SZNKO v Minister for Immigration and Anor (No.2)

Link copied
Case Copied 35 min read

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZNKO v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR (NO.2) [2012] FMCA 861
MIGRATION – Application for review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – Tribunal’s decision was not irrational, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable or clearly unjust – Tribunal did not adopt an inflexible rule or policy – Tribunal not required to make any finding as to the cumulative effect of the applicant’s political and religious claims as the Tribunal rejected any claim of future harm based on political opinion or affiliation – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed.
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.424A, 476
SZNKO v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2009] FMCA 978
SZNKO v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2010] FCA 297
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611; (2010) 266 ALR 367
SZOOR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 58
Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407; [2000] HCA 1
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister of Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf  [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323; (2001) 180 ALR 1
Abebe v The Commonwealth of Australia [1999] HCA 14; (1999) 197 CLR 510; (1999) 162 ALR 1
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Guo Wei Rong [1997] HCA 22; (1997) 191 CLR 559
VAJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 59
Sellamuthu v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 247; (1999) 90 FCR 287
Applicant: SZNKO
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP
Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 2482 of 2011
Judgment of: Nicholls FM
Hearing date: 15 May 2012
Date of Last Submission: 15 May 2012
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 2 October 2012

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr J R Young
Solicitors for the Applicant: Simon Diab & Associates
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms E Baggett
Solicitors for the Respondents: DLA Piper Australia

ORDERS

  1. The application made on 1 November 2011 is dismissed.

  2. The applicant to pay the first respondent’s costs set in the amount of $5,500.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 2482 of 2011

SZNKO

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application, made on 1 November 2011, pursuant to s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”), seeking review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”), made on 3 October 2011, which affirmed the decision of the respondent Minister’s delegate to refuse the grant of a protection visa to the applicant.

Background

  1. The applicant is a citizen of Bangladesh (Court Book – “CB” – CB 13). He arrived in Australia on 17 July 2008 (CB 15) and applied for a protection visa on 29 August 2008 (CB 1 to CB 86, with annexures). He was assisted in…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read SZNKO v Minister for Immigration and Anor (No.2) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2012] FMCA 861
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of SZNKO v Minister for Immigration and Anor (No.2), the dispute centered on the applicant's claim for refugee status and the validity of the documents submitted in support of that claim. The Federal Circuit Court was tasked with reviewing the decision of the Tribunal, which had rejected the applicant's claims due to the lack of an explanation for identical text in two different letters. The applicant argued that the Tribunal's decision was illogical and irrational. The court examined whether the Tribunal's conclusion was based on a process of reasoning that could be considered illogical or irrational, and whether reasonable minds might differ in their conclusions based on the evidence presented. The Tribunal had found that the absence of an explanation for the identical text in the letters was indicative that the document was not genuine. The court held that it was open to the Tribunal to reach this conclusion, and that the lack of an explanation could reasonably lead to the inference that the document was not genuine.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal's reasoning in rejecting the applicant's claims was illogical or irrational, and if so, whether this amounted to a jurisdictional error. The court considered whether the Tribunal's conclusions were based on a process of reasoning that could be deemed illogical or irrational, and whether reasonable minds might differ in their conclusions based on the evidence. The court found that the Tribunal's reasoning was not illogical or irrational, as it was open to the Tribunal to infer that the absence of an explanation for the identical text in the letters indicated that the document was not genuine. The court held that the Tribunal's decision was based on a plausible inference drawn from the evidence, and that the decision did not amount to a jurisdictional error.

In summary, the court dismissed the application, finding that the Tribunal's decision was not illogical or irrational. The court held that the Tribunal was entitled to draw the inference it did from the evidence presented, and that the decision did not amount to a jurisdictional error. The applicant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs in the amount of $5,500.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The application made on 1 November 2011 is dismissed.

2.

The applicant to pay the first respondent’s costs set in the amount of $5,500.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Further, in SZMDS at [131] to [132] per Crennan and Bell JJ):“[131] What was involved here was an issue of jurisdictional fact upon which different minds might reach different conclusions. The complaint of illogicality or irrationality was said to lie in the process of reasoning. But, the test for illogicality or irrationality must be to ask whether logical or rational or reasonable minds might adopt different reasoning or might differ in any decision or finding to be made on evidence upon which the decision is based. If probative evidence can give rise to different processes of reasoning and if logical or rational or reasonable minds might differ in respect of the conclusions to be drawn from that evidence, a decision cannot be said by a reviewing court to be illogical or irrational or unreasonable, simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion. Was the Tribunal’s fact finding ‘illogical’ or ‘irrational’?[132] Because illogicality or irrationality may constitute a basis for judicial review in the context of jurisdictional fact finding as explained above, it becomes necessary to decide whether the Tribunal's conclusion about the state of satisfaction required by s 65 and its findings on the way to that conclusion revealed illogicality or irrationality amounting to jurisdictional error. It is clear, from the extracts from the Federal Court decision set out above, that the Federal Court emphatically disagreed with the Tribunal's finding that the first respondent's return to Pakistan and failure to seek asylum in the United Kingdom was conduct which was inconsistent with the claimed fear of persecution arising as a result of homosexuality. It also seems clear that the Federal Court, acting on the same material or evidence on which the decision was based, would have been satisfied that the first respondent feared persecution as alleged.” In the current case, the Tribunal found that the text of letter provided in support of the applicant’s claims was identical to another letter in a completely different case where similar claims to protection had been made. The Tribunal relied on the absence of an explanation for that remarkable coincidence. The applicant’s inability to provide an explanation as to how identical documents could be prepared by two different sources was, in the circumstances, said to be “indicative” that the document was not genuine ([139] at CB 440). It is the case that a different Tribunal may have come to a different conclusion and, indeed, may have concluded that no weight should be given to the document, without the need to then go and express that the absence of an explanation indicated that the document was not genuine. However, in the current case, it was open to the Tribunal to come to the conclusion it did. The absence of an explanation for this remarkable “coincidence” (in the circumstances, the identical text of both letters) was, in my view, a matter on which the Tribunal could rely given that the applicant himself provided one of the letters to the Tribunal.