FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| HILLMAN-MCLEAN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION (No.3) | [2020] FCCA 2546 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Cancellation of Special Category visa – decision that representation made to Minister was outside of legislative time limit – where applicant claims he had previously handed representations to “prison officer” within time limit – whether applicant did so – whether prison officer serves as Ministerial proxy – whether prison officer has a duty, express or implied, to transmit documents to the Minister – no jurisdictional error. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5, 99, 103, 273, 501, 501CA Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) |
| Applicant: | TAMAIKOHA HILLMAN-MCLEAN |
| Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
| File Number: | PEG 316 of 2019 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Kendall |
| Hearing dates: | 18 February 2020, 9 April 2020, 8 May 2020 and 3 June 2020 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 1 July 2020 |
| Delivered at: | Perth |
| Delivered on: | 11 September 2020 |
REPRESENTATION
| Applicant: | In person |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr G T Johnson |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Sparke Helmore Lawyers |
ORDERS
The application be dismissed.
All previous orders in this matter be discharged.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PERTH |
PEG 316 of 2019
| TAMAIKOHA HILLMAN-MCLEAN |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
This is an application for judicial review of a decision of a delegate of the respondent (the “Minister”) dated 5 August 2019 (CB 104). The delegate determined that the Minister cannot consider revoking the decision to cancel the applicant’s Special Category (Class TY) visa (the “visa”) because the applicant’s representations had not been received within the prescribed legislative time frame.
Background
An accurate overview of the background to this matter is provided by Counsel for the Minister in written submissions dated 11 February 2020. The Court adopts Counsel’s summary as its own. With minor amendments it provides as follows.
The applicant is a citizen of New Zealand. He arrived in Australia in May 2008. He was 17 at the time of his arrival.
On 5 January 2011, the applicant was granted the visa (Court Book (“CB”) 1).
On 8 May 2017, the applicant was sentenced by the District Court of Western Australia to a term of imprisonment (CB 12).
On 20 June 2017, a delegate of the Minister sent the applicant a notice that his visa had been cancelled pursuant to s.501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the “Act”). Section 501(3A) provides that:
The Minister must cancel a visa that has been…
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- Case
- [2020] FCCA 2546
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the applicant's alleged act of handing representations to a "prison officer" constituted making representations to the Minister within the statutory timeframe. This involved considering whether a prison officer could be considered a proxy for the Minister and whether such an officer had an express or implied duty to transmit documents to the Minister. The court also had to assess whether the applicant's subsequent email, sent almost two years after receiving the cancellation notice, could be considered a valid representation within the time limit.
Judge Kendall reasoned that the legislative framework required representations to be made in accordance with the instructions provided, which specified a 28-day timeframe for lodging a completed Revocation Request Form. The court found that the applicant's claim of handing documents to a prison officer did not satisfy the requirements for making representations to the Minister. There was no evidence that the prison officer was a Ministerial proxy or had a duty to transmit such documents. Furthermore, the applicant's email, sent well outside the 28-day period, was not a valid representation for the purpose of revoking the cancellation decision. Consequently, the court concluded that no jurisdictional error had occurred.
Background
Background to the litigation
On 29 May 2019, over two years after receiving the cancellation notice, the applicant emailed the Department's National Character Consideration Centre requesting a reissue of the revocation notification. The applicant explained that he believed his signed declaration and the revocation package had not been received by the Department of Home Affairs. This email was sent after the statutory deadline for making representations had passed. The applicant's claim was that he had handed his representations to a "prison officer" within the legislative time limit while he was still in prison. This assertion raised questions about whether the prison officer served as a proxy for the Minister and if such an officer had an express or implied duty to transmit documents to the Minister.
The crux of the factual dispute is whether the applicant indeed handed his representations to a prison officer within the legislative timeframe, and if the prison officer's role or duties included ensuring these representations reached the Minister. The applicant's claim of timely delivery to a prison officer within the legislative limits is central to the factual dispute in this case.
This case, Hillman-McLean v Minister for Immigration (No.3), involves a third iteration in the Federal Court concerning the cancellation of a Special Category visa. The applicant, Hillman-McLean, had previously been involved in two other judicial reviews in relation to the same visa cancellation. The central issue in this proceeding revolves around the timing and manner of the applicant’s representations to the Minister for Immigration regarding the revocation of the visa cancellation decision. Specifically, the matter concerns whether the applicant's representations made to a prison officer were considered valid submissions within the legislative timeframe. This iteration of the case came before the court following a referral from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), which had earlier dismissed the applicant's review application. Key procedural steps in this matter include the applicant's request for a reissue of the revocation notification, the AAT's dismissal of the review application, and the subsequent judicial review by the Federal Court. Throughout these proceedings, the court has had to consider whether the prison officer could be considered a proxy for the Minister, and if there was any duty, express or implied, for the officer to transmit the applicant's documents to the Minister.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court in Hillman-McLean v Minister for Immigration (No.3) examined the applicant's argument that his representations to a prison officer should be considered equivalent to making a representation directly to the Minister within the legislative time limit. The court began by considering the specific language of the cancellation notice, which explicitly invited representations to be made to the Minister and outlined the requirement to submit these within a 28-day period. The court noted that the applicant acknowledged receipt of this notice on 20 June 2017, thereby commencing the 28-day period within which any representations must be made.
In addressing whether a prison officer serves as a Ministerial proxy for receiving representations regarding visa cancellation, the court held that the statutory framework did not support the notion that a prison officer could stand in for the Minister in this context. The court relied on the principle that statutory mandates must be strictly adhered to, and the clear directive to the applicant to make representations directly to the Minister indicated that no proxy was intended. The authorities cited in support of this interpretation underscored the necessity for literal compliance with legislative instructions, reinforcing that any deviation from these instructions could result in the representations not being considered.
The court also examined whether the prison officer had an express or implied duty to transmit the applicant's representation to the Minister. The court found that the legislative provisions did not confer such a duty on the prison officer. The statutory language was unequivocal in specifying the Minister as the recipient of representations, and no implied duty could be inferred from the context. The authorities used by the court emphasized that statutory duties must be expressly provided, and any ambiguity would not be resolved in favor of implying additional duties.
Turning to the issue of whether the Minister's decision not to consider the applicant's representation due to it being received outside the prescribed timeframe constituted a jurisdictional error, the court held that the Minister's decision was within the bounds of the legislative framework. The court reaffirmed that the statutory time limit was mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, meaning strict adherence was required. The authorities cited by the court confirmed that failure to comply with a jurisdictional requirement could result in the Minister's decision not being subject to judicial review. The court concluded that the Minister's decision not to consider the late representations was not a jurisdictional error, as the legislative mandate was clear and the applicant failed to comply with it.
In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that representations regarding the revocation of a visa cancellation must be made directly to the Minister within the specified timeframe, as outlined in the statutory provisions. The court underscored the importance of strict compliance with legislative mandates and held that prison officers do not serve as proxies for the Minister in this context. The court further clarified that the absence of an express or implied duty on prison officers to transmit representations to the Minister meant that any such representations received by them are not considered. Lastly, the court affirmed that the Minister's decision not to consider representations received outside the legislative timeframe is not a jurisdictional error.