SZSJB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZSJB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 229

Appeal from: SZSJB v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2016] FCCA 1748
File number(s): NSD 1412 of 2016
Judge(s): PERRY J
Date of judgment: 10 March 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether assessor erred in International Treaties Obligation Assessment (ITOA) in assessing reasonableness of appellant relocating if returned to Afghanistan – consideration of relocation principles – proper characterisation of appellant’s claims – failure by assessor to consider essential integers of appellant’s claims – appeal allowed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 7, 91R, 198, 414

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954)

Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967)

Cases cited:

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26

Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1802

Januzi v Secretary of State for Home Department [2006] 2 AC 426

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRMA [2013] FCAFC 161

MZYPW v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 99

MZYQU v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1032

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs(No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263

NAIZ v Minister for Immigration and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 37

NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1695

NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 124

Plaintiff M61/2010 v Commonwealth of Australia  [2010] HCA 41

Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437

SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship  [2007] HCA 40

SZMCD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCAFC 46

SZSSC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 863

SZSSJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 143

WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184

Date of hearing: 17 February 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 59
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr C Jackson
Solicitor for the Appellant: Labour Pains Legal
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr MJ Smith
Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor

NSD 1412 of 2016
BETWEEN:

SZSJB

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

K NAYLOR IN HER CAPACITY AS INTERNATIONAL TREATIES OBLIGATIONS ASSESSOR

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRY J

DATE OF ORDER:

10 MARCH 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is allowed.

2.The orders of the Federal Circuit Court made on 12 July 2016 are set aside.

3.The first respondent is to pay the appellant’s costs in the Federal Court and in the Federal Circuit Court as agreed or assessed.

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

4.The parties are to provide short minutes of order to otherwise give effect to these reasons…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 229
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the appellant, a citizen of Afghanistan, appealed against the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to remove him from Australia. The appellant argued that it would be unreasonable for him to relocate within Afghanistan due to the risk of generalised violence and non-targeted harm. The primary judge dismissed the application for judicial review, but the appeal was subsequently heard by the court. The central legal issues in this case revolved around whether the assessor had erred in her International Treaties Obligation Assessment (ITOA) when assessing the reasonableness of the appellant relocating within Afghanistan. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the appellant had properly characterised his claims, whether the assessor had failed to consider the risk of generalised violence, and whether the relocation test was applied correctly. The court found that the appellant had indeed raised concerns about the risk of generalised violence in Kabul, and that the assessor had failed to adequately consider this risk when determining the reasonableness of relocation. The court held that the appellant's claims were not limited to specific persecution or serious harm but also encompassed the risk of generalised violence. The appeal was allowed, and the orders of the Federal Circuit Court were set aside. The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection was required to pay the appellant's costs in both the Federal Court and the Federal Circuit Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed.

2. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court made on 12 July 2016 are set aside.

3. The first respondent is to pay the appellant’s costs in the Federal Court and in the Federal Circuit Court as agreed or assessed.

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

4. The parties are to provide short minutes of order to otherwise give effect to these reasons within 7 days hereof.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons given below, the appeal is allowed and the declaratory and injunctive relief sought should be granted. 2. BACKGROUND2.1 The ITOA The assessor explained in her reasons that the purpose of the assessment was to assess whether Australia has non-refoulement obligations to the appellant under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol (Refugees Convention), the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and its Second Optional Protocol, aimed at the abolition of the death penalty. Consequently, while she stated that the ITOA employs certain concepts relevant to assessing whether Australia under the Act owes protection obligations to the appellant, the assessor explained that the assessment was not an assessment of a protection visa application. The ITOA is a process which is preparatory to a decision required to be made under the Act, namely, whether or not the appellant should be removed from Australia under s 198 of the Act: SZSSJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 143; (2014) 231 FCR 285 (SZSSJ) at [40] (the Court). In their pre-hearing submission dated 27 January 2015, the appellant’s migration agents summarised his claims as follows: Ÿ[the appellant’s] father was killed on his way to Uruzgan Province by the TalibanŸ[the appellant] owned a passenger car in Ghazni , transporting goods and passengers along the route from [the appellant’s home town] to Ghazni City. [The appellant] was stopped by the Taliban many times, had his goods confiscated and was pressured by the Taliban to be an informant for them.Ÿ[The appellant] has received threats from [a] Taliban-aligned Hazara commander … and the Taliban. He has been accused of stockpiling weapons and his family were forced to leave Afghanistan due to their fear of harm. [The appellant] has been threatened in both [the appellant’s home town] and Kabul.Ÿ[The appellant] fears harm because of recent threats from neighbouring Kuchis to harm residents of his village…Ÿ[The appellant] fears harm because the identity verification process has made it more likely that he will be identified as having returned from Australia. The appellant attended an ITOA interview on 3 March 2015 conducted in the presence of his migration agent and with the assistance of an accredited Hazaragi interpreter. He was afforded a further two weeks within which to provide information following the interview and a post hearing submission. This material was submitted on 18 March 2015. The assessor found that the appellant is a citizen of Afghanistan. The assessor found that the threat level in the Hazara majority districts of Ghazni remains low and accepted the assessment by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) that there is a low risk of violence for Hazaras in this area. Accordingly, the assessor found that the body of evidence did not support a finding that all Hazaras face a real chance of persecution throughout the entirety of Afghanistan on account of their race and/or religion. However the assessor stated that:The [appellant] contended that it would be unreasonable for him to live in his home district because in order to survive he would need to travel to other districts that do not have a Hazara majority in order to purchase food and work as a driver. On his way to these other districts he might be caught by the Taliban, recognised as a Hazara and possibly be killed.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The assessor also accepted that: The Taliban’s perception of Hazara’s affiliation with the government or international community may be sufficient for a Hazara to be mistreated in a persecutory way should they be found by the Taliban on the road or on other places especially outside the Hazara dominated areas. As stated above, the [appellant] may inevitably find himself away from areas deemed to be safe for Hazaras in order to search for work or to engage in employment activities. The chance of the [appellant] encountering the Taliban and be [sic] recognised as a Hazara Shia is not remote. The chance of him being harmed in a persecutory manner when travelling on the roads from [the appellant’s home town] to other districts cannot be dismissed as insubstantial but must be regarded as real based cumulatively upon his race, religion and imputed political opinion against the Taliban. In those circumstances, the assessor found that the appellant could not return to his home town. However, for reasons I later explain, the assessor found that “relocation to Kabul is both relevant and reasonable for the claimant”. As a result, the assessor found that the appellant did not have a real chance of being persecuted for a Refugees Convention reason and his fear of persecution was not well founded, with the result that Australia did not have a non-refoulement obligation under the Refugees Convention. Nor was the assessor satisfied that the appellant has a real chance of being subject to significant harm should he be returned to Afghanistan and accordingly was not satisfied that he was a person in respect of whom Australia has non-refoulement obligations under the CAT or the ICCPR.2.2 The decision below The primary judge dismissed the application for judicial review on 12 July 2016. While the respondent did not seek to rely upon the whole of the reasons below, the respondent contended that in dismissing the application, the primary judge rightly held that: 28. On a fair reading of the applicant’s submissions [before the assessor], the applicant’s claims were that he would be specifically targeted and not merely that he would face the same risk of harm as the population generally. There was no failure by the assessor to address the integers of the claim advanced by the applicant in relation to his fears in respect of relocation. There was no failure by the assessor to apply the correct relocation test or to take into account the particular circumstances of the applicant in determining whether relocation was reasonable. The submission that the assessor applied the wrong test in finding the applicant could relocate to Kabul is not made out.3. CONSIDERATION3.1 The issues Initially the appellant contended that, when assessing whether it was reasonable for him to relocate, the assessor failed to consider the impact of the general security situation and the risk of random or non-targeted harm (referred to as “generalised harm”), as opposed to his specific claims to fear persecution for a Refugees Convention reason or serious harm attracting complementary protection (“serious harm”). In order to establish that ground, the appellant accepted that it was necessary for him to establish in line with the principles set out below that:(1)the risk of the appellant being affected by generalised violence in Kabul was a claim expressly made by him and/or which squarely arose on the material before the assessor (the characterisation issue); and(2)it is apparent from the assessor’s reasons that she failed to take into account the risk of generalised violence when determining that it would be reasonable for the appellant to relocate to Kabul.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge dismissed the application for judicial review on 12 July 2016. While the respondent did not seek to rely upon the whole of the reasons below, the respondent contended that in dismissing the application, the primary judge rightly held that: 28. On a fair reading of the applicant’s submissions [before the assessor], the applicant’s claims were that he would be specifically targeted and not merely that he would face the same risk of harm as the population generally. There was no failure by the assessor to address the integers of the claim advanced by the applicant in relation to his fears in respect of relocation. There was no failure by the assessor to apply the correct relocation test or to take into account the particular circumstances of the applicant in determining whether relocation was reasonable. The submission that the assessor applied the wrong test in finding the applicant could relocate to Kabul is not made out.3. CONSIDERATION3.1 The issues Initially the appellant contended that, when assessing whether it was reasonable for him to relocate, the assessor failed to consider the impact of the general security situation and the risk of random or non-targeted harm (referred to as “generalised harm”), as opposed to his specific claims to fear persecution for a Refugees Convention reason or serious harm attracting complementary protection (“serious harm”). In order to establish that ground, the appellant accepted that it was necessary for him to establish in line with the principles set out below that:(1)the risk of the appellant being affected by generalised violence in Kabul was a claim expressly made by him and/or which squarely arose on the material before the assessor (the characterisation issue); and(2)it is apparent from the assessor’s reasons that she failed to take into account the risk of generalised violence when determining that it would be reasonable for the appellant to relocate to Kabul. As such, the appellant submitted that this case was analogous to that in MZYQUv Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1032; (2012) 206 FCR 191 (MZYQU). In that case, Dodds-Streeton J held that the Independent Merits Reviewer fell into jurisdictional error not merely in considering whether there was a risk of “serious harm” as defined in s 91R of the Act in applying the relocation test, but in implicitly treating such harm as the only level or kind of harm that could affect the reasonableness of the relocation: MZYQU at [61]. The respondent initially contended that:(1)the appellant did not make a claim that he feared generalised violence (in the sense referred to) but rather that “the nub of the appellant’s claim was that he feared harm in Kabul because he is a Hazara Shia.”; and(2)to the extent that a claim of generalised violence arose on the materials, it was dealt with by the assessor in any event. However, the parties’ respective characterisation of the appellant’s claims shifted during the course of the hearing of the appeal. Ultimately in his oral submissions, the Minister submitted that the appellant raised concerns as to his safety by reason of being caught up in insurgent attacks in Kabul (but not random or generalised violence) if he were to relocate to Kabul, as well as his specific claims to fear persecution on Convention grounds or serious harm. It was apparent from the appellant’s submissions in reply that broadly speaking he accepted that characterisation of his claims on the issue of relocation although there remained significant differences. This is apparent from the following exchange with counsel for the appellant in reply: MR JACKSON: Well, the good news, as far as I can see, is that we basically agree, my learned friend and I, that what was raised on the evidence was the possibility of random – being caught up in insurgent attacks for no particular reason other than he was in Kabul or West Kabul. Now, where we probably disagree is on there being any particular magic to the word “insurgency” or “insurgent group”, because basically, in my submission, it really just means anyone who’s trying to disrupt the orderly business of government and day-to-day living in Kabul, which is really pretty much every sort of attack of generalised or, for that matter, targeted violence that might occur in Kabul. HER HONOUR: Is that so when the word “insurgent group” is spoken of?MR JACKSON: Well, there’s also reference to suicide bombers, who may or may not be a part of a group, and there’s reference to more than 100 insurgent groups. So apart from someone who’s just generally discontent and is unhappy with the state of politics, either in Kabul or in Washington, and just decides to randomly blow themselves up, it seems to cover, in my submission, pretty much any form of any group that might wish to disrupt action in Kabul. So I don’t think there’s any magic. I would submit there’s no magic to the word “insurgency” or “insurgent group”, but I’m not too troubled with it as a concept either, but I would just probably define it a bit more – I would define it broadly in the way that I suggested.