FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZUUH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1370
Appeal from: SZUUH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 2017 File number: NSD 1395 of 2016 Judge: GRIFFITHS J Date of judgment: 17 November 2016 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing judicial review application - whether primary judge erred in rejecting appellant’s judicial review ground that the Tribunal’s adverse credibility findings were arbitrary and lacked evidence – whether procedural unfairness. Held: - appeal dismissed. Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 425 Case cited: Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; 77 ALJR 1165 Date of hearing: 17 November 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 40 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr A Keevers from Sparke Helmore Lawyers Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted to any order the Court may make, save as to costs. ORDERS
NSD 1395 of 2016 BETWEEN: SZUUH
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
GRIFFITHS J
DATE OF ORDER:
17 NOVEMBER 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
GRIFFITHS J:
The appellant appeals against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (the FCCA). The FCCA rejected his application for judicial review of a decision of the then Refugee Review Tribunal (now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (both the Tribunal)). The Tribunal dismissed the appellant’s application for review of a decision of the Minister’s delegate to refuse him a Protection (Class XA) visa (protection visa).
It is desirable to summarise the relevant background matters, which include the reasons of both the Tribunal and the FCCA for rejecting the appellant’s challenges.
Summary of background facts
The appellant’s claims for protection primarily related to his fear of persecution in Bangladesh based upon his political opinions. He claimed that, in 1993, after he was admitted into a college to complete the Higher Secondary School Certificate, he was elected the Vice-President of the Jatiyatabadi Chatradal student wing of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). In 1994 he became an executive member of the Khasmahal Balur Char Union Parisad of the BNP. During that time Sheikh Hasina, the head of the Bangladesh Awami League, raised a political movement to oust Begum Khaleda Zia from power. When this movement reached its peak, power was transferred to a caretaker government to hold a parliamentary election. The election was held in June 1996, at which time the appellant said that he worked for a BNP candidate, Mr X. Their main opponent was a…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 1370
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the primary judge had correctly dismissed the appellant’s claims. The appellant's argument that the Tribunal's adverse credibility findings were arbitrary and unsupported by evidence was rejected as the Tribunal's reasoning was found to be rational and sufficiently detailed. The court also held that there was no procedural unfairness as the appellant had not identified any error that affected the primary judge’s findings. Notably, the appellant's failure to arrange for an interpreter despite being represented by a solicitor did not constitute procedural unfairness.
The court's reasoning was based on the Tribunal's comprehensive examination of the appellant's claims and the documents provided. The Tribunal's findings regarding the authenticity and reliability of the documents were supported by the presence of typographical errors in the translations, which the court deemed reasonable grounds for doubt. Furthermore, the court found that the Tribunal's decision-making process was transparent and logically sound, with adequate reference to the materials that supported its conclusions.
In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the Minister's costs. This outcome underscores the importance of the Tribunal's detailed and rational approach to credibility assessments in refugee status determinations.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As to the appellant’s claim that he had been denied an opportunity to present evidence or argument concerning his method of departure from Dhaka Airport which constituted a failure to comply with s 425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Migration Act), the primary judge rejected this claim for the following two reasons:(a)the appellant’s method of departure could not reasonably be viewed as an issue because it only arose in response to the Tribunal’s questions concerning his departure; and(b)even if it were an issue, the appellant was the person who raised the question about the method of his departure and there was nothing in the Tribunal’s questioning that could reasonably have suggested to the appellant that his evidence on this matter had been accepted by the Tribunal. He could have asked the Tribunal to provide him with more time to provide substantiating material to support his answers but he failed to do so. As to the appellant’s challenge to the Tribunal’s non-acceptance of the authenticity and reliability of the documents relied upon by the appellant and its findings that the documents were not genuine or reliable, the primary judge referred to the Minister’s submission that it was reasonably open to the Tribunal to give no weight to the documents because it had already made a comprehensive adverse credibility finding against the appellant (citing Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; 77 ALJR 1165 (Applicant S20) at [12]). The primary judge did not accept the Minister’s submission that the Tribunal’s finding that the documents were not genuine or reliable was based on a comprehensive adverse credibility finding, but his Honour concluded that this did not mean that the Court should accept the appellant’s submission that Applicant S20 was distinguishable because the Tribunal did not find that he had fabricated his claim but simply rejected his evidence. The primary judge found that the Tribunal’s statement of decision and reasons sufficiently referred to materials to which a rational decision-maker could have evaluated the genuineness and reliability of the appellant’s documents and that the Tribunal’s rejection of each of the appellant’s claims for the reasons given by the Tribunal provided a logical basis for the Tribunal not to accept that the appellant’s documents were genuine or reliable. The primary judge noted that there were several typographical errors in documents provided by the appellant which did not purport to be translations. His Honour stated at [39] that he did not agree that it was irrational for the Tribunal to rely upon the typographical errors in the purported translated documents as being evidence of the documents not being genuine. His Honour explained at [39] (footnotes omitted):39… The basis of the applicant's submissions that it was irrational for the Tribunal to so reason is that the typographical errors in translation could only reflect on the translator, not the original document. That submission, however, might carry weight if there were evidence that the translated documents on which the applicant relied were what they purported to be, namely, translated documents. There is nothing in the evidence before me that indicates the applicant had provided to the Tribunal the documents that had been purportedly translated. For example, the letter dated 3 January 2014 from the applicant's agent the Tribunal enclosed a “translated copy” of various documents. Even if there were evidence of the documents of which each of the purported translated copies was a translation, the errors in the translations are such as to have rendered it reasonable for the Tribunal not to accept the translations to be genuine translations. Here are some such examples: “Please have my greetings in the letter”; “after performing assignments with very success”, “He is known to me long days”, “He is a success organizer”, and “Due to his such popularity”. The appeal