Stern v National Australia Bank

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Stern v National Australia Bank [1999] FCA 1421

TRADE PRACTICES – misleading and deceptive conduct – whether Bank made false representations concerning the enforceability of loan documents, acceleration clause, and extension of a loan – whether silence constituted misleading conduct – reasonable expectation – where representations were expressions of opinion – whether applicants relied on misleading and deceptive conduct when they entered into guarantees and later an assumption agreement – whether Ministerial consent required before commencement or conclusion of hearing – Trade Practice Act 1974 (Cth) ss 5, 51A, 52

LIMITATION PERIOD – under s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) limitation period runs from date on which cause of action accrued – right to damages under s 82 arises when loss is crystallised or contingency is met - loss accrued under Californian law when judicial foreclosure order as well as deficiency judgment had been given

RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT – application for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment – deficiency judgment of Californian court – defence to enforcement if contrary to Australian public policy – relevant policy identified as policy in s 52 together with s 5 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) – whether foreign judgment contrary to Australian public policy – whether foreign law contrary to Australian public policy

FOREIGN LAW – choice of law – proof of foreign law a question of fact – expert evidence on content of foreign law – application of foreign law to the facts a matter for the Court of the forum – construction of acceleration clause in a Deed of Trust

ESTOPPEL – Anshun estoppel – whether a claim under s 52 could have been raised in the Californian proceedings creating an estoppel from making the claim in the present proceedings

WAIVER – application of substantive law of California – intent to relinquish right – whether Bank waived its right to enforce an acceleration clause in a loan by acceptance of payment of interest

AGENCY – whether one applicant was agent for Bank when he communicated information given to him by Bank to the other applicant

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 4(1), 5, 52, 82, 86
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 18C, 19

Elders Trustee & Executor Co Pty Ltd v E G Reeves Pty Ltd (1987) 78 ALR 193 applied
Taco Co of Australia Inc v Taco Bell Pty Ltd (1982) 42 ALR 177 cited
Browne v Dunn [1894] 6 R 67 cited
Seymour v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1977) 19 NSWLR 219 cited
Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [1983] 1 NSWLR 1 cited
In the marriage of L C and T C (1998) 23 Fam LR 75 cited
Pappas v Soulac (1983) 50 ALR 231 at 234 cited
Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 191 cited
Elders Trustee and Executor Co Ltd v E G Reeves Pty Ltd (1987) 78 ALR 193 cited
Leda Holdings Pty Ltd v Oraka Pty…

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Details
Case
[1999] FCA 1421
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Stern v National Australia Bank was a case involving a dispute between the Stern siblings and the National Australia Bank, which had made a loan to their mother, Fani Pollak, secured by a mortgage over property in California. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, where the Bank sought to enforce a Californian judgment against the Stern siblings. The dispute raised several legal issues, including whether the Californian judgment should be enforced in Australia, the applicability of the Trade Practices Act to overseas conduct, the interpretation of documents relating to land in California, the application of Californian law, conflicts of laws, and issues of misleading and deceptive conduct. The Stern siblings argued that enforcing the Californian judgment would be contrary to Australian public policy, as it would permit the Bank to enforce a judgment obtained through proscribed conduct under Australian law. The Court considered the elements required for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment, including the jurisdiction of the foreign court, the finality and conclusiveness of the judgment, identity of parties, and the existence of a fixed debt. The Court found that the Bank had satisfied these elements and turned to the issue of public policy. The Court rejected the Stern siblings' argument that Australian public policy precluded enforcement of the Californian judgment, holding that the Stern siblings had not established a sufficient basis for such a defence. The Court found that the Stern siblings had not raised the relevant defences in the Californian proceedings and were therefore not entitled to do so in the Australian courts.

The Court's decision in Stern v National Australia Bank highlights the importance of considering public policy when enforcing foreign judgments in Australia. The Court held that while Australian public policy may be relevant in determining whether to enforce a foreign judgment, it is not a sufficient basis for refusing enforcement in all cases. The Court found that the Stern siblings had not established a sufficient basis for a public policy defence, and therefore the Californian judgment could be enforced in Australia. This decision serves as a reminder to courts that while public policy considerations may be relevant in certain cases, they must be balanced against the principles of comity and the recognition of foreign judgments. The Court's decision also highlights the importance of parties raising relevant defences in the appropriate jurisdiction, as failure to do so may result in those defences being unavailable in subsequent proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

Both matters are closely interrelated and the proceedings were heard together with the evidence in one being taken evidence in the other. The Bank’s enforcement application raises a short question as to whether the judgment should be enforced in Australia. The defence is in substance that enforcement would be contrary to public policy. The second matter is more complex and raises questions as to the application of the TPA to conduct overseas; the construction of documents relating to land in California; the application of Californian law; conflicts of laws; entitlements under security documents; as well as misleading and deceptive conduct.Background The time-frame over which the relevant events occurred is between 1986 and 1996. The applicants are brother and sister. They are Sydney residents and are the children of Fani Pollak who died on 18 November 1987 and Mihail Pollak who predeceased her. On 17 September 1986, the Bank, in California, made an interest only loan to Fani Pollak of $US 3 million (“the loan”) which was repayable on 31 July 1993 or at an earlier date in the event of acceleration under what is known as a “due on sale” clause. The loan was secured by a mortgage over property in the Los Angeles suburb of Van Nuys. Erected on the land were office buildings and residential buildings with a car park. Mrs Pollak held the property partly in her own right and partly as executrix of the estate of her late husband, Mihail. The loan was documented by a promissory note given by Fani Pollak on 17 September 1986 (the promissory note). In addition, she executed a Deed of Trust and Leasehold Deed of Trust and Security agreement and Fixture filing with Assignment of Rents (the Deed of Trust). The loan documents were executed by Fani Pollak, both in her own right and, as executrix of the estate of Mihail Pollak. Under the will of Fani Pollak, Mrs Ilana Stern was appointed executrix of her estate and the applicants were the two sole beneficiaries. At that time the estate was said to have a value of $ 64 million. Clause 2.26 of the Deed of Trust is of central importance in this matter and reads as follows:“2.26 In the event that the interest of the Trustor in the Property, or any part thereof, or any interest therein is sold, agreed to be sold, encumbered, conveyed, alienated or otherwise transferred by the Trustor, whether by operation of law or otherwise, the Note, irrespective of the maturity dates expressed therein, at the option of the Beneficiary [the Bank], and without demand or notice, shall immediately become due and payable…” An important issue in the present proceeding is whether cl 2.26 operated under Californian law to “accelerate” the due date for re-payment of the loan upon the death of Fani Pollak or upon the distribution of the assets of the estate under her will. During 1986, there were negotiations in relation to the terms of the Deed of Trust in which the applicant, Mr Joseph Pollak, was involved. As a consequence of these negotiations a letter, dated 22 September 1986, was delivered by the Bank addressed to Fani Pollak, which reads:“This letter is to confirm the agreement of National Australia Bank that a distribution or other transfer of the real property described in the … Deed of Trust from Fani Pollak, as Executor, to Fani Pollak, a widow shall not constitute a transfer of such property described in paragraph 2.26 of such Deed of Trust.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

TAMBERLIN J
In summary, although Dr Pollak at times presented documents to his sister for signature at the suggestion of the Bank this did not give rise to any agency relationship whereby any misstatements by Dr Pollak could be attributed to the Bank in favour of Mrs Stern.Enforcement of Californian judgment – Public Policy The elements that must be established for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment are outlined by Professor Nygh in Conflict of Laws in Australia, 6th ed 1995 at p 137, as follows:“To entitle a foreign judgment to recognition at common law four conditions must be satisfied: (a) the foreign court must have exercised a jurisdiction which Australian courts will recognise; (b) the foreign judgment must be final and conclusive; (c) there must be an identity of parties; and (d) if based on a judgment in personam , the judgment must be for a fixed debt.The onus of establishing the existence of those conditions rests upon the party seeking to rely upon the foreign judgment. The party must not only establish that the foreign court had jurisdiction in the international sense, but also that the foreign judgment was final and conclusive according to the law under which it was pronounced. Once that onus is satisfied, the judgment is prima facie entitled to enforcement as a valid obligation, unless the defendant can establish one or more of the recognised defences to the enforcement of a foreign judgment.” I am satisfied, and it was not argued otherwise, that the four conditions referred to have been established in this case, and it now remains for me to determine the validity of the public policy defence raised by the applicants. The applicants submit that this Court would not or should not enforce the Californian judgment because its enforcement would be contrary to Australian public policy. The public policy relied on is identified as being the policy that Australian Corporations should not, outside Australia, engage in conduct proscribed by s 52 of the Trade Practices Act1974 read in conjunction with s 5 of that Act. It is said that such public policy is at least as great, for example, as that associated with defences of undue influence and duress. It is further said that if an Australian Corporation engages in such proscribed conduct outside Australia but nonetheless obtains a judgment against the victim in relation to that conduct, it would be “offensive” to Australian public policy to permit that judgment to be enforced without giving the defendant an opportunity to raise such defence or to pursue such claims, unless an equivalent defence or claim was available in the foreign jurisdiction. The applicants rely on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Israel Discount Bank of New York v Hadjipateras [1984] 1 WLR 137. That was a case which concerned an application made to enforce a judgment in England, which it was said was against public policy because it was based on a transaction which was tainted by undue influence. In that case the respondent alleged that he had signed a guarantee under the undue influence of his father. The Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the primary judge and the substance of the decision is that the respondent had deliberately refrained from raising a defence in New York and was therefore not entitled to take the point in the English courts. The decision does not advance the applicants’ case.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: TAMBERLIN J

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