SZMXI v Minister for Immigration - [2009] FMCA 240

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZMXI v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR

[2009] FMCA 240

MIGRATION – Review of Refugee Review Tribunal decision – no bias or apprehension of bias – Tribunal not required to uncritically accept applicant’s claims – Tribunal considered all claims and integers of claims – findings were open to the Tribunal on what was before it – Tribunal not required to conduct further inquiries – Tribunal entitled to make findings as to applicant’s credibility – application dismissed.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.424, 427

SBBS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 361
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SBAN [2002] FCAFC 431
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v NAOS of 2002 [2003] FCAFC 142
Randhawa v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1994] FCA 1253; (1994) 52 FCR 437
SJSB v Minister to Immigration Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 225
NAST v Minister for Immigration Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 208
Minister for Immigration Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v VSAF of 2003 [2005] FCAFC 73
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo & Anor [1997] HCA 22, (1997) 191 CLR 559
ReMinister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1; (2000) 168 ALR 407
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang & Ors [1996] HCA 6; (1996) CLR 259
NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10
Applicant NABD of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2005] HCA 29; (2005) 216 ALR 1
NBKT v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 195; (2006) 156 FCR 419
Kopalapillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 1126; (1998) 86 FCR 547
W148/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 185 ALR 703; [2001] FCA 679
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Lee (2007) 164 FCR 151
Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) FCR 155
WADA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 202 at [33]
SZHPD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 157
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507, [2001] HCA 17
SCAA v Minster for Immigration Multicultural and Business Affairs [2002] FCA 668

Applicant:

SZMXI

First Respondent:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

Second Respondent:

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

File Number:

SYG 2868 of 2008

Judgment of:

Nicholls FM

Hearing date:

23 March 2009

Date of Last Submission:

23 March 2009

Delivered at:

Sydney

Delivered on:

27 March 2009

REPRESENTATION

Appearing for the Applicant:

In person

Solicitors for the Applicant:

In person

Appearing for the Respondent:

Mr B May

Solicitors for the Respondent:

Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

The application made on 5 November 2008 and amended on 29 January 2009 is dismissed.
The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs set in the amount of $4,000.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

SYG 2868 of 2008

SZMXI

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(As Corrected)

This is an application made on 5 November 2008, and amended on 29 January 2009, under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”), seeking review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”), which was signed on 23 September 2008, which affirmed the decision of a delegate of the first respondent to refuse a protection visa to the applicant.

Background

The first respondent has put a bundle of relevant documents before the Court (the Court Book – “CB”) from which the following background may be discerned.
The applicant is a citizen of Bangladesh who arrived in Australia in March 2008 (CB 14). He applied for a protection visa on 7 April 2008 (CB 1 to CB 66, including annexures). This application was refused by the delegate on 7 July 2008 (CB 70 to CB 79).
On 30 July 2000 the applicant applied for review of that decision (CB 80 to CP 83). The applicant also provided written submissions to the Tribunal (CB 88 to CB 19) and attended a hearing before the Tribunal on 8 September 2008 (CB 102). The Tribunal’s account of what occurred at the hearing is set out in its decision record (CB 113.5 to CB 118.4).

Claims to protection

The applicant’s claims to fear persecution in Bangladesh were said to arise from circumstances concerning his involvement with the Awami League (“AL”) and fear of harm following the rise of the opposition, Bangladesh National Party (“BNP”) and its ally, Jamaat-e-Islami (“JI”). Ultimately, before the Tribunal, he claimed to fear harm from a variety of sources including BNP, JI, Muslim fundamentalists, business competitors (the applicant claimed to have been involved in a construction business) and from the “interim” (or “caretaker”) government (not aligned with the parties above) that had come to power in Bangladesh a year before his departure.

The Tribunal

After considering the various aspects of the applicant’s claims, particularly as they were enhanced and developed before it, the Tribunal concluded that it was: “not satisfied that the applicant provided a truthful account of his circumstances in Bangladesh or in Australia” (CB 119.4). In particular, the Tribunal found it had: “formed the view that the applicant greatly exaggerated the harm he faced in Bangladesh in the period when the BNP was in power from 2001 to 2006. The Tribunal is not satisfied that he was a person of particular or adverse interest to the BNP, the JI, fundamentalists, their associates, or the authorities” (CB 119.6).
The Tribunal’s findings underpinning these conclusions were variously that it found:
1)Claimed difficulties with business competitors related more to his “business activities”, rather than any particular interest by the government, or anyone associated with the government seeking: “to harm him for political reasons” (CB 119.7). It found further that: “the applicant fabricated the claim to enhance his application” (CB 119.8).
2)It did not accept that the applicant was “credible”, or the applicant’s claim that he was a “prominent” or “influential” member of the Awami League, or any of its affiliated groups, and that claims that he feared harm because of this association from opponents in the BNP, JI, business rivals and fundamentalists were not credible (CB 119.9 to CB 120.4).
3)It did not accept as being credible the applicant’s claim that he had been involved with the Awami League in Australia. It found this to be a fabrication (CB 120.6).
4)The applicant’s claim that a false case had been fabricated against him to be “greatly exaggerated” and not credible (CB 120.8).
5)The authorities and the government did not demonstrate any real interest in apprehending, or mistreating the applicant, for corruption, or any other reason, in the thirteen months before he left Bangladesh (CB 120.4).
6)If the applicant had been a person of interest to the government, with regard to relevant country information, he would have been arrested and investigated (CB 121.7).
7)There was “no real evidence” to support his claim that he was on a “second” wanted list in Bangladesh in relation to corruption charges (CB 121.8).
8)The applicant’s fear that he would be prevented from expressing his political views, or that he would be harmed if he did, was not well-founded (CB 122.5).
9)The Tribunal: “rejected the applicant’s claim that his political opinion was a motivating factor” in attacks, which he had claimed had occurred to him. It: “formed the view” that “business rivalries involving government contracts while the BNP was in power” was the motivating factor. Further, given: “that the circumstances which existed when those attacks took place no longer exist,” the Tribunal was satisfied that he was not currently, or in the reasonably foreseeable future, at risk of attack from business rivals in Bangladesh (CB 123.4).
In all, the Tribunal found that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution in Bangladesh for reasons of political opinion or any other Convention reason, and found that the applicant was not person to whom Australia has protection obligations. It therefore affirmed the decision under review.

Application to the Court

The applicant’s amended application (with some particulars) is in the following terms:
“1. The Refugee Review Tribunal made the decision in bad faith …
[Particulars]
2. The Refugee Review Tribunal acted in excess of its jurisdiction
[Particulars]
3. The Refugee Review Tribunal made a wrong comment about the activities of the interim government and the conditions in Bangladesh.
[Particulars].”
The Court also has before it the applicant’s affidavit of 5 November 2008, which accompanied his application, and his written submissions made on 2 March 2009. For the respondent the Court has the respondent’s response and written submissions filed on 4 March 2009.

Hearing before the Court

At the hearing before the Court, the applicant appeared in person. He was assisted by an interpreter in the Bangla language. Mr May appeared for the first respondent.
At the hearing the applicant submitted:
1)He sought to rely on the matters asserted in his amended application and written submissions. He pressed those matters (as opposed to what was set out in his originating application and the accompanying affidavit).
2)The Tribunal made a “wrong decision” because “without verification” it found against him. He was “treated like others” before the Tribunal, who were similarly unsuccessful.
3)The interim (“caretaker”) government had “faults”, but the Tribunal said that it did not have any faults.
4)When he explained (presumably to the Tribunal) what the caretaker or interim government had done in Bangladesh, the Tribunal had agreed with him, yet it still found against him.
5)He thought the Tribunal would “take” the right decision, but when he received the decision he “didn’t know how” the Tribunal ended up making a “false and wrong” decision.
6)The Tribunal did not give any reasons for the decision, which was arbitrary.
7)Everything that he had stated to the Tribunal was “fact”. That perhaps he had not presented his case “properly”, but that did not mean that it was “false”.
8)That the “true” situation in Bangladesh is not available on the Internet and that the Tribunal should have conducted a “physical verification of conditions in Bangladesh”.

Ground one: Bad faith

In ground one of the amended application, the applicant complains that the Tribunal made its decision in bad faith. This is particularised with reference to the Tribunal’s finding that the applicant had not provided a truthful account of his circumstances in Bangladesh or in Australia, and the Tribunal not accepting the applicant’s claims as being credible.
In written submissions, the applicant explains that he was involved in Awami League politics in Bangladesh, that he had been attacked and had been under pressure and that there were many “international reports” showing that BNP and JI had attacked and killed Awami League leaders and activists. The applicant complains that, despite all of this, the Tribunal said: “that nothing happened to [his] life in that time”. This is said by the applicant to show bad faith on the part of the Tribunal.
As the Minister submits, an allegation of bad faith is a serious matter and must be clearly proved (SBBS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 361, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SBAN [2002] FCAFC 431, and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v NAOS of 2002 [2003] FCAFC 142). Such an allegation challenges the integrity of the decision maker.
The applicant is plainly aggrieved that the Tribunal did not believe his account of what he said had occurred in Bangladesh. Unfortunately for the applicant, the Tribunal is not required to uncritically accept everything, or anything, that an applicant says (Randhawa v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1994] FCA 1253; (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451).
In conducting the review, which it is jurisdictionally charged to conduct, the Tribunal is required to consider each of an applicant’s claims, each aspect of those claims, and to address the question as to whether the applicant is owed protection by Australia. The relevant statutory regime requires the Tribunal, in effect, to reach the requisite level of satisfaction that the person meets the definition of “refugee” as set out in Article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention. In which case, the protection visa must be granted (SJSB v Minister to Immigration Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 225 at [15]- [16], NAST v Minister for Immigration Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 208 at [4]-[5] and Minister for Immigration Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v VSAF of 2003 [2005] FCAFC 73, Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo & Anor [1997] HCA 22, (1997) 191 CLR 559)
To achieve this, it is necessary for the Tribunal to make findings of fact, including findings on credibility. These are for the Tribunal to make (ReMinister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1; (2000) 168 ALR 407), and are not susceptible to review by the Court on their merits (Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang & Ors [1996] HCA 6; (1996) CLR 259).
To the extent that the applicant seeks to complain about factual findings made by the Tribunal, a plain reading of the Tribunal’s decision record reveals that it fully considered each aspect of the applicant’s claims, and made findings which were clearly open to it on the material, and for which it gave reasons (Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang & Ors [1996] HCA 6; (1996) CLR 259).
The basis of the applicant’s assertion of bad faith on the part of the Tribunal is simply not made out on the material before the Court, let alone is there any evidence before the Court to sustain such a serious charge. This ground does not succeed.

Ground two: Excess of jurisdiction

Ground two of the amended application asserts that the Tribunal acted in excess of its jurisdiction. This is particularised with reference to what is said to be Tribunal’s finding that the applicant was: “not attacked by business rivals after the current government came to power”, and its finding that the applicant was not at risk of attack by business rivals in Bangladesh.
The applicant’s submissions assert that the Tribunal: “has given me confirmation that I will not be persecuted for political opinion ... in Bangladesh”. The applicant complains that if he were to return to Bangladesh he would face persecution for this reason, and he complains that the Tribunal did not consider the possibility of future persecution.
This also appears to be directed to a different complaint than that stated in the grounds of the amended application.
In any event, in the amended application the applicant asserts that the Tribunal found that he had not been attacked by business rivals after the current (“interim”) government had come to power.
First, I note that the Tribunal did consider the applicant’s claim to have been attacked by business rivals. However, despite what the applicant now appears to say, his claim to have been attacked by business rivals, was confined to the period of the BNP government, and prior to the time at which the “interim” government came to power. (See, in particular, CB 111.8 to CB 112.3 when “goons” were sent to a meeting to “target him”). The Tribunal accepted (contrary to what is asserted at particular (ii) to ground one) that the applicant did have: “difficulties with business competitors after the BNP came to power and that on three occasions he was physically attacked during that period” (CB 119.7).
The Tribunal found, however, that those difficulties related to his “business activities” rather than any particular interest by the government, or anyone associated with the government, seeking to harm him for political reasons.
Specifically in relation to the particulars in ground two, I cannot see that the applicant ever claimed before the Tribunal to have been physically attacked after the installation of the “interim” government.
It was therefore open to the Tribunal to find that:
“Nevertheless, the Tribunal has formed the view that the attacks against him related to business rivalries involving government contracts while the BNP was in power. The Tribunal finds that the circumstances which existed when those attacks took place no longer exist. The Tribunal is satisfied that with improved conditions under the interim government the applicant will not be prevented from competing for the available work and he will not be at risk of attack from business rivals. The Tribunal finds that the applicant was not attacked by business rivals after the current government came to power and it is satisfied that he is not currently, or in the reasonably foreseeable future, at risk of attack by business rivals in Bangladesh” (CB 123.4).
As the Minister’s written submissions state, the Tribunal was required, in conducting the review, to consider whether the applicant satisfied the relevant criteria for a protection visa. In effect, this required it to assess the risk of future harm to the applicant on return to Bangladesh. The Tribunal, therefore, was acting within jurisdiction in turning its mind as to whether the applicant was at risk of being attacked by business rivals in Bangladesh in the “reasonably foreseeable future”.
Further, the Tribunal did turn its mind (contrary to what is asserted in written submissions) as to whether the applicant would be at risk of future persecution for reason of his political beliefs and activities for the Awami League, and in particular, whether he would face persecution from the BNP and JI as he had claimed to have faced in the past. The Tribunal plainly did turned its mind to this issue, and found (see CB 122 to CB 123) that he would not be at risk of future harm either from his business rivals or from (what was at the time of the Tribunal’s decision) the “current” government. In particular, the Tribunal found that he would be free to express his political opinion if he were to return to Bangladesh (in particular see CB 122.4).
Nor, contrary to written submissions, is the Tribunal required to give “confirmation” that the applicant would “not be persecuted for political opinion”. The Tribunal is jurisdictionally required to assess an applicant’s claims and to reach a level of satisfaction as to the likelihood of those claims causing harm to the applicant on return to the home country. The Tribunal, in my view, comprehensively dealt with the applicant’s claim to fear harm on return to Bangladesh because of his political beliefs and activities for the Awami League. It rejected those claims because of its view of the evidence presented by the applicant, and because of country information available to it. This complaint, in all, does not succeed.

Ground three

Ground three of the amended application complains that the Tribunal made a “wrong comment about the activities of the interim government and the conditions in Bangladesh”. The particulars claim that this is because it found that conditions had improved since the interim government had come to power and that “political targeting” under the previous governments (both political persuasions) had: “decreased significantly under the current government”.

In written submissions, the applicant states that: “There were many international reports” to the effect that: “human rights in Bangladesh were under threat” during the time of the interim or “caretaker” government. For example, that the government had: “banned political and trade union activities and restricted provocative news” and that it was therefore “wrong” of the Tribunal to make the relevant finding that it did.
The Tribunal did consider relevant conditions in Bangladesh under the interim government and relied on what it said was: “information from external sources” to the effect that the applicant would be: “able to express his political opinion without adverse interest from the authorities”. It: “noted that during the state of emergency the government imposed restrictions on political activity.” It found, based on independent country information, that: “even at the height of the restrictions, the AL was still functioning and its members had opportunities and venues to express their views” (CB 122, and see also CB 114.8, CB 115.3, CB 115.6).
It is, of course, as the Minister submits, that the selection and weight of country information is a matter for the Tribunal (NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [11] – [13], Applicant NABD of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2005] HCA 29; (2005) 216 ALR 1 at [8] per Gleeson CJ, NBKT v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 195; (2006) 156 FCR 419 (FC) at [81] – [84])).
While there may have been “many international reports” expressing opinions as set out in the applicant’s written submissions, the applicant’s claims were that should he return to Bangladesh, he would not be able to express his political opinion without attracting adverse interest from the authorities. The Tribunal dealt with this claim made by the applicant, not some broader claim (that he appears to seek to introduce now) that the Tribunal should have been persuaded by reports that claimed that there were restrictions on political activity – claims, in any event, that the Tribunal accepted. That there were restrictions on political activity was acknowledged by the Tribunal.
The issue, however, was whether the circumstances were such that if the applicant were to return to Bangladesh in the reasonably foreseeable future, he would be targeted, and prevented from expressing his political opinion. The Tribunal made findings that that would not be the case. Findings which were clearly open to it on the material before it (Kopalapillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 1126; (1998) 86 FCR 547 at 558-559, W148/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 185 ALR 703; [2001] FCA 679 at [64]-[69] per Tamberlin and Nicholson JJ ).
If the applicant had other country information directly to the contrary, then it is clear that he had ample opportunity before the Tribunal, before, during and after the hearing to have put such information to it.
This ground also does not succeed.

Complaints made at hearing before the Court

It was unclear, despite attempts to solicit further explanations from the applicant at the hearing before the Court, what he meant by the complaint that the Tribunal made a wrong decision “without verification”, and what was meant by “physical verification”.
Ultimately, it would appear that the applicant is aggrieved by, and takes issue with, the Tribunal relying on “information from external sources” in making its findings on the claim by the applicant that the government was targeting the AL and that he would not be able to express his political views in Bangladesh (see, in particular, the Tribunal’s analysis and findings at paragraph [65] of its decision record – CB 122.2 to CB 122.5)
First, to the extent that this may be said to be a complaint that the Tribunal did not properly “investigate his claims” in the sense that it did not properly consider his claims, then a plain reading of the Tribunal’s decision record reveals that this complaint cannot be made out. The Tribunal clearly understood that the applicant was drawing on claimed experiences and the political situation in Bangladesh, over a number of years, and regarding governments of different political hue in Bangladesh.
The Tribunal relied on certain country information in making its findings and conclusions. This is, as already set out above, a matter for the Tribunal itself. While the Tribunal plainly has the power to conduct further investigations and enquiries (per s.424 and s.427, for example), I cannot see that the particular circumstances of this case required the Tribunal to engage the use of these provisions. Such use, of course, being discretionary and not mandatory. Nor was it the case that factual material critical to the consideration of the matters before the Tribunal was readily available (see Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Lee (2007) 164 FCR 151 at 60, Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) FCR 155 at 169 – 170).
The Tribunal is not obliged to conduct further investigations to find other country information that may or may not be of assistance to the applicant. There is no obligation on the Tribunal to conduct enquiries in the way that appears to be implied by the applicant now. I note that the applicant had ample opportunity before the Tribunal to have pressed his claims and to have put to it country information that may have been of assistance to him and I note that the applicant did make written submissions to the Tribunal.
Importantly, however, it is clear from the Tribunal’s unchallenged account of what occurred at the hearing that the Tribunal specifically raised with him the information on which it subsequently relied. See for example:
1)CB 114.6:
“The Tribunal commented that information from external sources indicates that political violence has decreased significantly since the caretaker government came to power ...”
2)CB 114.8:
3)“The Tribunal referred to information from external sources related to the current political situation in Bangladesh”.
(See paragraphs [39] and [40] with further references to this independent information.)
4)CB 115.5:
“The Tribunal noted the applicant’s claim that the government was preventing AL supports from expressing their views. The Tribunal commented that freedom of expression has been limited by the current government but the information from external sources indicates that political activity continues in Bangladesh and that party members have opportunities and venues to express their views”
This latter is directly an answer to the applicant’s complaint that the Tribunal had noted information to the extent that there had been some restrictions imposed by the interim government.
5)CB 115.8:
“The Tribunal commented that information from external sources indicates that the current government was investigating political cases from the previous governments …”
The applicant was plainly on notice as a result of the Tribunal’s discussion at the hearing of the information that the Tribunal would seek to use in relation to political conditions under the caretaker government. I cannot see jurisdictional error in what

the Tribunal has done in this regard.
In relation to the applicant’s complaint that the Tribunal “treated him like others”, Mr May submitted that this could be a complaint that the Tribunal failed to give proper individual attention to the applicant’s claims and circumstances. If this be the case, then I agree with Mr May’s submissions that the decision record shows quite plainly that it did. It directed its questioning to the applicant’s claims and circumstances and gave him an opportunity to comment.
Ultimately, it is plain, that the Tribunal did not believe critical aspects of the applicant’s account and that it relied on independent information available to it in making findings that led to its conclusion that the applicant was not a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations, in that it was not satisfied that he fell within the definition of “refugee” as set out in Article 1A(2) of the Convention
As already stated, these findings were plainly open to the Tribunal on the material before it. It is not for this Court to substitute its own findings as to the merits of the applicant’s claims (see, for example, WADA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 202 at [33] and NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [13]).
The applicant also complains that that he was not aware as to how the Tribunal came to the decision that it did.
In light of the Tribunal’s unchallenged account of what occurred at the hearing, this is either a disingenuous complaint, or the applicant is being purposely obtuse. Any plain reading of the Tribunal’s account of what occurred at the hearing shows very plainly that the Tribunal repeatedly raised its concerns with the applicant’s evidence, and put him on notice of the difficulty that it had in accepting key aspects of his claims. (See, in particular, CB 114.3, CB 114.5. See also:
1)CB 116.7, where the Tribunal: “commented that a more plausible explanation for his lack of knowledge …”
2)Further at CB 117.7, where the Tribunal raised its concerns with “another new claim introduced at the hearing”)
The report of the Tribunal’s comments in these instances, when taken with the instances of country information put to the applicant, make it difficult to understand the applicant’s complaint now that the Tribunal’s adverse decision came, in effect, as a surprise. The Tribunal plainly put the applicant on notice as to the Tribunal’s range of concerns about his account, and how (even if those parts of his account were accepted) it would be viewed in the light of country information. This complaint also does not succeed.
To the extent that this is a complaint of bias or the apprehension of bias on the part of the Tribunal, in addition to the claim of bad faith, there is no evidence before the Court to sustain such a complaint (SZHPD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 157, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507, [2001] HCA 17, SCAA v Minster for Immigration Multicultural and Business Affairs [2002] FCA 668, SBBS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 194 ALR 749; [2002] FCAFC 361).
The applicant’s complaint before the Court that there were no reasons for the Tribunal’s decision, and that its decision was “arbitrary”, is simply not made out on the material before the Court. The Tribunal’s decision record, and its analysis, are comprehensive. Any plain reading would clearly provide to the applicant the reasons as to why the Tribunal found against him. This complaint also does not succeed.

Conclusion

For the applicant to succeed before the Court, jurisdictional error would need to be found in the Tribunal’s decision. I cannot see such error as it is said to arise from the applicant’s complaints, nor otherwise. For this reason, the application is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding fifty-five (55) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Nicholls FM

Associate: C Darcy

Date: 27 March 2009

CORRECTIONS

After paragraph 39 and before paragraph 40 - insert heading: “Complaints made at hearing before the Court”.