SZJTK v Minister for Immigration
[2008] FMCA 839
•25 June 2008
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZJTK v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2008] FMCA 839 |
| MIGRATION – Application to review decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – hearing conducted via video-link – whether failure to comply with s.425 of the Migration Act – whether inadequate interpretation – whether failure to consider applicant’s claims. |
| Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.424A, 425, 429A, 430 |
| M175 of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1212 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 Perera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 92 FCR 6 SZJYD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FMCA 452 SZJYD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 798 SZLAJ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship & Anor [2007] FMCA 1695 WACO v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 131 FCR 511 |
| Applicant: | SZJTK |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 3504 of 2006 |
| Judgment of: | Barnes FM |
| Hearing date: | 17 April 2008 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 29 May 2008 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 25 June 2008 |
REPRESENTATION
| Applicant: | In person |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Blake Dawson |
ORDERS
That the application be dismissed.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 3504 of 2006
| SZJTK |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Background
This is an application for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal handed down on 2 November 2006 affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
The applicant, a citizen of India, arrived in Australia in May 2006 and applied for a protection visa. He claimed to be a Muslim and a member of the local Muslim community organisation Al-Ummah, whose family had employed Dalit people as workers on their farm and supported them by providing education. He claimed that RSS and BHS activists threatened that the Dalits might convert to Islam if they were supported by the applicant’s family and warned the family not to help the Dalits. He claimed that after he raised this with his community at the mosque the RSS and BHS activists accused him of being a terrorist and filed a false case against him. He claimed that the Hindu extremists forced the police to arrest him and that his parents had to pay a large amount to have him released. He claimed that while in custody he was tortured and asked to make a statement that he was involved with terrorists.
The applicant also claimed that during a Hindu festival their house was ransacked by extremists. His parents were injured and forced to leave the village. He was not at home at that time, but thereafter decided to leave India. He worked in Saudi Arabia between 1997 and 2004. He claimed to fear arrest, torture and persecution as he would be perceived as a possible sympathiser or a person with links to “any Muslim movements” with a political opinion opposed to the majority Hindus.
The application was refused by a delegate of the first respondent. The applicant sought review by the Tribunal. He attended a Tribunal hearing.
Tribunal Decision
In its reasons for decision the Tribunal outlined the applicant’s evidence, including a claim that he returned to India for two months in 2000 (during which time he married), for two months in 2002 and then in 2004 to stay with his family. He claimed that in 2004 RSS and BHS activists became aware he was in India after a couple of months and started looking for him. He claimed that in November 2004 people took him away and beat him up. He claimed that he was taken to a police station but that no formal complaint was recorded.
The Tribunal recorded that the applicant then decided to go to another part of India and that he did not experience any further harm, although he was concerned that the people causing him problems wanted to kill him. The applicant’s oral evidence was that the incident that caused him to leave India was the incident in November 2004. He had not been arrested before 2004, although he was hassled. The applicant travelled to Thailand in June 2005. He claimed that while he was in Thailand there was a “massive riot” in his home village which reminded him of his past experiences.
The applicant claimed that if he returned to India the police, politically-motivated radical Hindus and other political adversaries would harass and seriously harm or perhaps kill him without any fear of the authorities.
The Tribunal recorded that after the hearing it wrote to the applicant under s.424A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) inviting him to comment on a number of items of information, including what were said to be inconsistencies in his written and oral evidence. Such information was said to be relevant because it raised concerns about his credibility. The applicant replied to the s.424A letter by letter dated 27 September 2006. In that letter he complained that the Tribunal hearing had been conducted by video conference link and that he could not properly understand the interpreter who was from Sri Lanka. He claimed that this was reflected in his oral statement and that he realised when he read the s.424A letter the inconsistencies in his evidence had happened due to misinterpretation.
The applicant then reiterated the claims he had made in connection with his protection visa application, also stating that he feared he would be killed as a consequence of his “religious beliefs” being “in a Muslim minority from India and liberal thinking which contradicts with the Hindu extremists”.
The Tribunal noted the applicant’s claim that any conflict in his oral evidence resulted from misinterpretation due to difficulties he had with the interpreter at the Tribunal hearing. It stated that it took into account the applicant’s reiteration of his first version of events which he said caused him to leave India prior to 1997. It continued:
However the applicant had ample opportunity to inform the Tribunal at the time of the hearing if there was any difficulty with the interpreter and he did not take up that opportunity. For this reason the inconsistencies must remain a matter the Tribunal takes into account in assessing the applicant’s credibility in a negative way.
The Tribunal accepted the applicant’s account of his life working on his parents’ farm and the involvement of the family with the Dalit people prior to 1997 and that thereafter he went to Saudi Arabia.
It described the applicant’s oral evidence in relation to his political activities, including his evidence that he was a member of Al-Ummah and that when he was asked how long he remained a member he had stated that he was involved in 1995, 2000 and 2002 but not on his return to India in 2004 as the group had been banned. The Tribunal rejected the claim that the applicant was a member of Al-Ummah, not being satisfied on the evidence before it that he was a member of this or any other Muslim organisation. In reaching this conclusion the Tribunal had regard to inconsistencies in the accounts the applicant had variously given. The Tribunal referred to the fact that initially the applicant had claimed that in 1997 he was arrested and had a false case brought against him, that his parents had to pay for his release and that while in custody he was asked to make a statement that he was involved with “terrorist people”. Subsequently he had contended there was no incident until 2004 when he was taken away, blackmailed and beaten. Later still, he had qualified this evidence by saying that he was not put in prison but was blindfolded, taken to another place and blackmailed. The Tribunal found that “all this” led it to reject the truth of his claims. The second matter it had regard to in rejecting the applicant’s claim about membership of Al-Ummah or any other Muslim organisation was the applicant’s “ease and regularity” in returning to his home town to visit and stay with his family, including his admission that his visit to India in 2004 was a two month vacation which he later extended to seven months. It found that this was not credible against the background of problems and contentions he made.
As it found that the applicant was not a member of Al-Ummah the Tribunal did not accept the claim that the RSS and BHS took the chance during a rally to ransack the applicant’s parents’ house and look for him or that his parents were injured as a result of such incident and forced to flee.
The Tribunal rejected the applicant’s claims that any inconsistencies in the evidence were due to misinterpretation by the interpreter at the hearing, indicating that it had “afforded the applicant the opportunity to let it know if there were any difficulties in relation to interpreter services or not understanding” the procedures of the Tribunal and that he had made no complaint.
The Tribunal addressed the applicant’s claim that on 12 September 2005, while he was in Thailand, a riot occurred in his home village. It found that as the applicant had not provided any details as to the nature of the riot or why it would lead to him being targeted for a Convention reason and as he was in Bangkok at the time, it did not accept that should the applicant return to India in the reasonably foreseeable future he would face a real chance of persecution for a Convention reason because of the riot.
The Tribunal accepted the applicant’s evidence that during his visit to India in 2004 he obtained a visa for Thailand and that he did not leave India until June 2005. The Tribunal took this into account as well as his delay in applying for protection, despite many departures from India between 1997 and 2005.
The Tribunal found, based on the applicant’s work history and freedom of travel between India and Saudi Arabia over some seven years, that he chose to leave India for the purpose of employment opportunities and not for a Convention reason and that his willingness to travel to India indicated that he did not have a fear of persecution for any alleged involvement in Al-Ummah. The Tribunal found that this supported its finding that he was not involved in Al-Ummah.
The Tribunal concluded that the applicant had not been seriously harmed in the past and that there was nothing before it to support the claim that should he return to India he would face a real chance of serious harm in the reasonably foreseeable future on account of his religion, political opinion (actual or imputed) or other Convention ground by Hindu groups or the authorities.
The Tribunal also considered the applicant’s claim to be depressed and traumatised over his situation and the violence and unrest in India. It found that such sufferings as the applicant may have were not for a Convention reason. It was not satisfied that the applicant was a person to whom Australia had protection obligations under the Refugees Convention and affirmed the decision of the delegate.
This application
The applicant sought review by application filed in this Court on 27 November 2006. He filed an amended application on 26 April 2007 but now relies on a further amended application filed in Court on 25 February 2008 which takes issue with the fact the Tribunal member was not “physically present” in the same place as the applicant for the Tribunal hearing and contends that the Tribunal failed to consider an integer of his claims. The grounds in the further amended applications were addressed in oral submissions by each of the parties on 25 February 2008.
In oral submissions the applicant also sought to raise a new issue, challenging the adequacy of the interpretation at the Tribunal hearing and raising the issue of the use of a Sri Lankan Tamil interpreter who he suggested had a different vocabulary. As it was not clear whether he had been provided with a copy of the Tribunal hearing tapes he was given a further opportunity to file a transcript and any affidavit evidence, including expert evidence, in support of this claim.
Subsequently the applicant filed an affidavit that annexed what appears to be translation of an Indian magazine article of 23 September 2005 and an English language transcript of the Tribunal hearing. The affidavit does not address the applicant’s claim about interpretation at the Tribunal hearing.
The first respondent objected to the admissibility of the newspaper article that refers to a riot of 12 September 2005 as there was no evidence that it was before the Tribunal and it went only to the merits of the applicant’s claims before the Tribunal and not to any legal issue before the Court. I agree. Merits review is not available in this Court.
The Minister did not object to the transcript, but indicated in submissions that a defect had been identified. Subsequently an affidavit of Angela Louise Radich was filed on 16 April 2008 annexing (for completeness) a transcript of a part of the hearing that was omitted from the transcript provided by the applicant. The applicant did not take issue with this addition to the transcript.
At a subsequent directions hearing orders were made for each of the parties to file written submissions in relation to any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal hearing. However the applicant’s written submissions filed on 1 May 2008 did not address the conduct of the hearing or the interpretation, but raised different issues to which I will turn, as was pointed out in the first respondent’s further supplementary submissions of 14 May 2008. Nor did the applicant’s submissions in reply of 29 May 2008 address the Tribunal hearing.
I am satisfied that the applicant had the opportunity to put evidence before the Court and make submissions addressing any concern in relation to interpretation issue at the Tribunal hearing.
The transcript of the Tribunal hearing does not establish the claim that the interpretation provided at the hearing was defective or otherwise inadequate, let alone defective to the degree or in relation to matters of such significance that would establish a jurisdictional error (see Perera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 92 FCR 6; WACO v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 131 FCR 511; and M175 of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1212). I note that after outlining the hearing procedure and describing the scope of the Refugee Convention and the role of the Tribunal, the Tribunal asked the applicant if he had any questions. He replied “no”.
The Tribunal then explained the role of the interpreter and asked the applicant if he had “any objection to this interpreter?” The applicant replied “no” (Transcript p.4)
There is nothing in the English language transcript to establish the applicant’s claims of difficulties with the interpreter. In his response to hearing invitation he had indicated that he needed a “Tamil” language interpreter and there is no indication that he took issue with the interpreter during the hearing. Nor is there anything to indicate unresponsiveness or misunderstanding on the part of the Tribunal or the applicant such as to indicate defective or inadequate interpretation or difficulties attributable to different dialects. The interpreter did state towards the end of the hearing that “He is very disjointed. I can’t make sense of what he is saying” (Transcript p.19). It is not clear whether this remark was (as seems in context, more likely) a comment of the interpreter about the applicant’s evidence or a translation of a remark by the applicant. In any event the Tribunal proceeded to address the same issue again receiving a reply from the applicant which was responsive and comprehensible.
Indeed it is apparent from the transcript of the Tribunal hearing that the Tribunal member was at pains to ensure that the applicant paused often to allow the interpreter to translate. While there was some lack of clarity in his responses on occasion there is nothing in the material before the Court to indicate that this was attributable to interpretation difficulties. Nor, despite the opportunity given to the applicant to file affidavit evidence, is there any evidence before the Court identifying specific mistranslations or misunderstandings or the manner in which the provision of an interpreter who the applicant contends was from Sri Lanka was such as to mean that there was a failure by the Tribunal to comply with s.425 of the Migration Act. No jurisdictional error is established on this basis.
The video-link issue
The first ground in the further amended application is that the Tribunal failed to provide the applicant with an opportunity to appear before it and thus failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of s.425(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
The particulars to this ground are as follows:
1. Section 425 mandates an oral hearing at which both the applicant and the Tribunal are physically present (giving the word “before” its natural English meaning, in the context, of “in front of”) in the one place, in order that the applicant may present their case.
2. The Tribunal was not physically present at the hearing, because the Tribunal was in Melbourne, not in Sydney, and thus the applicant did not “appear before” the Tribunal.
In essence the applicant took issue with the fact that the Tribunal hearing was conducted by way of video conference link. However s.429A of the Act is as follows:
For the purposes of the review of a decision, the Tribunal may allow the appearance by the applicant before the Tribunal, or the giving of evidence by the applicant or any other person, to be by:
a) telephone; or
b) closed circuit television; or
c) any other means of communication.
In light of this provision it has not been established that the conduct of the hearing by way of a video link facility constituted a breach of s.425 of the Act. I agree that, as Federal Magistrate Smith stated in SZJYD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FMCA 452 at [30] in relation to a hearing conducted by video-link, s.429A is an empowering provision which allows the Tribunal on its own motion to arrange a hearing in which the member constituting the Tribunal “is physically separated from the hearing room at which the applicant has attended” and to conduct the hearing by any means of communication. On appeal (see SZJYD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 798) Moore J recorded that Federal Magistrate Smith had considered the legality of conducting a proceeding by way of video link, referring to s.429A of the Act. Moore J did not suggest that Smith FM erred in his conclusion. Similarly no jurisdictional error has been established on this basis in this instance. (Also see to the same effect SZLAJ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship & Anor [2007] FMCA 1695 at [2]).
More generally, the fact that the Tribunal conducted the hearing by way of video link has not been shown to be such that in the particular circumstances of this case the applicant was not afforded the requisite opportunity under s.425 to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review. While the applicant filed a transcript of the Tribunal hearing he did not refer to any part of that transcript in support of any argument that the conduct of the hearing by way of video link gave rise to a jurisdictional error. There is nothing in the transcript to establish his contention that because the hearing was conducted by way of video link he was confused and in some way unable to present his case. It is apparent from the transcript that at the end of the hearing the Tribunal member gave the applicant the opportunity to tell it anything further he wanted to say about his application or his fears or concerns. The applicant indicated “okay, nothing more” and after the Tribunal explained the closing procedures for the hearing the applicant stated “don’t know how to explain, thinking all kinds of things but I don’t know how to explain”. However he did not elaborate on this generally expressed concern and, in particular, did not suggest that he had any particular issue either at this or at any other stage in the Tribunal hearing with the conduct of the hearing by way of video link or, as discussed above, with the interpretation. No jurisdictional error is established on the basis contended for in ground 1 of the further amended application.
The integers of the applicant’s claim
The second ground in the further amended application is “The Tribunal failed to consider an integer of the applicant’s claim, in failing to consider whether or not a liberal Muslim (regardless of their specific claims of affiliation or past persecution) in India was at risk of harm from radical Hindus, and not able to access effective protection”.
The applicant did not address this ground in his oral submissions or in his later written submissions. As counsel for the first respondent recognised, a number of claims made by the applicant could be seen as possibly relevant to this ground of review. The applicant claimed that he feared harm as a Muslim from radical Hindus, that he feared harm by reason of his actual or perceived links to Muslim movements (in particular Al-Ummah, the local Muslim community organisation), that he was perceived to be a person with a political opinion opposed to the majority and that he stood against the opinions of certain Hindu groups who did not want him to support the Dalits that he employed.
In both his protection visa application and response to the s.424A letter he claimed to fear “the police and politically motivated radical Hindus and other political adversaries in India” and in his s.424A response added that he sought refugee status because he would be killed if he returned to India “as a consequence of my religious beliefs (sic). I am a Muslim minority from India and liberal thinking, which contradicts with the Hindu extremists.”
In its reasons for decision the Tribunal referred to the applicant’s claims about supporting Dalits and summarised his claims that he feared harm from (inter alia) politically-motivated radical Hindus and other political adversaries. It made findings in relation to certain specific claims which it disbelieved (such as the applicant’s claim to be a member of Al-Ummah or any other Muslim organisation). After referring to matters such as the absence of detail or explanation as to why the applicant would face persecution for a Convention reason because of the claimed riot of 12 September 2005 and the evidence about his travel and work history, it found that he chose to leave India for the purpose of employment opportunities, not for a Convention reason. It then stated:
The Tribunal finds the applicant has not been seriously harmed in the past. The Tribunal finds there is nothing before the Tribunal to support the claim that should the applicant return to India he would face a real chance of serious harm in the reasonably foreseeable future on account of his religion, political opinion (actual or imputed) or other Convention ground by Hindu groups or the authorities.
The Tribunal rejected the applicant’s claim to have suffered serious harm in the past. It found that there was nothing before it to support a claim that he faced harm for reasons of his religion or his actual or imputed political opinion should he return to India by Hindu groups or the authorities. I am satisfied that insofar as the applicant’s claims raised a general claim based simply on his religion or that he feared harm from radical Hindus as a liberal Muslim it is apparent from the Tribunal decision as a whole that such claims were addressed by this Tribunal finding, which can be characterised as a finding at a higher level of generality, consistent with a statement by McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at [91] that:
… In rejecting the argument that the two attacks it accepted had occurred could give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution, the Tribunal made a finding that Hawiye plan was not targeting the Abaskul clan. This finding, being a finding of a higher level of generality than the question of specific incidents, may well explain why the Tribunal made no detailed finding about the house invasion. That being so, it is not demonstrated that the Tribunal made some error of law. It is not shown that it failed to take account of a relevant matter or that it asked itself the wrong question.
While the Tribunal’s ultimate finding was at a very high level of generality, it is clear (from the Tribunal’s account of the applicant’s claims, its rejection of his claims about past harm and the finding that he did not leave India for a Convention reason or have a real chance of persecution for a Convention reason because of the subsequent riot as well as its reference to his delay in leaving India and seeking protection when outside India) that it understood and addressed the applicant’s claims to fear harm from radical Hindus for any Convention reason and that he would not be able to access effective protection in relation to such a claimed fear of harm.
In his response to the s.424A letter the applicant described himself as a “Muslim minority from India and liberal thinking, which contradicts with Hindu extremists” in the context of claiming that he feared he would be killed as a consequence of his religious beliefs. The Tribunal set out this response in its reasons for decision. It is apparent, reading the Tribunal decision fairly and as a whole, that it considered not only the applicant’s claims on the basis of his claimed membership of Al-Ummah, but also more generally, in finding that he had not been seriously harmed in the past at all and that there was nothing before it to support a claim that he would face a real chance of serious harm on account of his religion or actual or imputed political opinion or indeed for any other Convention ground by Hindu groups or the authorities. The Tribunal considered but rejected this aspect of the applicant’s claims. Consistent with this conclusion is the fact that the Tribunal found that based on the applicant’s work history and freedom of travel between India and Saudi Arabia over some seven years, he chose to leave India for the purpose of employment opportunities in Saudi Arabia (and later in Thailand) and not for a Convention reason.
As indicated, the Tribunal also addressed the applicant’s claims in relation to a fear of persecution based on the fact that a riot had occurred in his home village on 12 September 2005, finding that he did not provide any details as to the nature of the riot or why it would lead to his being targeted for a Convention reason and as he was in Bangkok at the time it did not accept that he would face a real chance of persecution for a Convention reason because of the riot should he return to India in the reasonably foreseeable future.
Further, while the Tribunal dealt specifically with the applicant’s claim to be a member of Al-Ummah it also found that it was not satisfied on the evidence before it that he was a member of any other Muslim organisation. No jurisdictional error is established on the basis contended for in ground two of the further amended application.
Section 430 issue
In his written submission of 1 May 2008 the applicant did not address the conduct of the hearing or the interpretation, but contended first that the Tribunal failed to record its decision in accordance with s.430 of the Migration Act.
The first particular to this ground is that the Tribunal made no finding as to the extent or nature of the persecution suffered by the applicant. Insofar as this is a further ground, it is not made out. The Tribunal found that the applicant had not been seriously harmed in the past. It found that his claims in that respect were inconsistent and that his ease and regularity in returning to visit his family were not credible against the background of claimed “problems and contentions”.
The applicant also contended that the Tribunal found that any persecution he suffered was not for any Convention reason but did not give reasons for the finding. As indicated, the Tribunal found that the applicant had not been seriously harmed in the past and that there was “nothing before it” to support his claim of a real chance of future serious harm for any Convention reason. The Tribunal considered the applicant’s claim to be depressed and traumatised in relation to his situation and the violence and unrest he claimed existed in India, but found that such sufferings as the applicant may have were not for a Convention reason.
There is nothing in the material before the Court to indicate that the applicant raised a Convention reason for his depression and trauma, beyond the matters addressed by the Tribunal in its findings and reasons based on his religion and actual or imputed political opinion and his claim to fear Hindu groups or the authorities. The Tribunal was not obliged to identify any non-Convention reason for the applicant’s state of mind. Its findings in that respect are consistent with its earlier findings that the applicant had not been seriously harmed in the past and that there was nothing to support his claim that he would face a real chance of serious harm for a Convention reason should he return to India.
The next particular is that the Tribunal “failed to record the material facts for the reasons referred to above”. This contention is not made out. The Tribunal made the requisite findings on which it based its conclusion. I note, in any event, that insofar as it is contended that there was a breach of s.430 of the Migration Act this would not establish jurisdictional error (see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323).
The last particular is that the Tribunal “failed to determine the chances of the applicant being persecuted should he return to India”. Contrary to this contention the Tribunal did assess the applicant’s prospects of facing harm in the future, but found that he did not face a real chance of serious harm for a Convention reason.
It has not been established that the Tribunal failed to analyse properly the “future harm” the applicant may face if he returned to India or that due to such a failure the Tribunal failed to assess the “real chance” before dismissing the applicant’s claim as contended. No jurisdictional error is established on the basis contended for in the submission of 1 May 2008.
Other Issues
In further supplementary submissions of 29 May 2008 in reply to submissions of the first respondent the applicant again raised fresh issues unrelated to the Tribunal hearing. He contended that the Tribunal had failed to consider his claim that he feared persecution on the basis of membership of the Al-Ummah organisation. This claim is not made out. The Tribunal considered, but rejected, his claim to be a member of this or any other Muslim organisation.
He also claimed that the Tribunal accepted that he was “depressed and traumatised over [his] situation and the violence and unrest exists in India”, but failed to take into account the well founded fear of persecution he had experienced and would experience. It was contended that the Tribunal had failed to assess or carry out the “real chance” test.
However, as discussed above, while the Tribunal “noted” the applicant’s claim to be “depressed and traumatised” it found that such sufferings as he may have were not for a Convention reason. Given that it had found that he had not suffered past serious harm and that there was nothing before it to support his claim that he would face a real chance of serious harm for a Convention reason by Hindu groups or the authorities, no jurisdictional error is demonstrated in its consideration of the applicant’s claim of depression and trauma.
As no jurisdictional error has been established the application must be dismissed.
I certify that the preceding fifty-five (55) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Barnes FM
Associate:
Date: 25 June 2008
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