SZTYZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZTYZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1360

Appeal from: SZTYZ v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 1443
File number: NSD 1145 of 2016
Judge: MARKOVIC J
Date of judgment: 18 November 2016
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for extension of time to file a notice of appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where delay adequately explained but grounds of appeal lack merit – application dismissed
Legislation:

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 36.03

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2), 36(2A), 425

Cases cited:

Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344

SZTQL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1317

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSCA (2014) 254 CLR 317

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152

Date of hearing: 9 November 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 42
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr J R Young
Solicitor for the Applicant: Milestone Legal
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the Respondents: DLA Piper Australia

ORDERS

NSD 1145 of 2016
BETWEEN:

SZTYZ

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MARKOVIC J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 NOVEMBER 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant’s application for an extension of time filed on 14 July 2016 be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application as agreed or taxed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MARKOVIC J:

  1. The applicant seeks an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Federal Circuit Court) on 17 June 2016 dismissing his application for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) (the Tribunal) made on 10 February 2014: SZTYZ v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 1443 (SZTYZ).  The Tribunal had affirmed the decision of a delegate of the first respondent (the Minister) not to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa.

  2. The last day for the filing of a notice of appeal was 8 July 2016 as required by r 36.03 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (the Rules).  The application for extension of time to file a notice of appeal was filed on 14 July 2016.

    BACKGROUND

  3. The applicant, a citizen of Pakistan, arrived in Australia in September 2011 when he deserted his ship on which he worked as a diesel mechanic and welder.  He applied for a protection visa in February 2012.

  4. The applicant comes…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 1360
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SZTYZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved the applicant, who had been refused a protection visa by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. Following the refusal, the applicant sought a review of the decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal), which affirmed the delegate's decision. The applicant subsequently applied to the Federal Circuit Court for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision and subsequently applied for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from the Federal Circuit Court’s decision. The central issue before the court was whether the applicant's application for an extension of time should be granted, given that while the delay in filing the notice of appeal was adequately explained, the grounds of appeal lacked merit.

The court examined the applicant's grounds for appeal, which included claims that the Tribunal had constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction, had asked itself the wrong question in assessing the risk of significant harm, and had failed to invite the applicant to give evidence on why he returned to Swat. The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal’s decision did not involve the errors cited by the applicant. Specifically, the Tribunal correctly assessed the chance of the applicant facing persecution based on past events but without assuming those events would definitively predict future conduct. The court held that the Tribunal's approach was appropriate in considering the likelihood of future harm in light of the applicant's past actions and the current situation in Pakistan.

In dismissing the application for an extension of time, the court noted that while the delay in filing the notice of appeal was explained, the lack of merit in the grounds of appeal precluded the grant of an extension. The court ordered that the applicant pay the costs of the application as agreed or taxed. This decision underscores the importance of the merits of the grounds of appeal in determining whether an extension of time should be granted in appellate proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant’s application for an extension of time filed on 14 July 2016 be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

A delegate of the Minister refused the applicant’s application for a protection visa. He applied to the Tribunal for review of that decision. On 10 February 2014, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision.THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION The Tribunal accepted that the applicant was opposed to the Taliban, that he came from Mingora and that his wife was a nurse who worked in a hospital in Mingora and was transferred to Mansehra due to law and order difficulties in Swat in February 2009, that the Taliban was opposed to girls’ education and employment outside the home and that, while it was in control of the Swat Valley, it enforced these views. However, the Tribunal noted that, even if, as the applicant claimed he and his wife had been threatened by the Taliban in 2008, it considered it relevant that the applicant had returned to Swat in 2009 and 2011 and that his wife and children continued to live in Mingora after his departure from Pakistan. The Tribunal also accepted that when the applicant returned to Swat in 2009, after an altercation with his nephew, he was detained by the Taliban and then escaped. But again the Tribunal considered it relevant that the applicant returned to Swat in 2011 at which time he handed his nephew over to the army. The Tribunal rejected a number of the applicant’s claims including that his children had not been able to go to school, that his family was effectively under house arrest, that his actions in reporting his nephew to the army had increased the Taliban’s animosity towards him or that there was a real chance that the severity of the situation in Pakistan, or specifically Swat, would deteriorate in the foreseeable future. The Tribunal accepted that targeted killings continued to occur in Swat but had difficulty in accepting that there was a real chance that the applicant would be the victim of a targeted killing if he was to return to Swat or in the reasonably foreseeable future because, while he was opposed to the Taliban, he was not a prominent opponent. The Tribunal also noted that even if, as the applicant claimed, he and his wife had been threatened by the Taliban in 2008 saying that they were on a list and would be killed, the Taliban had not, on the applicant’s evidence, made good that threat. The Tribunal observed that the applicant had been taken by the Taliban in 2009 but escaped and that he had considered it safe for him to return to Swat in 2011 and that his wife and children had continued to live there. The Tribunal concluded that, on the evidence before it, there was not a real chance that the applicant would be persecuted for reasons of his real or imputed political opinion opposed to the Taliban if he returns to his home in Mingora now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Tribunal also considered and rejected the applicant’s claim that he would be seriously physically harmed or killed by other militant Sunni groups in Pakistan. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant had a well founded fear of being persecuted for one or more of the five Convention reasons if he returned to Pakistan now or in the reasonably foreseeable future nor did it accept that there was a real risk that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Pakistan, he would suffer significant harm as defined in s 36(2A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Migration Act).Proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant had a well founded fear of being persecuted for one or more of the five Convention reasons if he returned to Pakistan now or in the reasonably foreseeable future nor did it accept that there was a real risk that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Pakistan, he would suffer significant harm as defined in s 36(2A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Migration Act).Proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court The applicant sought judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision in the Federal Circuit Court. He raised three grounds of review being that:(1)the Tribunal constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction in considering the Refugee Convention criterion;(2)in finding that it did not have substantial grounds for believing that as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to Pakistan there was a real risk the applicant would suffer significant harm, the Tribunal asked itself the wrong question and thereby constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction; and (3)the Tribunal failed to comply with s 425 of the Migration Act because it did not invite the applicant to give evidence and present arguments on the issue of why he returned to Swat when he claimed to have a well founded fear of harm. In relation to the first ground the primary judge noted the applicant’s submission that the Tribunal had fallen into error of the kind identified by the High Court in AppellantS395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473 (S395/2002) relying on the view of McHugh and Kirby JJ at [43] and Gummow and Hayne JJ at [80]–[82]. The primary judge also noted that the applicant submitted that by “directing” his wife to cease work and by removing himself and his wife from Mingora in the past he had acted to suppress his own religious and/or political views and freedom and that, in assuming that his future conduct would be the same as his past conduct, the Tribunal reasoned that he had conducted himself in a discreet manner in the past and there was no reason to suppose he would not continue to do so if he returned home. The primary judge held that the first ground was not made out. She found that the Tribunal’s decision did not raise an issue to which S395/2002, or the line of authority following that case, is relevant. Her Honour held that in this case, unlike in S395/2002, the Tribunal found that there was not a real chance that the applicant would face a well founded fear of harm if he returned to Mingora, which was no longer under Taliban control. It did not ask whether the applicant could avoid persecution in the future or make any assumption about how persecution might be avoided by the applicant by a modification in his behaviour: SZTYZ at [51]–[52]. The primary judge held that the Tribunal had regard to past events as a guide to what would happen in the future as an integral part of determining the chance of something occurring in the future. It did not treat what had occurred in the past as determinative of the future nor did it make any assumption about future behaviour: SZTYZ at [54].