SZSJA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZSJA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 158

Citation: SZSJA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 158
Appeal from: SZSJA v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2013] FCCA 741
Parties: SZSJA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 1453 of 2013
Judges: ALLSOP CJ, ROBERTSON AND MORTIMER JJ
Date of judgment: 18 December 2013
Catchwords:

MIGRATION  –  appeal from Federal Circuit Court determining application for review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – appellant failed to attend Tribunal hearing in circumstances where he did not sign the Response to Hearing Invitation form but where his migration agent placed appellant’s signature on the form and did not tell the appellant of the hearing date – appellant asserted fraud by agent –  primary judge held that agent had implied authority so to sign – whether primary judge erred in so finding

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE  – limited leave granted to file written submissions after the hearing of the appeal – practice deprecated of filing submissions going beyond the grant of leave

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 234(1)(a), 314, 426A

Code of Conduct for Registered Migration Agents

Cases cited:

Bale v Mills [2011] NSWCA 226; (2011) 81 NSWLR 498; (2011) 282 ALR 336
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336
Cheng v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 198 FCR 559

Macleod v R [2003] HCA 24; (2003) 214 CLR 230
Marcolongo v Chen [2011] HCA 3; (2011) 242 CLR 546
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLIX [2008] FCAFC 17; (2008) 245 ALR 501
NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power and Water Authority [2004] HCA 48; (2004) 219 CLR 90
Seafish Tasmania Pelagic Pty Ltd v Burke, Minister for Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities [2013] FCA 782

SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 35; (2007) 232 CLR 189
SZLHP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCAFC 152; (2008) 172 FCR 170
SZHVM v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 600; (2008) 170 FCR 211
SZIVK v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 334
SZMGX v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCAFC 67
SZNNJ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 1356

Date of hearing:

Date of last submissions:

29 November 2013

6 December 2013

Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 68
Counsel for the Appellant: Ms TT Baw
Counsel for the First Respondent:

Mr GT Johnson SC with Ms A Mitchelmore

Solicitor for the First Respondent:

DLA Piper Australia


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1453 of 2013

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZSJA
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGES:

ALLSOP CJ, ROBERTSON AND MORTIMER JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

18 DECEMBER 2013

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

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Details
Case
[2013] FCAFC 158
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SZSJA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, a migrant from the PRC, contested the Federal Circuit Court's decision to deny his application for judicial review of the Refugee Review Tribunal's decision to affirm the delegate's refusal to grant him a Protection (Class XA) visa. The appellant argued that his registered migration agent fraudulently placed his signature on the Response to Hearing Invitation form, thus depriving him of the opportunity to attend the Tribunal hearing. The key issues before the court were whether the primary judge correctly found that the agent had implied authority to sign the form on the appellant's behalf and whether the primary judge misconstrued the relevant legal authority in finding the appellant complicit in the signature placement.

The court found that the primary judge erred in concluding that the appellant implicitly authorised the agent to sign documents on his behalf without specific knowledge or consent. The primary judge failed to adequately address the appellant's evidence that he did not give his agent such express permission, and did not consider the significance of the appellant's evidence that he would not have been happy for his agent to file a document without his signature. As a result, the court held that the primary judge's findings were not supported by a clear rejection of the appellant's evidence. The court also found that the primary judge misconstrued the authority of [SZLHP] v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship in concluding that the appellant was complicit in the agent's conduct.

Accordingly, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court, and remitted the amended application to that court for rehearing. The court also granted leave to the appellant to amend his notice of appeal and ordered the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal from the date on which the Minister had notice of the proposed amended notice of appeal. Each party was to bear their own costs of the appeal up to that date.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The name of the first respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Border Protection”.

2. The appellant have leave to amend his notice of appeal in the form of the Amended Notice of Appeal annexed and marked SZSJA to his affidavit affirmed on 15 November 2013.

3. The appeal be allowed.

4. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 8 July 2013 be set aside.

5. The amended application be remitted to that Court for rehearing.

6. The costs of the first hearing before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia abide the outcome of the second hearing.

7. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal from the date on which the first respondent had notice of the proposed amended notice of appeal. Each party is to bear his own costs of the appeal up to that date.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The grounds of appeal, as amended by leave granted at the commencement of the hearing of the appeal, are as follows:1.The Federal Circuit Judge made findings without any evidentiary basis and/or contrary to the evidence (refer to paragraphs [75], [78] & [80] of the judgment).2.The Federal Circuit Judge misconstrued the authority of [SZLHP] v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 172 CLR 170, when his Honour held that the appellant was complicit in the placing of the signature on the Response to Hearing Invitation form.3.The Federal Circuit Judge failed to take into account all of the evidence when his Honour held that the appellant was denied the opportunity to attend the Refugee Review Tribunal hearing due to the negligence and not the fraud of the migration agent’s employee.Background The short history of the matter is as follows. The appellant left the PRC on a valid passport issued to him on 4 May 2011. He applied to the Department of Immigration for a Protection (Class XA) visa on 15 March 2012. The delegate refused to grant the visa on 19 July 2012 and the appellant applied to the Tribunal for review of that decision on 15 August 2012. On 14 November 2012 the Tribunal affirmed the decision not to grant the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa. The appellant applied to what is now the Federal Circuit Court on 7 December 2012 for judicial review of the decision of the Tribunal. That application was amended on 6 March 2013 and further amended on 19 April 2013. The ground of the application as so amended was as follows: 1.[The Tribunal] failed to exercise its jurisdiction as a result of third party fraud of the Applicant’s registered Migration Agent. The appellant explained this ground by stating that he did not attend the hearing before the Tribunal as a result of fraudulent acts of his agent.The Tribunal hearing The Tribunal said that on 15 August 2012 it received an application for review of the delegate’s decision. The appellant was represented in relation to the review by his registered migration agent. On 17 October 2012 the Tribunal wrote to the appellant’s authorised recipient at the last address for service provided by him in connection with the review and notified the appellant that the Tribunal had considered all the material before it but that the Tribunal was unable to make a favourable decision on this information alone. The Tribunal invited the appellant to give oral evidence and to present arguments at a hearing to be held on 9 November 2012. On 18 October 2012 the Tribunal received a Response to the Hearing Invitation indicating the appellant would be attending the hearing, and that the appellant’s authorised representative would not be attending the hearing. The appellant did not appear before the Tribunal on the day and at the time and place at which he was scheduled to appear nor did he contact the Tribunal to explain his failure to appear. The Tribunal hearing record was marked “NO SHOW”. In the circumstances, and pursuant to s 426A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), and being satisfied that the appellant had been given notice of a scheduled hearing which he failed to attend and failed to explain his failure to attend, the Tribunal decided to make its decision on the review without taking any further action to enable the appellant to appear before it.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The filing of such submissions is to be deprecated because it runs counter to the principle that the hearing, in open court, is the time and place to present argument; it is at the hearing that a party has the opportunity to put his or her case; and a fair and effective process requires that written submissions beyond the scope of any leave granted should not be filed lest there be a fresh round of answering submissions. So that the other party is not put at a disadvantage, the proper course to take is to ignore the passages in the further written submissions which go beyond the limited grant of leave. This we have done.Conclusion The name of the first respondent should be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Border Protection”. The appeal should be allowed and the orders of the primary judge set aside. The amended application should be remitted to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for rehearing.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As to all the grounds of appeal the respondent submitted that if all that caused the appellant not to attend the Tribunal hearing was that he was not notified of the date, once a hearing date was fixed, none of grounds one to three could succeed. Further, that failure would not itself be jurisdictional error: see SZFDE at [53], SZLIX at [33] and also SZMGX v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCAFC 67 at [25] per Bennett, Reeves and Foster JJ; Cheng v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and Anor (2011) 198 FCR 559 at [40] per Flick J; and SZNNJ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 1356 at [21] per Cowdroy J.Consideration The primary judge held that the signature on the Response to Hearing Invitation form was not the appellant’s signature. The respondent accepted that the signature on the form purported to be that of the appellant and was added without the appellant’s specific knowledge. The real issue here is, first, whether the primary judge erred in making the finding that the appellant impliedly authorised the agent to write the appellant’s signature on documents to be forwarded to the Tribunal. The second issue is whether there could be a basis for finding fraud in the relevant sense if the appellant did not so authorise the agent. In our opinion the primary judge erred in finding that the appellant had implicitly authorised the agent to put the appellant’s signature on the form and in so finding by reference to and by virtue of the findings that it was common for the appellant to sign documents that his agent gave to him without knowing what the documents were and that documents were submitted in circumstances where the appellant did not know what the documents were. The primary judge did not deal with the appellant’s evidence that he did not authorise the agent to put his signature on documents or, as a consequence, that the appellant’s signature was placed on the document without his specific knowledge. The primary judge did not consider the significance of the large number of documents which were, on the appellant’s evidence, signed by him. Neither did the primary judge expressly deal with the appellant’s evidence that he would not have been happy for his agent to file a document even if he, the appellant, did not sign it nor with the appellant’s evidence that he wanted to sign. There was no clear rejection of the appellant’s evidence on these critical matters: it is simply not dealt with. Although it is not necessary to go so far as to say there was no evidentiary basis for the conclusions of the primary judge or that the conclusions of the primary judge were contrary to the evidence (compare ground one of the amended notice of appeal), in our opinion, without a clear rejection of the appellant’s evidence, it was an error for the primary judge to find that the appellant’s evidence was equivocal as to whether he actually gave his migration agent express permission to conduct his affairs by putting the appellant’s signature on documents to be sent to the Tribunal. Without a clear rejection of the appellant’s evidence, it was also an error for the primary judge to conclude that it was clear that the appellant knew that this was happening. It follows that the primary judge was in error in concluding that, on that basis, in the circumstances it was open to say that the appellant, by his own conduct, implicitly agreed with this method of operation and was complicit in the conduct of the migration agent in acting on his behalf in this fashion.