SZKFX v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZKFX v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1226

Migration Act1958 (Cth)

Ram v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs & the Refugee Review Tribunal (1995) 57 FCR 565; [1995] FCA 433, Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225 and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Haji Ibrahim (2000) 204 CLR 1
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Re The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs;Ex parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1; (2000) 168 ALR 407
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507
SBBS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 361, (2002) 194 ALR 749
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v NAOS of 2002 [2003] FCAFC 142
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 26; (2007) 235 ALR 609
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; (2006) 228 CLR 152.
WAHU v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 890
Lee v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 464
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; (2003) 198 ALR 59
WACO v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 131 FCR 511; [2003] FCAFC 171
WAJR v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 204 ALR 624; [2004] FCA 106

SZKFX v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

NSD 481 OF 2008

REEVES J
13 AUGUST 2008
DARWIN

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 481 OF 2008

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SZKFX
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

REEVES J

DATE OF ORDER:

13 AUGUST 2008

WHERE MADE:

DARWIN

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

  1.  The appeal be dismissed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 481 OF 2008

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SZKFX
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

REEVES J

DATE:

13 AUGUST 2008

PLACE:

DARWIN

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an appeal against a judgment of Federal Magistrate Nicholls delivered on 28 March 2008, which dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’). The Tribunal’s decision was delivered on 1 February 2007 and affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent to refuse to grant a protection visa to the appellant.

    BACKGROUND – SUMMARY OF FACTS

  2. The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan who came to Australia on ‘shore leave’ from his employment on…

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Details
Case
[2008] FCA 1226
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SZKFX v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship involved the appellant, a Pakistani citizen, who sought judicial review of the decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) to refuse his application for a protection visa. The Tribunal had affirmed the decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship to deny the appellant’s application, finding his claims of fear of persecution in Pakistan were not credible. The appellant argued that the Tribunal erred in its assessment of his credibility and failed to properly consider his claims. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with determining whether the Tribunal's decision contained any jurisdictional or other errors warranting judicial review.

The central legal issue in this appeal was whether the Tribunal erred in its assessment of the appellant's credibility, particularly in light of the appellant's own account of his movements and activities between 1998 and 2005. The court had to decide if the Tribunal's findings on the appellant's credibility were open to it based on the evidence presented and whether there were any errors in law that undermined the Tribunal's decision. The court also needed to consider whether the Tribunal properly evaluated the appellant's claims about his political activities and the alleged persecution he faced in Pakistan.

In addressing these issues, the court emphasised that the Tribunal's conclusion regarding the appellant's credibility was based on his own evidence of his movements and activities. The Tribunal found that the appellant's repeated return to Pakistan and his town of Swat between 1998 and 2005 was inconsistent with his claims of a well-founded fear of persecution. This finding was deemed to be within the Tribunal's fact-finding jurisdiction and was clearly supported by the evidence. The court found that the Tribunal did not err in its assessment of the appellant's credibility or in rejecting his claims based on this finding. Consequently, there was no basis for a jurisdictional error or any other error warranting judicial review.

The Federal Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the Tribunal's decision to refuse the appellant's application for a protection visa. The court held that the Tribunal's conclusion on the appellant's credibility was a factual finding that was open to it on the evidence and was not subject to judicial review.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The appeal be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal against a judgment of Federal Magistrate Nicholls delivered on 28 March 2008, which dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’). The Tribunal’s decision was delivered on 1 February 2007 and affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent to refuse to grant a protection visa to the appellant.BACKGROUND – SUMMARY OF FACTS The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan who came to Australia on ‘shore leave’ from his employment on 14 June 2006. The appellant lodged an application for a protection visa two weeks later, on 29 June 2006. A delegate of the first respondent refused that application on 28 September 2006. The appellant applied to the Tribunal for a review of that decision on 11 October 2006. In his protection visa application, the appellant detailed his claim to fear persecution in Pakistan due to his nationality, his membership of a particular social group and his political opinion, stating that he had always fought to have his sisters educated and that his liberal views eventually brought him to the attention of Islamic fundamentalists. The appellant stated that he had been involved in the Roshni Welfare Society and that he had been targeted by extremists in Swat (his home area). According to the appellant, his video shop was burned down in 1998 to “teach him a lesson” and he was violently attacked on a number of occasions. He moved to Karachi to avoid harm. However, in 2005 he claimed he was again targeted by the same groups. The appellant further claimed that he had sought help from the Pakistani authorities but on two occasions the police had allegedly told him “to keep his mouth shut and nothing would happen”. On a further occasion, although the police took a report, they said they “could not do anything because of the political power and influence these radical clerics carry”. The appellant stated that he obtained employment on an Arabian livestock ship and he failed to return from shore leave when it docked in Fremantle.THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION The appellant attended a hearing before the Tribunal on 22 November 2006 and presented evidence, including his passport. The Tribunal’s Decision Record makes reference to: a letter apparently substantiating the appellant’s work for the Roshni Welfare Society; a membership card for that Society; a similar letter from the Union Council Barabandai Swat; a third letter apparently from the Swat District Police; a document referred to as an incident report; a translation of a membership card for the Pakistan Justice Movement; and a translation of an article about the murder of the social justice activist the appellant had referred to as his ‘mentor’. At the hearing the appellant confirmed that he had obtained these documents for the purposes of his application for protection. A submission lodged by the appellant’s solicitor on 30 October 2006 reiterated that the appellant feared harm on the basis of his political opinion and on the basis of his membership of a particular social group. It was submitted that the appellant’s shop was “attacked and burned in 1998 by religious fanatics who opposed him because they believed the western videos he rented out undermined traditional Islamic religious values” and that the appellant was assaulted seriously in 2005, “after he became involved in a marriage dispute between two families”. However the submission goes on to state that “the persecution suffered by [the appellant] he attributes to his social work activities ...”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Tribunal’s decision on the appellant’s credibility is encapsulated in the following paragraph of its Decision Record:The Tribunal does not accept that the applicant feared harm in his country for any Convention reason, either in his town of Swat or anywhere else before 2005. It is clear from the applicant’s own oral evidence to the tribunal that he was living and working in his country returning to his town to live over the period 1998 until 2005, including after he did his seaman’s training in 1998 and after he travelled overseas on two occasions in the course of his duties as a merchant seaman. In the Tribunal’s view these facts are not consistent with his claims that he feared harm in Pakistan during this time. When the Tribunal asked him why he returned to his country and to his town if he was afraid of harm he gave no reasonable explanation and … then said the real danger happened in 2005. The Tribunal does not accept as true that there was a fire in the applicant’s shop and he went to Karachi in 1998 for the reasons that he claims because he was afraid of harm. He in fact lived, worked in the ink factory and did his seaman’s training in Karachi and afterwards returned to his town in Swat after six months according to his evidence. He did not give reasonable explanation to the Tribunal of why he returned to Swat after six months if he left there because he feared harm there arising out of the fire”.(emphasis added) From this paragraph it is quite clear that the Tribunal found that the appellant did not fear harm for a Convention-related reason because, if he genuinely did fear that harm from Muslim extremists in Swat, or in Pakistan generally, as a result of his welfare work or his political beliefs, he would not have constantly returned to Pakistan and his home town of Swat between 1998 and 2005. Based upon this seminal conclusion as to his credibility, the Tribunal rejected the appellant’s claims one by one. In particular, it rejected his claims about being a welfare worker, and being a member of either the Roshni Welfare Society or the political organisation to which he claimed he belonged. My emphasis above highlights the fact that the Tribunal relied upon the appellant’s own account of his movements to and from Swat; and in and out of Pakistan, over that period, to reach this adverse conclusion on his credibility. It is a conclusion that was therefore clearly open on the evidence. That being so, it could not provide the basis for a ‘no evidence’ error of law. Conversely, it constitutes a factual finding that was squarely within the Tribunal’s fact finding jurisdiction. It was a matter for the Tribunal “par excellence”, as the Federal Magistrate observed. Furthermore, once the determinative effect of this conclusion is appreciated, it soon becomes apparent that the appellant’s complaints about: the Tribunal’s unduly harsh approach to the issue of his “well-founded fear” of persecution; or the Tribunal’s approach in designing and asking questions in a way that confused him; or its approach to the “real chance test” and the Convention terms “well founded fear” and “refugee”; or its approach in questioning the appellant from the perspective of his fear of the harm rather than addressing the motive of those threatening the harm; all become irrelevant. This is so because the Tribunal concluded as a matter of fact that he held no such fear, based upon the view it took of his own evidence.

Decision

Reasons for decision

REEVES J
The appellant further claimed that he had sought help from the Pakistani authorities but on two occasions the police had allegedly told him “to keep his mouth shut and nothing would happen”. On a further occasion, although the police took a report, they said they “could not do anything because of the political power and influence these radical clerics carry”. The appellant stated that he obtained employment on an Arabian livestock ship and he failed to return from shore leave when it docked in Fremantle.THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION The appellant attended a hearing before the Tribunal on 22 November 2006 and presented evidence, including his passport. The Tribunal’s Decision Record makes reference to: a letter apparently substantiating the appellant’s work for the Roshni Welfare Society; a membership card for that Society; a similar letter from the Union Council Barabandai Swat; a third letter apparently from the Swat District Police; a document referred to as an incident report; a translation of a membership card for the Pakistan Justice Movement; and a translation of an article about the murder of the social justice activist the appellant had referred to as his ‘mentor’. At the hearing the appellant confirmed that he had obtained these documents for the purposes of his application for protection. A submission lodged by the appellant’s solicitor on 30 October 2006 reiterated that the appellant feared harm on the basis of his political opinion and on the basis of his membership of a particular social group. It was submitted that the appellant’s shop was “attacked and burned in 1998 by religious fanatics who opposed him because they believed the western videos he rented out undermined traditional Islamic religious values” and that the appellant was assaulted seriously in 2005, “after he became involved in a marriage dispute between two families”. However the submission goes on to state that “the persecution suffered by [the appellant] he attributes to his social work activities ...”. The Tribunal records that it asked the appellant detailed questions about his work history and his travel prior to coming to Australia, including the amount of time he spent doing social justice work and the amount of time he lived in Swat. When the Tribunal asked the appellant why he returned to Swat if he feared he would suffer harm there, the appellant’s explanation was “the real danger happened in 2005”. In its ‘Findings and Reasons’, the Tribunal did not accept that the appellant had feared persecution in Pakistan at any time before 2005, as he had continued to reside in Swat between 1998 and 2005 despite the alleged threat to his safety, and he was unable to reasonably explain why he had returned there from Karachi in 1998 within six months of the destruction of his video shop. Due to inconsistencies in the appellant’s account and documents, the Tribunal found that he was not a witness of truth and did not accept his claims to have been involved in welfare work, or to have been a member of the Roshni Welfare Society. It found that the latter claim was “invented … to assist his application for protection”. Further, the Tribunal noted that the appellant claimed to have worked for welfare groups from approximately 1997, but conversely he claimed to suffer no harm from his welfare work or political involvement until 2005. It also noted that the appellant had admitted that his video business had been burned down, not because of his claimed political views or membership of a particular social group, but because he was “dealing in videos and was wrongly influencing the community”. The Tribunal found that the appellant’s claim that he went into hiding in Karachi in August/October 2005 was not plausible and instead found that the appellant was living there and awaiting contact for work on his ship (as in fact occurred in October 2005).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: REEVES J

In his oral submissions before me, Mr Cleary emphasised the point made in the outline of written submissions that Tribunal had rejected the appellant’s claims on credibility grounds and this was a finding of fact that was open to the Tribunal on the evidence. He submitted that there was therefore no error in the Tribunal’s decision, let alone jurisdictional error.CONSIDERATION I entirely agree with the Federal Magistrate’s observation (see [2008] FMCA 292 at [49]) that “the determinative issue in this case was the Tribunal’s rejection of the plausibility of the applicant’s evidence – both oral and documentary”. The Tribunal’s decision on the appellant’s credibility is encapsulated in the following paragraph of its Decision Record:The Tribunal does not accept that the applicant feared harm in his country for any Convention reason, either in his town of Swat or anywhere else before 2005. It is clear from the applicant’s own oral evidence to the tribunal that he was living and working in his country returning to his town to live over the period 1998 until 2005, including after he did his seaman’s training in 1998 and after he travelled overseas on two occasions in the course of his duties as a merchant seaman. In the Tribunal’s view these facts are not consistent with his claims that he feared harm in Pakistan during this time. When the Tribunal asked him why he returned to his country and to his town if he was afraid of harm he gave no reasonable explanation and … then said the real danger happened in 2005. The Tribunal does not accept as true that there was a fire in the applicant’s shop and he went to Karachi in 1998 for the reasons that he claims because he was afraid of harm. He in fact lived, worked in the ink factory and did his seaman’s training in Karachi and afterwards returned to his town in Swat after six months according to his evidence. He did not give reasonable explanation to the Tribunal of why he returned to Swat after six months if he left there because he feared harm there arising out of the fire”.(emphasis added) From this paragraph it is quite clear that the Tribunal found that the appellant did not fear harm for a Convention-related reason because, if he genuinely did fear that harm from Muslim extremists in Swat, or in Pakistan generally, as a result of his welfare work or his political beliefs, he would not have constantly returned to Pakistan and his home town of Swat between 1998 and 2005. Based upon this seminal conclusion as to his credibility, the Tribunal rejected the appellant’s claims one by one. In particular, it rejected his claims about being a welfare worker, and being a member of either the Roshni Welfare Society or the political organisation to which he claimed he belonged. My emphasis above highlights the fact that the Tribunal relied upon the appellant’s own account of his movements to and from Swat; and in and out of Pakistan, over that period, to reach this adverse conclusion on his credibility. It is a conclusion that was therefore clearly open on the evidence. That being so, it could not provide the basis for a ‘no evidence’ error of law. Conversely, it constitutes a factual finding that was squarely within the Tribunal’s fact finding jurisdiction. It was a matter for the Tribunal “par excellence”, as the Federal Magistrate observed.