FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| HILLMAN-MCLEAN v MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS | [2019] FCCA 2281 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Request for revocation of cancellation of visa on character grounds – whether application made within time. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958, ss.501, 501CA |
| Cases cited: AMK16 v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1557 |
| Applicant: | TAMAIKOHA HILLMAN-MCLEAN |
| Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
| File Number: | PEG 319 of 2019 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Jarrett |
| Hearing date: | 16 August 2019 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 16 August 2019 |
| Delivered at: | Brisbane |
| Delivered on: | 19 August 2019 |
REPRESENTATION
| The Applicant appeared in person via telephone link |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Sparke Helmore |
ORDERS
Discharge the orders made on 16 August, 2019.
Until further order, the first respondent, by himself or by his department, officers, delegates or agents, be restrained, and an injunction hereby issues restraining the respondent from removing the applicant from Australia.
The matter be listed for further directions on 16 September, 2019 at 2:00pm at the Federal Circuit Court of Australia at Perth, Western Australia.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
PEG 319 of 2019
| TAMAIKOHA HILLMAN-MCLEAN |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The applicant is a citizen of New Zealand. He was granted a Class TY Subclass 444 Special Category (Temporary) visa on 5 January, 2011. On 20 June, 2017 he was given notice that his visa was cancelled under s.501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
On 29 June, 2019 the applicant sought the revocation of the decision to cancel his visa. On 5 August, 2019 he was notified by an officer of the first respondent’s department that his application for revocation of his visa cancellation was invalid as it had not been made within the prescribed timeframe. On 7 August, 2019 the applicant was given notice that he was to be removed from Australia on 19 August, 2019.
The application, filed on 15 August, 2019 came before me on an urgent basis on 16 August, 2019. By this application, the applicant seeks an injunction restraining the Minister, by himself or by his Department, officers, delegates or agents, from taking action against him on the basis of the decision that his visa revocation application was invalid. But he seeks that relief as final relief in the proceedings together with the setting aside of the original decision to cancel his visa notified to him on 20 June, 2017.
I have treated the application heard before me as an application for an interlocutory injunction against the respondent to prevent the applicant from being removed from Australia pending his challenge to the cancellation decision. Although his application for review seeks to challenge the cancellation of his visa, in truth his application for review is more appropriately construed as an attempt to review the decision of the Department made on 5 August, 2019…
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- Case
- [2019] FCCA 2281
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the applicant had made his application for revocation of the visa cancellation within the time prescribed by Regulation 2.52. This required the Court to consider whether the applicant's submission of the application to prison officers at a state correctional facility, while he was in immigration detention as defined by the Act, constituted a valid submission for the purposes of the *Migration Act*. The Court also had to determine whether the obligations outlined in s.256 of the *Migration Act*, concerning the provision of reasonable facilities to persons in immigration detention, extended to state prison officers in the same manner as they applied to officers in designated immigration detention facilities.
The Court reasoned that while s.256 of the *Migration Act* imposes obligations on those responsible for immigration detention to provide reasonable facilities, including the transmission of documents, the application of this section to state prison officers was not straightforward. The Court distinguished the present case from *AMK16 v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection* [2016] FCA 1557, where a concession by the Minister led to a finding of a breach of obligation. In *BVA18 v Minister for Home Affairs (No.2)* [2019] FCCA 744, a similar distinction was drawn between immigration detention facilities and state correctional facilities. The Court noted that imprisonment is fundamentally different from immigration detention, and it was not evident that state prison officers are susceptible to the same directions from the Minister as officers in immigration detention centres. Crucially, the Minister in this case did not make a concession similar to that in *AMK16*, and the applicant had not demonstrated that the status of state prison officers as "officers" under the Act carried material substance in terms of their duties to transmit documents on behalf of detainees.
The Court found that the applicant had not established that the state prison officers had a duty to transmit his revocation request. Consequently, the application for judicial review was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Section 256 of the Migration Act provides:256 Person in immigration detention may have access to certain advice, facilities etc.Where a person is in immigration detention under this Act, the person responsible for his or her immigration detention shall, at the request of the person in immigration detention, give to him or her application forms for a visa or afford to him or her all reasonable facilities for making a statutory declaration for the purposes of this Act or for obtaining legal advice or taking legal proceedings in relation to his or her immigration detention. In AMK16 v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1557 the Court acted upon a concession by the Minister that officers who are properly authorised under the Act are under an obligation to provide material that is supplied to them for provision to a review tribunal in connection with an application for review by a disappointed visa applicant. On the basis of that concession, the Court found that there had been a breach of the obligation on immigration detention officers to transmit correspondence to the Minister relating to the applicant’s request for revocation of a visa cancellation decision. Save for the nature of the immigration officer (in AMK16 it was an officer at an immigration detention centre and here it is an officer employed by the state of Western Australia in a state correctional facility), the facts in AMK16 are substantially similar to the present. Those facts demonstrate that, assuming the duty to transmit documents on behalf of detainees without delay, the critical issue will generally be a factual inquiry about the request to forward documents. AMK16 was distinguished by a judge of this court in BVA18 v Minister for Home Affairs (No.2) [2019] FCCA 744. The factual distinction of relevance is that in BVA18 the applicant was in a state detention facility under the control of state authorities, rather than in a designated immigration detention facility. Judge Cameron thought that a critical distinction. In that case, the applicant had until 15 March, 2017 to make his revocation application. The applicant argued that on 14 March, 2017 he gave the revocation application to a prison officer who had been an officer under the Act because in March, 2017 he was in immigration detention as that term is defined by the Act (as set out above). After considering AMK16, his Honour concluded:41. Whatever the case, imprisonment is different from immigration detention and most relevantly is not, except in the most technical way, namely by way of definition, a form of immigration detention. It is not obvious that the considerations which applied in AMK16 apply in this case where, at the relevant time, the applicant was serving a term of imprisonment for crimes committed. This important aspect of the matter was not argued in any depth. The applicant’s case was limited to reliance on the fact that prison officers are also defined to be officers under the Act but he did not address the significant difference in the circumstances and duties of prison officers and officers at detention centres. For instance, it has not been shown in this proceeding that state prison officers are susceptible to direction by the Minister, as one must assume is the case with officers in the Minister’s immigration detention centres. Something more than the existence of a status – which has not been shown to be of any material substance – is required in order to find that the relevant state prison officers had a duty to transmit the applicant’s Revocation Request. In this case the Minister did not make a concession of the sort made in AMK16.