SZTYO v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZTYO v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION [2014] FCCA 1180

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Jurisdiction of Federal Circuit Court.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Summary dismissal of proceeding for want of an arguable cause of action.

Legislation:

Constitution, s.75

Migration Act 1958, ss.5, 5AA, 46A, 198, 474, 476

Migration Regulations 1994, reg.5.35AA, cl.866.222 of sch.2
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001, r.44.12

Cases Cited:
General Steel Industries Inc. v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125
Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62
Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552
Applicant: SZTYO
Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
File Number: SYG 504 of 2014
Judgment of: Judge Cameron
Hearing date: 30 May 2014
Date of Last Submission: 30 May 2014
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 13 June 2014

REPRESENTATION

The Applicant appeared in person

Solicitors for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

  1. The application be dismissed pursuant to Rule 44.12 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AT SYDNEY

SYG 504 of 2014

SZTYO

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Background facts

  1. The applicant arrived in Australia on 5 October 2012 as the holder of a Transit (Class TX) visa.  He was refused immigration clearance and placed in immigration detention and applied for a protection visa on 15 October 2012.  The applicant’s application was refused by a delegate of the respondent (“Minister”) and that decision was affirmed by the Refugee Review Tribunal (“RRT”) on 30 August 2013.  The applicant then sought judicial review of the RRT’s decision and that proceeding is listed for hearing before me on 3 July 2014.

  2. In February 2014 the applicant’s name and other personal details, along with the personal details of other immigration detainees, were disclosed on the public website of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (“Department”).  Following that breach the Secretary of the Department wrote to the applicant on 12 March 2014 relevantly stating:

    The department will assess any implications for you personally as part of its normal processes.  You may also raise any concerns you have during those processes.

  3. The above background information was set out in the affidavit of Dale Jennifer Watson affirmed on 26 May 2014.

This proceeding

  1. On 4 March 2014 the applicant commenced this proceeding, separate from his protection visa judicial review proceeding, seeking a “declaration” that what he described as the bar imposed on him filing a protection visa application by s.46A of the Migration Act 1958 (“Act”) be lifted and that cl.866.222 of sch.2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (“Regulations”) be waived. In his application the applicant specified the following grounds.

    1.The First Respondent breached the applicant’s privacy to information by releasing his name and other details on the departmental website as part of the January 2014 Detention Statistics for a period of several days before 19 February 2014.

    Particulars

    a)It is a fundamental principle of refugee law that a person seeking asylum should…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCCA 1180
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application by the applicant, SZTYO, against the Minister for Immigration, concerning the release of information by the Department. The proceeding was before Judge Cameron of the Federal Circuit Court. The Minister sought the summary dismissal of the proceeding, arguing that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the matter did not concern a "migration decision" as defined by the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth).

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the release of information by the Department constituted a "migration decision" within the meaning of the Act, thereby engaging the Court's jurisdiction under s 476(1). This required the Court to consider the definitions of "migration decision" in s 5 and "privative clause decision" in s 474(2) of the Act, and whether the impugned action fell within those definitions, particularly in light of the Minister's argument that the decision was not a privative clause decision and therefore not subject to review.

Judge Cameron reasoned that for a decision to be a "migration decision" under s 5, it must be either a privative clause decision, a purported privative clause decision, or a non-privative clause decision. The Court found there was no evidence to suggest the release of information was a "decision of an administrative character made... under" the Act, as required for it to be a privative clause decision under s 474(2). Consequently, it was not proven to be a privative clause decision or the product of one. While no argument was addressed to whether it was a non-privative clause decision, the Court assumed, for the purposes of the application, that the publication of a "routine report" on the Department's website, even if inadvertent, constituted a non-privative clause decision. Such decisions are not affected by the finality provisions of s 474. Therefore, the Minister's argument that the Court lacked jurisdiction was not made out. The Court also noted the provisions of s 46A and s 5AA concerning unauthorised maritime arrivals, though these were not central to the jurisdictional determination.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 474 of the Act relevantly provides:474 Decisions under Act are final(1)A privative clause decision:(a)is final and conclusive; and(b)must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court; and(c)is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account.(2) In this section:privative clause decision means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not) … There was no evidence before the Court to suggest that the release of information concerning the applicant was a “decision of an administrative character made … under” the Act, as referred to in s.474(2). I find that it has not been proved that the release of the information in question was a privative clause decision or the product of a privative clause decision. Without that quality it did not satisfy the first two paragraphs of the definition of “migration decision” set out in s.5 of the Act. No argument was addressed to the question whether the release of information was a non-privative clause decision or the product of a non-privative clause decision. I note that it does not fall within any of the specific examples of “non-privative clause” decisions set out in s.474(4) of the Act or reg.5.35AA of the Regulations. On the basis that the information was released because someone published a “routine report” (as it was described in the letter from the Secretary of the Department) on the Department’s website, even if inadvertently (as the Secretary stated in his letter), I am prepared to assume for present purposes that the decision to publish the report was a non-privative clause decision and one which falls within the third paragraph of the definition of “migration decision”. Such decisions are not affected by s.474 of the Act. Consequently, the Minister did not make out his argument that this case did not concern a “migration decision” as required by s.476(1) or that for that reason the Court did not have jurisdiction to consider it. Section 46A of the Act bars a person who arrives in Australia at an “excised offshore place” from applying for a visa. It presently provides:46AVisa applications by unauthorised maritime arrivals(1)An application for a visa is not a valid application if it is made by an unauthorised maritime arrival who:(a)is in Australia; and(b)is an unlawful non‑citizen. Section 5AA relevantly provides:5AA Meaning of unauthorised maritime arrival (1)For the purposes of this Act, a person is an unauthorised maritime arrival if: (a)the person entered Australia by sea: (i) at an excised offshore place at any time after the excision time for that place; or (ii) at any other place at any time on or after the commencement of this section; and (b)the person became an unlawful non-citizen because of that entry …Entered Australia by sea (2)A person entered Australia by sea if: (a)the person entered the migration zone except on an aircraft that landed in the migration zone …

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Section 5 of the Act relevantly provides:migration decision means:(a)a privative clause decision; or(b)a purported privative clause decision; or(c)a non‑privative clause decision. Section 474 of the Act relevantly provides:474 Decisions under Act are final(1)A privative clause decision:(a)is final and conclusive; and(b)must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court; and(c)is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account.(2) In this section:privative clause decision means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not) … There was no evidence before the Court to suggest that the release of information concerning the applicant was a “decision of an administrative character made … under” the Act, as referred to in s.474(2). I find that it has not been proved that the release of the information in question was a privative clause decision or the product of a privative clause decision. Without that quality it did not satisfy the first two paragraphs of the definition of “migration decision” set out in s.5 of the Act. No argument was addressed to the question whether the release of information was a non-privative clause decision or the product of a non-privative clause decision. I note that it does not fall within any of the specific examples of “non-privative clause” decisions set out in s.474(4) of the Act or reg.5.35AA of the Regulations. On the basis that the information was released because someone published a “routine report” (as it was described in the letter from the Secretary of the Department) on the Department’s website, even if inadvertently (as the Secretary stated in his letter), I am prepared to assume for present purposes that the decision to publish the report was a non-privative clause decision and one which falls within the third paragraph of the definition of “migration decision”. Such decisions are not affected by s.474 of the Act. Consequently, the Minister did not make out his argument that this case did not concern a “migration decision” as required by s.476(1) or that for that reason the Court did not have jurisdiction to consider it. Section 46A of the Act bars a person who arrives in Australia at an “excised offshore place” from applying for a visa. It presently provides:46AVisa applications by unauthorised maritime arrivals(1)An application for a visa is not a valid application if it is made by an unauthorised maritime arrival who:(a)is in Australia; and(b)is an unlawful non‑citizen. Section 5AA relevantly provides:5AA Meaning of unauthorised maritime arrival (1)For the purposes of this Act, a person is an unauthorised maritime arrival if: (a)the person entered Australia by sea: (i) at an excised offshore place at any time after the excision time for that place; or (ii) at any other place at any time on or after the commencement of this section; and (b)the person became an unlawful non-citizen because of that entry …Entered Australia by sea (2)A person entered Australia by sea if: (a)the person entered the migration zone except on an aircraft that landed in the migration zone …