PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Sunshine Coast Regional Council v D Agostini Property Pty Ltd and Others [2019] QPEC 52
PARTIES:
SUNSHINE COAST REGIONAL COUNCIL
(Applicant)v
D AGOSTINI PROPERTY PTY LTD
(First respondent)and
13 INVESTMENT COMPANY PTY LTD
(Second respondent)and
ROSS WILLIAM MAUDSLEY & MARYA VERONICA MAUDSLEY
(Third respondent)and
ROSSPROP PTY LTD
(Fourth respondent)and
ONCE UPON A TIME ENTERPRISES PTY LTD
(Fifth respondent)and
CEMONE LEITH TIRA
(Sixth respondent)and
XYCON PTY LTD, STEVEN DOUGLAS MOODY, HORIZON GROUP INVESTMENTS PTY LTD
(Seventh respondent)and
LMFC HOLDINGS PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE
(Eighth respondent)and
MARION JOSEPHINE CRUTTENDEN
(Ninth respondent)and
VERA BRAZEL & BERNADETTE ANNE MOORE
(Tenth respondent)and
PRICELESS & UNIQUE ENTERPRISES PTY LTD
(Eleventh respondent)and
GARRY ANDREW CAMPLIN & KAREN PAMELA CAMPLIN
(Twelfth respondent)and
JOHN ARTHUR HOZIER & DENISE BETTY HOZIER
(Thirteenth respondent)and
RL & CG THOMPSON PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE
(Fourteenth respondent)and
SHUKRY SAHHAR & HELEN SAHHAR
(Fifteenth respondent)and
KAY ELIZABETH SOMERVILLE
(Sixteenth respondent)and
ROBERT JOHN BALMER
(Seventeenth respondent)and
JAMES WILLIAM BROWN
(Eighteenth respondent)and
DIDIER MARIE LAROSE & MAEVA JOSEE ROSE-MAY LAROSE
(Nineteenth respondent)and
MICHAEL JAMES HARRIS & YASMEEN LIZA HARRIS
(Twentieth respondent)and
VIVIENNE ELIZABETH GREEN, PHILIP JOHN GREEN, MICHAEL ESKANDER & OLIVIA ESKANDER AS TRUSTEES
(Twenty-first respondent)and
GREGORY JOHN BOTT & LINDA JULIE BOTT
(Twenty-second respondent)and
HOMESHIELD THE HOME IMPROVERS (SOUTHSIDE) PTY LTD
(Twenty-third respondent)and
KEVIN BRUCE FULFORD
(Twenty-fourth respondent)and
ADRIAN RICHARD ARTHUR WATERS AS TRUSTEE
(Twenty-fifth respondent)and
RICHARD ANTHONY GARDNER & FIONA HEATHER HORNERY
(Twenty-sixth respondent)and
RAOUF NASEIF ISHAG GEORGE
(Twenty-seventh respondent)PETER JOHN JACKSON & LEAH JANE JACKSON AS TRUSTEES
(Twenty-eighth respondent)and
KELLEY SUE LACY
(Twenty-ninth respondent)and
ALISON LOUISE BERNER
(Thirtieth respondent)and
AZTEC DEVELOPMENTS (QLD) PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE
(Thirty-first respondent)and
WILLIAM ANTHONY WELFORD PEGLER & ELIZABETH JEAN TOWNS
(Thirty-second respondent)and
STUART REGINALD SIMMONDS & VERITY LOUISE SIMMONDS AS TRUSTEES
(Thirty-third respondent)and
DENISE KAY RUHLE
(Thirty-fourth respondent)and
DAVID NEVILLE RICHARD HANLIN, DULCIE LOUISE HANLAN & RICHARD HENRY HANLIN AS TRUSTEES
(Thirty-fifth respondent)and
ANTHONY JOHN WEST & SANDRA DIANNE WEST
(Thirty-sixth respondent)and
RCR DEVELOPMENTS PTY LTD
(Thirty-seventh respondent)and
REX WILLIAMS BARNES & JUDI MARGARET BARNES
(Thirty-eighth respondent)and
ROBERT RAYMOND SPRIGGS & BRENDA JOY STICKLER
(Thirty-ninth respondent)and
BRONWYN LOUISE HOWE & PAUL ALEXANDER HOWE
(Fortieth respondent)GRAHAM IAN POWLEY
(Forty-first respondent)and
MICHAEL LOUIS WOODBURY BUGLER
(Forty-second respondent)and
GARY WAYNE JONES & LEE MARGARET JONES
(Forty-third respondent)and
GARY EDWARD PENROSE
(Forty-fourth respondent)and
BRIAN JOHN PEGLER & NAOMI LORRAINE PEGLER
(Forty-fifth respondent)and
BODY CORPORATE FOR PELICAN WATERS RESORT COMMUNITY TITLES SCHEME 34816
(Forty-sixth respondent)FILE NO/S:
09/2019
DIVISION:
Planning and Environment
PROCEEDING:
Application within a proceeding for the determination of a preliminary point
ORIGINATING COURT:
Planning and Environment Court
MaroochydoreDELIVERED ON:
8 November 2019
DELIVERED AT:
Maroochydore
HEARING DATE:
8-9 August 2019
JUDGES:
Cash QC DCJ
ORDERS:
It is declared that the decision notice dated 17…
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- Case
- [2019] QPEC 52
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court began by outlining the principles relevant to the construction of planning documents, emphasizing that the rights to land use should be determined from the terms of the approval itself. The court noted that any limitations or restrictions should be plainly stated in the approval, and the consequences of ambiguity fall upon the approving authority. The court considered whether extrinsic evidence, including expert opinions, could aid in understanding the planning instruments. However, it was held that an expert's opinion on the construction of the approval itself is not admissible.
In reaching its decision, the court examined the evidence presented, including affidavits from a town planner and the general manager of the resort. The court disregarded certain expert opinions that ventured into the construction of the approval, focusing instead on the actual use of the allotments and the terms of the approval. The court concluded that the allotments in question were approved for use only in accordance with the definition of "motel" found in the Planning Scheme, which limits their use to the "temporary accommodation of travellers." The court was cautious about defining "temporary accommodation" precisely, finding it unnecessary to do so for the purposes of the case.
The court ultimately declared that the decision notice limited the use of the specified allotments to temporary accommodation of travellers. The court also noted that the term "holidaymakers" was not mentioned in the planning approval and should not be imported into the interpretation of the approval. The court's decision was based on the evidence of use and the explicit terms of the approval, without delving into broader definitions or speculative interpretations. The final order reflected this, limiting the use of the allotments to temporary accommodation of travellers as per the approval.
Orders
Orders of the court
It is declared that the decision notice dated 17 October 2003, as it relates to the premises identified as lots 201-218, 301-318 and 401-418 on SP 168156, limits the use of that part of the premises to use for the temporary accommodation of travellers.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The respondents submitted it was unnecessary to consider the meaning of “temporary accommodation” as, on their case, the use of the allotments was not restricted in this way.Consideration The respondents’ first proposition, that the development approval permits any part of the premises to be used for any of the listed purposes, cannot be accepted. Merely stating the proposition that a part of the building designed as a restaurant could be used as a multiple dwelling is probably sufficient to illustrate the absurdity of this interpretation. As well, this interpretation is inconsistent with the very idea of a condition, which is to confine or restrict the manner in which the approval is to be exercised. It is also inconsistent with the assessment of infrastructure charges, which levy different rates based upon the assumption there will be different uses. The condition should be read as requiring each component of the development to be used in accordance with the Planning Scheme definition for that component. It is necessary then to consider into which category the allotments the subject of this application fall. As noted, the subject allotments total 102. The allotments on the remaining floors number 62. This is consistent with the approval and the plans. It must follow that the 102 allotments the subject of the present application are those described as “Hotel/Motel (102 suites)” in the approval. This leads to the respondents’ second point, that the allotments were approved for use as a hotel as well as motel and “hotel” does not impose any restriction on the length of accommodation. I am unpersuaded this is how the approval should be read. The relevant definition of hotel says nothing about accommodation. It refers only to that part of a building that may be subject to a liquor licence or a TAB betting shop. As was submitted by the applicant, a building can be a hotel even if it does not have accommodation. Indeed, common experience suggests this is often the case. If there is to be an accommodation component to a hotel development it is necessary to obtain approval for that purpose. Approval of a “hotel” is not itself enough to allow accommodation, temporary or otherwise. The CMS does not assist the respondent. It was brought into existence some time after the approval. The CMS contains no restrictions on the use of the allotments on levels two, three and four. The respondent submitted this supports the conclusion that permanent accommodation was intended or contemplated. In my view it is at least equally open to conclude the absence of restriction in the CMS reflected that the use was otherwise limited by the approval. The applicant’s submission that the 102 allotments were approved for use in accordance with the definition of “motel” in the Planning Scheme must be accepted. Apart from the language of the decision and condition five, which is in my view persuasive, there is considerable support for a finding that the allotments were not approved for permanent accommodation. Each of these allotments was planned to be relatively small, studio-style accommodation with limited kitchen facilities. The levels on which the allotments are found was planned to be serviced by a dedicated “service lift” that starts adjacent to the laundry, passes through the kitchen and housekeeping areas, and ends at level four. The car parking arrangements provide further support. Each car park in the “Resident Parking” section bears a number that correlates to one of the unit numbers on the plan for levels five to twelve. Many of these parks are adjacent to a storage cage. In contrast, the car parks in the “Hotel Parking” section are unallocated and do not have storage facilities. Finally, the calculations of infrastructure charges also suggests the accommodation was approved for different uses.