FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZIOG v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2006] FMCA 1450 |
| MIGRATION – RRT decision – Chinese applicant claiming persecution for Falun Gong practice – disbelieved by Tribunal – whether principle of caution when assessing credibility – no jurisdictional error found. |
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36, 91R(3), 474(1), 476, 476(1)
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476
SAAK v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2002) 121 FCR 185, (2002) 191 ALR 663
SCAV of 2001 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 182
| Applicant: | SZIOG |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG897 of 2006 |
| Judgment of: | Smith FM |
| Hearing date: | 19 September 2006 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 19 September 2006 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Ms S Thode |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Ms E Palmer |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Clayton Utz |
ORDERS
The application is dismissed.
The applicant must pay the first respondent’s costs in the sum of $5,000.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG897 of 2006
| SZIOG |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(revised from transcript)
This is an application filed on 27 March 2006 under s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Migration Act”) which seeks orders by way of judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) dated 31 January 2006 and handed down on 23 February 2006. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate made on 11 November 2005, refusing to grant a protection visa to the applicant.
Under s.476(1) the Court has “the same original jurisdiction in relation to migration decisions as the High Court has under paragraph 75(v) of the Constitution”, but its powers are confined by s.474(1) if the Tribunal’s decision is a “privative clause decision”. It is such a decision unless I am satisfied that it was affected by jurisdictional error (see Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476). I do not have power myself to decide whether the applicant’s claim should be believed, nor whether she qualifies for a protection visa.
The applicant arrived in Australia in July 2005, and a protection visa was filed by her on 4 August 2005 without any recorded involvement of a migration agent. In a typed statement attached to the application, the applicant said that she had become a Falun Gong member in 1997 after suffering depression. She referred to a Chinese government crackdown “since 1999” and said:
Members of Falun Gong have been regarded to be connected with overseas Falun Gong organisation which has been threatening the safety of China. I am a member because it can do well to my health; I was actually not connected with anyone of Falungong members overseas. As a result,…
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- Case
- [2006] FMCA 1450
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court considered whether the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error. The Court noted that it did not have the power to decide whether the applicant’s claim should be believed, nor whether she qualified for a protection visa. The Court held that the Tribunal was entitled to find that the applicant’s evidence was problematic, and that it was open to the Tribunal to conclude that she was not a credible witness. The Court held that the Tribunal’s decision was not affected by jurisdictional error.
The Court dismissed the application and ordered the applicant to pay the Minister’s costs in the sum of $5,000.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
The application is dismissed.
2.
The applicant must pay the first respondent’s costs in the sum of $5,000.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
This is an application filed on 27 March 2006 under s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Migration Act”) which seeks orders by way of judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) dated 31 January 2006 and handed down on 23 February 2006. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate made on 11 November 2005, refusing to grant a protection visa to the applicant. Under s.476(1) the Court has “the same original jurisdiction in relation to migration decisions as the High Court has under paragraph 75(v) of the Constitution”, but its powers are confined by s.474(1) if the Tribunal’s decision is a “privative clause decision”. It is such a decision unless I am satisfied that it was affected by jurisdictional error (see Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476). I do not have power myself to decide whether the applicant’s claim should be believed, nor whether she qualifies for a protection visa. The applicant arrived in Australia in July 2005, and a protection visa was filed by her on 4 August 2005 without any recorded involvement of a migration agent. In a typed statement attached to the application, the applicant said that she had become a Falun Gong member in 1997 after suffering depression. She referred to a Chinese government crackdown “since 1999” and said: Members of Falun Gong have been regarded to be connected with overseas Falun Gong organisation which has been threatening the safety of China. I am a member because it can do well to my health; I was actually not connected with anyone of Falungong members overseas. As a result, I was found out to practice Falungong in China, and was a members of “Falun Gong” and was taken to police for investigation for 10 days in September 2003. I admitted I was a Falungong member, they then penalized me severely, and I lost freedom from then on. They supervised me and severely interfered with my normal life. I suffered persecution from the Chinese government. I left China for my safety; I can no longer stay in China. I can not enjoy basic human rights and normal life there. No details of these events were provided, and no corroboration was given either to the Department or the Tribunal. The applicant did send to the Tribunal photographs showing her attendance at Falun Gong demonstrations in Australia, and two statements from witnesses who had met the applicant practising Falun Gong in Australia. The applicant also attended a hearing, and was questioned by the Tribunal about her claims. A transcript of the hearing is not in evidence before me, and I have no reason not to accept the description given by the Tribunal in its statement of reasons. Arising from its questioning, the Tribunal made a finding that: “the Tribunal found a number of aspects of the applicant’s oral evidence problematic”. The problems referred to by the Tribunal included the following: ·There was an inconsistency between the applicant’s claim to become a Falun Gong practitioner in 1997 “yet her oral evidence indicates a lack of basic knowledge about Falun Gong and significant events relating to Falun Gong which occurred in China”. The Tribunal referred to the applicant’s identification of only “the cultivation of what is called xinxing”, and not the performance of five sets of exercises when asked what it meant to be a Falun Gong practitioner. She also referred to the cultivation of xinxing involving loss, without also referring to “gain”. The Tribunal did not accept explanations given by the applicant when the Tribunal put these inadequacies in her responses to her. ·The Tribunal thought that the applicant’s claim that the crackdown in China only affected her province in September 1999 was inconsistent with independent evidence which “indicates that the Chinese government saw Falun Gong as a national problem and introduced nationwide measures against Falun Gong from July 1999”. The Tribunal did not identify the source of the information which it relied upon. The Tribunal also said that the applicant “could not recall a significant event occurring” in October 1999, when there were further proclamations by the Chinese government. ·The applicant had gave the Tribunal inconsistent statements as to when she practised Falun Gong in China in relation to the days of the week, and the Tribunal said that it would have expected that she could have accurately recalled the days of the week on which she practised. ·The Tribunal said that “on several occasions during the hearing the applicant seemed to avoid answering the Tribunal’s questions and gave evidence that was vague or confusing”. It referred to examples where it had to repeat questions, where tentative answers were given, and where there were inconsistencies. The Tribunal concluded: It did not seem to the Tribunal that the applicant did not understand the straightforward questions she was asked. Rather she left the Tribunal with the strong impression that she was being either intentionally evasive or vague or was confused because she was not speaking spontaneously about actual personal experiences.