Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] FCA 1026  

Appeal from: Kaur & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3272
File number: VID 1539 of 2018
Judgment of: BROMBERG J
Date of judgment: 27 August 2021
Catchwords: MIGRATION – fraud by migration agent – consideration of the concept of indifference in public law fraud – whether an applicant has a “heavy burden” in respect of discharging the onus of proof that he or she was not indifferent to fraud – whether the Federal Circuit Court erred in finding that the applicant was indifferent to fraud – whether the reasons of the Federal Circuit Court were inadequate – appeal allowed  
Legislation:

Evidence Act 2008 (Cth), s 140

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 24

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg 485.224 and public interest criterion 4020

Cases cited:

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 362

Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118

Gill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 248 FCR 398

Katragadda v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 143

Kaur & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3272

Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 269 FCR 464

Maharjan v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 258 FCR 1 at [78]

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLIX [2008] FCAFC 17; 245 ALR 501

Pyramid Building Society (in liq) v Scorpion Hotels Pty Ltd [1998] 1 VR 188

Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 261 FCR 556

SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 232 CLR 189

SZIVK v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 334

SZRUR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2013) 216 FCR 445

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 81
Date of hearing: 30 July 2020 and 13 October 2020
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr W Smith
Solicitor for the Appellants: Fernandez & Johnson Solicitors
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr N Wood
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

VID 1539 of 2018
BETWEEN:

SUKHWINDER KAUR

First Appellant

HARWINDER SINGH

Second Appellant

GURTAJ SINGH (and another named in the Schedule)

Third Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

BROMBERG J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 AUGUST 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is allowed.

2.The orders of the Federal Circuit Court made on 15 November 2018 are set aside.

3.The matter be remitted to the Federal Circuit Court for reconsideration according to law.

4.The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal and of the application to the Federal Circuit Court.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

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Details
Case
[2021] FCA 1026
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involves an appeal against a decision by the Federal Circuit Court (FCCA) regarding the denial of a visa application. The appellants, Ms Kaur and Mr Ajjan, contested the decision, asserting that Ms Kaur was the victim of fraud by Mr Ajjan. The central issue before the court was whether the Federal Circuit Court erred in finding that Ms Kaur was indifferent to the fraud committed by Mr Ajjan. Additionally, the court considered whether the reasons provided by the Federal Circuit Court were adequate.

The court examined the concept of "indifference" in the context of public law fraud, referencing the High Court's decision in SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and the Federal Court's decision in Gill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The court also reviewed the evidence given by Ms Kaur, taking into account her capacity with the English language and the apparent infelicities in her expression. Despite some ambiguity in Ms Kaur's evidence, the court found that the primary judge did not deem her to be untruthful.

The court determined that while the primary judge's reasons could have been more clearly expressed, they sufficiently explained the basis for the conclusion that Ms Kaur had not discharged the onus of proving she was not indifferent to the fraud. The court found that the reasons provided were adequate and did not constitute a failure to lawfully discharge the judicial obligation to give reasons. However, the court did find errors in the primary judge's findings, and therefore the matter was remitted to the FCCA for reconsideration.

The court's decision resulted in the setting aside of the Federal Circuit Court's orders and the remission of the matter to the FCCA for redetermination. The Minister was ordered to pay the appellants' costs on the appeal and those before the FCCA.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed.

2. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court made on 15 November 2018 are set aside.

3. The matter be remitted to the Federal Circuit Court for reconsideration according to law.

4. The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal and of the application to the Federal Circuit Court.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellants also contended that the primary judge failed to rule on whether tendency evidence before the FCCA was inadmissible. The evidence in question was not relied upon below, so it is immaterial whether the primary judge ruled on it. It would only be necessary to determine the issue of tendency evidence if I were to rehear the application for judicial review. The parties agree, and I accept, that where I have found error in the primary judge’s finding that Ms Kaur was indifferent to the fraud of Mr Ajjan, the stultification error would best be addressed by the matter being remitted to the FCCA. It follows that the issue of tendency evidence will not arise in this Court and accordingly it is not necessary for me to address it.PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On 12 January 2011, Mr Ajjan applied for the working visa purportedly on behalf of Ms Kaur. On 28 March 2012, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the visa. The reasons for the decision include reference to the application being prepared by S & S Migration, which had by that time been previously found to have provided false or misleading information to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (Department) in other applications, and the application itself containing false or misleading information. On 10 April 2012, the first and second appellant applied to the Tribunal for review of the decision of the delegate. Ms Kaur maintained that she was the victim of fraud by Mr Ajjan. On 4 March 2014, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate. On 27 March 2014, the appellants applied to the FCCA for judicial review, which was dismissed on 18 April 2016 (first hearing). On appeal, Mortimer J ordered by consent that the order of the FCCA dismissing the application be set aside and remitted the matter to the FCCA. On 15 November 2018, the primary judge found that Ms Kaur had not established that she had not been indifferent to the fraud of Mr Ajjan. The primary judge made orders dismissing the application and that the appellants pay the Minister’s costs. THE CONCEPT OF “INDIFFERENCE” IN PUBLIC LAW FRAUD The leading authority on public law fraud is the High Court’s decision in SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 232 CLR 189. In SZFDE, the High Court observed the importance in public law fraud of paying close attention to “the nature, scope and purpose of the particular system of review by the Tribunal which the Act establishes and the place in that system of registered migration agents”: at [29]. The High Court made no reference in SZFDE to the concept of “indifference”, but alluded to the necessity of an applicant for judicial review establishing that he or she did not “collude” in the fraud of a third party: at [28]. The concept of “indifference” arose in the context of public law fraud by a migration agent in Gill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 248 FCR 398 (Kenny, Griffiths and Mortimer JJ). At the outset, it should be observed that the explanation of “indifference” in Gill occurred in the context of the following comments at [47] (Kenny, Griffiths and Mortimer JJ), referring to SZFDE:Recognition that fraud can arise in a wide range of factual circumstances, such that it is apt to describe the range as “infinite in variety”, highlights the undesirability of prescribing in generally applicable terms the scope for judicial review where there is third party fraud.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

I do not consider that the primary judge enjoyed advantages not enjoyed by this Court in making the findings which are in contest on this appeal. I will return to that issue later when addressing the particular findings in contest. However, it is convenient to note here that the primary judge did not regard the applicant’s demeanour as being determinative on any issue of importance. At [33], his Honour said this:In some respects, although not all, issues relating to the first applicant’s demeanour played a role in my overall assessment of her veracity. That said, her demeanour in the witness box was not determinative of the issues of importance in this case. In assessing the matters in issue in this case, I have considered not only what the first applicant said and how she said it but also the likelihood of her version of events transpiring in the manner she said they transpired, whether other objective evidence contradicted her version of events and whether contemporaneous documentary evidence corroborated or contradicted her version of events.THE CRITICAL EVIDENCE GIVEN BY MS KAUR Ms Kaur’s evidence is not entirely free of ambiguity. However, the primary judge did not find her to be untruthful. Nor, on this appeal, did the Minister suggest that there were aspects of the evidence given by Ms Kaur which ought not to have been accepted as truthful. To the extent that aspects of Ms Kaur’s evidence are less than clear, that may well be a consequence of her capacity with the English language. English is not her first language. At the first hearing before the FCCA, Ms Kaur gave evidence through an interpreter. She agreed that she spoke English fluently but wanted an interpreter to avoid “misunderstanding something”. At the hearing before the primary judge, she gave evidence unassisted by an interpreter. Despite Ms Kaur’s own view, the transcript reveals her not to be a fluent speaker of the English language although her spoken English, though somewhat broken, was largely comprehensible. With those observations in mind, Ms Kaur’s evidence must be fairly read and read as a whole. The whole of the evidence of Ms Kaur that the parties sought to draw my attention to comprised an affidavit made by Ms Kaur on 19 February 2016 which was tendered at the first and second hearings before the FCCA, a section of Ms Kaur’s cross-examination at the first hearing, and most of her evidence in cross-examination before the primary judge. The transcript of Ms Kaur’s evidence given at the first hearing was before the primary judge. Having carefully read the evidence given by Ms Kaur, alert to the apparent infelicities in expression, my understanding of the import of that evidence or, more particularly, those aspects of the evidence most relevant to the appeal is as follows. Ms Kaur attended the offices of S & S Migration at least twice, and possibly three times, in early 2011. She first attended in early January 2011. That attendance occurred on a day prior to 12 January 2011, being the date upon which S & S Migration lodged the fraudulent application for the working visa with the Department, purportedly on her behalf.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Put shortly, I am not satisfied that the reasons of the primary judge were flawed to a degree that would justify the appellants’ second ground of appeal. In Kaur at [166]-[191], the Full Court provided a detailed summary of the principles pertaining to the ground of inadequate reasons. It is not necessary to recount those authorities or embark on a lengthy exposition of principles. Adopting the authorities referred to in Kaur, I consider that the primary judge’s reasons sufficiently explained the basis for his Honour’s conclusion that Ms Kaur had not discharged the onus of proving she was not indifferent to the fraud of Mr Ajjan. Although I have found that the primary judge erred in several important respects, and at times, with respect, the reasons could have been expressed more cogently, I consider that the rationale of the primary judge was sufficiently exposed. Accordingly, I am not persuaded that the reasons of the primary judge were so inadequate that they constituted a failure to lawfully discharge the judicial obligation to give reasons.CONCLUSION It follows that his Honour’s dismissal of the appellants’ application for judicial review and a declaration should be set aside. All parties submitted that in that circumstance, the matter should be remitted to the FCCA for redetermination. I will make those orders and also orders that the Minister pay the appellants’ costs on the appeal and those before the FCCA.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court considered the concept of indifference in public law fraud and the importance of the nature, scope, and purpose of the system of review established by the Act. The court referred to the High Court’s decision in SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and noted the allusion to the necessity of establishing non-collusion in the fraud of a third party. The court also examined the explanation of “indifference” in Gill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, recognising that fraud can arise in a wide range of factual circumstances.

The court addressed the evidence given by Ms Kaur, noting that her English language skills were not fluent, which might explain some of the apparent infelicities in her evidence. However, the court found that the primary judge did not regard the applicant’s demeanour as determinative and had considered various aspects of her evidence, including the likelihood of her version of events, objective evidence, and documentary evidence.

The court assessed the reasons provided by the primary judge, acknowledging that while some aspects of the reasons could have been expressed more cogently, they sufficiently explained the basis for the primary judge’s conclusion that Ms Kaur had not discharged the onus of proving she was not indifferent to the fraud of Mr Ajjan. The court held that the primary judge’s reasons were not so inadequate as to constitute a failure to lawfully discharge the judicial obligation to give reasons.

The court concluded that the appeal should be allowed, the orders of the Federal Circuit Court set aside, and the matter remitted to the Federal Circuit Court for reconsideration according to law. The Minister was ordered to pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal and of the application to the Federal Circuit Court.