SZTYO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZTYO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 30

Citation: SZTYO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 30
Appeal from: Application for extension of time (NSD 1084 of 2014): SZTYO v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCCA 1180
Parties: SZTYO v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
SZTYO v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
File numbers: NSD 1084 of 2014
NSD 1174 of 2014
Judge: FOSTER J
Date of judgment: 30 January 2015
Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether the Court should grant an interlocutory injunction restraining the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, and the Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection from transferring the applicant from the Villawood Immigration Detention Centre to the Wickham Point Immigration Detention Centre until such time as the Federal Circuit Court of Australia has determined the matters raised in proceedings commenced in that Court and remitted to that Court after a successful appeal  
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 23
Federal Court Rules 2011 r 30.33
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 196, 256, 424A, 424AA

Cases cited:

Le v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 53 FCR 27
NAFC v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 126 FCR 99

NAKG v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 997
Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238

SZSSJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 143
SZTGV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 3

SZTYO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 1180
SZUBU v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 1498

Date of hearing: 19 November 2014
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 96
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A Hochroth (Pro Bono)
Solicitor Advocate for the Respondents: Ms D Watson of Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1084 of 2014

BETWEEN:

SZTYO
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE OF ORDER:

30 JANUARY 2015

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Interlocutory Application dated 18 November 2014 and filed in Court by the applicant (SZTYO) on 19 November 2014 be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the said Interlocutory Application.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1174 of 2014

BETWEEN:

SZTYO
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE OF ORDER:

30 JANUARY 2015

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The balance of this proceeding be dismissed.

2.The applicant (SZTYO) pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 30
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SZTYO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the Federal Circuit Court was tasked with deciding whether to grant an interlocutory injunction preventing the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and the Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection from transferring the applicant, SZTYO, from the Villawood Immigration Detention Centre to the Wickham Point Immigration Detention Centre until certain legal matters were resolved. The applicant argued that his transfer would interfere with his ability to effectively participate in his legal proceedings.

The court needed to determine if it had the jurisdiction to grant such an injunction and whether the balance of convenience favoured granting the injunction. The legal issues centred on whether the court could prevent an abuse of its own processes and if the applicant had a sufficient claim for final relief to warrant interim injunctive relief. The applicant's arguments were based on anticipated difficulties in communication and participation in his ongoing legal matters if he were transferred to another detention centre.

The court found that the injunction sought was interlocutory and did not finally determine any rights. It held that for an interlocutory injunction to be granted, the applicant must demonstrate a serious question to be tried, a probability of success at trial, irreparable injury without adequate compensation, and a balance of convenience in favour of the injunction. The court noted that SZTYO had not articulated any substantive claim for final relief and that the anticipated difficulties were speculative at the time. The court concluded that the application did not meet the criteria for an interlocutory injunction and dismissed the application. The court also dismissed the balance of the proceeding and ordered SZTYO to pay the respondents' costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Interlocutory Application dated 18 November 2014 and filed in Court by the applicant (SZTYO) on 19 November 2014 be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the said Interlocutory Application.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

1. The balance of this proceeding be dismissed.

2. The applicant (SZTYO) pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to this proceeding insofar as those costs relate to the case brought against them by SZTYO in this proceeding.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

By Notice of Objection to Competency lodged by the Minister and the Secretary on 14 November 2014 in proceeding NSD 1174 of 2014, those parties objected to the competency of SZTYO’s Application in that proceeding. The grounds specified in that Notice are:1.The Court has no jurisdiction in relation to application:1.1The orders sought in the application make it plain that the injunction sought by each of the applicants is an interlocutory injunction, pending the resolution of their proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court.1.2An interlocutory injunction is only available where the Court’s jurisdiction has been properly invoked by a substantive application.1.3Section 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) is not a source of jurisdiction; it provides that the Court has power to make orders “in relation to matters in which it has jurisdiction”.1.4The applicants have not identified any matter in the Court’s jurisdiction in relation to which they seek the relief claimed.THE RELEVANT FACTSThe Evidence of SZTYO By letter dated 12 March 2014 from the Secretary to SZTYO which was received by SZTYO on or about the same date, the Secretary informed SZTYO that, in February 2014, a routine report released on the Department’s website unintentionally enabled access to some personal information about persons who were in immigration detention on 31 January 2014. This incident has come to be known as “the 2014 data breach”. I shall refer to it by that descriptor. The Secretary said that this information had been accessible for a short period of time before it was removed from the Department’s website. The information was not visible as part of the report displayed on the Department’s website and was not easily accessible. SZTYO was in immigration detention on 31 January 2014. In his letter, the Secretary went on to inform SZTYO that the information that it had been possible to access via the report to which he referred was SZTYO’s name, date of birth, nationality and gender, as well as details about his detention and whether any other members of his family were also in detention in Australia. In his letter, the Secretary went on to say that the Department would assess any implications for SZTYO personally as part of its normal processes. He said that SZTYO himself may also raise any concerns that he might have during the course of those processes. Shortly after receiving that letter, SZTYO commenced proceeding SYG 504 of 2014 in the Circuit Court. As I have already mentioned, on 13 June 2014, a Judge of the Circuit Court summarily dismissed that proceeding. By letter dated 27 June 2014 from a Departmental officer to SZTYO, the Department invited SZTYO to put in writing any concerns that he might have regarding the impact upon him of the 2014 data breach. SZTYO subsequently wrote two letters in response to that letter, the first of which was sent on 11 July 2014 and the second a little later. In his responses, SZTYO argued that:(a)The 2014 data breach was a crime;(b)The Department was not entitled to investigate the circumstances in which the 2014 data breach occurred as it had a conflict of interest;(c)There was no way of knowing who had accessed SZTYO’s personal information; (d)There was a real possibility that SZTYO’s personal information had been revealed to authorities in his home country thereby putting him at serious personal risk; and(e)The consequences of the 2014 data breach should be dealt with by the Privacy Commissioner (to whom SZTYO had already complained).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

She also provided some rudimentary information about the redevelopment of Villawood based upon information available on the Department’s website.The Respondents’ Evidence The respondents read an affidavit affirmed by Christopher John De Ruyter who is presently employed as the Director of the Operational Support and Logistics Section in the Compliance Operations and Detention Division within the Department. Mr De Ruyter said that, as part of his duties in that capacity, he is responsible for the placement of detainees within Australia’s immigration detention network, for transfer of detainees around that immigration detention network, for coordinating logistical arrangements such as charter flights, commercial travel and escorts for detainees, and for obtaining necessary clearances to facilitate transfers of detainees. He said that he is familiar with the operations and practices of the immigration detention facilities under the control of the Department, including Villawood and Wickham Point. He also said that he was familiar with the policies of the Department in relation to the management of those facilities. Mr De Ruyter said that he made his affidavit on the basis of his own knowledge and experience and upon the basis of conversations and communications which he had had with an officer based at Wickham Point and with an officer based at Villawood. Mr De Ruyter said it is important for the management of its immigration detention facilities that the Department has flexibility in managing the capacity of each facility due to ever changing requirements of the Department and of the individuals detained in each detention facility. He said that it is also necessary for detention facilities to have some flexibility in their capacity due to the fact that they also support a number of Departmental activities at Australia’s international airports, including removal action, and the holding of detected unlawful non-citizens as the result of compliance action. This is particularly important for Villawood which is the only detention centre in Sydney. Mr De Ruyter did not make the decision to transfer SZTYO out of Villawood to Wickham Point. He said that a total of 40 detainees were transferred out of Villawood in mid-November 2014—15 to Yongah Hill and 25 to Wickham Point. Based upon information which he obtained from a Departmental officer based at Villawood, Mr De Ruyter testified that the decision to transfer 15 detainees from Villawood to Yongah Hill on 12 November 2014 and the decision to transfer 25 detainees from Villawood to Wickham Point on 13 November 2014 were taken in order to relieve the pressure on accommodation at Villawood caused by the redevelopment of Villawood. He said that, since May 2014, the overall capacity at Villawood had been reduced from approximately 600 persons to 415 persons. He said that it might be necessary to transfer out additional detainees in the future. Mr De Ruyter was told by his informant at Villawood that detainees were identified for transfer from Villawood based upon five particular criteria, namely:(a)Having no immediate family in New South Wales;(b)Having no ongoing police investigations in New South Wales;(c)Having no Court or Refugee Review Tribunal matters where a date for a substantive hearing is in the near future;(d)Not requiring ongoing specialist medical appointments in New South Wales; and(e)Having no imminent migration outcome (ie an imminent removal or visa grant).

Decision

Reasons for decision

It was also submitted on behalf of the respondents that the Minister, the Secretary and the Department generally needed to retain flexibility in the management of the immigration detention centre network which included the need to know and have control over where particular detainees will be held. She pointed out that there was currently no substantive administrative law challenge to the decision to transfer SZTYO. Rather, the injunction presently being sought was said to be based upon the need to prevent the processes of the Court from abuse. The respondents’ advocate submitted that none of the authorities relied upon by Counsel for SZTYO supported the grant of the injunction sought in the present case.Decision There is no doubt that the injunction presently being sought by SZTYO is an interlocutory injunction. It does not finally determine any rights between him and the respondent parties and is admittedly being sought in aid of other alleged rights. The claim is not elevated to any higher status by being included in a fresh proceeding (viz proceeding NSD 1174 of 2014). Further, the interlocutory injunction being sought is in aid of private rights. In Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238 at 254-262 [44]-[74] the Full Court comprehensively explained the principles which should generally be applied when the Court is considering an application for interlocutory injunctive relief. In particular, at 256 [52]-[53], the Full Court said:[52]In Lenah Game Meats, a majority of the High Court held that, where an interlocutory injunction is sought (inter alia) in respect of private rights, it is necessary to identify the legal or equitable rights which are to be determined at the trial and in respect of which the final relief is sought. As Gleeson CJ said at [15]:If the respondent cannot show a sufficient colour of right of the kind sought to be vindicated by final relief, the foundation of the claim for interlocutory relief disappears.See also [8]-[21] (per Gleeson CJ); [59]-[61] (per Gaudron J); and [86]-[92]; [98]-[100]; and [105] (per Gummow and Hayne JJ). At [10], Gleeson CJ also specifically cited with approval Spry, The Principles of Equitable Remedies (5th ed, 1997) pp 446-456.[53]At [13], Gleeson CJ expressly approved the following passage from the judgment of Mason ACJ in Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148 at 153:In order to secure such an injunction the plaintiff must show (1) that there is a serious question to be tried or that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, in the sense that if the evidence remains as it is there is a probability that at the trial of the action the plaintiff will be held entitled to relief; (2) that he will suffer irreparable injury for which damages will not be an adequate compensation unless an injunction is granted; and (3) that the balance of convenience favours the granting of an injunction. In proceeding NSD 1174 of 2014, SZTYO has not articulated any claim for final relief which is intended to be preserved by the claim for relief made in par 1 of the Originating Application filed in that proceeding. Indeed, there is no substantive claim at all articulated in that Originating Application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In his evidence, Mr De Ruyter emphasised that the transfers were driven by the need to address accommodation pressures brought about by the construction work at Villawood.CONSIDERATIONThe Parties’ Submissions As matters presently stand, SZTYO has the following applications in train:(a)His extant applications in proceeding NSD 1084 of 2014. Those applications will almost certainly result in proceeding SYG 504 of 2014 in the Circuit Court being remitted to that Court for reconsideration by that Court according to law. The claims for relief made in that proceeding may well be amended once they have been remitted.(b)The ITOA process which he has initiated. It is highly likely that he will be interviewed as part of that process. (c)An application before the Privacy Commissioner in respect of the 2014 data breach. I am confident that SZTYO will probably give evidence in proceeding SYG 504 of 2014 when it is remitted to the Circuit Court because it is reasonably clear, even at this stage, that it would be in his interests to do so. Although SZTYO tendered evidence and made submissions directed to proving what his reasonable needs will be in respect of all the applications listed at [59] above, the interlocutory injunction which he seeks is sought only until the determination of proceeding SYG 504 of 2014 in the Circuit Court. He does not relate the injunction which he seeks to either of the other applications referred to at [59] above. Ms Byers and SZTYO have outlined the difficulties which they anticipate will be presented for the fair and effective presentation of SZTYO’s various applications by his transfer from Villawood to Wickham Point. I have described those anticipated difficulties at [37]-[43] above. All of the obstacles to effective communication between SZTYO and his advisers which Ms Byers has anticipated in her evidence are, at this point in time, matters in prospect rather than matters which have already occurred. This is not to detract from Ms Byers’ evidence but it must be said that, given that SZTYO remains at Villawood for the time being, none of the anticipated difficulties has yet occurred. Nonetheless, it was submitted on behalf of SZTYO, upon the basis of Ms Byers’ evidence and, to some extent, by reference to the evidence of Mr De Ruyter, that the Court should restrain any transfer of SZTYO from Villawood to Wickham Point for so long as his application soon to be remitted to the Circuit Court remains outstanding. Counsel for SZTYO submitted that this Court has jurisdiction to grant the injunction which he seeks on two alternative bases. First, he submitted that the Court has an implied jurisdiction to prevent an abuse of its own processes. He said that, should I form the view that the transfer of SZTYO from Villawood to Wickham Point would unduly interfere with the conduct of the two sets of proceedings which remain outstanding in this Court, that implied jurisdiction would be engaged. Second, he relied upon s 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) because the relief sought is an injunction against the Minister and the Secretary, both of whom are officers of the Commonwealth.