Pollak v National Australia Bank Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Pollak v National Australia Bank Limited [2002] FCA 237

BANKRUPTCY – appellant and his sister jointly and severally liable for judgment debt – construction of agreement between bank and appellant’s sister – whether agreement an accord and satisfaction or accord and conditional satisfaction – whether agreement a release of a single debtor releasing all other joint debtors or a covenant not to sue

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)

Osborn v McDermott [1998] 3 VR 1 applied
Walker v Bowry (1924) 35 CLR 48 discussed
Dorgal Holdings Pty Ltd v Buckley (1996) 22 ACSR 164 cited
Deanplan v Mahmoud [1993] Ch 151 applied
Murray-Oates v Jjadd Pty Ltd (1999) 76 SASR 38 cited
Johnson v Davies [1999] Ch 117 cited

JOSEPH POLLAK v NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED
N1446 OF 2001

BRANSON, WEINBERG & DOWSETT JJ
14 MARCH 2002
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N1446 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

JOSEPH POLLAK
APPELLANT

AND:

NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

BRANSON, WEINBERG & DOWSETT JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

14 MARCH 2002

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed. 

2.The respondent’s costs be taxed and paid from the estate of the appellant in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N1446 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

JOSEPH POLLAK
APPELLANT

AND:

NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

BRANSON, WEINBERG & DOWSETT JJ

DATE:

14 MARCH 2002

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT

INTRODUCTION

  1. The background to this appeal was accurately described by the learned primary judge (Madgwick J) as “somewhat tortuous”.  However the legal issue which requires determination is limited in scope.  It is whether an agreement entered into between the appellant’s sister, Ilana Elenka Stern (“Mrs Stern”), her husband, Harry Stern (“Dr Stern”), and Stern Nominees Pty Ltd on the one hand and National Australia Bank Limited (“the Bank”) on the other (“the Agreement”) operates as a release of a judgment debt owed jointly by the appellant and Mrs Stern to the Bank.

  2. The primary judge concluded that the Agreement did not operate as a release but rather constituted a covenant by the Bank not to sue Mrs Stern in respect of the judgment debt.  On this basis His Honour, having rejected an alternative argument advanced by the appellant which does not give rise to a live issue on this appeal, upheld the validity of a bankruptcy notice served on the appellant by the Bank which required payment of the judgment debt.  His Honour made a sequestration order against the estate of the appellant.

  3. The appellant by this appeal seeks to have the sequestration order made by Madgwick J set aside and in lieu therefore an order made dismissing the creditor’s petition presented by the Bank.

    BACKGROUND FACTS

  4. Neither party to the appeal challenged the accuracy of the summary history of the proceeding which Madgwick J included in his reasons for judgment.  At [3]-[9] of his reasons for judgment His Honour…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCAFC 55
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Pollak v National Australia Bank Ltd, the appellant sought to have a sequestration order set aside, which was made by Madgwick J, and in its place, an order dismissing the creditor’s petition presented by the Bank. The underlying dispute arose from a loan taken by Mrs Pollak in 1986, which Dr Pollak and Mrs Stern assumed liability for after her death. The Bank obtained a judgment in California for $US 3.8 million plus interest and costs against Dr Pollak and Mrs Stern in 1996. The Bank applied to enforce this judgment in Australia, leading to various court proceedings and orders, including a Mareva injunction preventing the disposal of certain assets.

The legal issues in this case centred on the interpretation of an agreement between the Bank and Mrs Stern, particularly whether this agreement operated as a release of the entire judgment debt or merely Mrs Stern’s share. The Bank argued that the agreement was intended as a covenant not to sue rather than a full release, while Dr Pollak contended for a full release. The court had to determine the nature of the agreement and its effect on the judgment debt.

The court found that the common law rule applied, which states that the release of a number of co-debtors jointly or jointly and severally liable for the same debt releases all. However, the court also considered whether the agreement in question was a release or merely a covenant not to sue, a question of contract construction. The court examined the language and surrounding circumstances of the agreement to determine its true nature. Ultimately, the court concluded that the agreement was indeed a release of the entire judgment debt, as per the common law rule, and dismissed the appeal. The respondent's costs were to be taxed and paid from the estate of the appellant in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The respondent’s costs be taxed and paid from the estate of the appellant in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant by this appeal seeks to have the sequestration order made by Madgwick J set aside and in lieu therefore an order made dismissing the creditor’s petition presented by the Bank.BACKGROUND FACTS Neither party to the appeal challenged the accuracy of the summary history of the proceeding which Madgwick J included in his reasons for judgment. At [3]-[9] of his reasons for judgment His Honour set out that history as follows:“In 1986 the Bank lent money in the USA to Mrs Pollak, Dr Pollak’s mother. When Mrs Pollak died, Dr Pollak and his sister, Mrs Stern, after negotiations, agreed to assume liability for the debt. On 26 April 1996, the Bank obtained judgment in the Superior Court of the State of California for $US 3.8 million plus interest and costs against Dr Pollak and Mrs Stern. On 23 February 1996, Dr Pollak and Mrs Stern brought an application under s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) alleging misleading and deceptive conduct by the Bank in relation to the agreement which bound them to make good the debt. The Bank applied to this Court on 29 November 1996 to enforce the Californian judgment. The two sets of proceedings were heard together. On 21 December 1998, Tamberlin J granted an interlocutory application by the Bank for a Mareva injunction preventing Dr Pollak and Mrs Stern, along with their spouses and the trustee of a Stern family trust, from disposing of any property or assets in which they had an interest without giving the Bank’s solicitor at least 28 days notice: see National Australia Bank Limited v Stern [1998] FCA 1665. (These orders were varied on 4 August 2000 to reduce the period of notice from 28 days to 19 days.)On 15 October 1999, Tamberlin J delivered his decision in the principal proceedings. His Honour dismissed the s 52 claim. On 19 November 1999, his Honour ordered, giving effect to his reasons, that judgment be entered in favour of the Bank against Dr Pollak and Mrs Stern jointly and severally in the sum of $US 4,910,562.76 and that interest accrue on the judgment at the rate of 10% p.a. from that date: see Stern v National Australia Bank [1999] FCA 1421. An appeal to the Full Court against Tamberlin J’s decision was rejected on 27 March 2000.On 14 August 2000, Dr Pollak filed an amended application with the High Court Registry for special leave to appeal against the decision of the Full Court. Mrs Stern was named as an applicant in the application. However, the evidence was that Mrs Stern had no interest in pursuing her rights on appeal, was committed to reaching a commercial settlement with the Bank, and had only agreed to being named so as not to prejudice Dr Pollak’s application. Special leave to appeal was later refused by the High Court on 24 November 2000. A bankruptcy notice was issued on 29 August 2000 at the behest of the Bank. It claimed $US 5,291,600.96, being the amount payable under Tamberlin J’s orders, including the accrued interest. On 8 November 2000, Dr Pollak was served with a bankruptcy notice. The time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice was 29 November 2000. At the time of the expiry of the bankruptcy notice, no payment had been made by Dr Pollak on account of the judgment debt.…On 11 September 2000, the Bank and Mrs Stern had entered into “Heads of Agreement” (“the agreement”) under which certain properties were to be sold and the proceeds, together with other funds, were to be paid to the Bank in satisfaction of Mrs Stern’s share of the judgment debt. The principal dispute in these proceedings related to whether this agreement operated as a release of the entire judgment debt or only an amount equal to Mrs Stern’s share.On 21 February 2001, consummation of the agreement occurred, with Mrs Stern, her husband Dr Stern and Stern Nominees Pty Limited entering into Terms of Settlement as the agreement had contemplated. On 22 February 2001, the Terms of Settlement were filed in this Court. Those terms evidenced an agreement to release Mrs Stern from liability for the judgment debt and otherwise arising under the related orders made by Tamberlin J.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Bank submitted as follows:(a)the provision regarding a release did not take effect until after the Agreement had been varied to include an express reservation of rights against the appellant, with the consequence that it operated only as a covenant not to sue; alternatively,(b)the Agreement from the outset was not intended to be an unqualified release, but contemplated a reservation of rights against the appellant; in the further alternative,(c)the Agreement called for a release by a subsequent instrument (see pars 8 and 11) and in the result, the Terms of Settlement contained only a covenant not to enforce, as opposed to a release.CONSIDERATION In Walker v Bowry (1924) 35 CLR 48 the High Court applied the common law rule that the release of a number of co-debtors jointly or jointly and severally liable for the same debt releases all. Although, as McLelland CJ in Equity observed in Dorgal Holdings Pty Ltd v Buckley (“Dorgal v Buckley”) (1996) 22 ACSR 164 at 167, the rule seems impossible to justify as a matter of principle, the decision of the High Court is binding on all other Australian courts. Neither party suggested to the contrary. However, as Judge Paul Baker QC observed in the context of a contractual debt in Deanplan v Mahmoud [1993] Ch 151 at 170:“A covenant not to sue is not a release. It is merely a contract between the creditor and the joint debtor which does not affect the liabilities of the other joint contractors or their rights of contribution or indemnity against their co‑contractor. It is a question of construction of the contract between the creditor and the joint debtor in the light of the surrounding circumstances whether the contract amounts to a release or merely a contract not to sue.”Moreover, even where an instrument purports to release one of two or more joint debtors, if it discloses an intention to reserve rights against the other joint debtor, it will be construed merely as a covenant not to sue (see Dorgal v Buckley at 167). The authorities support the proposition that an agreement may constitute a covenant not to sue, rather than a release, even where there is no express reservation of rights against debtors. In Murray-Oates v Jjadd Pty Ltd (1999) 76 SASR 38 at 54 Wicks J, with whom Doyle CJ and Mullighan J agreed, said:“The question of whether we are concerned with a release or covenant not to sue should be approached as being one of construction having regard to the words used. At the same time one has to bear in mind the possibility of an implied reservation of rights. The fact that the plaintiff might not have intended to release the defendant, or did not realise the legal consequence of a release to one joint debtor, is not of itself of any particular significance ….” In Johnson v Davies [1999] Ch 117 at 127-128 Chadwick LJ, with whom Ward and Kennedy LJJ agreed, in considering the issue of whether a voluntary arrangement effected a release of joint debtors, found that the words used in certain paragraphs of the voluntary arrangement, construed in the light of the whole of the proposals made by the debtor the subject of the voluntary arrangement, were inconsistent with any intention to effect an immediate or absolute release of the debts owed to creditors. His Lordship found that the release of which the voluntary arrangement spoke was not to take effect, if at all, until the debtor’s obligations under the proposals were fulfilled. In Deanplan v Mahmoud at 170 Judge Paul Baker QC considered whether there was anything in the surrounding circumstances which would rebut the prima facie meaning of the agreement.