SZQUM v Minister for Immigration

[2012] FMCA 79

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZQUM v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2012] FMCA 79

MIGRATION – Application for review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal – ministerial intervention – breach of natural justice – failure to consider evidence – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.91N, 422B, 424A, 424B, 425, 425A, 426, 429A, 430, 441A, 441C, 441G, 476
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Sch.2

Saeed v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2010] HCA 23; (2010) 241 CLR 252; (2010) 267 ALR 204
NAOA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 241
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; (2006) 228 CLR 152; (2006) 231 ALR 592
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 26; (2007) 235 ALR 609
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR and Another[2011] HCA 1; (2011) 241 CLR 594
SZFDF & Ors v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship& Anor [2007] HCA 35; (2007) 232 CLR 189; (2007) 237 ALR 64
Minister for Immigration v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507
SBBS v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 361; (2002) 194 ALR 749
VFAB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 872; (2003) 131 FCR 102
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28; (2001) 179 ALR 425
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs vWu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parteDurairajasingham [2000] HCA 1
Minister of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323; (2001) 180 ALR 1
NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No2) [2004] FCAFC 263
ApplicantWAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 75 ALD 630
Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1802; (2001) 194 ALR 244
Randhawa v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1994] FCA 1253; (1994) 52 FCR 437
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Guo Wei Rong [1997] HCA 22; (1997) 191 CLR 559

Applicant: SZQUM

First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

File Number: SYG 2446 of 2011

Judgment of: Nicholls FM

Hearing date: 6 February 2012

Date of Last Submission: 6 February 2012

Delivered at: Sydney

Delivered on: 14 February 2012

REPRESENTATION

The Applicant: In person

Appearing for the Respondents: Mr O Jones

Solicitors for the Respondents: Clayton Utz

ORDERS

1. The application made on 27 October 2011 is dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs set in the amount of $5,000.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 2446 of 2011

SZQUM

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. This application was made on 27 October 2011 under s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) and seeks review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) made on 22 September 2011, which affirmed the decision of the Minister’s delegate (“the delegate”) on 11 July 2011 to refuse the applicant a protection visa.

Background

1. The Minister has put a bundle of relevant documents before the Court (the Court Book – “CB”). This material reveals that the applicant has given different versions of his personal circumstances to both Australian and New Zealand authorities. The version that probably represents the most beneficial account (to the applicant) is as follows.

2. The applicant is a citizen of Nigeria who travelled to South Africa. The applicant is of Igbo ethnicity and Christian faith ([1] at CB 26). Further:

   1)The applicant was born in Nigeria and resided there until 2005 ([32] at CB 166).

   2)He trained as an electrical engineer and, as part of his studies, was assigned to work at Xerox in the Delta region of Nigeria ([3] at CB 26).

   3)He continued to work at Xerox for fifteen years ([4] at CB 27). In 2005, the applicant assisted the police following an attack by the Asare, a militant group which purportedly represented the interests of the Delta indigenous tribe: the Kalabri. It was allegedly revealed to the Asare that the applicant had assisted the police in their enquiries. The applicant was forced to flee when the Asare came to his home to attack him. He escaped from his home through a glass window, which cut him and left scars on his body. The applicant hid in Lagos until papers could be organised for him to enter South Africa ([5] at CB 27 to [15] at CB 29, [40] – [42] at CB 167).

   4)The applicant fled to South Africa, where he was detained in a refugee camp in “Nedela” for approximately one month. The applicant was granted a six-month temporary visa and then remained living in South Africa until 2010 ([44] – [45] at CB 168).

   5)In 2009 the applicant and his roommates were subject to physical abuse, allegedly by the police. The applicant was placed in a room, handcuffed and had a covering placed over his head. He was severely beaten. His roommates received the same treatment. When they made a complaint to the police it was ignored and no action was taken ([86] – [88] at CB 174).

   6)In August 2010 the applicant was confronted by an Asare member with whom he had previously worked at Xerox, and whom he had reported to the police in 2005. The Asare member threatened his life and attacked him. Although the applicant was able to escape, he received harassing telephone calls following the incident ([45] – [46] at CB 168).

   7)On 6 August 2010 the applicant lodged an application at the Australian High Commission in Pretoria for a short stay business visa. The application was accompanied by a South African passport and a letter from the President of the “Association of New Africa”. On 10 September 2010 the application was withdrawn ([21] – [24] at CB 164).

   8)On 20 October 2010 the applicant “transited” at Melbourne airport and did not clear customs. He continued on to Auckland, arriving on 21 October 2010 on the same South African passport. Upon arrival he was questioned by an immigration official. The applicant applied for a short stay business visa which was refused. He was given an opportunity to raise any medical conditions or other special circumstances with the immigration official and he declined to do so. The applicant departed Auckland on 23 October 2010 and again “transited” through Melbourne airport, before returning to South Africa ([25] at CB 164 to [26] at CB 165).

The Application

1. On 28 November 2010 the applicant arrived in Australia and claimed to be a Nigerian. He was detained by the immigration authorities. When questioned about his previous application for a visa on a South African passport, the applicant “conceded” that he was also a South African citizen.

2. The applicant lodged a protection visa application on 21 December 2010 (CB 1 to CB 32). The application was accompanied by a statutory declaration made on 17 December 2010. The applicant was assisted by a legal practitioner in drafting these documents.

3. He was interviewed by the Minister’s delegate (“the delegate”) on 21 January 2011, and again on 4 March 2011 (CB 37). Following the interviews, the applicant submitted a statement signed on 12 April 2011. The applicant’s representative provided written submissions to the Minister’s department, by way of letter, on 17 April 2011 (CB 37 to CB 51).

4. The delegate received confirmation through the Australian High Commission in Pretoria “… that the applicant was naturalised as a citizen of South Africa on 7 February 2006”. Since the applicant was a national of two countries, by operation of s.91N of the Act, the application made on 21 December 2010 was found to be invalid (CB 52 to CB 56).

5. The Minister received a submission regarding intervention, and decided to intervene on 10 May 2011. The applicant’s representative was informed of the Minister’s decision and the applicant was invited to lodge a valid protection visa application within 7 days.

6. On 19 May 2011 the applicant lodged a fresh protection visa application, along with a statutory declaration also dated 19 May 2011 (CB 59 to CB 99). It is the decision made in relation to this application that was the subject of the Tribunal’s review.

The Delegate

1. The Minister’s delegate interviewed the applicant with respect to this application on 10 June 2011.

2. The delegate held that the applicant was a citizen of both Nigeria and South Africa. However, the delegate found that the applicant was not credible in his evidence and claims, and had made inconsistent claims relating to his travels to New Zealand and his reasons for leaving South Africa. While the delegate accepted that the applicant had left Nigeria because of fear of harm from the Asare group, he did not find that the applicant feared harm from this group for a Convention reason. This was held to be particularly so in the context of no other supporting evidence, and the applicant’s overall lack of credibility. Further, the delegate was not satisfied that the applicant had a genuine fear of harm. Consequently the delegate found that Australia did not owe protection obligations to the applicant, and refused the application on 11 June 2011 (CB 107 to CB 123).

The Tribunal

1. On 14 July 2011 an application was made to the Tribunal to review the delegate’s decision (CB 124 to CB 127). The applicant was invited on 28 July 2011 to attend a hearing before the Tribunal. The hearing was scheduled to take place on 24 August 2011. The applicant’s representative appeared by telephone. The interpreter, in the Igbo language, whose attendance had been arranged by the Tribunal, failed to attend. The hearing was adjourned, with no questions being asked of the applicant or evidence given.

2. A letter pursuant to s.424A of the Act, was sent to the applicant on 29 August 2011 (CB 136 to CB 152). The letter set out the information which the Tribunal considered would “be the reason, or part of the reason, for affirming the decision under review” ([150] at CB 184 to CB 197). The letter specifically referred to:

   1)The applicant’s status in South Africa.

   2)The applicant’s claimed fear of persecution in South Africa, particularly the attack at the applicant’s residence in 2009.

   3)The applicant’s fear of persecution in South Africa and Nigeria.

   4)The applicant’s previous travel through Australia and to New Zealand and his failure to seek protection.

   5)Inconsistent and incorrect information provided by the applicant in his applications, interviews and hearings.

3. A hearing was held on 5 September 2011, at which the applicant was assisted by an interpreter in the Igbo language. The applicant’s representative again participated by telephone. The applicant provided several documents to the Tribunal at this hearing, specifically a statement from the applicant dated 2 September 2011, a letter in support of the applicant from a religious pastor at Hillsong church, and several documents about xenophobia in South Africa (CB 153 to CB 158).

4. On 22 September 2011 the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate to refuse the application for a protection visa (its analysis is at [196] at CB 207 to [224] at CB 213). The Tribunal found that the applicant was a citizen of both Nigeria and South Africa. However, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant was a witness of truth and held that the applicant had provided false and misleading evidence ([205] at CB 209).

5. Amongst other matters, the Tribunal found that, for the applicant to be granted South African citizenship on 7 February 2006, the applicant must have been permanently residing in South Africa from at least 6 February 2005 ([206] at CB 209). This was inconsistent with his claim that members of Asare had attempted to kill him in August 2005 and led the Tribunal to conclude that the applicant had fabricated the claim ([207] at CB 209). The Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant would suffer any harm in South Africa or Nigeria, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future, for any Convention reason ([216] at CB 211 and [218] at CB 212).

Before the Court

1. The application before the Court asserts two grounds:

   “1. The decision was made in breach of natural justice.

   2. The Tribunal failed to consider crucial evidence constructively before it.”

2. The applicant appeared at the hearing in person, assisted by an interpreter in the Igbo language. Mr O Jones appeared for the respondent. The respondent filed written submissions. At the hearing the applicant provided written submissions (dealt with below).

3. Leave was granted to the Minister to file and serve additional relevant documents that should have been included in the Court Book. These were subsequently filed on 7 February 2012 (Supplementary Court Book – “SCB”). They are:

   1)The Tribunal’s record of hearing times (SCB 1); and

   2)Report of a medical examination of the applicant (SCB 4).

4. Leave was granted to the applicant to file written submissions in reply to the supplementary documents, which was done by way of facsimile on 10 February 2012. That document stated that:

   1)The applicant had been taken to a hospital on 5 January 2011 and diagnosed with “… very high blood pressure.”

   2)Medication was prescribed to “help” the applicant manage his blood pressure, and he has taken the medication “… every day since, to this very day.”

5. At the hearing before the Court the applicant made the following complaints:

   1)His representative was not present at the Tribunal hearing.

   2)The time provided for the hearing by the Tribunal was “very short”.

   3)The Tribunal did not consider that he was sick and that a doctor’s report had been prepared which showed he had high blood pressure.

   4)It was easy in South Africa to get a “permit” to come to Australia if you had money. The Tribunal did not consider the “permit” that he used to come to Australia.

Consideration

1. As Mr Jones submitted, there is no merit in this application. The bare unparticularised grounds are inadequate in explaining any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. Further, any plain reading of the Tribunal’s decision record reveals no such error. Nor was the applicant able to assist before the Court in this regard.

Ground One

1. The first ground asserts that the Tribunal’s decision was made in breach of natural justice.

2. This is a case to which s.422B of the Act applies. That is, for this case, the matters set out in Div.4 of Pt.7 of the Act are the exhaustive statement of the natural justice hearing rule (absent bias) in relation to the matters dealt with in that division (Saeed v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2010] HCA 23; (2010) 241 CLR 252; (2010) 267 ALR 204).

3. In this regard, the applicant was invited to a hearing pursuant to s.425 of the Act (CB 131 and CB 134). While the Tribunal had to abandon the hearing at the first scheduled date ([149] at CB 183) because of the unavailability of an appropriate interpreter, the notice of the rescheduled hearing complied with all the relevant statutory and regulatory requirements (ss. 425, 425A, 426, the reference to s.426A, ss.441G, 441A(5), 441C(5) and reg.4.35D(a) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“the Regulations”)).

4. The applicant has not provided any evidence in relation to what occurred at the hearing. The only account before the Court is the Tribunal’s account set out in its decision record ([51] at CB 197 to [183] at CB 201). In these circumstances it is not open to this Court to draw inferences or make assumptions as to what may otherwise have occurred (NAOA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 241).

5. This account reveals that the Tribunal raised with the applicant the issue determinative of the review. That is, that given the inconsistencies in the applicant’s claims and evidence, and as contained in the various accounts he gave to Australian immigration authorities, the Tribunal was not satisfied as to the applicant’s credibility (see [158] at CB 198 to [165] at CB 199, [170] at CB 200 to [171] at CB 201, [181] at CB 201, and the general conclusion at [200] at CB 207) (SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; (2006) 228 CLR 152; (2006) 231 ALR 592). In any event, this was a live issue arising out of the delegate’s decision (CB 122.1).

6. The Tribunal also complied with s.424A. It wrote to the applicant, through his adviser, drawing his attention to information as required by the obligation in that section (CB 136 to CB 152). While the Tribunal also put to the applicant its subjective appraisals, thought processes and doubts, and the inconsistencies in his evidence, no error is revealed notwithstanding that such matters are not “information” for the purposes of s.424A(1) (SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 26; (2007) 235 ALR 609 at [17] to [18] and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR and Anor [2011] HCA 1; (2011) 241 CLR 594).

7. Before the Court, the applicant complained that the period of the hearing before the Tribunal was “very short”.

8. The supplementary documents provided by the Minister show that the hearing was a total of 2 hours and 44 minutes duration. The relevant issue is not the actual length of the hearing but whether the applicant was given a fair and reasonable opportunity to put his evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in the review (s.425 of the Act). There is no evidence presented by the applicant to support any assertion to the contrary. What relevant evidence is before the Court (the Tribunal’s unchallenged account) reveals that the determinative issue and relevant matters were appropriately raised, and an opportunity for comment provided. There is no evidence that the proceedings were truncated such as to deprive the applicant of a meaningful opportunity to comment and give his evidence.

9. Further, the applicant was represented before the Tribunal by the “Refugee and Immigration Legal Service” of Victoria (“RILC”). No complaint was received by the Tribunal from the applicant, or his adviser, in relation to the length of the hearing or any failure to provide a meaningful opportunity for him.

10. In his written submissions the applicant complains that he was only given 7 days to respond to the Tribunal’s letter seeking comments pursuant to s.424A.

11. The evidence available reveals that the letter was sent to his adviser, as the authorised recipient, by facsimile transmission on 28 July 2011 (CB 130). The Tribunal notified the applicant that his comments should be provided to the Tribunal by 5 September 2011.

12. That is indeed a 7 day period, as the applicant complains. The difficulty for him however is that this is the period prescribed for this purpose by the relevant regulation (see s.424B(2) and reg.4.35(2) of the Regulations).

13. For the remainder, the applicant’s written submissions take issue with his representatives, whom he describes as “lawyers”. Variously, that he had difficulty in contacting his lawyers due to their unavailability, the “transfer” of his case to another lawyer within RILC, the paucity (in terms of volume) of the response to the Tribunal’s letter prepared by the lawyer, and some “language barrier”.

14. First, there is no evidence to say that the Tribunal, or for that matter the Minister, arranged for these lawyers to assist the applicant.

15. Second, and in any event, even if the assistance provided by RILC was inadequate (the evidence does not support any such finding), it would still not amount to third party conduct such as to vitiate the process of the review before the Tribunal (see SZFDF & Ors v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship& Anor [2007] HCA 35; (2007) 232 CLR 189; (2007) 237 ALR 64). This complaint does not assist in revealing jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.

1. Before the Court, the applicant complained that his representative was not present at the Tribunal hearing. It must be noted that there is no right to representation before the Tribunal under the statutory code or, in the circumstances of this case, at common law.

2. In any event, the representative did participate in the hearing by “speakerphone” ([151] at CB 197). Further, there is nothing to show that the representative’s attendance in this way denied the applicant a fair hearing. Even further, s.429A(a) provides that the Tribunal may allow the appearance of an applicant by telephone to give evidence. To the extent that the representative may be present at a hearing to assist an applicant, I cannot see how this facility cannot be extended to a representative.

3. Finally, in relation to ground one, any charge of a breach of natural justice, whether at common law or the statutory code, conjures reference to the question of bias, or the apprehension of bias. Such charges need to be clearly made and distinctly proven (Minister for Immigration v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507 per Gleeson CJ and Gummow J at [69] and Kirby J at [127], SBBS v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 361; (2002) 194 ALR 749 per Tamberlin, Mansfield and Jacobson JJ at [43], VFAB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 872; (2003) 131 FCR 102 and Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28; (2001) 179 ALR 425). In the current case there is nothing in the evidence before the Court to give rise to any such suggestion, let alone that it can be made out.

4. In all, ground one is not made out.

Ground Two

1. In ground two the applicant complains that the Tribunal failed to consider crucial evidence constructively before it.

2. Although not presented as an explanation of ground two, before the Court the applicant complained that the Tribunal did not consider that he was sick and that a doctor’s report showed that he had high blood pressure.

3. On the available evidence, it appears that the applicant underwent a medical examination by a Commonwealth medical officer in relation to his protection visa application (CB 61). A copy of this report was not included in the Court Book. However in its decision record the Tribunal makes reference to this report ([51] at CB 169). It makes no reference to any blood pressure difficulties.

4. Documents subsequently put before the Court do reveal that the applicant did undergo a medical examination on 5 June 2011 (SCB 16). The examination doctor does note “elevated bp”.

5. However, there is nothing before the Court to show that any issue of elevated blood pressure affected the applicant’s capacity to participate in the hearing or, more generally, in the conduct of the review. In the circumstances, the Tribunal’s reference to the medical report is sufficient to answer the applicant’s complaint before the Court. If there was anything further as to how the elevated blood pressure had affected his capacity to give evidence at the hearing then it was not put before the Tribunal for consideration. In any event, and further, the applicant’s written response to the supplementary documents lists a number of medications prescribed at that time which, on his own statement (“I have been taking every day since …”) allows that the “elevated bp” was controlled with medication by the time of the Tribunal’s hearing eight months later.

6. The only medical condition which was put forward to the Tribunal as affecting his capacity was a claim put in explanation of the inconsistencies in his evidence. That is that he suffered from memory loss and could not “remember things clearly” (item 6 at CB 153). The Tribunal noted this in its decision record ([181] at CB 201).

7. Contrary to the applicant’s complaint now, the Tribunal did consider the applicant’s claim in this regard. The Tribunal found ([214] of CB 211):

   “… that the applicant is unable to recall particular events or gives inconsistent evidence, not because of any loss of memory relating to being harmed, suffering any injuries or psychological stress but due to having contriving his claims for protection.”

8. Before the Court the applicant also complained that the Tribunal did not consider that the “permit” that he used to come to Australia was easily obtained in South Africa due to corruption.

9. It is not clear how this would have been of assistance to the applicant before the Tribunal. If indeed it was easy to obtain passports and visas for this purpose by the payment of money to corrupted officials, or others, the applicant’s actions in this regard would hardly have impressed as to the issue of his truthfulness and credibility before the Tribunal.

10. In any event, the question of his travel to Australia and documentation obtained in South Africa, including South African citizenship and residency documentation, was considered by the Tribunal.

11. Arising out of the many inconsistent, and indeed directly conflicting, accounts provided by the applicant as to past events, the Tribunal relevantly found that the applicant was granted South African citizenship in 2006 and continued to be a citizen of that country ([196] at CB 207).

12. If what the applicant is now seeking to assert is that while he obtained South African citizenship papers they were obtained by fraud and corruption and that therefore he was not a “genuine” South African citizen, then such a claim is a direct challenge to a finding of fact made by the Tribunal. [So that, therefore, he was in Nigeria at times when he had otherwise said he had been there and was the subject of threats.]

13. As this finding was reasonably open to the Tribunal on what was before it, and for which it gave reasons, it is not open to this Court to substitute its own factual findings for those of the Tribunal (Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs vWu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259). The Tribunal acted within its jurisdiction in the circumstances (Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parteDurairajasingham [2000] HCA 1).

14. The Tribunal is not required to consider each and every piece of evidence before it. Section 430 of the Act required it to set out in its decision record a reference to those pieces of evidence and material on which its findings of fact were based (s.430(1)(d)). Although, in any event, there is no jurisdictional error if it fails to do so (Minister of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323; (2001) 180 ALR 1)

15. What the Tribunal is obliged to do is to deal with the applicant’s claims and aspects of those claims as expressly made and clearly arising from the circumstances presented (NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No2) [2004] FCAFC 263, ApplicantWAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 75 ALD 630, Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1802; (2001) 194 ALR 244).

16. In the current case, the Tribunal did consider the applicant’s claims. Notwithstanding the difficulty presented to the Tribunal as to the truth of what the applicant variously said by the way of various inconsistent accounts given by the applicant, I cannot see that the Tribunal failed to meet its obligations in this regard.

17. That the Tribunal did not accept as true large parts of the applicant’s claims does not mean that the Tribunal failed to consider what the applicant now claims is “crucial evidence”. The Tribunal is not required to uncritically accept the applicant’s accounts (Randhawa v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1994] FCA 1253; (1994) 52 FCR 437 and Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Guo Wei Rong [1997] HCA 22; (1997) 191 CLR 559).

18. It was clear before the Court that the applicant did not understand, or chose not to accept, that if an applicant presents such significantly inconsistent evidence in relation to his application for a protection visa and the Tribunal’s review, he runs the risk that the Tribunal will find adversely to him.

19. In the current case, the Tribunal found in emphatic and comprehensive terms that the applicant was not credible, had provided false and misleading evidence, had fabricated claims and was not a witness of truth ([200] at CB 207, [201], [204] at CB 208, [205], [207] at CB 209, [21] at CB 210, [214] at CB 211). Those finding were all open to the Tribunal on what was before it. No legal error is revealed and ground two is not made out.

Conclusion

1. For the applicant to succeed before the Court, the Court would need to, at least, find jurisdiction error in the Tribunal’s decision. No such error is evident. I will therefore make an order dismissing the application before the Court.

I certify that the preceding sixty-one (61) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Nicholls FM

Date: 14 February 2012