Sumol+Compal Marcas SA v Sumo IP Holdings Pty Ltd

[2017] ATMO 84

TRADE MARKS ACT 1995

DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS

ReOpposition by Sumol+Compal Marcas SA to registration of trade mark application 1661393 (29, 30, 32, 35, 43) – SUMO logo - in the name of Sumo IP Holdings Pty Ltd

Delegate:                 Robert Wilson

Representation:       Opponent: Davies Collison Cave

Applicant: brandUlegal

Decision:                   2017 ATMO 84

Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) - Section 52 opposition: ss 42(b), 44 and 60 considered – no grounds established – trade mark may proceed to registration

Background

1.     This decision concerns an opposition brought by Sumol+Compal Marcas SA (‘the Opponent’) pursuant to s 52 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (‘the Act’) to registration of the trade mark subject of the application detailed below in the name of Sumo IP Holdings Pty Ltd (‘the Applicant’):

Application Number:

1661393

Filing Date:

3 December 2014

Goods and Services:

See Appendix

(‘the Applicant’s Goods and Services’)

Trade Mark:

(‘the Applicant’s Trade Mark’)

2.     On 23 April 2015 the application’s acceptance for possible registration was advertised in the Australian Official Journal of Trade Marks. The Opponent filed a Notice of Intention to Oppose the registration on 22 June 2015 and a Statement of Grounds and Particulars (‘the SGP’) on 22 July 2015. The Applicant filed a Notice of Intention to Defend on 25 August 2015. The SGP nominated grounds of opposition under ss 42(b), 44 and 60 of the Act.

Evidence

3.     The Opponent filed Evidence in Support of its opposition (‘EIS’) on 30 November 2015. This evidence consists of:

·Declaration made on 30 November 2015 by Ian Drew, a partner at Davies Collison Cave, the legal representatives of the Opponent, with Exhibits ID-1 to ID-7 (‘the Drew declaration’).

4.     The Applicant filed Evidence in Answer (‘EIA’) on 20 May 2016. This evidence consists of:

·Statutory Declaration made on 18 May 2016 by Luke Baylis, a director of the Applicant, with Exhibits LB-1 to LB-12 (‘the Baylis declaration’).

5.     The Opponent chose not to file any Evidence in Reply. Once the time allowed for filing evidence had ended the parties were given an opportunity to request an oral hearing or to file written submissions. In September 2016 both parties requested an oral hearing. The matter was set down for a hearing in Canberra on 4 July 2017. I was allocated to decide the matter as a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks. In line with usual practice, an email was sent to the parties on 24 May 2017 which contained a schedule for the provision of written summaries of submissions to be filed prior to the hearing. The Applicant filed written submissions by Rebecca White of Counsel. Ms White was instructed by brandUlegal. The Opponent did not file any written submissions. In the end, neither party appeared at the scheduled hearing and I am to decide the matter on the written record consisting of the SGP, the EIS, the EIA and the Applicant’s submissions.

The Opponent

6.     The Opponent is the owner of the registered trade mark detailed below:

Trade Mark Number:

1394840 (IR 215817)

Priority Date:

4 August 2010

Goods:

Class 32: Coolers and fruit juices

(‘the Opponent’s Goods’)

Trade Mark:

(‘the Opponent’s Trade Mark’)

7.     According to the Drew declaration:

The Opponent is an international beverage manufacturer and fruit processing business with its headquarters in Portugal. It exports it goods to more than 70 countries internationally.

The Opponent’s objective is to become a world leader in the production of fruit drinks and is continually investing in its operations in foreign markets. … [T]he Opponent can trace its history back over 60 years in Portugal. …

The Opponent’s SUMOL branded beverage was first launched in 1954. By 1965 the Opponent’s company was promoting its SUMOL branded beverages on Portugese [sic] television. The Opponent’s company expanded throughout the 1970s and 1980s, entering the Swiss, US, Angolan, San Tome, and Principe [sic], and Cape Verde markets. Through the 1990s, the business further expanded with the introduction of new flavoured beverages and, by the 2000s, to further beverage products including SUMOL LIGHT, SUMOL ICE, SUMOL MANGO, SUMOL STRAWBERRIES, SUMOL Z, SUMOL INTENSE - ORANGE & CHOCOLATE, and SUMOL BLISS. By 2013, sales of SUMOL beverages internationally overtook sales in the Portugese [sic] market. The Opponent has sold its various beverage products in Australia since at least as early as 2000.

The Applicant

8.     According to the Baylis declaration:

[The Applicant] is the owner of all rights title and interest in and to [the Applicant’s Trade Mark] and pursuant to a Licence Agreement dated 13 July 2012, [the Applicant] has authorised Sumo Group Australia Pty Ltd and its related entities (hereinafter referred to as Sumo Group) to use its trade marks including [the Applicant’s Trade Mark].

Sumo Group was founded by myself and James Miller in around the year 2001. Together we devised the concept for the business due to the lack of a healthy alternative to the traditional fast food on offer in Australia.

In or around 2002, the word SUMO was chosen for the business due to its association with size, namely to signify the association of ‘sumo-sized’ portions of healthy, wholesome fast food as opposed to the super-sized portions of unhealthy fast food being offered at the time. Due to this association, the word SUMO was to be used as the core trade mark for the business. This word has since been used on its own and together with other descriptive words including SALAD, SOCIETY, SUGGESTION BOX, CONCEPT and others to denote [the Applicant’s Goods and Services].

Sumo Group’s first restaurant opened in 2003 in Liverpool Street, Sydney under the name Sumo Salad. Since then, 115 stores have been opened throughout Australia. …

In addition to the Australian stores, Sumo Group has opened stores internationally, namely in Brazil, New Zealand, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates and the United States of America.

Grounds of Opposition, Onus and Standard of Proof

9. As indicated above, in the SGP the Opponent nominated grounds of opposition under ss 42(b), 44 and 60 of the Act. The onus of proof in an opposition rests upon the Opponent.[1] The relevant standard of proof is the ordinary civil standard based on the balance of probabilities.[2] The date at which the rights of the parties are to be determined is 3 December 2014, being the filing date of the application (‘the Relevant Date’).[3]

Discussion

[1] Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network GP [2010] FCAFC 58, [32].

[2] Following Gyles J in Pfizer Products Inc v Karam [2006] FCA 1663, [6]-[26] affirmed by the Full Federal Court in Telstra Corporation Limited v Phone Directories Company Ltd [2015] FCAFC 156, [132]-[133].

[3] Southern Cross Refrigerating Co v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd [1954] HCA 82, [2].

Section 44

10. Relevant provisions of the Act with respect to the s 44 ground are reproduced below:

Section 44 - Identical etc. trade marks

(1)Subject to subsections (3) and (4), an application for the registration of a trade mark (applicant's trade mark) in respect of goods (applicant's goods) must be rejected if:

(a)the applicant's trade mark is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to:

(i)    a trade mark registered by another person in respect of similar goods or closely related services; or

(ii)   a trade mark whose registration in respect of similar goods or closely related services is being sought by another person; and

(b)the priority date for the registration of the applicant's trade mark in respect of the applicant's goods is not earlier than the priority date for the registration of the other trade mark in respect of the similar goods or closely related services.

Note 1: For deceptively similar see section 10.

Note 2: For similar goods see subsection 14(1).

Note 3: For priority date see section 12.

Note 4: The regulations may provide that an application must also be rejected if the trade mark is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to, a protected international trade mark or a trade mark for which there is a request to extend international registration to Australia: see Part 17A. …

Section 10 - Definition of deceptively similar

For the purposes of this Act, a trade mark is taken to be deceptively similar to another trade mark if it so nearly resembles that other trade mark that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion.

11. In the SGP, the Opponent nominated the Opponent’s Trade Mark in respect of s 44. To successfully oppose the application pursuant to s 44 of the Act the Opponent must establish the requirements of s 44(1), i.e. that the Opponent’s Trade Mark:

·     has a priority date which is earlier than the Relevant Date (‘the first requirement’); and

·     is registered for goods which are similar or closely related to at least some of the Applicant’s Goods and Services (‘the second requirement’); and

·     is substantially identical with or deceptively similar to the Applicant’s Trade Mark (‘the third requirement’).

12.     The Opponent’s Trade Mark has a priority date which is earlier than the Relevant Date, thus satisfying the first requirement. The fruit juices which appear in the Opponent’s Goods are similar to at least the fruit juices claimed by the Applicant in Class 32, thus satisfying the second requirement. I will now consider the third requirement.

Substantially identical or deceptively similar?

13.     I will firstly consider whether the Applicant’s Trade Mark is substantially identical to the Opponent’s Trade Mark. When considering ‘substantial identity’ in Shell Co of Australia Ltd v Esso Standard Oil (Australia) Ltd  Windeyer J said:

In considering whether marks are substantially identical they should, I think, be compared side by side, their similarities and differences noted and the importance of these assessed having regard to the essential features of the registered mark and the total impression of resemblance or dissimilarity that emerges from the comparison.[4]

[4] [1963] HCA 66, [12].

14.     On a side by side comparison there are clear differences between the respective trade marks. There is the device of what appears to be a stylised drawing of a sumo wrestler holding a large bowl in the Applicant’s Trade Mark: this is absent from the Opponent’s Trade Mark. The Applicant’s Trade Mark contains the word SUMO whereas the Opponent’s Trade Mark includes the word SUMOL. These differences alone, even without considering other differences, are sufficient to cause the respective trade marks not to be substantially identical. I move then to consider whether the trade marks are deceptively similar.

15.     Guidance for determining whether trade marks are deceptively similar is generally found in the judgment of Windeyer J in Shell Co (Aust) Ltd v Esso Standard Oil (Aust) Ltd:

On the question of deceptive similarity, a different comparison must be made from that which is necessary when substantial identity is in question. The marks are not now to be looked at side by side. The issue is not abstract similarity, but deceptive similarity.

Therefore the comparison is the familiar one of trade mark law. It is between, on the one hand, the impression based on recollection of the plaintiff’s mark that persons of ordinary intelligence and memory would have; and, on the other hand, the impressions that such persons would get from the defendant’s [trade mark].[5]

[5] [1963] HCA 66, [13].

16.     In the SGP the Opponent asserted that the respective trade marks are deceptively similar but did not elaborate on why they considered this to be so. Nor are there any submissions from the Opponent which address the assertion of deceptive similarity. The EIS also contains nothing which addresses this question. The Applicant has addressed this question and has submitted:

In considering whether [the Applicant’s Trade Mark] is deceptively similar to [the Opponent’s Trade Mark], the overall impression of the competing marks must be considered.[6]

This is no requirement that an element of difference between two marks has to be particularly distinctive. For example, a suffix may make an obvious difference to the earlier element of a mark.[7]

The test is whether upon an imperfect recollection of [the Opponent’s Trade Mark], the use of [the Applicant’s Trade Mark] would be likely to cause confusion.

The imperfect recollection of [the Opponent’s Trade Mark] is of a made up or foreign word. This can be contrasted with the visual emphasis in [the Applicant’s Trade Mark] on the logo positioned above the word SUMO. This visual emphasis is not present in [the Opponent’s Trade Mark]. …

When the Court has regard to the ‘effect of the respective wholes’ … it is clear that the marks are not deceptively similar.

[6] Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network GP (2010) 86 IPR 437, [89]-[92]; Clark v Sharp (1898) 15 RPC 141, 146 (Ch D).

[7] Floden v Penta Hotel Holdings Ltd (2009) 83 IPR 423, [16].

17.     I would add to the Applicant’s comparison and note that ‘sumo’ is a word which is well understood in Australia to mean a type of Japanese wrestling or wrestler. This meaning is reinforced by the device present in the Applicant’s Trade Mark. This combination of elements gives the Applicant’s Trade Mark a very strong conceptual meaning. On the other hand—and in the absence of evidence or submissions to the contrary—‘SUMOL’ appears to have no meaning which is readily apparent to Australians who might be exposed to the Opponent’s Trade Mark. SUMO is likely to be pronounced significantly differently to SUMOL: the ‘MO’ in SUMO typically pronounced in Australia with a long vowel sound as in the ‘mo’ in ‘motel’, whereas the ‘MOL’ element in SUMOL is likely to be pronounced in the manner of the ‘mol’ in ‘mollify’. This is a significant difference in my view, notwithstanding ‘the tendency of persons using the English language to slur the termination of words’.[8]

[8] Re London Lubricants (1920) Limited’s Application to Register a Trade Mark (1925) 42 RPC 264, 279 (Sargant J).

18.     The significant visual, conceptual and aural differences between the trade marks means that deception or confusion between the two are unlikely. I am not satisfied, therefore, that the respective trade marks are deceptively similar. Consequently, the Opponent has failed to establish the third requirement and, because of that failure, this ground of opposition.

Section 60

19. Section 60 of the Act is reproduced below:

Section 60 - Trade mark similar to trade mark that has acquired a reputation in Australia

The registration of a trade mark in respect of particular goods or services may be opposed on the ground that:

(a)another trade mark had, before the priority date for the registration of the first‑mentioned trade mark in respect of those goods or services, acquired a reputation in Australia; and

(b)because of the reputation of that other trade mark, the use of the first‑mentioned trade mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion.

20. The ground based on s 60 of the Act is particularised in the SGP as follows:

The Opponent has used the trade mark SUMOL (‘the said trade mark’) in Australia since at least as early as 2000, in relation to beverages and has a significant reputation in the Australian marketplace in connection with the said trade mark. The said trade mark has also been used extensively in over 70 countries and has a significant reputation on an international level. The trade mark and registration of the Applicant’s trade mark is sought in relation [to] goods which are at least similar goods to those which the Opponent has a significant reputation in Australia and internationally.

By reason of the Opponent’s use of and reputation in the said trade mark, the use of the mark applied for by the Applicant would be likely to deceive or cause confusion.

21. To establish a ground of opposition under s 60 an opponent must demonstrate that at the Relevant Date there was another trade mark which had acquired a reputation in Australia amongst a significant number of persons in the relevant market such that use of the Applicant’s Trade Mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion. The Opponent has stated that its trade mark, SUMOL, has acquired such a reputation.

22.     In McCormick & Co Inc v McCormick, Kenny J considered what is intended by the word ‘reputation’. Her Honour had consulted the Macquarie Dictionary and on the basis of the definition provided decided that, in s 60, reputation is ‘the recognition of the [trade mark] by the public generally’.[9] Her Honour quoted with approval the following words of Lockhart J from Re ConAgra Inc v McCain Foods (Aust) Pty Ltd:

[R]eputation within the jurisdiction may be proved by a variety of means including advertisements on television or radio, or in magazines and newspapers within the forum. It may be established by showing constant travel of people between other countries and the forum and that people within the forum, (whether residents there or persons simply visiting there from other countries) are exposed to the goods of the overseas owner …[10]

[9] [2000] FCA 1335, [81].

[10] [1992] FCA 159, [118].

23.     On the subject of reputation Kenny J also referred to the Hugo Boss decision, where the Registrar’s delegate observed:

[I]t is true that the assessment of the reputation of a trade mark goes far beyond mere examination of sales or turnover of goods sold under that trade mark and contemplation of the advertising and promotional figures.

As regards a trade mark, its reputation derives both from the quantum of sales under that mark and also its esteem, or image, projected by that trade mark. The quantum of sales, advertising and promotion contributes to the ‘recognition’ component of the trade mark’s reputation. The credit, image and values projected by a trade mark attaches to the ‘esteem’ component of the reputation as do the public events and other trader’s marks with which [the] owner of the trade marks in question chooses to associate the trade marks via sponsorships, cross-promotions, ‘contra deals’ and so forth.

It follows that a trade mark used in relation to goods with comparatively low sales may have a high and strong reputation by virtue of the high credit or esteem in which it is held, or, conversely, that a trade mark which has very high sales may have a strong reputation notwithstanding the lack of esteem that attaches to it. The particular popular images, or sets of values, that attach to the trade mark are also, therefore, important parts of the reputation of the trade mark and may be as strong an associative force in the minds of the public as the association of the trade marks with the goods or services themselves.[11]

[11] Jackson International Trading Co Kurt D Bruhl GMbH & Co KGv Hugo Boss AG [1999] ATMO 23 (Thompson).

24. As stated above, as well as the consideration regarding reputation, another factor relevant to an opposition under the provisions of s 60 is the consideration of what constitutes a significant number of persons in the relevant market. The case of Le Cordon Bleu BV v Cordon Bleu International Ltee[12] was decided under s 28(a) of the (now repealed) Trade Marks Act 1955. That provision did not refer to ‘reputation’ at all, only that use of the impugned trade mark would be ‘likely to deceive or cause confusion’. Nevertheless the words of Heerey J provide us with some guidance:

What is ‘significant’ or ‘substantial’ will depend on the nature of the goods or services in question. For some highly specialised products, awareness among a few thousand persons, or even less, might be sufficient … We are here concerned with foodstuffs sold in supermarkets, delicatessens, milk bars and other retail outlets. The relevant market is virtually the entire Australian population from early teenage years onwards.[13]

[12] [2000] FCA 1587.

[13] Ibid [91]. Heerey J’s decision was overturned on appeal to the Full Federal Court, although not on the point quoted.

25.     The Drew declaration provides a brief history of the Opponent and a number of exhibits—the relevance of which is unstated in the declaration. In the absence of submissions from the Opponent it is unclear what conclusions it is intended that I draw from particular exhibits. It is, in the end, unnecessary that I provide a detailed analysis of the evidence; however, I will make some observations. Much of the evidence is dated after the relevant date. There is limited demonstrated use of SUMOL as a plain word. Most of the demonstrated use is in a stylised form such as shown on the examples of packaging below:

26.     The EIS falls short of satisfying me that SUMOL has acquired a significant reputation in Australia. Nevertheless, even if I were to be satisfied that the plain word SUMOL, or SUMOL in some stylised form as shown in the EIS, had acquired a significant reputation, I would not be satisfied that because of that reputation the use of the Applicant’s Trade Mark would give rise to deception or confusion. The overall impressions left by the SUMOL trade marks in their various forms are very different to that left by the Applicant’s Trade Mark (as discussed above in respect of the ground of opposition under s 44). These differences mean that use of the Applicant’s Trade Mark is unlikely to deceive or cause confusion regardless of any reputation which might have been acquired by any SUMOL trade mark found in the EIS. Consequently, the Opponent has failed to establish this ground of opposition.

Section 42

27. Section 42 of the Act is reproduced below:

42 Trade mark scandalous or its use contrary to law

An application for the registration of a trade mark must be rejected if:

(a) the trade mark contains or consists of scandalous matter; or

(b) its use would be contrary to law.

28.     The onus is on the Opponent to establish that use of the Applicant’s Trade Mark would be, rather than could be, contrary to law on the balance of probabilities.[14]

[14] Advantage Rent-a-Car Inc v Advantage Car Rental Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 683.

29. The ground of opposition pursuant to s 42 of the Act was particularised in the SGP as follows:

The Opponent has used the trade mark SUMOL (‘the said trade mark’) in Australia since at least as early as 2000, in relation to beverages and has a significant reputation in the Australian marketplace in connection with the said trade mark. The said trade mark has also been used extensively in over 70 countries and has a significant reputation on an international level. The trade mark applied for by the Applicant is strikingly similar to the said trade mark and registration of the Applicant's trade mark is sought in relation [to] goods which are at least similar goods to those which the Opponent has a significant reputation in Australia and internationally.

Accordingly, the use of the mark applied for by the Applicant would be likely to mislead and deceive consumers in contravention of sections 18 & 29 of the Australian Consumer Law.

30. In the present matter the Opponent has failed to establish a ground of opposition under s 60 of the Act. As the test for misleading or deceptive conduct under s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law (‘the ACL’) is a more stringent test than that for deception or confusion under s 60,[15] I am satisfied that the Opponent has also failed to establish that the use of the Applicant’s Trade Mark would be contrary to s 18 of the ACL.

[15] See, eg: Ownit Homes Pty Ltd v Ownit Conveyancing Pty Ltd [2005] ATMO 47, [36]; Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 191, 198 (Gibbs CJ).

31. Where a trade mark does not run afoul of s 18 of the ACL, neither will it run afoul of s 29 of the ACL. In Pacific Publications Pty Ltd v IPC Media Pty Ltd, Beaumont J considered—in connection with the superseded Trade Practices Act1974 (‘TPA’)—that ‘the Court’s conclusion on s 52 would necessarily carry with it a conclusion on s 53(c) and (d)’.[16] Section 53(d) of the TPA is the equivalent provision to s 29(1)(h) of the ACL.

[16] [2003] FCA 104, [107].

32.     For these reasons I am not satisfied that use of the Applicant’s Trade Mark would be contrary to law. Therefore, the Opponent has failed to establish this ground of opposition.

Decision

33.     The Opponent has failed to establish any of the grounds of opposition it nominated in the SGP. Accordingly, application 1661393 may proceed to registration after one month from the date of this decision. If the Registrar has been served with a notice of appeal before that time, I direct that registration shall not occur until either the appeal is withdrawn or a court so orders.

Costs

34. The Applicant has sought an award of costs in its favour. I see no reason to depart from the general rule that costs follow the event. As the Opponent has failed to establish a ground of opposition, I award costs against the Opponent under s 221 of the Act in line with the amounts in Schedule 8 of the Trade Mark Regulations 1995.

Robert Wilson
Hearing Officer
Oppositions and Hearings
10 August 2017

Appendix

The Applicant’s Goods and Services

Class 29: Fruit salads; Prepared salads; Salads; Salads containing meat; Salads containing poultry; Potato salad; Vegetable salads; Food products made from cooked vegetables; Food products made from dried vegetables; Food products made from preserved vegetables; Vegetable food products; Mixed vegetables; Prepared vegetables; Prepared meals consisting principally of fish; Prepared meals made principally of cheese; Prepared meals, predominantly of meat or vegetables; Salmon; Tuna fish; Meat excluding raw, uncooked meat; Fish (not live); Fresh game excluding raw, uncooked meat; Fresh poultry excluding raw, uncooked poultry; Meat extracts excluding raw, uncooked meat extracts; Yoghurt; Cheese; Combinations of cheese and fruit; Cooked fruits; Dried fruit; Food products made from dried fruits; Food products made from cooked fruits; Food products made from preserved fruits; Preserved fruits; Stewed fruits; Drinks flavoured with fruit pastes and having a milk base; Fruit flavoured beverages having a milk base; Fruit flavoured yoghurts; Prepared foods consisting principally of fruits; Prepared meals made from fruit (fruit predominating); Fruits (processed); Mixed fruit; Frosted fruits; Frozen fruits; Soups; Preparations for making soup; Eggs

Class 30: Salad dressings; Honey; Mustard; Vinegar; Sauces (condiments); Condiments; Spices; Breakfast cereals; Foodstuffs made with cereals; Preparations for making cereals; Bread; Mixes for the preparation of bread; Tortillas; Sandwiches containing salad; Sandwiches; Toasted sandwiches; Wrap (sandwich); Rice paper; Cereal based snack food; Snack foods consisting principally of pasta; Snack foods consisting principally of rice; Snack bars containing a mixture of grains, nuts and dried fruit (confectionery); Snack foods prepared from grains; Pasta salads; Rice salads; Flavourings for soups (other than essential oils); Pasta products; Prepared meals containing (principally) pasta; Quiches; Aerated beverages (with coffee, cocoa or chocolate base); Beverages made from coffee; Coffee; Coffee beverages; Coffee beverages with milk; Ice beverages with a coffee base; Iced coffee (coffee based beverages); Preparations with a coffee and tea base; Beverages made of tea; Beverages with tea base; Chai tea; Fruit flavoured tea (other than medicinal); Fruit tea (other than for medical purposes); Herbal tea (other than for medicinal use); Iced tea; Preparations for making beverages (tea based); Tea (not medicinal); Tisanes made of tea; Beverages made from cocoa; Cocoa; Cocoa based products; Cocoa beverages with milk; Cocoa preparations; Ice beverages with a cocoa base; Beverages consisting principally of chocolate; Beverages made from chocolate; Beverages with a chocolate base; Ice beverages with a chocolate base

Class 32: Aerated fruit juices; Bottled fruit juices; Fresh fruit juices; Frozen fruit juices; Fruit juices; Beverages consisting of a blend of fruit and vegetable juices; Concentrates for use in the preparation of fruit juice drinks; Fresh vegetable juices; Frozen vegetable juices; Fruit juice extracts for use as a beverage; Non-alcoholic fruit juice beverages; Vegetable juice concentrates (beverages); Vegetable juices (beverages)

Class 35: Retail services; Business assistance relating to franchising; Franchising consultancy and business support services; Franchising services (group purchasing, group advertising); Management advisory services related to franchising; Provision of business information relating to franchising; Distribution of goods (not being transport services) (agent, wholesale, representative services, by any means); Wholesaling of goods (by any means)

Class 43: Takeaway food and drink services; Preparation of food and drink; Providing food and drink; Restaurant services; Cafe services; Bar services; Catering services; Mobile catering services; Preparation of take-away and fast food; Take away food services; Restaurant services for the provision of fast food; Snack-bars; Consultancy, advisory and information services in relation to the provision of food and drink; Consultancy services relating to food preparation