FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZTQD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2016] FCA 339
Appeal from: SZTQD & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2530 File number: NSD 1331 of 2015 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 10 February 2016 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where decision makers did not consider the specific claims of second applicant on protection visa application – whether Tribunal entered into a jurisdictional error by failing to consider specific and independent claims of multiple applicants as required by ss 422B(3) and 425 of the Act Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 422B, 424AA, 425 Cases cited: Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389
Gray v Richards (No 2) (2014) 89 ALJR 113
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH (2015) 326 ALR 1
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152
Date of hearing: 10 February 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 65 Counsel for the Appellants: A Searle with S Lawrence Solicitor for the Appellants: Rasan T Sellah & Associates Counsel for the First Respondent: O Jones Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice ORDERS
NSD 1331 of 2015 BETWEEN: SZTQD
First Appellant
SZTQE
Second Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
10 FEBRUARY 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 29 September 2015 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:
(a)The decision of the second respondent dated 15 November 2013 be quashed.
(b)An order in the nature of a writ of mandamus be issued directing the second respondent to hear and determine the applications for review of the decision of the first respondent’s delegate dated 28 August 2012 according to law.
(c)The first respondent pay 75% of the applicants’ costs.
3.The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)
RARES J:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court refusing the appellants’ claims for constitutional writ relief in respect of a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 15 November 2013 that affirmed the Minister’s delegate’s decision not to grant the appellants’ protection visas: SZTQD v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 2530.
Background
The appellants are husband and wife. They are citizens of Sri Lanka who arrived in Australia on 19 June 2011, at which time the wife held a student visa and her husband was named as…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 339
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had committed a jurisdictional error by not considering the specific claims of the second applicant (the wife) on her protection visa application. The court examined the obligations under sections 422B(3) and 425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which require the Tribunal to review the decision of the delegate in a fair and just manner. The court found that the Tribunal had failed to properly consider the wife's independent claims, mischaracterising her application as dependent on her husband's claims.
The court concluded that the Tribunal's failure to properly consider the wife's claims constituted a jurisdictional error. The Tribunal had a duty to conduct a fair review of her independent application, but it erroneously dismissed her evidence as fabricated. The court quashed the Tribunal's decision and ordered that the Minister hear and determine the applicants' review applications according to law. Additionally, the court ordered the Minister to pay the appellants' costs of the appeal and 75% of the costs before the trial judge, reflecting the changes in the arguments over the course of the proceedings.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 29 September 2015 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:
(a) The decision of the second respondent dated 15 November 2013 be quashed.
(b) An order in the nature of a writ of mandamus be issued directing the second respondent to hear and determine the applications for review of the decision of the first respondent’s delegate dated 28 August 2012 according to law.
(c) The first respondent pay 75% of the applicants’ costs.
3. The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
He argued that because the wife had indicated that her case was not independent of that of her husband, the Tribunal had not committed any jurisdictional error. The Minister contended that the Tribunal had offered the wife the opportunity to expand about her account and asked her about aspects of the evidence, to which she had responded, and that it was open in those circumstances for it to make the findings about the wife’s credit that it did. The Minister submitted that the wife had not been denied an opportunity to present her case fully and that the Tribunal’s statement at the conclusion of the hearing that it was “probably a good time to stop the hearing now” had to be read in the context of the hearing as a whole, including the unclear statement by the wife, which the Tribunal took as a matter of fact to be a clear one, that she was not making any independent claims of her own.Consideration The claims raised in the wife’s protection visa application that had not been considered by the delegate and were not the subject of any adverse conclusion by the delegate. They were that the wife feared persecution by reason of an imputed political opinion that she was a supporter of the LTTE and that she had, in fact, suffered some harm through the physical assault and threatening behaviour during the claimed visits to the family home on 23 and 24 April 2011. While the wife’s claims had a degree of connection to those being advanced by the husband, including because they related to her understanding of video clips she had not seen, she made her claims in a separate protection visa application and as discrete claims in the application for review. In my opinion, the Tribunal had before it a substantial, clearly articulated argument relying upon established facts that appeared pellucidly in the wife’s separate application for a protection visa: Dranichnikov 197 ALR at 394 [24]-[26], 408 [95]; NABE 144 FCR at 17-18 [55]. She had applied to the Tribunal to review that claim. Her claim had not been considered by the delegate, indeed it had been mischaracterised by the delegate in her decision as being one dependent upon the husband’s claims alone. The wife’s claim was made as a separate claim in both the Form 866C and in the application to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision. It was not merely a claim solely dependent on the husband’s claims. Moreover, during the course of the hearing the wife, as the Tribunal recorded at [60] of its reasons, she told it that “there is no safety for her and [her] husband in Sri Lanka”. The Tribunal’s characterisation that the wife had not made any protection claims on her own behalf amounted to a failure by it to perform its function of review of the delegate’s decision under s 425. That function required that the wife appear before the Tribunal, give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision of the delegate under review. The decision of the delegate under review had ignored the wife’s independent claim for a protection visa, as did the Tribunal.