SZTQD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZTQD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2016] FCA 339

Appeal from: SZTQD & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2530
File number: NSD 1331 of 2015
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 10 February 2016
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where decision makers did not consider the specific claims of second applicant on protection visa application – whether Tribunal entered into a jurisdictional error by failing to consider specific and independent claims of multiple applicants as required by ss 422B(3) and 425 of the Act
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 422B, 424AA, 425
Cases cited:

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389

Gray v Richards (No 2) (2014) 89 ALJR 113

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH (2015) 326 ALR 1

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152

Date of hearing: 10 February 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 65
Counsel for the Appellants: A Searle with S Lawrence
Solicitor for the Appellants: Rasan T Sellah & Associates
Counsel for the First Respondent: O Jones
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

NSD 1331 of 2015
BETWEEN:

SZTQD

First Appellant

SZTQE

Second Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

10 FEBRUARY 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 29 September 2015 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:

(a)The decision of the second respondent dated 15 November 2013 be quashed.

(b)An order in the nature of a writ of mandamus be issued directing the second respondent to hear and determine the applications for review of the decision of the first respondent’s delegate dated 28 August 2012 according to law.

(c)The first respondent pay 75% of the applicants’ costs.

3.The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

RARES J:

  1. This is an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court refusing the appellants’ claims for constitutional writ relief in respect of a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 15 November 2013 that affirmed the Minister’s delegate’s decision not to grant the appellants’ protection visas:  SZTQD v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 2530.

    Background

  2. The appellants are husband and wife.  They are citizens of Sri Lanka who arrived in Australia on 19 June 2011, at which time the wife held a student visa and her husband was named as…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 339
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SZTQD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellants, a husband and wife from Sri Lanka, challenged the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal, affirming the Minister's delegate's decision to deny their applications for protection visas. The couple arrived in Australia in June 2011, with the wife initially holding a student visa and the husband as her dependent. On 29 July 2011, they submitted separate protection visa applications. The wife's application included specific claims of persecution based on an imputed political opinion and incidents of physical assault and threatening behavior.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had committed a jurisdictional error by not considering the specific claims of the second applicant (the wife) on her protection visa application. The court examined the obligations under sections 422B(3) and 425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which require the Tribunal to review the decision of the delegate in a fair and just manner. The court found that the Tribunal had failed to properly consider the wife's independent claims, mischaracterising her application as dependent on her husband's claims.

The court concluded that the Tribunal's failure to properly consider the wife's claims constituted a jurisdictional error. The Tribunal had a duty to conduct a fair review of her independent application, but it erroneously dismissed her evidence as fabricated. The court quashed the Tribunal's decision and ordered that the Minister hear and determine the applicants' review applications according to law. Additionally, the court ordered the Minister to pay the appellants' costs of the appeal and 75% of the costs before the trial judge, reflecting the changes in the arguments over the course of the proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 29 September 2015 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:

(a) The decision of the second respondent dated 15 November 2013 be quashed.

(b) An order in the nature of a writ of mandamus be issued directing the second respondent to hear and determine the applications for review of the decision of the first respondent’s delegate dated 28 August 2012 according to law.

(c) The first respondent pay 75% of the applicants’ costs.

3. The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court refusing the appellants’ claims for constitutional writ relief in respect of a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 15 November 2013 that affirmed the Minister’s delegate’s decision not to grant the appellants’ protection visas: SZTQD v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 2530.Background The appellants are husband and wife. They are citizens of Sri Lanka who arrived in Australia on 19 June 2011, at which time the wife held a student visa and her husband was named as her dependant on that visa. On 29 July 2011, the appellants lodged their own independent claims for protection visas. The husband and wife jointly completed Part B of Form 866B, but stated that each had claims in his and her own right to be a refugee. The fact that each appellant separately claimed protection in his or her own right is a matter of considerable significance having regard to the way in which those claims were dealt with in the administrative stages and later proceedings in the Court below. The wife completed her Form 866C headed “Application for an applicant who wishes to submit their own claims to be a refugee”, to which she attached a statement answering the questions in that form as to the basis of her individual claims. Her statement asserted that on the night of 23 April 2011, when she was in her room, unknown persons came to the house in which she and her husband lived. She wrote that those persons were searching for her husband and had commenced their search downstairs before coming upstairs. She claimed that the persons pushed her father. She asked who the persons were and then her father said that he would telephone the police, to which they responded that they were from the police. She claimed that the person asked a lot of questions, including whether her husband was in the LTTE (or the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam). She claimed that the persons asked whether “we all supported the LTTE”. The wife claimed they asked what her husband’s telephone number was, she responded that she did not know, they searched the cupboards, then they slapped her and she fainted. She said that she understood from something her husband had said that he was having problems with “those people” and her father-in-law had said that her husband’s phone had some video clips. The wife also claimed in the statement that the following day the same people came again looking for her husband, later “they tried to take me”, her parents begged them not to and prostrated themselves to persuade the people not to take her. She claimed that afterwards she was very confused and that her parents advised her not to stay at home as those people might come again, and her parents took her to her uncle’s house, where she stayed until she came to Australia. She claimed that she understood, “that all these problems are caused by [her husband’s] work for Mano Ganesan, and some video clips he had in his phone. I have not seen these video clips.” She claimed to have been very scared when the people came to her house and that they had tried to take her because her husband was not in the house. She claimed that they had behaved very badly and used bad words to scold her when she did not tell them anything.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

This was not a case, as his Honour characterised it, of the wife complaining that she should have had an opportunity “to retell her account”. The Tribunal had a duty to conduct the review of her independent claim for a protection visa under s 425 and to do so in a way that was fair and just in accordance with s 422B(3). It failed to do so by erroneously characterising her application as wholly dependent on her husband’s claims and then globally dismissing her evidence as concocted and fabricated in the way it did. His Honour made a similar error.Conclusion For these reasons, the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error and must be quashed. The Minister argued that I should make an order as to costs that reflects that the appellants’ grounds of judicial review have developed and changed over the course of the proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court and on appeal. The power to award costs where there are competing considerations involves the exercise of a judicial discretion that reflects “a broad evaluative judgment of what justice requires”: Gray v Richards (No 2) (2014) 89 ALJR 113 at 113-114 [2] per French CJ, Hayne, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ. The arguments that the appellants put in the Court below did not appear to mirror the basis on which I have decided the appeal. However, his Honour rejected the ground of judicial review that was pressed before him. That ground did raise the issue and his Honour addressed it in [17] and [18] of his reasons, erroneously, as I have found. The central argument in support of the appellant’s ground of review in the Court below and on appeal as originally articulated, reflected the essential reasons on which I have decided the appeal. The changes in the way in which that ground has been put and its refinement during the course of argument today suggest that it is appropriate to make an adjustment to the usual order for costs that would otherwise have followed the event in the Court below. Accordingly, I will order that the Minister pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal and 75% of the costs before the trial judge.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

He argued that because the wife had indicated that her case was not independent of that of her husband, the Tribunal had not committed any jurisdictional error. The Minister contended that the Tribunal had offered the wife the opportunity to expand about her account and asked her about aspects of the evidence, to which she had responded, and that it was open in those circumstances for it to make the findings about the wife’s credit that it did. The Minister submitted that the wife had not been denied an opportunity to present her case fully and that the Tribunal’s statement at the conclusion of the hearing that it was “probably a good time to stop the hearing now” had to be read in the context of the hearing as a whole, including the unclear statement by the wife, which the Tribunal took as a matter of fact to be a clear one, that she was not making any independent claims of her own.Consideration The claims raised in the wife’s protection visa application that had not been considered by the delegate and were not the subject of any adverse conclusion by the delegate. They were that the wife feared persecution by reason of an imputed political opinion that she was a supporter of the LTTE and that she had, in fact, suffered some harm through the physical assault and threatening behaviour during the claimed visits to the family home on 23 and 24 April 2011. While the wife’s claims had a degree of connection to those being advanced by the husband, including because they related to her understanding of video clips she had not seen, she made her claims in a separate protection visa application and as discrete claims in the application for review. In my opinion, the Tribunal had before it a substantial, clearly articulated argument relying upon established facts that appeared pellucidly in the wife’s separate application for a protection visa: Dranichnikov 197 ALR at 394 [24]-[26], 408 [95]; NABE 144 FCR at 17-18 [55]. She had applied to the Tribunal to review that claim. Her claim had not been considered by the delegate, indeed it had been mischaracterised by the delegate in her decision as being one dependent upon the husband’s claims alone. The wife’s claim was made as a separate claim in both the Form 866C and in the application to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision. It was not merely a claim solely dependent on the husband’s claims. Moreover, during the course of the hearing the wife, as the Tribunal recorded at [60] of its reasons, she told it that “there is no safety for her and [her] husband in Sri Lanka”. The Tribunal’s characterisation that the wife had not made any protection claims on her own behalf amounted to a failure by it to perform its function of review of the delegate’s decision under s 425. That function required that the wife appear before the Tribunal, give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision of the delegate under review. The decision of the delegate under review had ignored the wife’s independent claim for a protection visa, as did the Tribunal.