SZTOY v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZTOY & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2015] FCCA 2314
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application to review decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal – whether to extend time for making application under s.477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5, 91R, 430, 477

Applicant A & Anor v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs & Anor (1997) 190 CLR 225; [1997] HCA 4
Chen Shi Hai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 201 CLR 293; [2000] HCA 19
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZAPN (2015) 320 ALR 467; [2015] HCA 22
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLSP & Ors (2010) 187 FCR 362; [2010] FCAFC 108
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Respondent A & Ors (1995) 57 FCR 309
Monis v R (2013) 249 CLR 92; [2013] HCA 4
NAFT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Indigenous Affairs  [2003] FCAFC 254
SZRIQ v Federal Magistrates Court of Australia (2013) 139 ALD 252; [2013] FCA 1284
SZSXY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1183
Weheliye v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1222
WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 947
First Applicant: SZTOY
Second Applicant: SZTOZ
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 2962 of 2013
Judgment of: Judge Barnes
Hearing date: 25 November 2014
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 31 August 2015

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr P. Bodisco
Solicitors for the Applicant: New South Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr J. Smith
Solicitors for the Respondents: DLA Piper Australia

ORDERS

  1. The name of the Second Respondent be amended to read “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”.

  2. The application for an extension of the time within which to make the application be dismissed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 2962 of 2013

SZTOY

First Applicant

SZTOZ

Second Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application for review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (formerly the Refugee Review Tribunal) affirming a decision of a delegate of the First Respondent not to grant the Applicants protection visas.

  2. The Applicants, a father and his son (who is a minor), are citizens of Iran who arrived in Australia in June 2012 and lodged an application for protection visas in December 2012.  The application was refused by the delegate.  The Applicants sought review by the Tribunal. 

  3. The Tribunal made its decision on 28 June 2013. Under s.477(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the “Migration Act”) an application for judicial review of such a Tribunal decision must be made within 35 days of the date of the decision. The Applicants did not seek review of the Tribunal decision until 28 November 2013, five months after the date of the Tribunal decision. Hence, they require an…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCCA 2314
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, SZTOY, sought judicial review of a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal. The dispute concerned whether the applicant would face torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment if returned to Iran, thereby satisfying the complementary protection criteria under the Act. The matter was heard by Judge Barnes.

The court was required to determine whether the Tribunal erred in finding that the applicant did not satisfy the complementary protection criteria under section 36(2)(aa) of the Act. Specifically, the court needed to consider if the Tribunal's assessment of the risks the applicant faced upon return to Iran, particularly in relation to transporting alcohol and his claimed conversion to Christianity, was legally sound.

Judge Barnes reasoned that the Tribunal's finding that the applicant did not meet the complementary protection criteria was adequately supported by its earlier findings of fact. The Tribunal had accepted that the applicant might face prosecution for transporting alcohol, but concluded that the potential imprisonment of six months to two years did not constitute torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Furthermore, the Tribunal rejected the applicant's claim to be a genuine convert to Christianity, rendering it unnecessary to consider the risks faced by converts. The court found that the Tribunal's reasoning, when read in conjunction with its earlier detailed findings, was sufficient to discharge its review obligations. The ground of review was therefore found to lack sufficient prospects of success to warrant an extension of time.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal continued at [133]:Based on the country information cited above, and in light of the tribunal’s assessment of the applicant’s circumstances discussed in this decision record, the tribunal is satisfied that there are not substantial grounds for believing that as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Iran as the receiving country, there is a real risk that the applicant will suffer torture or cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or degrading treatment or punishment, as those terms are defined in section 5(1) of the Act. The tribunal therefore finds the applicant does not satisfy the complementary protection criteria in section 36(2)(aa) of the Act (emphasis added). It is apparent that this part of the Tribunal’s findings was informed by and based upon its earlier pertinent findings of fact made in the context of addressing the Refugees Convention criterion and its consideration of independent country information about the situation in Iran. Apart from the death penalty, the other harm the Applicant claimed to fear for transporting alcohol was life imprisonment. However in considering the Refugees Convention criterion the Tribunal had accepted (at [103]) that while the Applicant may face prosecution for transporting alcoholic drinks under s.175 of the Iranian Penal Code, if convicted he faced between six months to two years of imprisonment and that he would not face the punishment of lashes as he had not persuaded or lured anyone to consume alcohol. Such findings implicitly rejected any claim by the Applicant to fear life imprisonment for transporting alcohol. Further, insofar as any aspect of the Applicant’s claim to fear harm within the complementary protection criterion was based on his claims to be a Christian convert (as his adviser had submitted), the Tribunal rejected the Applicant’s claim that he was a genuine convert to Christianity. Such rejection meant that it was not necessary for the Tribunal to consider harm faced by genuine converts to Christianity in the context of considering the complementary protection criterion. It is apparent from [133] of the Tribunal’s decision that the reference to “country information cited above” is a reference to whole of the country information discussed in the Tribunal’s reasons for decision. More pertinently, the reference to the Tribunal’s assessment of “the applicant’s circumstances discussed in this decision record” is clearly a reference to all of its findings, based not only on credit but also in relation to the claims that were accepted, in particular the Applicant’s claim that he was wanted by the authorities for transporting alcohol. Read in the light of this material, it is apparent that in paragraph [133] of its decision, the Tribunal’s finding was that the consequences it accepted that the Applicant may face for transporting alcohol did not constitute torture, or cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment, or degrading treatment or punishment such as to amount to significant harm. The Tribunal’s reasoning in this part of its reasons for decision is brief, but considered in conjunction with the more extensive earlier reasoning, no more was required for the Tribunal to carry out its review in relation to consideration of the complementary protection criteria. The ground as pleaded does not have sufficient prospects of success to warrant or support an extension of time.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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