FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZTYO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 30
Citation: SZTYO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 30 Appeal from: Application for extension of time (NSD 1084 of 2014): SZTYO v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCCA 1180 Parties: SZTYO v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
SZTYO v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTIONFile numbers: NSD 1084 of 2014
NSD 1174 of 2014Judge: FOSTER J Date of judgment: 30 January 2015 Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether the Court should grant an interlocutory injunction restraining the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, and the Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection from transferring the applicant from the Villawood Immigration Detention Centre to the Wickham Point Immigration Detention Centre until such time as the Federal Circuit Court of Australia has determined the matters raised in proceedings commenced in that Court and remitted to that Court after a successful appeal Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 23
Federal Court Rules 2011 r 30.33
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 196, 256, 424A, 424AACases cited: Le v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 53 FCR 27
NAFC v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 126 FCR 99NAKG v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 997
Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238SZSSJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 143
SZTGV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 3SZTYO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 1180
SZUBU v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 1498Date of hearing: 19 November 2014 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 96 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A Hochroth (Pro Bono) Solicitor Advocate for the Respondents: Ms D Watson of Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1084 of 2014
BETWEEN: SZTYO
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent
JUDGE:
FOSTER J
DATE OF ORDER:
30 JANUARY 2015
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Interlocutory Application dated 18 November 2014 and filed in Court by the applicant (SZTYO) on 19 November 2014 be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the said Interlocutory Application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1174 of 2014
BETWEEN: SZTYO
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentSECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
FOSTER J
DATE OF ORDER:
30 JANUARY 2015
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The balance of this proceeding be dismissed.
2.The applicant (SZTYO) pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 30
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court needed to determine if it had the jurisdiction to grant such an injunction and whether the balance of convenience favoured granting the injunction. The legal issues centred on whether the court could prevent an abuse of its own processes and if the applicant had a sufficient claim for final relief to warrant interim injunctive relief. The applicant's arguments were based on anticipated difficulties in communication and participation in his ongoing legal matters if he were transferred to another detention centre.
The court found that the injunction sought was interlocutory and did not finally determine any rights. It held that for an interlocutory injunction to be granted, the applicant must demonstrate a serious question to be tried, a probability of success at trial, irreparable injury without adequate compensation, and a balance of convenience in favour of the injunction. The court noted that SZTYO had not articulated any substantive claim for final relief and that the anticipated difficulties were speculative at the time. The court concluded that the application did not meet the criteria for an interlocutory injunction and dismissed the application. The court also dismissed the balance of the proceeding and ordered SZTYO to pay the respondents' costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Interlocutory Application dated 18 November 2014 and filed in Court by the applicant (SZTYO) on 19 November 2014 be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the said Interlocutory Application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
1. The balance of this proceeding be dismissed.
2. The applicant (SZTYO) pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to this proceeding insofar as those costs relate to the case brought against them by SZTYO in this proceeding.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In his evidence, Mr De Ruyter emphasised that the transfers were driven by the need to address accommodation pressures brought about by the construction work at Villawood.CONSIDERATIONThe Parties’ Submissions As matters presently stand, SZTYO has the following applications in train:(a)His extant applications in proceeding NSD 1084 of 2014. Those applications will almost certainly result in proceeding SYG 504 of 2014 in the Circuit Court being remitted to that Court for reconsideration by that Court according to law. The claims for relief made in that proceeding may well be amended once they have been remitted.(b)The ITOA process which he has initiated. It is highly likely that he will be interviewed as part of that process. (c)An application before the Privacy Commissioner in respect of the 2014 data breach. I am confident that SZTYO will probably give evidence in proceeding SYG 504 of 2014 when it is remitted to the Circuit Court because it is reasonably clear, even at this stage, that it would be in his interests to do so. Although SZTYO tendered evidence and made submissions directed to proving what his reasonable needs will be in respect of all the applications listed at [59] above, the interlocutory injunction which he seeks is sought only until the determination of proceeding SYG 504 of 2014 in the Circuit Court. He does not relate the injunction which he seeks to either of the other applications referred to at [59] above. Ms Byers and SZTYO have outlined the difficulties which they anticipate will be presented for the fair and effective presentation of SZTYO’s various applications by his transfer from Villawood to Wickham Point. I have described those anticipated difficulties at [37]-[43] above. All of the obstacles to effective communication between SZTYO and his advisers which Ms Byers has anticipated in her evidence are, at this point in time, matters in prospect rather than matters which have already occurred. This is not to detract from Ms Byers’ evidence but it must be said that, given that SZTYO remains at Villawood for the time being, none of the anticipated difficulties has yet occurred. Nonetheless, it was submitted on behalf of SZTYO, upon the basis of Ms Byers’ evidence and, to some extent, by reference to the evidence of Mr De Ruyter, that the Court should restrain any transfer of SZTYO from Villawood to Wickham Point for so long as his application soon to be remitted to the Circuit Court remains outstanding. Counsel for SZTYO submitted that this Court has jurisdiction to grant the injunction which he seeks on two alternative bases. First, he submitted that the Court has an implied jurisdiction to prevent an abuse of its own processes. He said that, should I form the view that the transfer of SZTYO from Villawood to Wickham Point would unduly interfere with the conduct of the two sets of proceedings which remain outstanding in this Court, that implied jurisdiction would be engaged. Second, he relied upon s 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) because the relief sought is an injunction against the Minister and the Secretary, both of whom are officers of the Commonwealth.