Stirling Harbour Services Pty Ltd v Bunbury Port Authority (No 2)

Link copied
Case Copied 17 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Stirling Harbour Services Pty Ltd v Bunbury Port Authority (No 2)
 [2000] FCA 87

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – interlocutory injunction – following dismissal of application – pending filing of notice of appeal – general principles – serious question to be tried – balance of convenience – no special or exceptional grounds required to warrant grant of relief – considerations analogous to stay orders pending appeal applicable within normal principles governing interlocutory relief – delay to public tender process – possible irreversible prejudice to successful respondent and tenderers – motion dismissed.

Trade Practices Act 1976 (Cth) ss 45, 46, 47
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 23, 25(2), 25(2B), 28, 29(1), (2)
Federal Court of Australia Rules 1976 (Cth) O 37 r 10, O 52 r 17
Port Authorities Act 1999 (WA) s 35(4), 35(5)

Bercove v Hermes (No 2)  (1983) 51 ALR 105 followed
Tuncak v Young (1987) 14 ALD 286 discussed
Westaflex (Aust) Pty Ltd v Wood [1990] AIPC 36,227 cited
Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations Inc v Tobacco Institute of Australia Ltd (1991) 30 FCR 548 cited
Henderson v Amadio Pty Ltd (No 3) (1996) 65 FCR 66 discussed
Powerflex Services Pty Ltd v Data Access Corporation (1996) 137 ALR 498 cited
Alexander and Ors v Cambridge Credit Corp Ltd(Receivers Appointed) (1985) 2 NSWLR 685 cited
Cellante v G Kallis Industries Pty Ltd [1991] 2 VR 653 cited
Lagarna Pty Ltd v Bridge Wholesale Acceptance Corporation (Australia) Ltd [1995] 1 VR 150 cited
Bryant v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1995) 134 ALR 460 cited
Hollier v Australian Maritime Safety Authority (Fed Court, unrep, 27/4/98, Sundberg J)
Bullock v Federated Furnishing Trades Society of Australasia (No 1) (1985) 5 FCR 464 at 472 followed

STIRLING HARBOUR SERVICES PTY LTD and ADSTEAM MARINE LIMITED v BUNBURY PORT AUTHORITY
W 89 of 1999

FRENCH J
11 FEBRUARY 2000
PERTH

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W89  OF 1999

BETWEEN:

STIRLING HARBOUR SERVICES PTY LTD
(ACN 008 767 600)
First Applicant

ADSTEAM MARINE LIMITED (ACN 065 888 440)
Second Applicant

AND:

BUNBURY PORT AUTHORITY
Respondent

JUDGE:

FRENCH

DATE OF ORDER:

11 FEBRUARY 2000

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The Applicants’ motion filed 8 February 2000 is dismissed.

2.        The Applicants’ are to pay the Respondent’s costs of the motion.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W89  OF 1999

BETWEEN:

STIRLING HARBOUR SERVICES PTY LTD
(ACN 008 767 600)
First Applicant

ADSTEAM MARINE LIMITED (ACN 065 888 440)
Second Applicant

AND:

BUNBURY PORT AUTHORITY
Respondent

JUDGE:

FRENCH

DATE:

11 FEBRUARY 2000

PLACE:

PERTH

REASONS FOR RULING ON MOTION FOR INJUNCTION
PENDING APPEAL

Introduction

  1. Stirling Harbour Services Pty Ltd and Adsteam Marine Limited were unsuccessful in an application to this Court seeking to prevent the grant of an exclusive licence to the successful tenderer for the provision of towage…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Stirling Harbour Services Pty Ltd v Bunbury Port Authority (... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2000] FCA 87
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Stirling Harbour Services Pty Ltd (the applicants) sought an injunction to restrain the Bunbury Port Authority (the BPA) from proceeding with a tender process for the provision of towage services at the Bunbury Port. The applicants' contract for the provision of towage services had been terminated by the BPA. The applicants sought an injunction on the basis that the BPA's decision to terminate their contract was unlawful and that the BPA's proposed tender process was unfair. The High Court of Australia heard the applicants' motion for an interlocutory injunction.

The legal issues before the court were whether the BPA's decision to terminate the applicants' contract was unlawful and whether the BPA's proposed tender process was unfair. The court also had to consider whether the balance of convenience favoured the granting of an interlocutory injunction to restrain the BPA from proceeding with the tender process.

The court held that the BPA's decision to terminate the applicants' contract was not unlawful and that the BPA's proposed tender process was fair. The court found that the BPA had acted within its statutory powers in terminating the applicants' contract and that the tender process was designed to promote competition in the market for towage services at the Bunbury Port. The court also found that the balance of convenience did not favour the granting of an interlocutory injunction. The court held that the applicants had no private rights which would be adversely affected by the continuance of the tender process and that any adverse impacts of a successful appeal upon the BPA and the successful tenderer were part of a commercial risk which should be assessed by them rather than imposed upon them by the court. The court held that if the tender process was enjoined pending the appeal, there was a significant risk that it would have to be recommenced with costs and inconvenience to all concerned.

The applicants' motion for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed with costs.

The court ordered that the applicants' motion filed on 8 February 2000 be dismissed and that the applicants pay the respondent's costs of the motion.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Applicants’ motion filed 8 February 2000 is dismissed.

2. The Applicants’ are to pay the Respondent’s costs of the motion.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH J
BPA says it will suffer from further delay in that: (a)It will need to re-tender due to current tenders “going out of date”. In this connection it raises the hypothesis that the applicants’ proceedings can be characterised as strategic litigation intended to cause a further tender process. (b)If there is a need to re-tender the BPA will have to bear the costs of the tender process and the additional costs of a re-tender.(c)Any subsequent re-tender may not attract tenderers other than the applicants because others will not want to become involved in a process of indeterminate delay and legal costs. (e)The BPA will lose the benefit of its proposed licence fee. Further it is submitted that third party tenderers will be prejudiced because they will have incurred costs in the tender process and will have lost their legal right to be considered unless they re-tender. The preferred tenderer runs the risk on a re-tender of losing its priority right to negotiate. The applicants’ rights for the purpose of this application are said to be the same as other tenderers, they do not have any other rights which will be affected. They do not have a licence, their contract having been terminated. The public interest, it is submitted, will also be prejudiced by the delay and extra costs paid for towage services pending the new contract. Conclusion Assuming a notice of appeal is filed within the next few days, there is no prospect of the appeal being heard in the February sittings. The next Full Court sittings commence on 8 May. It is possible that the applicants could obtain an order for an expedited hearing and a special sitting of a Full Court for that purpose. Even so there will be a delay of a further two or three months to a tender process which has already been delayed by this litigation. I accept that there is a real chance that further delay of this magnitude would put the whole tender process at risk. As it is, any preferred tenderer will enter contractual relations with the BPA in the knowledge of the possible consequences of a successful appeal. No doubt commercial and other measures will be taken to anticipate that possibility. It can be accepted that there are serious questions to be argued on the appeal, although the draft notice of appeal as it presently stands suggests something of a “kitchen sink” approach to possible challenges to the findings underpinning the judgment at first instance. But relevantly to the balance of convenience I have come to the following conclusions: 1.The applicants have no private rights which are adversely affected by the continuance of the tender process. 2.The applicants are in no worse position if the tender process continues than if it is enjoined. In either event they will, if they want to remain in the market place, have to compete with other tenderers for either an exclusive or a non-exclusive licence. 3.Adverse impacts of a successful appeal upon BPA and the successful tenderer, if a contract is let in the meantime, are part of a commercial risk, the assessment of which is best left to them rather than imposed upon them by the Court. If the risk were unacceptable then they could voluntarily agree to suspend negotiations. It is not for the Court to apply its view of the risk they may face to the imposition of a restraint upon them. 4.If the tender process is enjoined pending the appeal, there is a significant risk it will have to be recommenced with costs and inconvenience to all concerned. That is a cost and inconvenience which would not necessarily be compensated pursuant to any undertaking, accepting that the present undertaking which is limited to compensation to BPA, were modified to extend to third parties. 5.The public interest is not at significant risk from continuance of the tender process. The view I have formed, based on the evidence in the case, is that the process adopted enhances rather than diminishes competition in relation to the relevant market. If that view is wrong, corrective orders can be made by the Court on appeal or the case remitted for consideration of appropriate orders at first instance. In my opinion, the balance of convenience lies against the granting of interlocutory relief and the applicants’ motion will be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FRENCH J