MZAHU v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MZAHU v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 537

Appeal from: MZAHU & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 3519
File number(s): VID 942 of 2015
Judge(s): BUCHANAN J
Date of judgment: 18 May 2016
Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether reasoning by the Migration Review Tribunal was illogical or irrational  – whether Tribunal failed to consider child’s claim separately to the mother’s – no individual claim separately or independently raised for the child – no error shown in the Tribunal’s reasoning  
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36, 36(1A), 36(1A)(b), 36(2), 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 36(2)(b), 36(2)(c), 36(2A)
Cases cited:

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs(No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152

SZOVB v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 1462; (2011) 125 ALD 38

SZTQD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 339

WZAOT v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 211 FCR 543

Date of hearing: 2 May 2016
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 59
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr M Hosking (Pro Bono)
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms C Symons
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

VID 942 of 2015
BETWEEN:

MZAHU

First Appellant

MZAHV

Second Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BUCHANAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 May 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The amended draft notice of appeal lodged on 18 April 2016 be treated as the notice of appeal. 

2.The appeal be dismissed. 

3.The appellants pay the costs of the first respondent, as taxed if not agreed. 

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BUCHANAN J:

  1. The first and second appellants are mother and daughter.  The first appellant is a citizen of India.  She came to Australia in 2009, arriving on 18 June 2009 on a student visa.  Her husband came as her dependant and they both commenced to live in Australia. 

  2. The second appellant was born in Australia some months later, on 5 November 2009, but was evidently conceived before her parents came to this country. 

  3. The marriage did not survive.  It broke down around August 2013, although the parents did not physically separate until January 2014, when the first appellant returned to India, apparently for a family event.  The first appellant had, in fact, regularly returned to India while she held student visas (three in total), doing so also in 2010, 2012 and 2013 as well as 2014. 

  4. When the appellants last returned to Australia on 22 March 2014, the first appellant’s student visa was cancelled when she entered Australia at Melbourne Airport, and the appellants were taken into immigration…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 537
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

MZAHU v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection concerned a challenge to the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT) which dismissed an appeal against the refusal of a protection visa application. The applicants were a mother and her child, both from Vietnam, who sought protection under the Refugee Convention. The mother argued that she faced persecution based on her political opinion, while the child’s claim was contingent on the mother’s status. The legal issues in this case revolved around whether the MRT erred in its reasoning or failed to consider the child's claim separately from the mother’s. Specifically, the applicants argued that the MRT should have assessed whether the child independently satisfied the criteria for a protection visa under the Migration Act.

The Federal Court found that the MRT did not commit a jurisdictional error. The Court held that the claim made on behalf of the child was entirely dependent on the mother’s circumstances and that no separate or independent claim was raised for the child. Consequently, the Court found that the MRT's approach was not illogical or irrational, as the child's claim was inherently linked to the mother's status. The Court emphasised that a failure to consider a claim not expressly advanced by the applicant would not be lightly found, and in this case, the child’s claim did not emerge clearly from the materials before the MRT. Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellants to pay the costs of the first respondent.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The amended draft notice of appeal lodged on 18 April 2016 be treated as the notice of appeal.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellants pay the costs of the first respondent, as taxed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It observed that: 63It is plain enough, in the light of Dranichnikov, that a failure by the Tribunal to deal with a claim raised by the evidence and the contentions before it which, if resolved in one way, would or could be dispositive of the review, can constitute a failure of procedural fairness or a failure to conduct the review required by the Act and thereby a jurisdictional error. It follows that if the Tribunal makes an error of fact in misunderstanding or misconstruing a claim advanced by the applicant and bases its conclusion in whole or in part upon the claim so misunderstood or misconstrued its error is tantamount to a failure to consider the claim and on that basis can constitute jurisdictional error. The same may be true if a claim is raised by the evidence, albeit not expressly by the applicant, and is misunderstood or misconstrued by the Tribunal. Every case must be considered according to its own circumstances. … (Emphasis added.)but emphasised that: 68… A judgment that the Tribunal has failed to consider a claim not expressly advanced is, as already indicated in these reasons, not lightly to be made. The claim must emerge clearly from the materials before the Tribunal. … In the present case, consideration of the content and context of the applications made to the Minister does not support the appellants’ arguments. The application for a protection visa made by the first appellant on 27 March 2014 contained Part A and Part B. Part A required identification of “persons included in this application”. At Question 2 in Part A the following instruction appeared: A distinction is there made between those persons seeking protection in their own right, and those claiming as family members. That distinction reflects the differing considerations arising under s 36(2)(a) and (aa) on the one hand, and s 36(2)(b) and (c) on the other hand. Question 23 in Part A required a response from (or on behalf of) all persons named in answer to Question 2 (here the first and second appellants): However, a Part B was only completed for the first appellant. Part B is entitled “Application for a person who wishes to submit their own claims for protection”. Question 2 in Part B was completed as follows: It was Part B which contained the questions and answers set out earlier which constituted the particular claims for protection. On their face, those claims for protection were made by the first appellant relying on s 36(2)(a) and (aa). She claimed to fear being killed so her child could be taken. The claim made on behalf of the second appellant was as a dependent family member. At [4], the RRT said: 4.Only the first named applicant has made specific claims under the Refugees Convention and Complementary Protection, her child relying on her membership of her family. For convenience, therefore, the Tribunal will refer to the first named applicant as the applicant. The submissions for the appellants attacked this approach, suggesting that it demonstrated jurisdictional error. It was submitted that separate attention was required to whether the second appellant’s circumstances independently satisfied the criteria in s 36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Act.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established