SZJFP & Anor v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZJFP & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2007] FMCA 1320
MIGRATION – Review of Refugee Review Tribunal decision – refusal of a Protection (Class XA) visa – no reviewable error – application dismissed.
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s.39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.91X, 424A, 425, 476
Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth), rr.44.11(c), 44.12
Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510
Algama v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 115 FCR 253
Applicant NAHF of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 140
Huo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 383
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
NALQ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2004] FCAFC 121
Re Minister; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 26
Sreeram v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 106 FCR 578
Xiao v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1472
W148/00A v Minister (2001) 108 ALR 703
WAEE v Minister [2003] FCAFC 184
Win v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 105 FCR 212
Zeng v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2007] FMCA 169
First Applicant: SZJFP
Second Applicant: SZJFQ
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP
Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: SYG2289 of 2006
Judgment of: Lloyd-Jones FM
Hearing date: 19 June 2007
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 14 August 2007

REPRESENTATION

Advocate for the Applicants: The applicants appeared in person with the assistance of a Mandarin interpreter
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr B O’Donnell
Solicitors for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

  1. The name of the first respondent be amended to read ‘Minister for Immigration and Citizenship’.

  2. The application filed on 17 August 2006 is dismissed.

  3. The applicants are to pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

SYG2289 of 2006

SZJFP

First Applicant

SZJFQ

Second Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

The Proceedings

  1. The applicants in these proceedings are not to be identified pursuant to s.91X of the Act and have been given the pseudonyms “SZJFP” (applicant husband) and “SZJFQ” (applicant wife).

  2. These proceedings were commenced by an application under s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) invoking s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) filed in the Sydney Registry of the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia on 17 August 2006 for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”). The Tribunal decision was made on 6 July 2006 and the applicants were notified by letter on 18 July 2006. The decision affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent made on 10 March 2006, refusing to grant the applicants a Protection (Class XA) visa. The applicants seek relief in the form…

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Details
Case
[2007] FMCA 1320
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SZJFP & Anor v Minister for Immigration involved the appellants, SZJFP and another, who were challenging a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT) that had affirmed the decision of the Minister for Immigration to refuse their application for a protection visa. The primary legal issues that the court had to address were whether the Tribunal had correctly interpreted and applied sections 424A and 425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in its review of the Minister's decision. The appellants argued that the Tribunal had breached these sections by failing to properly consider certain information provided in their statutory declarations and by not providing a real and meaningful opportunity for them to be heard.

The court examined the statutory framework and the obligations imposed on the Tribunal under sections 424A and 425. In relation to section 424A, the court noted that the Tribunal's decision to affirm the Minister's decision did not depend on the Tribunal's reasoning but rather on the statutory criteria for the decision. The court found that the Tribunal had correctly identified the statutory criterion relevant to the Minister's decision and had appropriately considered the information provided by the appellants in light of that criterion. As for section 425, the court held that the Tribunal had indeed provided a real and meaningful opportunity for the appellants to be heard, as required by the statute. The court rejected the appellants' contention that they had not been given a proper opportunity to present their case, finding that the Tribunal had adequately considered the issues raised by the appellants.

The court concluded that the appellants' appeal was without merit, and dismissed the application. The orders included an amendment to the name of the respondent to reflect a change in the ministerial portfolio, dismissal of the application, and an award of costs to the respondent.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The name of the first respondent be amended to read ‘Minister for Immigration and Citizenship’.

2.

The application filed on 17 August 2006 is dismissed.

3.

The applicants are to pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

Additionally, the first respondent does not accept that the Tribunal’s reasons are relevant to determining whether there has been a breach of s.424A. The question must be determined in advance. As the majority said in SZBYR at [17]:Secondly, the appellants assumed, but did not demonstrate, that the statutory declaration "would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review". The statutory criterion does not, for example, turn on "the reasoning process of the Tribunal", or "the Tribunal's published reasons". The reason for affirming the decision that is under review is a matter that depends upon the criteria for the making of that decision in the first place. The Tribunal does not operate in a statutory vacuum, and its role is dependent upon the making of administrative decisions upon criteria to be found elsewhere in the Act. The use of the future conditional tense ("would be") rather than the indicative strongly suggests that the operation of s 424A(1)(a) is to be determined in advance - and independently - of the Tribunal's particular reasoning on the facts of the case. Here, the appropriate criterion was to be found in s 36(1) of the Act, being the provision under which the appellants sought their protection visa. The "reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review" was therefore that the appellants were not persons to whom Australia owed protection obligations under the Convention. When viewed in that light, it is difficult to see why the relevant passages in the appellants' statutory declaration would itself be "information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review". Those portions of the statutory declaration did not contain in their terms a rejection, denial or undermining of the appellants' claims to be persons to whom Australia owed protection obligations. Indeed, if their contents were believed, they would, one might have thought, have been a relevant step towards rejecting, not affirming, the decision under review. The third ground claims that the Tribunal failed to comply with s.425 of the Act. Mr O’Donnell submits with respect to particular (a) of the third ground that the applicants fundamentally misunderstood the Tribunal’s obligation under s.425. The applicants are not provided with two Tribunal hearings – one to give evidence and another to present arguments. The applicants suggest that the Tribunal member did discuss a number of issues with the applicant husband generally. However, they do not identify the information nor the inadequacies or shortcomings which were adverse to them. NALQ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 121 at [30]-[32] considered s.425 in the context of the broader operation of Part 7, Division 4 of the Act:30 The obligation of the Tribunal under s 425 of the Migration Act is to issue an invitation to the applicant for review to attend a hearing. That invitation must be real and meaningful and not just an empty gesture – Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR (2003) 198 ALR 293 at [33]; Mazhar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 183 ALR at 188 [31]. In Liu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 113 FCR 541 at [44] the Full Court expressly rejected a submission that changes made to s 425 had diminished the applicant’s right to appear before the Tribunal to ‘a merely formal right to be invited ...’. Importantly also s 425 did not, at the time of the present appellant’s application to the Tribunal, exhaust the requirements of procedural fairness so far as they relate to the right to be heard. Put in that context the effect of the subsequent enactment of s 422B does not fall for consideration in this case. 31 The Full Court in SCAR characterised the requirements of s 425 as ‘objective’. Their Honours said (at [37]): ‘The statutory obligation upon the tribunal to provide a "real and meaningful" invitation exists whether or not the tribunal is aware of the actual circumstances which would defeat that obligation. Circumstances where it has been held that the obligations imposed by s 425 of the Act have been breached include circumstances where an invitation was given but the applicant was unable to attend because of ill heath: Applicant NAHF of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 140.’32 In his judgment in NAHF Hely J found for the appellants on the basis of a want of procedural fairness rather than a breach of the obligation imposed by s 425. As to the latter, he followed the views expressed by Branson J in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Mohammad (2000) 101 FCR 434 and approved by Wilcox J in Xiao v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1472 and by Beaumont J in Sreeram v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 106 FCR 578. In Mohammad, Branson J said of s 425 and the change in its language (at [43]): ‘This change from the substantive requirement of giving the applicant an opportunity to appear before the Tribunal to the procedural requirement of inviting the applicant to appear before the Tribunal suggests an intention in the legislature to remove the statutory requirement which had been construed as requiring the Tribunal to give an applicant a genuine and reasonable opportunity to appear before it, and to replace it with a more formal requirement.’

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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