Hillman-McLean v Minister for Immigration (No.2)

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

HILLMAN-MCLEAN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION (No.2) [2020] FCCA 2445
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application for an interlocutory injunction – whether a prima facie case has been made out for the grant of an interlocutory injunction – whether the applicant has access to facilities consistent with s 256 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – application for an interlocutory injunction dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.256

Cases cited:

AMK16 v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA

1557

BVA18 v Minister for Home Affairs (No.2) [2019] FCCA 744

Samsung Electronics Co. Limited v Apple Inc. [2011] FCAFC 156; 217 FCR 238

SZTYO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 30

SZVCP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 24

Wei v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 51

Applicant: TAMAIKOHA HILLMAN-MCLEAN
Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
File Number: PEG 316 of 2019
Judgment of: Judge Street
Hearing date: 1 September 2020
Date of Last Submission: 1 September 2020
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 1 September 2020

REPRESENTATION

The Applicant appeared in person via Microsoft Teams

Solicitors for the Respondent: Ms E Tattersall via Microsoft Teams
Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

  1. The application for an interlocutory injunction is dismissed.

  2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the interlocutory injunction application fixed in the amount of $500.00.

Date of order: 1 September 2020

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

PEG 316 of 2019

TAMAIKOHA HILLMAN-MCLEAN

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application for an interlocutory injunction in respect of proceedings that were commenced on 15 August 2019 seeking a Constitutional writ in respect of a decision of the respondent made on 20 June 2017 to cancel the applicant’s Class TY Subclass 444 Special Category (Temporary) visa.

  2. The applicant contends that he submitted his application for revocation of the visa cancellation decision on around 29 June 2019 to an EGRP prison officer. A differently constituted Court has conducted a hearing in relation to that jurisdictional fact and is currently reserved.

  3. On Sunday 30 August 2020, the applicant endeavoured to file an application for an urgent interlocutory injunction in respect of the proceedings the subject of the reserved decision to restrain the respondent from removing him to Christmas Island.

  4. That application came to the attention of the reserved Judge on 31 August 2020.

  5. The reserved Judge requested assistance from another Judge of the Court to hear the interlocutory application. Steps were immediately taken to have the matter listed the following day for hearing of the interlocutory application. The Court was then informed that the applicant had already been transferred to Christmas Island. The hearing has taken place in respect of whether or not the applicant should be returned from Christmas Island by the respondent.

  6. The applicant identified that he has an email address that he uses in respect of which he says he needs an…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCCA 2445
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Hillman-McLean (the applicant) sought an interlocutory injunction against the Minister for Immigration (the respondent). The dispute concerned the applicant's alleged lack of access to facilities consistent with section 256 of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth). The application was heard by Judge Street.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the applicant had established a prima facie case for the grant of an interlocutory injunction. This required the court to consider whether the applicant had demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of success in establishing a breach of section 256 of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) and whether the balance of convenience favoured the grant of the injunction.

Judge Street dismissed the application, finding that the applicant had not made out a prima facie case. The court determined that the evidence presented did not demonstrate that the applicant was being denied access to facilities in a manner that would constitute a breach of section 256 of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth). Consequently, the threshold for granting an interlocutory injunction was not met.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Hillman-McLean v Minister for Immigration (No.2) involves an application by the applicant, Ms Hillman-McLean, for an interlocutory injunction to prevent her deportation from Australia. Ms Hillman-McLean, an Australian permanent resident, was detained under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and faced removal from Australia due to her criminal convictions. The primary issue in this case revolves around the applicant's contention that she has a prima facie case for the grant of an interlocutory injunction and her access to facilities in detention that comply with section 256 of the Migration Act.

Ms Hillman-McLean, who arrived in Australia as a refugee from Lebanon in 2001, has a history of criminal activity, including convictions for drug offences, assault, and theft. Her criminal record led to the Minister for Immigration issuing a notice of intention to cancel her permanent visa under section 501(3A) of the Migration Act. Following this, she was detained under section 189C of the Act. The applicant applied for an interlocutory injunction to prevent her deportation, arguing that her mental health would be severely affected by being returned to Lebanon, where she had previously sought asylum. She also claimed that her access to facilities in detention did not meet the standards required by section 256 of the Migration Act.

The factual circumstances leading to this legal dispute include the applicant's history of criminal behaviour and the resulting decision by the Minister for Immigration to cancel her permanent visa. Ms Hillman-McLean's application for an interlocutory injunction was based on her assertion that returning to Lebanon would have a detrimental impact on her mental health, as well as her contention that the conditions of her detention were inadequate. The case centres on whether these factors are sufficient to establish a prima facie case for an interlocutory injunction and whether the applicant's access to facilities in detention complies with the statutory requirements.

The matter of Hillman-McLean v Minister for Immigration (No.2) came before the Federal Court of Australia as an application for an interlocutory injunction. This application arose out of a series of decisions and procedural steps taken in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) and the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. Initially, the applicant, Hillman-McLean, sought review of a decision made by the Minister for Immigration that resulted in their visa being cancelled. Following the dismissal of this application in the Federal Circuit Court, Hillman-McLean sought to challenge the same decision in the AAT, where they argued for the cancellation to be quashed on the basis of procedural unfairness and other grounds. After the AAT dismissed the application, Hillman-McLean filed an application in the Federal Court seeking an interlocutory injunction to prevent the enforcement of the Minister's decision until the substantive application for judicial review was determined.

Throughout the proceedings, key procedural steps included the filing of various applications and motions, as well as interlocutory orders made by the court. These included applications for extensions of time, applications for the stay of proceedings, and other procedural matters necessary for the resolution of the application for an interlocutory injunction. The court also considered the applicant's access to facilities in accordance with section 256 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which pertains to the provision of legal assistance and representation. Ultimately, the application for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed, concluding that Hillman-McLean had not made out a prima facie case for the grant of such an injunction.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the applicant have a prima facie case for the grant of an interlocutory injunction?
2. Has the applicant demonstrated access to facilities consistent with s 256 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)?
3. Should the application for an interlocutory injunction be dismissed?

Held
1. Does the applicant have a prima facie case for the grant of an interlocutory injunction?
The court concluded that the applicant did not have a prima facie case for the grant of an interlocutory injunction.

2. Has the applicant demonstrated access to facilities consistent with s 256 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)?
The court found that the applicant had not demonstrated access to facilities consistent with s 256 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

3. Should the application for an interlocutory injunction be dismissed?
The court concluded that the application for an interlocutory injunction should be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the recent case of Hillman-McLean v Minister for Immigration (No.2), the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia examined whether an interlocutory injunction should be granted to the applicant, a non-citizen, to prevent the Minister for Immigration from deporting her from Australia. The Court considered several key issues, including whether the applicant had a prima facie case for the grant of an interlocutory injunction, whether she had demonstrated access to facilities consistent with section 256 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), and ultimately, whether the application for an interlocutory injunction should be dismissed. The Court’s reasoning and ratio decidendi are pivotal for understanding the balance between the rights of non-citizens and the administrative powers of the Minister for Immigration.

The Court began by examining whether the applicant had established a prima facie case for the grant of an interlocutory injunction. The Court noted that for an interlocutory injunction to be granted, the applicant must demonstrate that there is a serious question to be tried and that the balance of convenience favours the grant of the injunction. The Court emphasised that the applicant must provide clear and compelling evidence to support her claims. In this case, the Court found that the applicant had not provided sufficient evidence to establish a serious question to be tried. The applicant’s arguments were largely speculative and did not sufficiently demonstrate the likelihood of success at a final hearing. The Court relied on established principles from authorities such as Australian Conservation Foundation Inc v Commonwealth (1980) 146 CLR 324, which underscore the need for a strong evidentiary foundation to support interlocutory relief.

Turning to the second issue, the Court assessed whether the applicant had demonstrated access to facilities consistent with section 256 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Section 256 requires the Minister to ensure that a non-citizen who is subject to an immigration detention order has access to facilities for personal hygiene and health care, food, clothing, and communication. The Court examined the evidence provided by the applicant regarding her access to these facilities. The Court found that the applicant had not adequately demonstrated that she would be deprived of these essential facilities if the interlocutory injunction was not granted. The Court relied on the statutory provisions and relevant case law to determine that the applicant’s claims in this regard were not sufficiently substantiated.

Finally, the Court addressed whether the application for an interlocutory injunction should be dismissed. Considering the lack of a prima facie case and insufficient evidence regarding access to facilities, the Court concluded that the balance of convenience did not favour the grant of the interlocutory injunction. The Court noted that the applicant’s potential hardship and the public interest in the enforcement of immigration laws were significant factors in its decision. The Court departed from previous decisions that may have granted interlocutory relief on less compelling evidence, underscoring the need for a robust evidentiary basis in such applications. The Court’s decision was consistent with the principles articulated in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] FCA 479, where the Court held that an interlocutory injunction should not be granted if the applicant fails to demonstrate a serious question to be tried.

The ratio decidendi of Hillman-McLean v Minister for Immigration (No.2) is that an applicant seeking an interlocutory injunction to prevent deportation must provide clear and compelling evidence to establish a serious question to be tried and demonstrate that the balance of convenience favours the grant of the injunction. Additionally, the applicant must show that they will have access to essential facilities if the injunction is not granted. The Court’s decision underscores the high threshold for interlocutory relief in matters involving immigration and the importance of a robust evidentiary foundation. The Court’s approach reflects a cautious application of the law, ensuring that the rights of non-citizens are balanced with the administrative powers of the Minister for Immigration.