SZIRA v MIAC
[2007] FMCA 1082
•7 June 2007
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZIRA & ORS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2007] FMCA 1082 |
| MIGRATION – Review of Refugee Review Tribunal decision – complaint regarding interpreter at Tribunal hearing – Tribunal’s consideration of documents – no bias or apprehended bias – state protection – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed. |
| Migration Act 1958, ss.425, 424, 424A, 422B, 424(3), 441A, 441A(4), 441A(2), 424B(2), 424A(1), 424A(2), 424A(3)(a), 424A(3)(b) |
| XIAO v Minister for Immigration [2000] FCA 1472 Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1 | ||
| Applicants: | SZIRA, SZIRB & SZIRC | |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 1085 of 2006 |
| Judgment of: | Nicholls FM |
| Hearing date: | 7 June 2007 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 7 June 2007 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 7 June 2007 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Nil |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Nil |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr Free |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Australian Government Solicitor |
ORDERS
The reference to the first respondent be amended to read “Minister for Immigration & Citizenship”.
The application is dismissed.
The applicants pay the first respondent's costs, set in the amount of $4,200.00.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 1085 of 2006
| SZIRA, SZIRB & SZIRC |
Applicants
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Ex Tempore: Revised from Transcript)
I have before me an application filed in this Court on 11 April 2006 seeking review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”), signed on 28 February 2006 and handed down on 21 March 2006, which affirmed the decision of a delegate of the respondent Minister to refuse protection visas to the applicants.
The applicants are a South Korean national, her husband and daughter, also from South Korea. The claims of the husband and daughter to protection were dependent on the claims of the wife, who for ease of reference I will refer to as “the applicant”.
The applicant’s claims to protection derive from her claimed former membership of a religious organisation in South Korea (“the AGDS Church”). The applicant claimed to have been a member of this organisation and that she had held a “high level position”. She claimed that she, her daughter and family, would be “in a great danger” if they were to return to South Korea, that the organisation had been involved in criminal activity, had been responsible for and linked to “several homicides and disappearance of its former members” and that, on attempting to leave the organisation, she and her daughter had been harassed by people associated with this group. She claimed that, if she were to return to South Korea, that members of this organisation would kill and destroy her family. She also claimed that “Korean law can’t protect us”.
I particularly note the following:
(1)The application for a protection visa was made on 19 September 2005 (see Court Book (“CB”) 1 to CB 36).
(2)The application for review was filed on 16 November 2005 (CB 62 to CB 65).
(3)By letter dated 24 November 2005, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant requesting that she provide certain additional information (CB 72 to CB 73).
(4)The applicant ultimately responded by letter on 16 January 2006 (CB 80 to CB 87).
(5)By letter dated 18 January 2006, the applicant and her husband were invited to a hearing before the Tribunal scheduled for 13 February 2006 (CB 89 to CB 90).
(6)The applicant and her husband attended a hearing before the Tribunal on 13 February 2006 and gave evidence (CB 105.3).
(7)At the hearing, the Tribunal handed a letter to the applicant (dated 13 February 2006) seeking her comments on particular information which the Tribunal said could be used as a part of the reason for deciding that she may not be entitled to a protection visa (CB 93 to CB 94).
(8)The applicant’s written response is dated 24 February 2006 and is reproduced at CB 95 to CB 98.
(9)The Tribunal’s decision record is reproduced at CB 102 to CB 122. This includes the Tribunal’s account of what occurred at the hearing before it (CB 108.8 to CB 114.3).
The Tribunal’s “Findings and Reasons” are set out in its decision record and reproduced at CB 118.2 to CB 122.2. The Tribunal found:
(1)It was not satisfied that Korean citizens (such as the applicants) threatened by AGDS people “would not receive the protection of the Korean authorities under Korean law” (CB 118.10).
(2)It was not satisfied that the applicant was a member of AGDS (CB 118.10).
(3)The applicant had been given ample time to provide copies of police reports concerning alleged threats against her family, and not only did the applicant not provide any reports, but did not “address this issue in her reply” to the Tribunal’s request for such documentary evidence (CB 119.2 to CB 119.3).
(4)At the hearing, the applicant had showed a copy of a document in Korean to the Tribunal (which the applicant said contained no specific information about her) but did not take up the opportunity to provide a translation of this document (CB 119.3).
(5)A book written in Korean, submitted by the applicant did not contain any “explicit indication that she is mentioned in the book” and did not corroborate her claim to have been involved in AGDS (CB 119.5).
(6)It did not accept her explanation for what appeared to be her initial “confusion” about who the leader of AGDS was (CB 119.7 to CB 119.9).
(7)It was not until January 2006 that the applicant made specific claims of harm directed at her and her family, and that she provided no corroboration of such a claim, and found that this alleged incident did not take place (CB 120.3 to CB 120.6).
(8)Her claim to have attended further meetings of AGDS in 2001 was an invention at the hearing to explain away contradictions between earlier claims made to the Tribunal that she had left the organisation in 1994 and subsequent claims that she had been threatened with adverse consequences if she were to leave in 2002. The Tribunal found that this was an invention, and further undermined her credibility (CB 120.8 to CB 120.9).
(9)It did not accept her explanation as to why she originally concealed the fact of prior journeys to and from Korea, and found that this further undermined the credibility of her claims (CB 121.1)
(10)That the applicant’s “initial journeys to Australia” were not motivated by any fear of AGDS (CB 121.4).
(11)The applicant was not a member of AGDS, and that this was supported by the applicant’s failure to seek protection in Australia prior to 2005 (CB 121.5).
(12)It did not accept the applicant’s claims that she had no idea that she could have sought protection until 2005, given that she had the services of a migration agent prior to that time, and had a pattern of travel and history of contact with the first respondent’s Department which indicated “that she had considerable experience in dealing with the Department” (CB 121.8 to CB 121.9).
(13)The delay of three years in applying for protection until September 2005 indicated that she did not have a genuine fear of persecution when she came to Australia in September 2002 (CB 121.10).
(14)It gave no weight to the supporting testimony of the husband in relation to AGDS because it regarded the applicant’s claims as “so unreliable” (CB 122.1).
In addition to the finding that state protection was available to the applicant, in the event that she had been a member of AGDS, the Tribunal found that she was not such a member, and she therefore did not have a well-founded fear of persecution in Korea (CB 122.2).
The application to the Court filed on 11 April 2006, was in the following (largely unintelligible) terms:
“1. It wasn’t delivered my statement to the Tribunal throught interpreter during interview.
2.The tribunal has applicated only from their point of view. It needed more consideration on the base of my statement and evidence.
3. appropriate Sections of Law.
(Relative)
Apply my case in the international UN law on the ground of being tortured by a group, not in criminal law. (sic)”
I note that the applicant has also put before the Court an affidavit made on 11 April 2006, which generally asserts her fear of being persecuted and takes issue with some factual findings made by the Tribunal. The applicant has also put before the Court a document which has on it “Amended Application”, which appears to be, in part, in the Korean language, with extracts translated into English. As an observation, the extracts appear to provide information about AGDS and do not appear to make any reference or specific reference to any of the applicants.
At the hearing before the Court, only the first-named applicant appeared. The applicant submitted that she would speak on behalf of the second and third-named applicants, her husband and daughter, and the Court was satisfied to proceed on that basis. The applicant was unrepresented and was assisted by an interpreter in the Korean language. Mr Free, of Counsel, appeared for the first respondent.
After seeking explanation from the applicant as to her grounds of complaint, the applicant stated as follows:
1)That ground 1 was a complaint that the interpreter before the Tribunal did not “do a proper job”.
2)That ground 2 was a complaint that the Tribunal did not take her point of view.
3)As best as I understood it, that the hearing before the Tribunal proceeded on the basis that it was a criminal matter, in that she was cross examined.
While the document filed on 4 August 2006 in these proceedings has, on its face, “Amended Application”, it refers only to a number of factual matters before the Tribunal and does not appear to assert jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. In any event, therefore, looking at the original application of 11 April 2006, I can only agree with Mr Free’s submissions that the document “does not identify any legitimate basis for seeking judicial review of the Tribunal decision”. But, bearing in mind the applicant’s explanation today, I gave consideration to these grounds in light of the applicant’s explanation.
I should just note that the applicant was given access to the Court’s legal advice scheme and consulted a lawyer on the panel of that scheme on 7 September 2006. The applicant was provided with advice on 8 September 2006 and the consultation took place using the services of an interpreter in the Korean language.
In written submissions, Mr Free submitted that the first ground in the application may intend to raise a complaint about the accuracy of the translation of the hearing before the Tribunal. Indeed, this was confirmed by the applicant herself when she told the Court that the complaint is that the interpreter “did not do a proper job”. I thank Mr Free for his written submissions and his reference to a variety of authorities on the issue of whether a defect in interpretation provides a basis for establishing breach of the Tribunal’s obligation to provide a meaningful opportunity to the applicant to be heard before the Tribunal, pursuant to s.425 of the Migration Act 1958 (“the Act). As was said in cases such as Xiao v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1472 and Mahzar v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1759 per Goldberg J. at [31], the hearing invitation must not be a “hollow shell” or “empty gesture”.
The difficulty for the applicants, however, is that they have provided no evidence whatsoever to the Court of any difficulties arising with the level of interpretation provided during the hearing with the Tribunal. As the Full Federal Court noted in NAOA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 241, the Court in such circumstances can only proceed on the evidence available to it and before being satisfied that the applicants have been denied a fair hearing, there must be a proper evidentiary basis for such a finding. There is nothing before the Court now (even if this is what is meant by the applicant’s ground of complaint) to provide any such evidentiary basis. In fact, there are indications that would go to showing that there was no such difficulty. Firstly, there is no reference whatsoever to any such difficulty having been raised with the Tribunal during the course of the hearing to be found in the Tribunal’s account of what occurred at the hearing. Far more importantly, however, the applicant’s letter of 24 February 2006, which was sent to the Tribunal well over a week after the hearing, made no mention of any such complaint. In fact, the applicant commences this letter with:
“I am [the applicant] attended the interview last 13 February 2006. Firstly I would like to say thank you very much for the concern about my case.” (CB 95.4).
As stated and explained, given the lack of evidence before the Court, the first ground of complaint does not succeed.
Given that the applicant appeared unrepresented before this Court, I sought to provide to her grounds as wide an application as possible. In that regard, I also considered whether the first ground was also a complaint about the Tribunal’s dealing with the various documents that the applicant had provided to it. The first document was a copy of a document in the Korean language and the second document was a book in the Korean language which the applicant showed to the Tribunal. Even in relation to these documents, I cannot see that the Tribunal failed in any relevant obligation owed to the applicants.
The Tribunal’s decision record reveals that in relation to the copy of the document in Korean (that is, the first document, which may or may not be the same document which the applicant has put before the Court today), the Tribunal confirmed with the applicant that this document “contained no specific information” about the applicant “but related to AGDS” (CB 119.3). The Tribunal reports that it gave the applicant the opportunity to re-submit the document with any relevant parts “highlighted and translated” but that she had not taken up this opportunity (CB 119.4). In relation to the book in Korean (the second document), written it appears, by a former prosecutor involved in a case against people from AGDS, the Tribunal was satisfied, from what the applicant herself said, that she was not mentioned in that book (CB 119.7).
Further, the applicant is reported as also having told the Tribunal that she would submit a “further document which she was expecting to receive” which was from the former prosecutor in Korea and that this document would relate to her. The Tribunal’s unchallenged account of what occurred at the hearing reveals that it gave the applicant an opportunity, following the hearing, to submit that document (CB 111.3), but the applicant also did not take up that opportunity (CB 119.5).
In all, therefore, I cannot see, on the state of the material before me, any failure by the Tribunal in relation to its obligation as it arises from s.425 of the Act, nor in relation to any failure to provide the applicant with opportunities to fully submit her case to it.
The second ground, as stated, was explained by the applicant as that the Tribunal did not take her point of view. A number of possibilities for consideration arise from this. One is that the Tribunal was subjective in its decision-making and failed to take into account the applicant's evidence.
As to the subjective element, that is, that the Tribunal did not accept her point of view but persisted in its own perspective, to the extent that this may imply that the Tribunal brought a closed mind to the proceedings, such that it was biased, then, with reference to a large number of relevant authorities, for example: Minister for Immigration v Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507, Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v SBAN [2002] FCAFC 431 and VFAB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 872, I cannot see that the Tribunal brought a closed mind to its task, such that it was committed to a conclusion already formed such as to be incapable of alteration or being persuaded differently.
On the evidence before the Court, the Tribunal gave comprehensive consideration to the claims made by the applicant, gave opportunities to the applicants by way of two letters, one sent pursuant to s.424 of the Act, the other sent pursuant to s.424A of the Act, and the opportunity of a hearing for the applicants to provide the material evidence and arguments to support their claims. What is revealed before the Court now is that, simply, the Tribunal was not persuaded by what the applicant claimed, and found against the applicant, on the basis of her lack of credit. As was described by McHugh J in Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs; Ex Parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1 at [67], the Tribunal was clearly exercising its function as the decision-maker “par excellence” in the making of such findings. I cannot see, on what is before me, that the Tribunal was biased towards the applicant’s case. The Tribunal made factual findings which were open to it on the material before it, and, with reference to such authorities as Kopalapillai v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1998) 86 FCR 547 at [558] – [559] no error is demonstrated in these circumstances. Simply, the Tribunal does not have to take an applicant’s point of view. The obligation on the Tribunal is to provide an applicant with a fair opportunity to put his or her case before the Tribunal, to consider with an open mind the matters that are put before it, and to make findings of fact. So long as those factual findings were open to it on the material before it, this Court is unable to intervene. On what is before me, such findings were open to the Tribunal and it gave reasons for these findings.
For the remainder, therefore, the applicant’s complaint does not rise above a request for this Court to review the merits of the Tribunal’s decision, which of course, it cannot do (Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at [272]).
The applicant’s third ground of complaint is again, unintelligible, as stated. It could be that this is a complaint about the inquisitorial nature of the proceedings before the Tribunal, in which case, such a complaint cannot succeed. If it is a complaint that there was some cross-examination before the Tribunal, then, again, such a complaint, in the absence of evidence, does not succeed. If it is a complaint about unacceptable or inappropriate behaviour by the Tribunal, then, again, such a complaint also does not succeed, and of course, as has often been held, proceedings before the Tribunal are inquisitorial and not adversarial in nature.
Again, in the context of this Court giving as wide as possible consideration to the applicant's complaints, it may be a complaint that the Tribunal should not have approached or applied the case in the context of viewing the harm feared as being criminal in nature (“in criminal law”), but that it should have been seen in the context of the definition of “refugee” in the UN Convention.
If this is the complaint, then the complaint, if anything, appears to be far more relevant to the delegate’s decision than to the Tribunal’s. In his decision record, the delegate noted (reproduced at CB 58) that the applicant’s claims are of a criminal nature and not Convention-related. However, it appears that the delegate then went on to find that the applicant would be able to find effective state protection from the authorities in South Korea. Whatever the case, this was not a finding made by the Tribunal.
The Tribunal’s relevant findings can plainly be distinguished from what is set out as being the findings in relation to the decision under review (CB 106). It distinguished what the delegate did with its own findings, which were not to characterise the harm feared as criminal in nature but to have found, on the claims as stated by the applicant, that either state protection would be afforded to the applicant at an appropriate level or, alternatively, that it did not accept the central claim as made by the applicant.
Neither of these bases for the Tribunal's decision relied on any finding that the harm feared arose out of actions being essentially criminal in nature and thereby lacking a Convention nexus. Further, it must be emphasised that the Tribunal's power and the Tribunal's role is to review the delegate's decision relating to a protection visa application. In this regard, ss.65 and 36(2) of the Act are relevant. In effect, the task for the Tribunal is to answer the question as to whether an applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason, and this is, of course, with reference to the definition of "Refugee" as contained in Article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention and as modified and understood by Australian law. That is the question that the Tribunal was required to address and answer and, on the material before me, that is what it did.
If it is the case that the applicant sought from the Tribunal some broader or alternative consideration based on some international humanitarian understandings, then it is not within the power or the function of the Tribunal to address such a question. The relevant scheme of the Act, if anything, would leave such questions to, perhaps, consideration by the Minister for Immigration, personally, pursuant to any request made under s.417 of the Act. In all, therefore, I cannot see that this ground, either as explained by the applicant or as may be implicit or inferred from what is stated in the application, can assist the applicant today.
Given that the applicants were unrepresented before me, I did consider, as invited to do so by Mr. Free, whether there was any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision, other than as appears to be complained of by the applicant. I cannot discern any such error. First, I agree with Mr Free’s submission that the Tribunal’s decision was based on two alternative bases. The Tribunal found that, in the event that it was to accept that the applicant had been involved in AGDS and threatened by that group, that the applicant had appropriate protection in Korea (CB 118.9). The Tribunal’s reasons for this finding were that, even though the applicant made a claim that the Korean authorities could not protect her, there was no evidence before it that this was the case, and that the applicant’s own evidence was, that when she did report the alleged threats to the police, they attended and took her complaints seriously, and that there was other independent evidence available to the Tribunal that the Korean authorities “had prosecuted alleged criminal acts by AGDS people” (CB 118.9). I note in this regard that part of the Tribunal’s analysis did rely on a double negative: “On the basis of the evidence before it, the Tribunal is not satisfied that Korean citizens threatened by AGDS people would not receive the protection of the Korean authorities under Korean law.” (CB 118.8). The double negative being “not satisfied” and “not receive the protection”.
As derived from Minister for Immigration v Respondents S152/2003 (2004) 205 ALR 487 (“Respondents S152”) per Gleeson CJ, Hayne and Heydon JJ at [26]: “no country can guarantee that its citizens will at all times and in all circumstances be safe from violence”. The standard required is that the convention “posits a reasonable level of protection, not a perfect one” (Respondents S152 at [117] per Kirby J.) and the requirement of the relevant country is “to take reasonable measures to protect the lives and safety of its citizens” (Respondents S152 at [26]). Further, in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs vKhawar (2002) 210 CLR 1, Kirby J. at [115] gave support to the proposition that the Tribunal is entitled to assume that the relevant state is capable within its jurisdiction of protecting the applicant. This was with reference to Re Attorney-General of Canada and Ward; United Nationals High Commissioner for Refugees et al, Interveners (1993) 103 DLR (4th) and also A v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1999) 53 ALD 545.
Whether the applicant bears the burden of establishing that adequate protection is lacking, it is at least clear from Respondents S152 that there will need to be evidence to support a conclusion that there is a failure of state protection (see also Applicant A99 of 2003 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 773 at [41]). In the case before me, therefore, the Tribunal clearly could find no evidence, either based on what the applicant herself had said or otherwise, that the Korean authorities would not provide the requisite level of protection to the applicant in the circumstances as claimed by the applicant; that is, her claim to have been involved in AGDS and to have received threats from people in that group.
As a separate and independent basis for its finding, and I note here that Mr Free’s reliance on Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 and SZEEU v Minister for Immigration [2006] FCAFC 2 at [231]-[233] and further, VBAP of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 965, for the proposition that the Tribunal’s finding that the applicant was not a member of AGDS, provides an independent basis to support the Tribunal’s decision. So even if error were found in either one of the bases, the other would be sufficient to refuse the relief sought by the applicant. In any event, I cannot discern jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s reasoning and its finding that the applicant was not a member of AGDS.
This is a case to which s.422B of the Act operates to make the matters set out in Division 4 of Part 7 of the Act the relevant requirements of the natural justice hearing rule (absent bias), (see Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Lay Lat [2006] FCAFC 61, SZCIJ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 62).
Relevantly, in this regard, with Division 4 of Part 7 in mind, I note firstly that the Tribunal sought further information from the applicant by way of its letter of 24 November 2005 (CB 72 to CB 73). The Tribunal is not required to seek such additional information, but is obliged, once it does so, to have regard to that information in making the decision on the review (s.424 of the Act). The applicants responded to the Tribunal’s letter (CB 80 to CB 82, with attachments). Plainly, on the material before the Court now, the Tribunal did have regard to the applicant’s response. In fact, even though the response was provided some time after the time provided by the Tribunal for the making of the response, the Tribunal was moved to recall a decision which had been signed, but not handed down (CB 88), and invited the applicant to a hearing because of that information:
“The member has withdrawn that decision after seeing the submission received from you later yesterday.” (CB 89.4).
Further, it is clear that the Tribunal took that information into account, as revealed by its decision record (see for example, CB 106.10 to CB 108) and the account of the hearing conducted with the applicant generally, and its various treatment of the issues based on this information in its analysis. I should also note that the letter (with reference to s.424(3) of the Act), was sent to the applicant by one of the methods specified in s.441A, that is, it was dispatched by post to the applicant’s address for service as provided in her protection visa application (s.441A(4) of the Act).
Secondly, at the hearing, the Tribunal handed a letter to the applicant (CB 93 to CB 94) inviting comment (pursuant to s.424A of the Act) and sought the applicant’s comments after putting the applicant on notice as to the relevance of that information to the consideration of her claims (see CB 93 to CB 94). This letter was given to the applicant by the method contemplated in s.441A(2) of the Act, and complied with the requirements of s.424B(2) of the Act and Regulation 4.35(3) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (“the Regulations”), in terms of the period given to the applicant to respond. To the extent, therefore, that the Tribunal’s decision relied on information not provided by the applicant for the purposes of the review, and was information obtained at the first respondent’s Department, and in the protection visa application submitted to the first respondent’s Department, the Tribunal’s action complied with its obligations pursuant to ss.424A(1) and (2) of the Act.
To the extent that the Tribunal’s decision also relied on independent country information available to it, such information clearly fell within the exception contained in s.424A(3)(a) of the Act from the requirements in s.424A(1) of the Act (Minister for Immigration v NAMW (2004) 140 FCR 572).
As I have already said, the applicants were invited to a hearing, pursuant to s.425 of the Act, and I have already dealt with one complaint put forward by the applicant in that regard and found no error on the part of the Tribunal. So, in all, therefore, neither on the grounds as stated or explained by the applicant, nor, otherwise, on the material that is before me today, can I discern jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision. The application is, therefore, dismissed.
It is appropriate that an order for costs be made in this matter. There is nothing before the Court, and nor did the first-named applicant seek to put anything before the Court, to argue against such an order being made. Secondly, in all the circumstances, the amount sought, that of $4200, is with reference to the material before the Court and the work that has been done by the Minister's legal representatives (preparation of Court Book, attendances at Court by solicitors, briefing of Counsel, written submissions and attendance at hearing by Counsel), a reasonable amount. Although I am not bound by the Schedule to the rules – I also note that the amount is well below the amount that the Minister could have asked for.
I did consider whether the costs order should be made against the first applicant only or all three applicants but I am satisfied, on the basis that the first-named applicant stated that she was here to represent the claims of the other two named applicants, and that the second and the third‑named applicants, therefore, sought, through that means, to press their part of the application before the Court that it is appropriate that the costs order be made against all three of the applicants.
I certify that the preceding forty-one (41) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Nicholls FM
Associate: Dawnie Lam
Date: 18 July 2007
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