Stockingham Pty Ltd v Brisbane Angels Nominees Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Stockingham Pty Ltd v Brisbane Angels Nominees Pty Ltd [2024] QSC 171

PARTIES:

STOCKINGHAM PTY LTD ACN 615 829 082 (FORMERLY KNOWN AS APAGEIN BIOTECH PTY LTD)

(plaintiff)

v
BRISBANE ANGELS NOMINEES PTY LTD ACN 122 839 294

(first defendant)

AND
JOHN DUGALD MACTAGGART
(second defendant)
AND
ALAN JAMES MONAGHAN
(third defendant)
AND
FREDERICK RICHARD HOULT

(fourth defendant)

FILE NO/S:

BS 11902/20

DIVISION:

Trial

PROCEEDING:

Application (Commercial List review)

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

9 August 2024

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

15 July 2024; 17 July 2024

JUDGE:

Freeburn J

ORDERS:

1.   The court directs that the plaintiff may rely on as evidence-in-chief at the trial of the proceeding:

a.   the statement of Julie van Eps filed on 4 June 2024; and

b.   the supplementary statement of Julie van Eps dated 4 June 2024 (and marked as exhibit 1).

2.   The order in paragraph 1 be subject to any valid objections to admissibility.

3.   I will hear the parties on costs.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – MOTIONS, INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATIONS AND OTHER PRE-TRIAL MATTERS – SELF-EXECUTING ORDERS – where a self-executing/ guillotine order required the plaintiff, Stockingham to provide material by certain dates – where previously, Stockingham breached the order by ten minutes – where the court granted an extension and made further directions – where Stockingham served additional material – whether the guillotine orders have been triggered – whether the court has jurisdiction to grant an extension

EVIDENCE – OPINION EVIDENCE – EXPERT OPINION – where Stockingham served the Supplementary Statement purporting that it was expert evidence – whether the Supplementary Statement, in substance, is expert evidence

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF EVIDENCE – where Stockingham sought to rely on additional evidence outside that permitted by case management orders – whether leave should be granted

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 r 5, r 7, r 367, r 668

Bailey v Marinoff (1971) 125 CLR 529; [1971] HCA 49, cited
Chand v Railcorp [2011] NSWCA 79, cited
Couran Cove Resort Community Body Corporate v The Proprietors of Couran Cove Resort-Broadwater Villas GTP 106807[2022] QSC 247, cited
FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL (1998) 165 CLR 268; [1988] HCA 13, applied
Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589; [1981] HCA 45;
Rankin v Agen Biomedical Ltd [1999] 2 Qd R 435; [1998] QCA 282, cited
Sanrus Pty Ltd v Monto Coal 2 Pty Ltd (No 4) [2019] QSC 199, applied
Sanrus Pty Ltd v Monto Coal 2 Pty Ltd (No 7) [2019] QSC 241, applied

COUNSEL:

L Campbell (on direct brief) for the plaintiff

D Pyle and A Schriiffer for the defendants

SOLICITORS:

GRT Lawyers for the first, second, third and fourth defendants

  1. The plaintiff, Stockingham Pty Ltd, applies for the following order:

    “1. Pursuant to rule 367(1)…

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Details
Case
[2024] QSC 171
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Stockingham Pty Ltd v Brisbane Angels Nominees Pty Ltd, the plaintiff, Stockingham, and the defendant, Brisbane Angels, were engaged in litigation over various matters, including procedural compliance and the admissibility of evidence. The case primarily revolved around the interpretation and enforcement of court-imposed deadlines and the nature of certain evidence provided by Stockingham. The matter was heard by Bond J, who had to determine whether the court could grant extensions to Stockingham's compliance with self-executing orders, whether certain supplementary statements constituted expert evidence, and whether additional evidence outside the scope of case management orders should be admitted.

The key legal issues before the court were whether the court had jurisdiction to extend the deadlines set by the self-executing or guillotine orders and whether the supplementary statements provided by Stockingham could be considered expert evidence. Additionally, the court had to consider whether Stockingham's additional evidence should be allowed despite the restrictions imposed by the case management orders.

Bond J addressed these issues by first clarifying the nature of the orders in question. The court found that while the orders made by Applegarth J were indeed case management orders and not final judgments, they did not preclude the court from varying or revoking them under its inherent jurisdiction or the rules of court. The purpose of the guillotine orders was to ensure timely filing and service of evidence, and the court recognised its power to adjust these orders if necessary to maintain the efficiency and fairness of the proceedings. Regarding the supplementary statements, the court found that the substance of the statements, rather than their label, determined their admissibility as expert evidence. Bond J concluded that the statements did not meet the criteria for expert evidence as outlined in Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles and were therefore not admissible as such.

The court granted leave for Stockingham to rely on the supplementary statements as evidence-in-chief at the trial, subject to any objections regarding their admissibility. The court also directed that the parties would be heard on the issue of costs.

In summary, the court exercised its discretion to extend the deadlines for compliance with the guillotine orders and clarified the admissibility of the supplementary statements. The court allowed the supplementary statements to be used as evidence-in-chief, subject to admissibility objections, and scheduled a hearing on costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The court directs that the plaintiff may rely on as evidence-in-chief at the trial of the proceeding:

a. the statement of Julie van Eps filed on 4 June 2024; and

b. the supplementary statement of Julie van Eps dated 4 June 2024 (and marked as exhibit 1).

2. The order in paragraph 1 be subject to any valid objections to admissibility.

3. I will hear the parties on costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

As briefly described above, what gave rise to the present predicament was an email sent by counsel for Stockingham to the defendants, attaching the Supplementary Statement: Please find attached by way of service a supplementary witness statement of Julie van Eps. This statement contains confidential information regarding the therapeutic the subject of the proceedings and is provided on the basis that is contains expert evidence covered by order 1 of the Court’s orders dated 8 March 2024.[25] [emphasis added][25]Affidavit of Alexander John Button Sloan affirmed on 7 June 2024, exhibit AJS-10 at page 5. See also Transcript from the review on 7 June 2024, page 18 which is exhibit “ASH-8” to the Affidavit of Ashley Stephen Hill sworn on 11 July 2024. For reasons that are not entirely clear, the parties are at loggerheads about whether the Supplementary Statement can be properly characterised as expert evidence or not. As can be seen, Stockingham labelled the Supplementary Statement as containing expert evidence. The defendants say the description is an accurate one. But Stockingham now contends the opposite – namely that the Supplementary Statement is not expert evidence. The wording used in the covering email, and statements made during reviews by counsel for Stockingham, are not determinative of whether the Supplementary Statement is expert evidence. The substance needs to be considered. Bond J summarised the essential requirements for expert evidence to be admissible in Sanrus Pty Ltd v Monto Coal 2 Pty Ltd (No 7): [26]In Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705 at [85], Heydon JA stated that for expert opinion evidence to be admissible, it must meet the following criteria:(a) It must be agreed or demonstrated that there is a field of “specialised knowledge”;(b) there must be an identified aspect of that field in which the witness demonstrates that by reason of specified training, study or experience, the witness has become an expert;(c) the opinion proffered must be “wholly or substantially based on the witness’s expert knowledge”;(d) so far as the opinion is based on facts “observed” by the expert, those facts must be identified and admissibly proved by the expert;(e) so far as the opinion is based on “assumed” or “accepted” facts, those facts must be identified and proved in some other way;(f) it must be established that the facts on which the opinion is based form a proper foundation for it; and(g) finally, the expert’s evidence must explain how the field in which the expert has expertise — as established pursuant to (a), (b) and (c) — applies to the facts assumed or observed so as to produce the opinion propounded.[26][2019] QSC 241 at [94]. Of course, those are the requirements for expert evidence to be admissible. Expert evidence might still be able to be described as expert evidence even though it does not meet all the tests derived from Makita. One concept that is central to expert evidence is that an expert report expresses an opinion based on some established or assumed facts.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The purpose of the principle is for final decisions to remain final. A prerequisite is, of course, for the decision to be final. In Ainslie v Ainslie, Isaacs J said (emphasis added):If a judgment is put forward as a bar because by it a matter in contest in another proceeding is res judicata, it must, in my opinion, be final in its nature. I also accede to the contention that an order such as the one under consideration, so far as it directs payment of a weekly sum, is, in view of sec. 5 quoted, not final, and therefore not capable of being made the foundation of an action to recover the money. The statutory method of recovery (sec. 7) must be followed. But it is stating the relevant proposition much too widely to say that, because the Court that makes an order may revise it or discharge it, that conclusively shows the order is not final in the required sense.[10][10](1927) 39 CLR 381 at 389. Similar principles apply for issue estoppels.[11] [11]Linprint Pty Ltd v Hexham Textiles Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 508 at 517. Note the distinctions between the principles of res judicata and issue estoppel: Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 at 531-2, which was cited with approval in Castillon v P & O Ports Limited (No 2) [2008] 2 Qd R 219 at [49]. The requirement of finality is not satisfied here. The orders made by Applegarth J were case management orders and do not comprise a final judgment of the court. They were interlocutory orders made for the purpose of case management. The requirement of finality in the context of interlocutory orders is discussed by Hodgson JA in Chand v Railcorp (emphasis added):What the Appeal Panel actually did was to make orders affirming and setting aside specified orders of the Tribunal, and orders extending the appeal to a hearing on the merits; and to give directions concerning the structure of the further hearing on the merits. These directions were plainly not final orders. The matters set out in para [45] of the Appeal Panel's first judgment were not the basis of any of the final orders made by the Appeal Panel, but only the basis of interlocutory directions concerning the structure of the further hearing; and as such they do not amount to findings that could give rise to res judicata or issue estoppel, or that are otherwise unalterable by the Appeal Panel.[12][12][2011] NSWCA 79 at [52]. However, the orders made by Applegarth J did have an effect on the guillotine orders. A court has the power to vary or vacate its own orders, as reflected either through its inherent jurisdiction and the UCPR. For example, rule 367(6) of the UCPR provides “The court may at any time vary or revoke an order or direction made under this rule”. The purpose of the guillotine order was for Stockingham to file and serve its lay evidence and serve its expert evidence on fixed dates – in an effort to progress the proceeding. That reflects a central purpose of guillotine orders – to compel a party to do something by a required time. The guillotine orders have compelled Stockingham to do the following:(a)Stockingham filed and served its lay evidence, albeit 10 minutes late.(b)Stockingham served an expert report of Dr David Randerson on 8 March 2024 – within time.[13] [13]Affidavit of Alexander John Button Sloan affirmed on 5 June 2024 at [33].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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