FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZTYZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1360
Appeal from: SZTYZ v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 1443 File number: NSD 1145 of 2016 Judge: MARKOVIC J Date of judgment: 18 November 2016 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for extension of time to file a notice of appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where delay adequately explained but grounds of appeal lack merit – application dismissed Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 36.03
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2), 36(2A), 425
Cases cited: Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344
SZTQL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1317
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSCA (2014) 254 CLR 317
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152
Date of hearing: 9 November 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 42 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr J R Young Solicitor for the Applicant: Milestone Legal Counsel for the Respondents: Mr T Reilly Solicitor for the Respondents: DLA Piper Australia ORDERS
NSD 1145 of 2016 BETWEEN: SZTYZ
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MARKOVIC J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 NOVEMBER 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicant’s application for an extension of time filed on 14 July 2016 be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MARKOVIC J:
The applicant seeks an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Federal Circuit Court) on 17 June 2016 dismissing his application for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) (the Tribunal) made on 10 February 2014: SZTYZ v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 1443 (SZTYZ). The Tribunal had affirmed the decision of a delegate of the first respondent (the Minister) not to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa.
The last day for the filing of a notice of appeal was 8 July 2016 as required by r 36.03 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (the Rules). The application for extension of time to file a notice of appeal was filed on 14 July 2016.
BACKGROUND
The applicant, a citizen of Pakistan, arrived in Australia in September 2011 when he deserted his ship on which he worked as a diesel mechanic and welder. He applied for a protection visa in February 2012.
The applicant comes…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 1360
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the applicant's grounds for appeal, which included claims that the Tribunal had constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction, had asked itself the wrong question in assessing the risk of significant harm, and had failed to invite the applicant to give evidence on why he returned to Swat. The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal’s decision did not involve the errors cited by the applicant. Specifically, the Tribunal correctly assessed the chance of the applicant facing persecution based on past events but without assuming those events would definitively predict future conduct. The court held that the Tribunal's approach was appropriate in considering the likelihood of future harm in light of the applicant's past actions and the current situation in Pakistan.
In dismissing the application for an extension of time, the court noted that while the delay in filing the notice of appeal was explained, the lack of merit in the grounds of appeal precluded the grant of an extension. The court ordered that the applicant pay the costs of the application as agreed or taxed. This decision underscores the importance of the merits of the grounds of appeal in determining whether an extension of time should be granted in appellate proceedings.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant’s application for an extension of time filed on 14 July 2016 be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant had a well founded fear of being persecuted for one or more of the five Convention reasons if he returned to Pakistan now or in the reasonably foreseeable future nor did it accept that there was a real risk that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Pakistan, he would suffer significant harm as defined in s 36(2A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Migration Act).Proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court The applicant sought judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision in the Federal Circuit Court. He raised three grounds of review being that:(1)the Tribunal constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction in considering the Refugee Convention criterion;(2)in finding that it did not have substantial grounds for believing that as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to Pakistan there was a real risk the applicant would suffer significant harm, the Tribunal asked itself the wrong question and thereby constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction; and (3)the Tribunal failed to comply with s 425 of the Migration Act because it did not invite the applicant to give evidence and present arguments on the issue of why he returned to Swat when he claimed to have a well founded fear of harm. In relation to the first ground the primary judge noted the applicant’s submission that the Tribunal had fallen into error of the kind identified by the High Court in AppellantS395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473 (S395/2002) relying on the view of McHugh and Kirby JJ at [43] and Gummow and Hayne JJ at [80]–[82]. The primary judge also noted that the applicant submitted that by “directing” his wife to cease work and by removing himself and his wife from Mingora in the past he had acted to suppress his own religious and/or political views and freedom and that, in assuming that his future conduct would be the same as his past conduct, the Tribunal reasoned that he had conducted himself in a discreet manner in the past and there was no reason to suppose he would not continue to do so if he returned home. The primary judge held that the first ground was not made out. She found that the Tribunal’s decision did not raise an issue to which S395/2002, or the line of authority following that case, is relevant. Her Honour held that in this case, unlike in S395/2002, the Tribunal found that there was not a real chance that the applicant would face a well founded fear of harm if he returned to Mingora, which was no longer under Taliban control. It did not ask whether the applicant could avoid persecution in the future or make any assumption about how persecution might be avoided by the applicant by a modification in his behaviour: SZTYZ at [51]–[52]. The primary judge held that the Tribunal had regard to past events as a guide to what would happen in the future as an integral part of determining the chance of something occurring in the future. It did not treat what had occurred in the past as determinative of the future nor did it make any assumption about future behaviour: SZTYZ at [54].