SZSRI v Minister for Immigration
[2013] FCCA 1473
•27 September 2013
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZSRI & ORS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2013] FCCA 1473 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Review of a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal – refusal of a protection visa - whether Refugee Review Tribunal’s decision affected by jurisdictional error – whether Refugee Review Tribunal obliged to give notice potentially adverse findings - no jurisdictional error – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.91R(3) |
| Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 SZNUX v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 182 SZORL v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 553 |
| First Applicant: | SZSRI |
| Second Applicant: | SZSRJ |
| Third Applicant: | SZSRK |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 549 of 2013 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Manousaridis |
| Hearing date: | 9 August 2013 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 27 September 2013 |
REPRESENTATION
| Applicant: | In person |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Australian Government Solicitor |
ORDERS
The name of the first respondent recorded in the application be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Border Protection”.
The application is dismissed.
The first and second applicants pay the first respondent’s costs.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 549 of 2013
| SZSRI |
First Applicant
| SZSRJ |
Second Applicant
| SZSRK |
Third Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
The first and second applicants are citizens of the People’s Republic of China. They, together with their child, the third applicant, seek judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (Tribunal) which affirmed a delegate’s decision not to grant a protection visa to the first applicant (applicant) and, derivatively, to the second and third applicants.
The ground on which the applicant claimed a protection visa, and which the Tribunal did not accept, was a fear of persecution because of the applicant’s Christian beliefs and practices. The Tribunal did not accept the claim because it concluded the applicant was not a credible witness, and found she fabricated part of her claim.[1]
[1] CB200 [116]
In their amended application, under the heading “Grounds of application”, the applicants inserted lengthy passages which appear to allege the Tribunal failed to properly consider certain evidence, and denied the applicants procedural fairness. Later in these reasons I will identify the grounds of review that can be extracted from these passages. I must first set out, however, the claims the applicants made before the delegate and the Tribunal, and why the Tribunal did not accept the claims.
The claims before the Delegate
In her application for a protection visa the applicant claimed she was baptised in China on 1 January 2006,[2] ten months before she arrived in Australia on a student’s visa. Her baptism occurred at a secret meeting group of nine members of an underground Christian church in Foshan City, Guangdong.[3] The applicant returned to China three times. On each occasion she attended meetings of the secret meeting group of the underground church.[4] On the second occasion, she gave the group Christian publications she brought from Australia[5]. On the third occasion the applicant attended a meeting of the group during which she again distributed Christian publications, and spoke of church activities in Australia.[6] The “police from the PSB”, however, disrupted that meeting finding “the bible” and the “Australian Christian Promotion material” the applicant had brought from Australia.[7] The applicant was then interrogated, tortured, and detained for six days. She was released from detention only after her father bribed a police officer.[8]
[2] CB176 [24]
[3] CB176 [24]
[4] CB176-177 [26], [27].
[5] CB177 [26]
[6] CB177 [27]
[7] CB177 [27]
[8] CB177 [28]
The claims before the Tribunal
The first and second applicants appeared before the Tribunal on 23 September 2012. The applicant provided to the Tribunal six letters from different persons attesting to the applicant’s religious practices and commitment in Australia.[9] She also gave evidence about a number of matters. This included her being baptised in China on 1 January 2006;[10] her reading the bible in China;[11] her attending the Sydney Christian Assembly Point Church commencing in late October or early November 2006;[12] her distributing Christian publications to the secret group each time she returned to China;[13] the disruption by the “police from the PSB” of the meeting she attended on her third return to China, and her subsequent interrogation, detention, and release from detention;[14] the circumstances in which she left China on 10 October 2010 shortly after she was released from detention;[15] the reasons she did not apply for a protection visa until 2012;[16] her church attendances in Australia;[17] and her being baptised in the Sydney Christian Assembly Point Church on 5 February 2012.[18]
[9] CB183-184 [49]
[10] CB186 [60]
[11] CB186 [61]
[12] CB187 [63]
[13] CB189 [70]
[14] CB 190-193 [76] –[84]
[15] CB184 [50]; CB194 [87]
[16] CB195 [92]
[17] CB196 [97]
[18] CB196 [97]
The second applicant also gave evidence to the Tribunal on 23 September 2012. He said he met his wife in 2006; before he came to Australia he attended a Christian gathering; he and the applicant married in 2010; he did not make any independent claim of fear of persecution in China, but said he feared persecution if he returns to China because of the circumstances of his wife.[19]
[19] CB195 [93] – [94]
On 7 January 2013 the applicants attended a further hearing before the Tribunal.[20] The applicant said she wanted to make a number of changes to the evidence she gave at the hearing of 23 September 2012.[21] The applicant was asked about what type of church or gathering she was attending in Sydney;[22] the religious material she had taken to China;[23] country information which indicated the Chinese authorities tolerated Christianity, provided there was no proselytising;[24] and whether she had documentary evidence of her detention.[25] The Tribunal informed the applicant it had doubts about the credibility of her claims to have been arrested and detained in China and to have previously come to the adverse attention of the Chinese authorities.[26] The Tribunal also said it might doubt the applicant’s family members had a profile that would attract the attention of Chinese government authorities.[27] The applicant was also asked about what occurred to the other people who were present at the gathering that was disrupted by the “police from the PSB”.[28]
[20] CB196 [99]
[21] CB196 [99] – [100]
[22] CB197 [101]
[23] CB197 [102]
[24] CB197 [104]
[25] CB197 [105]
[26] CB198 [107]
[27] CB198 [107]
[28] CB199 [109]
The Tribunal’s decision and reasoning
The Tribunal found the applicant was not a credible witness.[29] It also found the applicant fabricated the claims she came to the adverse attention of the Chinese authorities for reasons relating to her religious beliefs and practices.[30] These findings were based on a number of considerations including a tendency to alter her evidence;[31] the applicant’s leaving China with ease two days after she had supposedly been detained by the authorities;[32] what the Tribunal considered to be the vague evidence the applicant gave about her father arranging to bribe an official to facilitate the applicant’s easy exit from China following her detention;[33] a lack of plausibility and internal logic in her account of her return visits to China;[34] her lengthy delay in applying for a protection visa after she returned to Australia in October 2010;[35] the lack of corroboration, documentary or otherwise of any of her claims;[36] and what the Tribunal considered to be an inconsistency between the six letters attesting to the applicant’s religious practices and the applicant’s evidence.[37]
[29] CB200 [116]
[30] CB200 [116]
[31] CB200 [117]
[32] CB200 [118]
[33] CB200 [118]
[34] CB200-201 [119]
[35] CB201 [120]
[36] CB201 [121]
[37] CB202 [122]
The Tribunal consequently did not accept the applicant was a Christian before travelling to Australia, or that she was baptised in China or attended any underground church in China; or that she took religious material to China, or that she engaged in religious activities in China, or that she ever came to the adverse attention of the Chinese authorities for reasons relating to her religious beliefs and activities.[38] The Tribunal did accept, however, that the first and second applicants did attend the Christian Assembly and that they have a genuine commitment to the Christian faith.[39]
[38] CB202 [123]
[39] CB202 [124]
The applicant’s grounds of review
As I say at the beginning of these reasons, the applicants have included two lengthy passages as their grounds of review. From these passages I have identified the following grounds of review:
a)The Tribunal did not properly consider the “support letters”, these being the letters to which the Tribunal referred in paragraph 49 of its reasons for decision.
b)The Tribunal wrongly thought the applicant had “embellished and exaggerated” her commitment to Christianity.[40]
c)The Tribunal denied the applicant procedural fairness by not giving her an opportunity to deal with the adverse findings the Tribunal made in paragraphs 122 and 125 of its reasons.
d)The Tribunal only considered country information relating to Guangdong province; it should have also considered country information relating to the Fujian province, being the birthplace of her husband.
e)As recorded in paragraph 97 of its reasons, the Tribunal asked the applicant irrelevant questions.
f)The Tribunal made without any evidence the finding in paragraph 119 of its reasons that the applicant’s claims were highly implausible and lacking internal logic.
g)The findings referred to in paragraph 119 of the Tribunal’s reasons manifest bias.
h)The Tribunal should have given the applicant an opportunity to deal with the matters referred to in paragraph 119 of its reasons before the Tribunal made the findings contained in that paragraph.
[40] CB203 [125]
Grounds (a) and (b)
I have extracted these two grounds from the following passage in the amended application:
RRT didn’t properly consider support letters submitted in support of my application. In paragraph 122 of RRT decision, RRT appears to have misapprehended the purpose of the written testimonies (or supporting letters) from my church friends in Sydney Church about my religious activities in Australia. Those letters were not to constitute irrefutable proof that I was actively evangelical person within the church, but rather that they attested my genuinely religious commitments in Australia. Subsequently, RRT, wrongly, thought that I have “embellished and exaggerated” my commitment to Christianity. (par 125).
It is apparent from this passage that the applicants challenge the correctness of the Tribunal’s treatment or assessment of two classes of evidence, namely six letters, and the applicant’s evidence. So stated, this passage does not reveal any jurisdictional error. It is for the Tribunal, not a court exercising judicial review, to evaluate the weight and significance that should be attached to evidence before it.
In one part of paragraph 1 of the grounds of application, the applicants state that the Tribunal did not consider the letters “properly and it appeared to overlook them simply”. To the extent the applicants intended to assert the Tribunal did not consider the letters, that assertion is incorrect. The Tribunal did consider them at paragraph 122 of its reasons.
Ground (c)
The passage in the Amended Application from which I have extracted ground (c) is as follows:
If RRT have some doubt between my oral evidence and those written evidence, it should write to me to invite me to respond or tell me orally when I came back for second hearing on 7 January 2013. I think that I was denied procedural fairness for not being given any opportunity to respond to the adverse findings about reference to me convincing acquaintances to attend church within my church fellows’ supporting letters.
The passage in the Tribunal’s reasons to which this ground appears to relate is the following portion of paragraph 122 of the Tribunal’s reasons:[41]
Further, I am concerned that, while the supporting letters provided by the applicant contain references to her convincing acquaintances to attend the Christian Assembly Church, when asked in the hearing whether she had brought people to the church the applicant said she tried to bring her friends from TAFE but they don’t live nearby so they didn’t come. These inconsistencies in the applicant’s evidence caused me to question the reliability of her evidence and to place little weight upon the written testimonies describing her religious activities.
[41] CB202 [122]. The evidence the applicant gave is also recorded earlier in the Tribunal’s reasons at [69].
Ground (c) also appears to relate to the following portion of paragraph 125 of the Tribunal’s reasons:[42]
As I noted above, the applicant’s evidence in the hearing was that she did not have a special role in the church and although she asked friends to attend they did not do so because they lived too far away. This is inconsistent with the written testimonies provided by the applicant’s friends which claim [the applicant] ‘promoted the Bible and Gospel to me’, invited friends to church, and moved her friend to take her husband to church where after he believed in God, and, along with the second named applicant, told friends about the Gospel. In my view the applicant has embellished and exaggerated her commitment to Christianity for the purpose of advancing her protection visa.
[42] CB202-203 (emphasis in reasons). The quote in this passage is from the letter that appears at CB120
The Minister submits that the applicants’ complaint concerning these passages may be taken to be a claim that the Tribunal was obliged under s.424A of the Act to inform the applicant of the concerns the Tribunal expressed in that passage. If that is correct, I agree with the Minister’s submission that the Tribunal was not so required.[43]
[43] Minister’s written submissions, [20], referring to SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609
In my opinion, however, the applicants’ complaint is broader. They claim the Tribunal was required to give the applicant advance notice of an adverse finding the Tribunal intended to make before the Tribunal could make such a finding. As the following passage from the joint reasons of French CJ and Kiefel J in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR indicate, however, such a claim is not supported by authority:[44]
Procedural fairness requires a decision-maker to identify for the person affected any critical issue not apparent from the nature of the decision or the terms of the statutory power. The decision-maker must also advise of any adverse conclusion which would not obviously be open on the known material. However, a decision-maker is not otherwise required to expose his or her thought processes or provisional views for comment before making the decision.
[44] (2011) 241 CLR 594 at 599 [9]
I must nevertheless consider whether the principles discussed in this passage come into play in connection with the adverse findings the Tribunal made in paragraphs 122 and 125 of its reasons.
The findings the Tribunal made in paragraphs 122 and 125 of its reasons are adverse credit findings which were based on the Tribunal’s consideration of two classes of evidence and its assessment that they were inconsistent. The first class of evidence was statements contained in letters the applicants provided to the Tribunal which addressed the applicant’s Christian faith and practice. One letter, a short passage from which the Tribunal quoted in paragraph 122 of its reasons, contained the following statements:[45]
She often promoted the Bible and Gospel to me and many times she invited me to the Church’s activities such as the youth gatherings, Gospel evening gatherings, family gatherings etc. so that she made me feel in the course of those activities the voices and the calls from our God and believe that Jesus Christ who created everything in our world is the Saviour.
[45] CB120
Another letter contained the following statements:[46]
After I got married, I eddom [sic] went to church. [The applicant] was very upset when she found out I didn’t go to church. She kept persuading me to go back to the church again. I was moved by her and take my husband . . . with me. Later my husband believed in God. . . .
[46] CB112
The second class of evidence the Tribunal considered, and which the Tribunal assessed to be inconsistent with the letters, is the applicant’s evidence which the Tribunal summarised in paragraph 68 of its reasons:[47]
The applicant confirmed her daughter and husband went to church with her every week. She said she did not have any special role in the church. The applicant sometimes attends youth group and the follower achievement gathering. The last followers’ achievement gallery she attended was about getting up early to read the bible. They also sat in a circle. I asked the applicant whether she had brought anyone to church. The applicant said she tried to bring her friends from TAFE to the church; however, they don’t live nearby so they didn’t come. (Emphasis added)
[47] CB188
In my opinion, it was open to the Tribunal to conclude these two classes of evidence were inconsistent. That is, it was open to the Tribunal to consider that the letters were provided by the applicant to represent her as a person who importuned others to attend church through active promotion of the Bible and the Gospel and through the expression of disappointment, and yet to regard the answer she gave about her attempt to bring her TAFE friends to church as not displaying these qualities.
Further, in my opinion, the finding of inconsistency, and the Tribunal’s reliance on such finding to not accord the applicant credit, were not findings which would not obviously have been open on the known material. The Tribunal made it clear to the applicant that there was an issue about whether she attended church in Australia to advance her refugee claims.[48] Nor were they findings the provisional holding of which the Tribunal was required to communicate to the applicants for their comment.
[48] CB196 [97]: “I discussed s91R(3) with the applicant. She said she didn’t agree that she attended church in Australia to advance her refugee claims.”
Even if, however, the Tribunal was obliged to, but did not give notice that it might make adverse credit findings to the effect of those made paragraphs 122 and 125 of its reasons, that would not necessarily mean the applicants would be entitled to relief. As was said by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Habib v Director-General of Security:[49]
[W]hether the obligation to afford natural justice has been discharged is not to be evaluated minutely or in a manner divorced from its context. As we have said, the obligation is a practical one. As McHugh J said in ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 at 122, a "[b]reach of the rules of natural justice...does not automatically invalidate a decision adverse to the party affected by the breach": see also Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141 at 145; ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 at 88-89 (per Gleeson CJ); 116 (per Gummow and Gaudron JJ); 130-131 (per Kirby J); 154 (per Callinan J). McHugh J went on to say (at 122) that a court can refuse relief "when it is confident that the breach could not have affected the outcome".
[49] (2009) 108 ALD 478 at 496 [77]
In my opinion, if the Tribunal had given notice to the applicants that it may make adverse findings to the effect set out in paragraphs 122 and 125 of its reasons, that would not have affected the outcome. That is so because the Tribunal would still have concluded that the applicant would not face persecution or harm if she were to return to China.
The Tribunal’s conclusion was based on three sets of findings. The first is that the applicant was not a credible witness and she had fabricated her claim that she attracted the attention of the Chinese authorities for reasons relating to her religious beliefs and practices.[50] That finding was based on seven matters or, more accurately, seven sets of matters, one set of which was the adverse findings the Tribunal made in paragraphs 122 and 125 of its reasons. Had the Tribunal given notice to the applicant that it may make adverse findings to the effect set out in paragraphs 122 and 125, and the applicants had persuaded the Tribunal not to make those findings, it is inevitable that the Tribunal would have relied on the six other matters to conclude the applicant was not a credible witness and had fabricated an essential element of her claim.
[50] CB203 [126]
The second finding on which the Tribunal relied for concluding the applicant would not face persecution or harm in China was country information which the Tribunal was satisfied showed that Christians who did not publicly engage in evangelical activity would not face persecution.[51] The Tribunal obviously did not rely on the adverse credit findings it made in paragraphs 122 and 125 of its reasons in making this finding.
[51] CB203 [127]
The third set of findings on which the Tribunal relied for concluding the applicant would not face persecution or harm in China was that, although the applicant was Christian and may therefore come to attend an unregistered church if she were to return to China, the applicant was not involved in evangelical activity in Australia, and she had never distributed religious material, and she had never taken a leadership role in church activities.[52] For these reasons, if the applicant were to return to China, she would not “proselytise publicly or engage in activities with oversees religious bodies, publicly distribute or engage in activities that may attract the attention of the Chinese authorities”.[53]
[52] CB203 [126]
[53] CB203 [127]
These findings appear to be based in part on the Tribunal’s findings in paragraphs 122 and 125 that the applicant had embellished and exaggerated her commitment to Christianity for the purpose of advancing her claims for a protection visa, and that, in fact, the applicant did not have the active role in the Church the Tribunal interpreted the letters as showing. The applicants, however, say that they did not provide the letters for the purpose of showing the applicant engaged in evangelical activities; their purpose was to show that the applicant’s faith was genuine.
Those letters were not to constitute irrefutable proof that I was actively evangelical person within the church, but rather that they attested my genuinely religious commitment in Australia.
Thus, what the applicants say they would have done, had the Tribunal given the applicant notice of its intention to make the adverse findings contained in paragraphs 122 and 125 of its reasons, was to attempt to disabuse the Tribunal of its view that the applicant was seeking to show by these letters that she engaged in evangelical activities. Had they succeeded in so persuading the Tribunal, that would have only reinforced the finding that the Tribunal ultimately made, namely, that the applicant did not engage in evangelical activities in Australia. It follows, therefore, that even if the Tribunal had not made the adverse credit findings in paragraphs 122 and 125 of its reasons, the Tribunal would have made the same findings, namely, that the applicant did not engage in evangelical activities in Australia and, therefore, would not engage in such activities in China and thus attract the attention of the Chinese authorities.
For these reasons, ground (c) fails.
Ground (d)
I have extracted ground (d) from the following passage in the Amended Application:
RRT erred by making her decision only on the basis of country information about the situation on Guangdong province because that information didn’t refer to the situation concerning other region in China, such as Fujian province, the birthplace of my husband. We are married and according to Chinese tradition I might travel to live with my husband in his birthplace in Fujian.
There is no merit in this ground. It was not part of the applicant’s claim that she would face persecution in the Fujian province. The applicant was born and lived in Foshan City, Guandong Province.[54] That is the place to which she returned three times. That was the place to which the Tribunal must have assumed the applicant would return if she were not to be granted a protection visa. The Tribunal specifically put to the applicant that the “country information indicate that Guandong province had a high proportion of Christians and Christians are tolerated provided they do not proselytise publicly and unofficial or unregistered churches are permitted to operate privately”.[55] The applicant did not, in her response, mention that, if she were to return to China, she might live in the Fujian province, and that that fact was or might be relevant to her claimed fear of persecution.
[54] CB175-176 [21]-[22]
[55] CB197 [104]
Ground (e)
I have extracted ground (e) from the following passage in the Amended Application:
In paragraph 97 of RRT decision, RRT asked wrong questions in order to test my purpose of attending church in Australia. RRT misled me from trying to reinstate [sic] my genuinely religious commitment by asking irrelevant questions about baptism
This does not state any recognised ground of review. In any event, there is nothing in paragraph 97 of the Tribunal’s reasons which suggests the Tribunal did any of the things asserted by the applicants in this passage. The ground, therefore, fails.
Ground (f)
The passage in the Amended Application from which I extracted this ground is as follows:
In paragraph 119 of RRT decision, RRT’s finding that my claims were “highly implausible and lacking internal logic” was a finding unsupported by evidence.
In paragraph 119 of its reasons the Tribunal gave two examples of evidence which it considered was “highly implausible and lacking in internal logic”. The first example was the applicant stating in her written claims that when she was discovered by the police at the underground church gathering she told the police that “she thought our Christians could have meetings freely just like in the overseas . . . [and] . . . she did not know that overseas Christian promotion materials were banned in China” whereas before the Tribunal, the applicant said that when the police arrived at the meeting she was frightened because “she knew she was a member of the underground church and the appearance of the police did not mean anything good”. The second example is “the applicant’s evidence in the hearing that the police officer continue to provide information to the applicant’s father runs counter to the applicant’s written claims that until now, the police has never stopped to harass her mother, her father as well as her siblings”. It was reasonably open to the Tribunal to consider these examples as evidence that was implausible, and lacking internal logic.
Accordingly, ground (f) also fails.
Ground (g)
I have extracted ground (g) from the following passage in the Amended Application:
I strongly believed the reason of RRT taking an irrelevant consideration into account was because RRT had bias on my case.
It appears the applicants allege the Tribunal made the findings in paragraph 119 of its reasons as a result of actual bias. In my opinion, this ground has no merit.
In SZORL v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, Flick J said:[56]
An allegation as to actual bias, it has been repeatedly said, will rarely be demonstrated solely by reference to the reasons for decision of the Tribunal: SCAA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 668 at [38] per von Doussa J; SGJB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1601 at [121] per Jacobson J; VFAB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 872 at [21], [2003] FCA 872; 131 FCR 102 at 107 per Kenny J; SZMOB v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 140 at [23] per Cowdroy J. Similarly, in SBBF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 358 at [16], Tamberlin, Mansfield and Jacobson JJ observed that it is:
... likely to be a rare and extreme circumstance that a lack of good faith on the part of the administrative decision-maker will be apparent by reference only to the reasons for the decision themselves ...
And it has also repeatedly been said that no bias should be inferred solely from factual findings that were open on the material before the Tribunal: SZKIR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1786 at [33] per Collier J. See also: SZNUX v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 182 at [18], [2010] FCA 182; 114 ALD 123 at 126 per Yates J.
[56] [2011] FCA 553 at [19]
The applicants rely on nothing more that the Tribunal’s reasons for claiming bias. There is nothing in those reasons which suggest actual bias. Further, given my conclusion that it was reasonably open to the Tribunal to make the findings in paragraph 119 of its reasons, no inference of bias can be drawn from the Tribunal having made those findings.
This ground, therefore, fails.
Ground (h)
I have extracted ground (h) from the following passage in the Amended Application:
Again, this finding [in paragraph 119 of the Tribunal’s reasons] was integral to RRT’s adverse credibility finding on me, so I think it is seriously unfair of me not being provided adequate chances to respond.
There is no merit in this ground. The applicant’s credit was in issue before the Tribunal. The Tribunal informed the applicant that it “had doubts about the credibility of her claims to have been arrested and detained in China and to have previously come to the adverse attention of the Chinese authorities”.[57] The findings were not such as would obviously not have been open on the known material. And the Tribunal member was not required to expose her thought process or provisional views for comment before the Tribunal made its decision.
[57] CB198 [107]
This ground also fails.
Conclusion and disposition
None of the grounds on which the applicants rely have been established. The Tribunal made no jurisdictional error in affirming the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicants a protection visa. Accordingly, I propose to dismiss the application and order that the first and second applicants pay the Minister’s costs.
I also propose to order that the Minister’s title as recorded in the application be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Border Protection”.
I certify that the preceding forty-nine (49) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Manousaridis
Associate:
Date: 27 September 2013
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