Sunshine Coast Regional Council v D Agostini Property Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 24 min read

PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Sunshine Coast Regional Council v D Agostini Property Pty Ltd and Others [2019] QPEC 52

PARTIES:

SUNSHINE COAST REGIONAL COUNCIL
(Applicant)

v

D AGOSTINI PROPERTY PTY LTD
(First respondent)

and

13 INVESTMENT COMPANY PTY LTD
(Second respondent)

and

ROSS WILLIAM MAUDSLEY & MARYA VERONICA MAUDSLEY
(Third respondent)

and

ROSSPROP PTY LTD
(Fourth respondent)

and

ONCE UPON A TIME ENTERPRISES PTY LTD
(Fifth respondent)

and

CEMONE LEITH TIRA
(Sixth respondent)

and

XYCON PTY LTD,  STEVEN DOUGLAS MOODY, HORIZON GROUP INVESTMENTS PTY LTD
(Seventh respondent)

and

LMFC HOLDINGS PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE
(Eighth respondent)

and

MARION JOSEPHINE CRUTTENDEN
(Ninth respondent)

and

VERA BRAZEL & BERNADETTE ANNE MOORE
(Tenth respondent)

and

PRICELESS & UNIQUE ENTERPRISES PTY LTD
(Eleventh respondent)

and

GARRY ANDREW CAMPLIN & KAREN PAMELA CAMPLIN
(Twelfth respondent)

and

JOHN ARTHUR HOZIER & DENISE BETTY HOZIER
(Thirteenth respondent)

and

RL & CG THOMPSON PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE
(Fourteenth respondent)

and

SHUKRY SAHHAR & HELEN SAHHAR
(Fifteenth respondent)

and

KAY ELIZABETH SOMERVILLE
(Sixteenth respondent)

and

ROBERT JOHN BALMER
(Seventeenth respondent)

and

JAMES WILLIAM BROWN
(Eighteenth respondent)

and

DIDIER MARIE LAROSE & MAEVA JOSEE ROSE-MAY LAROSE
(Nineteenth respondent)

and

MICHAEL JAMES HARRIS & YASMEEN LIZA HARRIS
(Twentieth respondent)

and

VIVIENNE ELIZABETH GREEN, PHILIP JOHN GREEN, MICHAEL ESKANDER & OLIVIA ESKANDER AS TRUSTEES
(Twenty-first respondent)

and

GREGORY JOHN BOTT & LINDA JULIE BOTT
(Twenty-second respondent)

and

HOMESHIELD THE HOME IMPROVERS (SOUTHSIDE) PTY LTD
(Twenty-third respondent)

and

KEVIN BRUCE FULFORD
(Twenty-fourth respondent)

and

ADRIAN RICHARD ARTHUR WATERS AS TRUSTEE
(Twenty-fifth respondent)

and

RICHARD ANTHONY GARDNER & FIONA HEATHER HORNERY
(Twenty-sixth respondent)

and

RAOUF NASEIF ISHAG GEORGE
(Twenty-seventh respondent)

PETER JOHN JACKSON & LEAH JANE JACKSON AS TRUSTEES
(Twenty-eighth respondent)

and

KELLEY SUE LACY
(Twenty-ninth respondent)

and

ALISON LOUISE BERNER
(Thirtieth respondent)

and

AZTEC DEVELOPMENTS (QLD) PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE
(Thirty-first respondent)

and

WILLIAM ANTHONY WELFORD PEGLER & ELIZABETH JEAN TOWNS
(Thirty-second respondent)

and

STUART REGINALD SIMMONDS & VERITY LOUISE SIMMONDS AS TRUSTEES
(Thirty-third respondent)

and

DENISE KAY RUHLE
(Thirty-fourth respondent)

and

DAVID NEVILLE RICHARD HANLIN, DULCIE LOUISE HANLAN & RICHARD HENRY HANLIN AS TRUSTEES
(Thirty-fifth respondent)

and

ANTHONY JOHN WEST & SANDRA DIANNE WEST
(Thirty-sixth respondent)

and

RCR DEVELOPMENTS PTY LTD
(Thirty-seventh respondent)

and

REX WILLIAMS BARNES & JUDI MARGARET BARNES
(Thirty-eighth respondent)

and

ROBERT RAYMOND SPRIGGS & BRENDA JOY STICKLER
(Thirty-ninth respondent)

and

BRONWYN LOUISE HOWE & PAUL ALEXANDER HOWE
(Fortieth respondent)

GRAHAM IAN POWLEY
(Forty-first respondent)

and

MICHAEL LOUIS WOODBURY BUGLER
(Forty-second respondent)

and

GARY WAYNE JONES & LEE MARGARET JONES
(Forty-third respondent)

and

GARY EDWARD PENROSE
(Forty-fourth respondent)

and

BRIAN JOHN PEGLER & NAOMI LORRAINE PEGLER
(Forty-fifth respondent)

and

BODY CORPORATE FOR PELICAN WATERS RESORT COMMUNITY TITLES SCHEME 34816
(Forty-sixth respondent)

FILE NO/S:

09/2019

DIVISION:

Planning and Environment

PROCEEDING:

Application within a proceeding for the determination of a preliminary point

ORIGINATING COURT:

Planning and Environment Court
Maroochydore

DELIVERED ON:

8 November 2019

DELIVERED AT:

Maroochydore

HEARING DATE:

8-9 August 2019

JUDGES:

Cash QC DCJ

ORDERS:

It is declared that the decision notice dated 17…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Sunshine Coast Regional Council v D Agostini Property Pty Lt... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2019] QPEC 52
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Sunshine Coast Regional Council v D Agostini Property Pty Ltd, the dispute centered around the interpretation of a development approval granted by the Sunshine Coast Regional Council. The approval was for the construction of a multi-level resort, which included a hotel/motel, function rooms, a restaurant, and multiple dwellings. The primary issue was whether certain allotments could only be used for temporary accommodation, as defined in the approval. The case was heard in the Land Court of Queensland, with Justice Finn presiding. The court was required to determine the proper construction of the development approval, specifically the meaning and implications of the term "temporary accommodation" within the context of the approved use of specific allotments in the resort.

The court began by outlining the principles relevant to the construction of planning documents, emphasizing that the rights to land use should be determined from the terms of the approval itself. The court noted that any limitations or restrictions should be plainly stated in the approval, and the consequences of ambiguity fall upon the approving authority. The court considered whether extrinsic evidence, including expert opinions, could aid in understanding the planning instruments. However, it was held that an expert's opinion on the construction of the approval itself is not admissible.

In reaching its decision, the court examined the evidence presented, including affidavits from a town planner and the general manager of the resort. The court disregarded certain expert opinions that ventured into the construction of the approval, focusing instead on the actual use of the allotments and the terms of the approval. The court concluded that the allotments in question were approved for use only in accordance with the definition of "motel" found in the Planning Scheme, which limits their use to the "temporary accommodation of travellers." The court was cautious about defining "temporary accommodation" precisely, finding it unnecessary to do so for the purposes of the case.

The court ultimately declared that the decision notice limited the use of the specified allotments to temporary accommodation of travellers. The court also noted that the term "holidaymakers" was not mentioned in the planning approval and should not be imported into the interpretation of the approval. The court's decision was based on the evidence of use and the explicit terms of the approval, without delving into broader definitions or speculative interpretations. The final order reflected this, limiting the use of the allotments to temporary accommodation of travellers as per the approval.

Orders

Orders of the court

It is declared that the decision notice dated 17 October 2003, as it relates to the premises identified as lots 201-218, 301-318 and 401-418 on SP 168156, limits the use of that part of the premises to use for the temporary accommodation of travellers.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It is appropriate to commence with a consideration of the principles relevant to the construction of the development approval. The same principles which apply to statutory construction apply to the construction of planning documents.[9] The rights to the use of land are to be determined from the terms of the approval itself, which may include expressly or by implication other material.[10] As development approvals operate, in effect, in rem and may be relied upon by subsequent owners and users of the land, the approval, where ambiguous, should be construed in the manner that places the least burden upon the land owner.[11] Any limitations or restrictions should appear plainly in the approval and the consequences of a lack of clarity fall upon the approving authority.[12] Extrinsic evidence, including that of experts, may be admissible to explain technical terms or “the physical state of the land and the course of development” to aid a proper understanding of planning instruments.[13] But the opinion of an expert about the construction of a planning approval is not admissible.[14][9] Zappala Family Co Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council [2014] QPELR 686, 698 [52]; AAD Design Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council [2013] 1 Qd R 1, 19 [73].[10] Aqua Blue Noosa Pty Ltd v Noosa Shire Council [2005] QPELR 318, 321 [20]; Parramatta City Council v Shell Co of Australia Ltd [1992] 2 NSWLR 632.[11] Matijesevic v Logan City Council [1984] 1 Qd R 599, 605.[12] Hawkins and Izzard v Permarig Pty Ltd and Brisbane City Council (No. 1) [2001] QPELR 414, 416.[13] Caloundra City Council v Pelican Links Pty Ltd & Anor [2005] QCA 84, [22].[14] HA Bachrach Pty Ltd v Caboolture Shire Council (1992) 80 LGERA 230, 235; Yu Feng Pty Ltd v Maroochy Shire Council [2000] 1 Qd R 305, 326.Evidence Prior to the hearing the applicant filed affidavits from Shane Adamson, a town planner, and Melissa Evans, the general manager of the resort. At the hearing the applicant relied only upon part of the affidavit of Mr Adamson.[15] The respondent initially objected to much of the affidavit of Mr Adamson, but at the hearing the objection narrowed to paragraphs [66] to [80] of the town planning report that is exhibit “SA-2” to the affidavit of Mr Adamson’s affidavit. In these paragraphs Mr Adamson expresses opinions about the impact on the resort of what he assumed was the permanent residential use of a number of allotments on levels two, three and four. He also ventured the opinion that permanent occupation of the relevant allotments “could not have been contemplated by the Development Approval”. In my view, the opinions expressed by Mr Adamson in paragraphs [66] to [80] of exhibit “SA-2” are not relevant to my determination of the preliminary point. I have not had regard to this material in reaching my conclusions.[15] The respondent relied upon Mr Adamson’s professional qualifications and experience as outlined in exhibit “SA-1”. As well the applicant sought to rely upon the following paragraphs in “SA-2”: [1] – [7]; [10] – [13]; [22] – [25]; [33]; [46] – [49]; [53] – [54]; [58] – [61]; and [66] – [80].

Decision

Reasons for decision

It is also, in my view, unnecessary to fix a definition. As noted above an issue in the proceedings is whether any particular allotment is being used in a manner inconsistent with the definition of “motel”. This question can be answered, based upon the evidence relating to the use of the allotment, without fixing a precise time limit for “temporary accommodation”.Conclusion and orders I have concluded that the allotments the subject of the application were approved for use only in accordance with the definition of “motel” found in the Planning Scheme. It follows that the use of these allotments is limited to the “temporary accommodation of travellers”. The questions reserved include a reference to holidaymakers. There is no mention of such a term in the planning approval and associated documents. Its use in the questions probably derived from the wording of the originating application. It would be inappropriate to answer the questions in a manner that imported “holidaymakers”. The first two questions are really sides of the same coin. In addition, I have noted my concerns about defining “temporary accommodation”. In the circumstances it is only necessary to answer the first question posed, and this should be reframed to reflect the matters I have noted. The order will be:It is declared that the decision notice dated 17 October 2003, as it relates to the premises identified as lots 201-218, 301-318 and 401-418 on SP 168156, limits the use of that part of the premises to use for the temporary accommodation of travellers.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The respondents submitted it was unnecessary to consider the meaning of “temporary accommodation” as, on their case, the use of the allotments was not restricted in this way.Consideration The respondents’ first proposition, that the development approval permits any part of the premises to be used for any of the listed purposes, cannot be accepted. Merely stating the proposition that a part of the building designed as a restaurant could be used as a multiple dwelling is probably sufficient to illustrate the absurdity of this interpretation. As well, this interpretation is inconsistent with the very idea of a condition, which is to confine or restrict the manner in which the approval is to be exercised. It is also inconsistent with the assessment of infrastructure charges, which levy different rates based upon the assumption there will be different uses. The condition should be read as requiring each component of the development to be used in accordance with the Planning Scheme definition for that component. It is necessary then to consider into which category the allotments the subject of this application fall. As noted, the subject allotments total 102. The allotments on the remaining floors number 62. This is consistent with the approval and the plans. It must follow that the 102 allotments the subject of the present application are those described as “Hotel/Motel (102 suites)” in the approval. This leads to the respondents’ second point, that the allotments were approved for use as a hotel as well as motel and “hotel” does not impose any restriction on the length of accommodation. I am unpersuaded this is how the approval should be read. The relevant definition of hotel says nothing about accommodation. It refers only to that part of a building that may be subject to a liquor licence or a TAB betting shop. As was submitted by the applicant, a building can be a hotel even if it does not have accommodation. Indeed, common experience suggests this is often the case. If there is to be an accommodation component to a hotel development it is necessary to obtain approval for that purpose. Approval of a “hotel” is not itself enough to allow accommodation, temporary or otherwise. The CMS does not assist the respondent. It was brought into existence some time after the approval. The CMS contains no restrictions on the use of the allotments on levels two, three and four. The respondent submitted this supports the conclusion that permanent accommodation was intended or contemplated. In my view it is at least equally open to conclude the absence of restriction in the CMS reflected that the use was otherwise limited by the approval. The applicant’s submission that the 102 allotments were approved for use in accordance with the definition of “motel” in the Planning Scheme must be accepted. Apart from the language of the decision and condition five, which is in my view persuasive, there is considerable support for a finding that the allotments were not approved for permanent accommodation. Each of these allotments was planned to be relatively small, studio-style accommodation with limited kitchen facilities. The levels on which the allotments are found was planned to be serviced by a dedicated “service lift” that starts adjacent to the laundry, passes through the kitchen and housekeeping areas, and ends at level four. The car parking arrangements provide further support. Each car park in the “Resident Parking” section bears a number that correlates to one of the unit numbers on the plan for levels five to twelve. Many of these parks are adjacent to a storage cage. In contrast, the car parks in the “Hotel Parking” section are unallocated and do not have storage facilities. Finally, the calculations of infrastructure charges also suggests the accommodation was approved for different uses.