he was able to manipulate his departure was implausible (implausibility finding). The second is the Tribunal’s not accepting as genuine or reliable the documents on which the applicant relied. The applicant submits the Tribunal’s findings were arbitrary or irrational. The applicant also submits the Tribunal failed to give the applicant an opportunity to present evidence about the applicant’s method of departure from Dhaka Airport.
Implausibility finding (ground 1(a))
The issue that led to the Tribunal’s making the implausibility finding arose during the hearing before the Tribunal. The applicant did not, in his statutory declaration, describe how he departed Dhaka Airport. The Tribunal, however, asked the applicant if he had problems departing the airport. As recorded by the Tribunal in its reasons for decision, the applicant gave the following evidence:[46]
[The applicant] indicated that he thought he may have political problems but had the assistance of a “media” person. He claimed to have through an immigration agent paid money to immigration. It was put to the applicant that Dhaka airport must be quite large given the size of the city. He responded that if you go through these people they make sure you get a boarding pass. When asked if he had any idea how they would facilitate his exit through immigration controls, the applicant claimed that they tell you what counter to go to. Asked if you can choose which counter you go to he said that he was called out by his name . . .
[46] CB270, [25]
It would also be useful to set out the evidence the applicant gave (emphasis added):[47]
[47] Transcript, pages 9-10. The transcript is annexed to the affidavit of W David.
Q. How about immigration control? What was the situation there?
A. INTERPRETER: The immigration control is very strong, but if you go through these people, they will make sure that you go through the immigration easily, got your boarding pass, they will make sure that you have boarded the plane to your seat.
Q. Any idea how they facilitate a person’s access through immigration controls?
A. INTERPRETER: There is a counter (indistinct) immigration, like one, two, three, they will tell you beforehand that you will go to that number counter.
MEMBER: So you’ve got the choice of what counter you go to?
INTERPRETER: Sorry?
Q. You have the choice of which counter you can go to, when you go through immigration?
A. INTERPRETER: No, I didn’t have any choice, they made the contact, I just giving the money. They will tell me which counter to go to.
Q. But, so you have the choice of which counter you would go through?
A. INTERPRETER: No, I can choose when I don’t have any problem, I can go to any counter, but when I have a problem, I have to go to a definite counter.
Q. So how does that work: Is it a queue, and then it breaks into separate windows?
A. INTERPRETER: All right, I will stay on the queue, that the counter I have to go. Stay in the queue.
Q. So it’s not one queue that breaks up and whichever window becomes open free first, that that’s where you’re called to?
A. INTERPRETER: All right it – it – it happens also, but there is another system, medium person will tell me that you go to that counter, and I know that person. Sometimes – sometimes security will come, and ask – ask for who is [the applicant]
It will be seen the applicant accepted that at Dhaka Airport there was a system where people formed a queue that broke up whenever a window became free, and the person at the head of the queue went to that window. The applicant, however, said there was also another system, one under which it was possible for the applicant to have been told to go to a particular counter. It is unclear, however, whether the applicant’s evidence was to the effect there were two systems for queuing. The more reasonable interpretation is that the applicant accepted there was one queue, but that he knew beforehand to which counter he would need to go, and that a person from security might seek to identify the applicant by calling his name. It is unnecessary for the purposes of these reasons to make any finding about whether the true effect of the applicant’s evidence was that there was only one queue or two systems of queuing at Dhaka Airport.
The applicant submits the implausibility finding was irrational or arbitrary because it was based on nothing more than the size of the city in which the airport was located. That is irrational, the applicant submits, because the Tribunal does not explain the connection between the size of the city – in this case, Dhaka – and the possibility of corrupt practices occurring at the airport. The applicant submits it is significant the Tribunal did not refer to any evidence that a “single queue” system operates at the departure gates at the airport, or that a person could not in fact choose which counter to approach.
When assessing the applicant’s submissions, there are two matters that should be noted. The first concerns the nature of the implausibility finding; it constitutes a reason on which the Tribunal relied for not accepting particular evidence from the applicant. The significance of this is that, although the “[u]ncritical rejection of evidence” by the Tribunal may constitute one means of demonstrating that the Tribunal has not properly undertaken a review,[48] the Tribunal “is not required to accept what an applicant says”.[49] Nor must the Tribunal “have rebutting evidence available before [it] can lawfully hold that a particular factual assertion by an applicant is not made out”.[50] That the Tribunal, therefore, made the implausibility finding without any evidence about whether a “single queue” system operated at the departure gates at Dhaka Airport, or that a person could not in fact choose which counter to approach, does not by itself mean it was not reasonably open to the Tribunal to make the implausibility finding.
[48] NAKD v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 321 at [7] (Hill J)
[49] NAKD v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 321 at [6] (Hill J)
[50] Velauther Selvadurai v the Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and J Good (Member of the Refugee Review Tribunal) [1994] FCA 1105 at [7] (Heerey J)
Why that is so leads me to the second matter I wish to note: evidence can be, and invariably is, assessed by decision makers against the background of unstated and unproved assumptions. This point has been made by J D Heydon:[51]
Much empirical material is employed in decision making by courts without evidence being received, without judicial notice being taken, without admissions being made, and without any specific warning being given to the party against whom that empirical material is used . . . It is material which is part of the make-up of human beings who form courts arising out of their general experience of life. That experience has many elements – their personal experiences, what they were taught by their parents and their schools, what others told them about their experiences, and what they learned from newspapers, radio, television, films and books. This general common experience of life causes the minds of courts to be full of many generalisations – right or wrong, crude or subtle, useful or misleading – about the behaviour of humans and about the physical and social world they inhabit.
[51] J D Heydon Cross on Evidence 10th Australian ed (2015) at 208 ([3200]) (footnotes omitted)
Although these observations are directed to courts, they apply with equal force to tribunals and to any other decision maker who must assess evidence before making a decision. The relevant question, therefore, is whether the Tribunal’s implausibility finding was not based, and could not reasonably have been based,[52] on unstated or unproven generalisations on which it was reasonably open to the Tribunal to rely.
[52] See Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [130] (Crennan and Bell JJ)
From the fact that Dhaka is a very large city it may reasonably be supposed that it has a large international airport. Many people, including, it may reasonably be assumed, the Tribunal member, would be acquainted with departure procedures at large international airports. It may also reasonably be supposed that it is within the common experience of those who are so acquainted that often there is a queue or queues of people waiting to be cleared through passport control, that there are multiple counters manned by different migration control officers to whom persons are directed to go, and the counter to which a particular person is directed to go depends on which counter is available at the time the person reaches the head of the queue. In those circumstances, it would have been open to a reasonable decision-maker in the position of the Tribunal not to find plausible the applicant’s unsupported assertion that there were two separate systems of queuing in Dhaka Airport, because it could reasonably be supposed to be outside the common experience of persons who depart from international airports to find there are two systems of queuing at the point of immigration control.
To the extent the applicant did not claim there were two systems of queuing, but instead claimed there was one queue and, while in the queue, he was told that the prearranged counter was available, that too could reasonably be regarded to be implausible. If, at the time his name was called, the applicant were not at the head of the queue, he would have had to jump the queue to go to the prearranged counter. That would be implausible because such a process is outside the common experience of persons who have passed through international airports. On the other hand, if the applicant’s name were not called, the only way he could have gone to the prearranged counter when he reached the head of the queue would have been if, by coincidence, the prearranged counter became available as the applicant reached the head of the queue, or if the applicant waited at the head of the queue until the prearranged counter had become available. Coincidence would be implausible by itself; and the spectacle of a person’s waiting at the head of a queue at passport control for a particular counter to become available would also be outside the common experience of persons who pass through international airports and, for that reason, implausible.
The Tribunal did not articulate the generalisations, or the links between the generalisations, I identified in the preceding paragraphs that would render rational the Tribunal’s reliance on Dhaka being a large city for making the implausibility finding. It is for the applicant, however, to prove that the Tribunal’s reliance on the size of Dhaka afforded no basis for the Tribunal to make the implausibility finding. I am not satisfied the Tribunal did not implicitly follow such rational chain of reasoning; nor am I satisfied the Tribunal otherwise adopted some irrational chain of reasoning. That is so because I have found there is a rationally available chain of reasoning, based on reasonably available generalisations that it was reasonably open to the Tribunal to hold and apply, that links Dhaka’s being large city with the Tribunal’s implausibility finding. Alternatively, given the chain of reasoning I have found was reasonably available to link the size of Dhaka and the implausibility finding, it cannot be said that the implausibility finding is “one at which no rational or logical decision maker could arrive on the same evidence”.[53]
[53] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [130] (Crennan and Bell JJ)
It is, of course, possible that, as the applicant asserted, a person at Dhaka Airport could have arranged to be processed by a particular migration control officer at a prearranged counter. That something is possible, however, does not by itself make it plausible. Evidence of the procedure at Dhaka Airport would have been required to render plausible the applicant’s claim that he went to a prearranged counter to be processed by a corrupted person. The applicant, however, appears to submit that it was for Tribunal to satisfy itself there was evidence that the applicant’s bare assertions were implausible. That is incorrect. It was for the applicant to persuade the Tribunal of the facts on which the applicant relied. It was for the applicant, therefore, to provide evidence to the Tribunal that was capable of satisfying the Tribunal that, contrary to the common experience of those who have passed through international airports, the procedures at Dhaka Airport at the time the applicant departed Dhaka were such that they could have enabled the applicant to be processed at a prearranged counter by a prearranged migration control officer, with or without the applicant’s name first being called out.
Ground 1(a), therefore, fails.
Failure to comply with s.425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (ground 2)
The applicant claims the Tribunal failed to give the applicant an opportunity to present evidence or argument in relation to the applicant’s method of departure from Dhaka Airport. The applicant submits the delegate did not raise as an issue the applicant’s method of departure, and that the Tribunal questions of the applicant did not raise this as an issue.
There are two answers to this submission. First, the applicant’s method of departure could not reasonably be regarded to have been an issue. The question of the method by which the applicant departed arose in response to questions the Tribunal’s asked about the applicant’s departure. Second, even if it were an issue, it was the applicant who had raised the question about the method by which he departed Dhaka Airport. There is nothing in the Tribunal’s questioning of the applicant that could reasonably have suggested to the applicant that the Tribunal had accepted the truth of the answers the applicant gave to the Tribunal’s questions. The applicant, therefore, ought reasonably to have expected that the Tribunal would not necessarily accept the truth of the answers the applicant gave. In those circumstances, it was open to the applicant to request the Tribunal provide him further time to enable him to obtain further evidence to substantiate the answers the applicant gave to the Tribunal. In other words, the applicant was on notice that whether or not the Tribunal would accept the applicant’s evidence of the method by which he departed Dhaka Airport was a question that the Tribunal was to determine, and that the applicant had an opportunity to address that question by asking the Tribunal for time to provide further evidence about that question.
Ground 2, therefore, fails.
Documents not genuine (ground 1(b))
This ground relates to the following finding:[54]
The Tribunal does not accept the documents submitted by the applicant at the hearing to be genuine or reliable. They are filled with typographical errors and contain information at odds with the applicant’s evidence in relation to his claimed affiliation with the BNP. It finds that these documents are not genuine or reliable and gives them no weight.
[54] CB275, [54]
The applicant submits these findings are not based on evidence, and are arbitrary and irrational. The applicant relies on a number of matters. First, the Tribunal does not identify the documents, and it is not “entirely clear” to which documents the Tribunal intended to refer.[55] Second, the Tribunal does not explain what it means by “typographical errors”. It is submitted that, to the extent the documents to which the Tribunal intended to refer are identifiable, the documents are translations and that the “typographical errors in translation could only reflect on the translator, not the original document”.[56] Third, the Tribunal does not explain why the typographical errors make the documents unreliable, and the Tribunal does not explain its finding that the documents contain information that is at odds with the applicant’s evidence.[57]
[55] Outline of submissions for the Applicant, 22.07.2015, [15]-[16]
[56] Outline of submissions for the Applicant, 22.07.2015, [18]
[57] Outline of submissions for the Applicant, 22.07.2015, [18]
The applicant, therefore, submits the Tribunal made the same jurisdictional error Kenny J found the Tribunal made in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLSP:[58]
On the face of the Tribunal’s written statement, the Tribunal’s conclusion that the first respondent’s answers were not correct was not grounded in probative material and logical grounds. That is, the statement does not disclose any material by reference to which a rational decision-maker could have evaluated the first respondent’s answers; no such material can be found in the record; and no other logical basis justifies the Tribunal’s finding. In these the circumstances, it is appropriate to infer that the Tribunal’s decision-making was arbitrary and irrational such as to constitute jurisdictional error.
[58] [2010] FCAFC 108 at [72] (emphasis added)
The Minister submits it was reasonably open to the Tribunal to give no weight to the documents on which the applicant relied because the Tribunal had already made a comprehensive credibility finding adverse to the applicant. The Minister relies on the following passage from the judgment of Gleeson CJ in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002:[59]
It is not necessarily irrational, or illogical, for a finder of fact, who is convinced that a principal witness is fabricating a story, which is considered to be inherently implausible, to reject corroborative evidence, even though there is no separate or independent ground for its rejection, apart from the reasons given for disbelieving the principal witness.
[59] [2003] HCA 30; (2003) 77 ALJR 1165 at [12]
The applicant, on the other hand, submits that this principle has no application to the circumstances of this case because, unlike in S20/2002, the Tribunal did not find the applicant fabricated his claim, and it did not otherwise make a general credibility finding adverse to the applicant; it simply rejected the applicant’s evidence.
I do not accept the Minister’s submission that the Tribunal’s finding that the documents the applicant provided to the Tribunal were not genuine or reliable was based on a comprehensive credibility finding adverse to the applicant. That does not mean, however, that I accept the applicant’s submission.
To establish that, in finding the applicant’s documents were not genuine or reliable, the Tribunal made the jurisdictional error Kenny J found the Tribunal made in SZLSP, the applicant must submit and establish that the Tribunal’s statement of reasons “does not disclose any material by reference to which a rational decision-maker could have evaluated” the genuineness or reliability of the documents, and that “no such material can be found in the record”, and that “no other logical basis justifies the Tribunal’s finding” that the documents were not genuine or reliable. The applicant, however, makes no such submission.
In my opinion, there is to be found in the Tribunal’s reasons for decision materials by reference to which a rational decision maker could have evaluated the genuineness or reliability of the documents provided by the applicant. Those materials are the matters on which the Tribunal relied for rejecting the applicant’s claims. Having rejected the applicant’s claims on the basis of those materials it would also have been reasonably open to a rational decision maker, on the basis of its rejection of the applicant’s claims, to find that the documents the applicant provided to the Tribunal were not genuine or reliable. Stated another way, the Tribunal’s rejection of each of the applicant’s claims for the reasons it gave constituted a logical basis for the Tribunal’s not accepting the applicant’s documents to be genuine or reliable.
There are other matters to note about this ground. First, not all documents the applicant provided to the Tribunal purported to be translations; and there are typographical errors in the documents that do not purport to be translations. In one such document there are the words “phisical [sic] serious injured”, “He addmit [sic] my Clinic Centre” and “he gone phisically [sic] fit”.[60] And in another such document, purportedly prepared by a different person, the word “admit” is misspelt “addmit”.[61]
[60] CB138
[61] CB139
Second, I do not agree that it was irrational for the Tribunal to the extent it relied on the typographical errors in the purported translated documents as evidence of their not being genuine. The basis of the applicant’s submissions that it was irrational for the Tribunal to so reason is that the typographical errors in translation could only reflect on the translator, not the original document. That submission, however, might carry weight if there were evidence that the translated documents on which the applicant relied were what they purported to be, namely, translated documents. There is nothing in the evidence before me that indicates the applicant had provided to the Tribunal the documents that had been purportedly translated. For example, the letter dated 3 January 2014 from the applicant’s agent the Tribunal enclosed a “translated copy” of various documents.[62] Even if there were evidence of the documents of which each of the purported translated copies was a translation, the errors in the translations are such as to have rendered it reasonable for the Tribunal not to accept the translations to be genuine translations. Here are some such examples: “Please have my greetings in the letter”;[63] “after performing assignments with very success”, “He is known to me long days”, “He is a success organizer”, and “Due to his such popularity”.[64]
[62] CB127
[63] CB141
[64] CB142
Ground 1(b), therefore, also fails.
Conclusion and disposition
The applicant has failed on each of his grounds of application. I propose, therefore, to order that the application be dismissed. I also propose to order that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be substituted for the Tribunal as the second respondent.
I certify that the preceding forty-one (41) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Manousaridis
Date: 10 August 2016
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