Sullaphen v Drilling Services Australia Pty Ltd; Sullaphen v Workers' Compensation Regulator

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QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Sullaphen v Drilling Services Australia Pty Ltd & Ors; Sullaphen v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2020] QIRC 189

PARTIES:

Sullaphen, Darren Clement
(Applicant)

v

Drilling Services Australia Pty Ltd
(First Respondent)

Bryant, Steve
(Second Respondent)

Zarafa, Michael
(Third Respondent)

AND

Sullaphen, Darren Clement
(Applicant)

v

Workers' Compensation Regulator
(Respondent)

CASE NOS:

AD/2019/33
WC/2019/80

PROCEEDING:

Applications in existing proceedings

DELIVERED ON:

30 October 2020

MEMBER:

HEARD AT:

Industrial Commissioner Dwyer

On the papers

ORDERS:

1.    The proceedings in AD/2019/33 against the First Respondent are dismissed;

2.    The application to hear matter AD/2019/33 and WC/2019/80 together is refused;

3.    The parties and witnesses in matter AD/2019/33 may give evidence in chief by affidavit; and

4.    Matter WC/2019/80 will be returned to the Registry for allocation to another Member. 

CATCHWORDS:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – DISCRIMINATION –- INTERLOCATORY APPLICATION – application for matter to be heard jointly with workers compensation appeal matter – powers of the Commission - application for evidence in chief by affidavit – pros and cons of affidavit evidence – parties to make their own election.  

LEGISLATION:

CASES:  

Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, s 174, s 208

Corporations Act2001, s 440D

Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 539, s 553

Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011, r 41, 50, 51, r 98

Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003, s 32, s 549

Brett Reynolds v Workers Compensation Regulator & Ors [2019] QIRC 140

Brisbane City Council v Gillow and Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2015] QIRC 124

Deanne Maree King v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2019] QIRC 134

Humphries v Newport Quays Stage 2A Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 699

McCauley v Club Resort Holdings Pty Ltd (No.2) [2013] QCAT 243

McCauley v Q-Comp and Club Resort Holdings Pty Ltd [2012] QIRC 45

Reasons for Decision

Background and nature of applications

  1. Mr Darren Sullaphen is the Appellant in WC/2019/80 ('the workers' compensation appeal') and the Applicant in AD/2019/33 ('the discrimination matter'), (referred to together as 'the matters').

  2. The Workers' Compensation Regulator ('the Regulator') is the Respondent in the workers compensation appeal. The Respondents named in the discrimination matter are: (First) Drilling Services Australia Pty Ltd, (Second) Steven Bryant, and (Third) Michael Zarafa. The First Respondent went into administration in or about early February 2020. The Second Respondent is now an undischarged bankrupt.

  3. There are two interlocutory applications in the matters to be determined:

    ·     The application of Mr Sullaphen for the hearing of matters AD/2019/33 and WC/2019/80 together ('the joint hearing application'); and

    ·     The application on behalf of the Respondents in AD/2019/33 pursuant to r 50 of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 ('the Rules') for inter alia evidence to be given by way of affidavit ('the affidavit evidence application').

  4. The applications were previously listed for hearing before the Commission on 14 February 2020 however, it became apparent on the morning of the hearing that the First Respondent had recently entered administration and was…

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Details
Case
[2020] QIRC 189
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Sullaphen v Drilling Services Australia Pty Ltd; Sullaphen v Workers' Compensation Regulator involved the applicant, Sullaphen, bringing claims of discrimination against his former employer, Drilling Services Australia Pty Ltd, and claims for workers' compensation against the Workers' Compensation Regulator. The dispute centred on the procedural issues of whether the two matters should be heard jointly, and whether the parties should be required to give evidence in chief by affidavit. The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia heard the case.

The primary legal issue was whether the two matters should be heard together and if the evidence should be given by affidavit. The court considered the criteria set out by Besanko J in Humphries to determine whether the proceedings were similar in nature and whether there were advantages to having the evidence given by affidavit. The court also considered the arguments put forward by the parties on the pros and cons of affidavit evidence.

The court found that the proceedings were not similar in nature, as they arose under different statutory regimes and required consideration of different statutory criteria. The court also found that there were advantages to having the evidence given by affidavit, such as reducing the cost of proceedings and allowing for comprehensive preparation of witnesses. However, the court noted that the decision on how to give evidence in chief should be left to the parties, and that an order compelling all witnesses to give evidence by affidavit would not be appropriate. The court dismissed the proceedings against the first respondent and refused the application to hear the matters together. The workers' compensation matter was returned to the registry for allocation to another member.

The court ordered that the proceedings against the first respondent be dismissed, the application to hear the matters together be refused, and that the parties and witnesses in the discrimination matter may give evidence in chief by affidavit. The workers' compensation matter was to be returned to the registry for allocation to another member.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The proceedings in AD/2019/33 against the First Respondent are dismissed;

2. The application to hear matter AD/2019/33 and WC/2019/80 together is refused;

3. The parties and witnesses in matter AD/2019/33 may give evidence in chief by affidavit; and

4. Matter WC/2019/80 will be returned to the Registry for allocation to another Member.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Rule 50(1) of the Rules relevantly provides:50 Evidence on affidavit(1) Evidence may be given by affidavit under a direction of the court, commission or registrar. Rule 50 gives the Commission a wide and unfettered discretion to direct that evidence be given by affidavit. Further, the term 'evidence' in no way limits the discretion to an order that all evidence be given by affidavit i.e. the language contemplates a variety of scenarios were e.g. the evidence of individual witnesses may be given on affidavit, where others provide evidence viva voce. The language of the order sought in the application filed by the Respondents includes the limiting language 'parties' and 'may'. If granted in those terms, such an order would do no more than give the parties (as opposed to non-party witnesses) leave to exercise their own discretion as to how they give their evidence in chief. I note that Mr Sullaphen generally consents to the making of such an order, and further, appears to consent to the Respondent's lay witnesses also giving evidence by affidavit[22].[22] See Mr Sullaphen's submissions dated 14 February 2020, at paragraph 5. However, it is apparent from the submissions of the Respondents and the minutes of proposed consent orders filed 17 June 2020 that the Respondents are seeking an order that all witnesses (including experts) file affidavit evidence in chief[23]. I will consider their application on that basis. [23] See draft minutes of consent order at paragraphs 1-3. Mr Sullaphen resists the application to the extent that it seeks to compel him he and his witnesses to give evidence in chief by affidavit. In written submissions dated 14 February 2020[24] Mr Sullaphen submits that viva voce evidence ought to be preferred because: In their written submissions of 17 June 2020, the Respondents set out their reasons for seeking the order for affidavit evidence[25]. I will deal with those in more detail below. Before doing so, I note that the Respondents also set out a number of propositions pertaining to affidavit evidence more generally in support of their application[26]. I broadly agree with each of those general propositions. [25] Respondents submissions dated 17 June 2020 at paragraph 15. [26] Respondents submissions dated 17 June 2020 at paragraphs 17 to 22. In particular, I do not consider that circumstances where the evidence of a witness is likely to be controversial, or where credit is in issue, should preclude affidavit evidence. Cross examination will ordinarily allow adequate challenges to be made regardless of the manner in which evidence in chief is delivered. I also do not consider that affidavit evidence is likely to add significantly to the cost of proceedings. As noted by the Respondents in their submissions, the proper preparation of witnesses will require comprehensive interviewing and often the preparation of a written proof of evidence. In addition, in hearings before this Commission where evidence is viva voce it is common practice to direct that parties exchange written summaries of witness evidence in advance. The preparation of an affidavit would replace two of those three steps.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Reynolds, having had regard to the above cited authorities, his Honour went on to apply the criteria identified by Besanko J in Humphries[6]. I intend to adopt the same approach. Where I do not address a criterion identified by Besanko J it should be understood that I consider that criterion has no application in this matter.[6] [2009] FCA699 [11].Consideration Before addressing the specific criteria it ought to be noted that my consideration of this application has, to some extent, been an exercise in speculating about the way in which the respective proceedings might be conducted. It has been necessary to take this approach because even though the material that has been filed in both matters provides some insight into how each matter might proceed, when it comes to hearings, a trial plan and the subsequent reality are rarely an exact match. Further, it is not uncommon for pleadings to be amended, plans to be altered, or witness lists to expand or contract. Even the most minor alteration to a pleading, or a plan, or a witness list can have a seismic effect on the proceedings. I have approached my consideration of this application with these vicissitudes in mind. Are the proceedings broadly similar in nature? In broad and simple terms, the two matters are factually founded in a series of interactions between Mr Sullaphen and the Respondents during the course of his employment between August and September 2018. Mr Sullaphen seeks to characterise these interactions as discrimination in the discrimination matter, and stressors in the workers' compensation appeal. In the latter he will additionally need to address the question of whether some or all of those actions amount to reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way. The Respondents and the Regulator have each provided summaries of the nature of each proceeding in their submissions[7]. Each of their submissions correctly identify the critical differences in the proceedings with respect to the statutory framework and e.g. onus.[7] Respondents submissions filed 17 June 2020, paragraphs 2-11; Regulators submissions filed 13 February 2020, paragraph 5. Mr Sullaphen, citing the criteria identified by Besanko J in Humphries, submits that the proceedings are 'similar in nature' by reference to the issues of fact common to each proceeding with both claims stemming from interactions and meetings between Mr Sullaphen and the Respondents in August and September 2018[8]. He also concedes that the issues of law are not similar[9].[8] Submissions of Mr Sullaphen dated 14 February 2020 at paragraph 7 and 13. [9] Submissions of Mr Sullaphen dated 14 February 2020 at paragraph 13. In this instance the proceedings are, on the whole, quite different. The matters independently arise under the wholly different statutory regimes of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) ('the AD Act') and the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) ('the WCR Act'). The proceedings advanced by Mr Sullaphen in each matter require the Commission to consider inter alia whether certain facts meet statutory criteria that are unrelated and completely dissimilar.