FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZSJB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 229
Appeal from: SZSJB v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2016] FCCA 1748 File number(s): NSD 1412 of 2016 Judge(s): PERRY J Date of judgment: 10 March 2017 Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether assessor erred in International Treaties Obligation Assessment (ITOA) in assessing reasonableness of appellant relocating if returned to Afghanistan – consideration of relocation principles – proper characterisation of appellant’s claims – failure by assessor to consider essential integers of appellant’s claims – appeal allowed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 7, 91R, 198, 414
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954)
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967)
Cases cited: Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26
Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1802
Januzi v Secretary of State for Home Department [2006] 2 AC 426
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRMA [2013] FCAFC 161
MZYPW v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 99
MZYQU v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1032
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs(No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263
NAIZ v Minister for Immigration and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 37
NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1695
NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 124
Plaintiff M61/2010 v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 41
Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437
SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 40
SZMCD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCAFC 46
SZSSC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 863
SZSSJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 143
WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184
Date of hearing: 17 February 2017 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 59 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr C Jackson Solicitor for the Appellant: Labour Pains Legal Counsel for the Respondents: Mr MJ Smith Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor
NSD 1412 of 2016 BETWEEN: SZSJB
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
K NAYLOR IN HER CAPACITY AS INTERNATIONAL TREATIES OBLIGATIONS ASSESSOR
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
PERRY J
DATE OF ORDER:
10 MARCH 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is allowed.
2.The orders of the Federal Circuit Court made on 12 July 2016 are set aside.
3.The first respondent is to pay the appellant’s costs in the Federal Court and in the Federal Circuit Court as agreed or assessed.
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
4.The parties are to provide short minutes of order to otherwise give effect to these reasons…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 229
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is allowed.
2. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court made on 12 July 2016 are set aside.
3. The first respondent is to pay the appellant’s costs in the Federal Court and in the Federal Circuit Court as agreed or assessed.
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
4. The parties are to provide short minutes of order to otherwise give effect to these reasons within 7 days hereof.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The primary judge dismissed the application for judicial review on 12 July 2016. While the respondent did not seek to rely upon the whole of the reasons below, the respondent contended that in dismissing the application, the primary judge rightly held that: 28. On a fair reading of the applicant’s submissions [before the assessor], the applicant’s claims were that he would be specifically targeted and not merely that he would face the same risk of harm as the population generally. There was no failure by the assessor to address the integers of the claim advanced by the applicant in relation to his fears in respect of relocation. There was no failure by the assessor to apply the correct relocation test or to take into account the particular circumstances of the applicant in determining whether relocation was reasonable. The submission that the assessor applied the wrong test in finding the applicant could relocate to Kabul is not made out.3. CONSIDERATION3.1 The issues Initially the appellant contended that, when assessing whether it was reasonable for him to relocate, the assessor failed to consider the impact of the general security situation and the risk of random or non-targeted harm (referred to as “generalised harm”), as opposed to his specific claims to fear persecution for a Refugees Convention reason or serious harm attracting complementary protection (“serious harm”). In order to establish that ground, the appellant accepted that it was necessary for him to establish in line with the principles set out below that:(1)the risk of the appellant being affected by generalised violence in Kabul was a claim expressly made by him and/or which squarely arose on the material before the assessor (the characterisation issue); and(2)it is apparent from the assessor’s reasons that she failed to take into account the risk of generalised violence when determining that it would be reasonable for the appellant to relocate to Kabul. As such, the appellant submitted that this case was analogous to that in MZYQUv Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1032; (2012) 206 FCR 191 (MZYQU). In that case, Dodds-Streeton J held that the Independent Merits Reviewer fell into jurisdictional error not merely in considering whether there was a risk of “serious harm” as defined in s 91R of the Act in applying the relocation test, but in implicitly treating such harm as the only level or kind of harm that could affect the reasonableness of the relocation: MZYQU at [61]. The respondent initially contended that:(1)the appellant did not make a claim that he feared generalised violence (in the sense referred to) but rather that “the nub of the appellant’s claim was that he feared harm in Kabul because he is a Hazara Shia.”; and(2)to the extent that a claim of generalised violence arose on the materials, it was dealt with by the assessor in any event. However, the parties’ respective characterisation of the appellant’s claims shifted during the course of the hearing of the appeal. Ultimately in his oral submissions, the Minister submitted that the appellant raised concerns as to his safety by reason of being caught up in insurgent attacks in Kabul (but not random or generalised violence) if he were to relocate to Kabul, as well as his specific claims to fear persecution on Convention grounds or serious harm. It was apparent from the appellant’s submissions in reply that broadly speaking he accepted that characterisation of his claims on the issue of relocation although there remained significant differences. This is apparent from the following exchange with counsel for the appellant in reply: MR JACKSON: Well, the good news, as far as I can see, is that we basically agree, my learned friend and I, that what was raised on the evidence was the possibility of random – being caught up in insurgent attacks for no particular reason other than he was in Kabul or West Kabul. Now, where we probably disagree is on there being any particular magic to the word “insurgency” or “insurgent group”, because basically, in my submission, it really just means anyone who’s trying to disrupt the orderly business of government and day-to-day living in Kabul, which is really pretty much every sort of attack of generalised or, for that matter, targeted violence that might occur in Kabul. HER HONOUR: Is that so when the word “insurgent group” is spoken of?MR JACKSON: Well, there’s also reference to suicide bombers, who may or may not be a part of a group, and there’s reference to more than 100 insurgent groups. So apart from someone who’s just generally discontent and is unhappy with the state of politics, either in Kabul or in Washington, and just decides to randomly blow themselves up, it seems to cover, in my submission, pretty much any form of any group that might wish to disrupt action in Kabul. So I don’t think there’s any magic. I would submit there’s no magic to the word “insurgency” or “insurgent group”, but I’m not too troubled with it as a concept either, but I would just probably define it a bit more – I would define it broadly in the way that I suggested.