State of Tasmania v Latham

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[1999] TASSC 148

CITATION:                 State of Tasmania v Latham [1999] TASSC 148

PARTIES:  TASMANIA, State of

v
LATHAM, Steven J

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
JURISDICTION:  APPELLATE
FILE NO/S:  LCA 60/1999
DELIVERED ON:  20 December 1999
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATE:  14 October 1999
JUDGMENT OF:  Cox CJ

CATCHWORDS:

Administrative Law - Appeals from administrative authorities - Statutory appeals from administrative authorities to courts - Appeals from particular authorities - Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal - Meaning of "decision" of tribunal - Whether appeal competent.

Land Use Planning and Approvals Act1993 (Tas), ss64 and 65.
Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act 1993 (Tas), s25.
Milner v Prima Construction & Development Pty Ltd (1992) 75 LGRA 25, referred to.
Aust Dig Administration Law [10]

Statutes - Acts of Parliament - Interpretation - Inconsistent statutes - Generalia specialibus non derogant - Whether Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993, s65 is exhaustive as to appeals or residual right to appeal is available under Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act 1993, s25.

Aust Dig Statutes [50]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Appellant:  D R Armstrong
             Respondent:  A C R Spence
Solicitors:
             Appellant:  Ogilvie McKenna
             Respondent:  Page Seager

Judgment  Number:  [1999] TASSC 148
Number of paragraphs:  10

Serial No 148/1999
File No LCA 60/1999

STATE OF TASMANIA v STEVEN J LATHAM

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  COX CJ

20 December 1999

  1. Application was made under the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 ("the Land Use Act"), s64 for an order that the appellant be restrained from using 7 Croesus Court, Lindisfarne as a Family Group Home. The respondent claimed that the premises in question were being used as a "welfare institution" within the meaning of the Eastern Shore Planning Scheme 1963, that use of premises within that classification was not authorised without a permit from the local council, that no such permit had been sought or granted, and that accordingly the appellant was in breach of the Land Use Act, s51. By virtue of the Land Use Act, s64(11), an application of this kind is deemed to be an appeal for the purposes of the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act 1993 ("the Planning Appeal Act").

  1. After hearing the parties before it, the Appeal Tribunal, established by the lastmentioned Act, delivered a written "Decision" dated 27 June 1999 stating that the Tribunal considered that the premises came within the definition of a welfare institution and that the appellant's use of them without a permit constituted a breach of the Land Use Act, s51. Proceedings were then adjourned to enable the parties to make written submissions as to the appropriate order to be made. On 6 July 1999, the Appeal Tribunal handed down a further "Decision" in which it was stated that the Tribunal considered that an appropriate time should be allowed to the appellant "to make an application for planning approval and have that application determined; and that if at the end of that time…

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Details
Case
[1999] TASSC 148
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The State of Tasmania, acting as the appellant, brought an appeal against Steven J Latham, the respondent, in the Supreme Court of Tasmania. The dispute arose from an application under the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993, where the appellant sought an order restraining the respondent from using 7 Croesus Court, Lindisfarne, as a Family Group Home. The respondent argued that the premises were being used as a "welfare institution" without the necessary permit from the local council, thus breaching the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993. The Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal, established under the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act 1993, found that the premises were indeed being used as a welfare institution and that the respondent's use without a permit constituted a breach of the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993. The Tribunal adjourned the proceedings to allow the respondent time to apply for a permit. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court on the basis that the Tribunal's decision to adjourn the proceedings constituted a decision from which an appeal could be made.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the appeal from the Tribunal's decision to adjourn proceedings was competent under the statutes in question. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the appellant could avail itself of the general appeal provision under the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act 1993, or if the right of appeal was exclusively governed by the specific provisions in the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993. The court also had to interpret the term "decision" as used in the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act 1993 to ascertain if the adjournment constituted a decision from which an appeal could be made.

The Supreme Court, led by Cox CJ, held that the appeal was incompetent. The court reasoned that the specific provisions for appeals in the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993, particularly section 65, evinced an intention by Parliament that these provisions should exhaustively govern the right to appeal. The court applied the principle of generalia specialibus non derogant, concluding that the general appeal provision in the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act 1993 did not apply to the case at hand. Furthermore, the court interpreted the term "decision" as used in the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act 1993 narrowly, holding that it did not extend to the adjournment of proceedings. Since the respondent's rights had not been irrevocably affected by the adjournment, the court deemed the appeal premature and dismissed it for incompetency.

The court did not make any further orders beyond dismissing the appeal for incompetency. The dismissal was based on the view that the appeal was not ripe for adjudication as the respondent's rights had not been finally determined by the Tribunal.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of State of Tasmania v Latham involves a dispute concerning the use of premises at 7 Croesus Court, Lindisfarne, as a Family Group Home. The appellant, Steven J. Latham, was alleged to be using the premises as a "welfare institution" without the necessary permit from the local council, in contravention of the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 (Tas). The respondent argued that this use was unauthorised and brought proceedings under the Act, which were deemed appeals under the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act 1993 (Tas). The Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal found that the premises did indeed fall within the definition of a welfare institution and that the appellant's use of them without a permit constituted a breach of the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act. However, the Tribunal did not make any orders at that stage, instead adjourning proceedings to allow the appellant time to apply for the necessary permit.

Following this, the appellant sought to appeal the Tribunal's decision to the Supreme Court of Tasmania. The central issue in this appeal was the competency of the appeal, specifically whether the appellant had the right to appeal the Tribunal's decision under the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act, s25, or if the right of appeal was exclusively governed by the specific provisions of the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act, s65. The appellant argued that the Tribunal's decision to adjourn proceedings without making any orders constituted a "decision" that could be appealed under the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act. The respondent, however, contended that the appeal was premature as no final order had been made by the Tribunal and the appellant's rights had not been irrevocably affected.

The Supreme Court had to determine whether the appeal was competent under either the general appeal provision of the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act or the specific provisions of the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act. The Court examined the language of both Acts and concluded that the specific provisions of the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act, s65, were intended to be exhaustive in governing the right to appeal, thus precluding any residual right of appeal under the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act. Furthermore, the Court held that the Tribunal's decision to adjourn proceedings without making any orders did not constitute a "decision" that could be appealed, as the appellant's rights had not been irrevocably affected at that stage. Consequently, the appeal was deemed premature and was dismissed for incompetency.

This case came before the Supreme Court of Tasmania as an appeal from the decision of the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal. The matter originated with an application made under the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993, seeking an order to restrain the appellant from using specified premises as a Family Group Home, on the basis that it constituted a breach of planning regulations. The Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal found that the premises did indeed qualify as a "welfare institution" and that the appellant's use of them without a permit constituted a contravention of the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act. The Tribunal adjourned the proceedings to allow the appellant to apply for the necessary permit. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Tribunal's decision was incorrect and should be quashed. The central procedural issue before the Court was whether the appeal was competent, given that the Tribunal had not yet made any final order under the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act, s64, and had only adjourned the matter pending the appellant's application for a permit.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the appeal tribunal's decision to adjourn proceedings without making an order is appealable under the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act 1993.
2. Whether the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993, section 65 is exhaustive as to appeals or if a residual right to appeal is available under the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act 1993, section 25.
3. Whether the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993, section 64(11) deems the appellant's application as an appeal for the purposes of the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act 1993, section 25.
4. Whether the word "decision" in the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act 1993, section 25 includes the tribunal's decision to adjourn proceedings without making an order.
5. Whether the appeal is premature and should be dismissed for incompetency.

Held
1. Whether the appeal tribunal's decision to adjourn proceedings without making an order is appealable under the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act 1993: The court concluded that the adjournment without making an order is not an appealable decision under the Act. The result was that the appeal was not competent on this ground.

2. Whether the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993, section 65 is exhaustive as to appeals or if a residual right to appeal is available under the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act 1993, section 25: The court concluded that the right of appeal under the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993, section 65 is exhaustive and no residual right to appeal exists under the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act 1993, section 25. The result was that the appeal under section 25 was not available.

3. Whether the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993, section 64(11) deems the appellant's application as an appeal for the purposes of the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act 1993, section 25: The court concluded that the provision of a specific power of appeal in the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993, section 65 should exhaustively govern the subject matter of the right to appeal. The result was that the deemed appeal under section 64(11) did not extend to the general right of appeal under section 25.

4. Whether the word "decision" in the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act 1993, section 25 includes the tribunal's decision to adjourn proceedings without making an order: The court concluded that the word "decision" in section 25 refers to decisions that irrevocably affect the legal rights of a person. The result was that the adjournment without making an order was not considered a decision under section 25.

5. Whether the appeal is premature and should be dismissed for incompetency: The court concluded that the appeal was premature as the appellant's rights had not been irrevocably affected and there was no real contest between the parties. The result was that the appeal was dismissed for incompetency.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the matter of State of Tasmania v Latham, the Supreme Court of Tasmania had to address several significant legal issues concerning the appealability of the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal's decision to adjourn proceedings without making an order. The court examined whether this particular decision was appealable under the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act 1993 and whether the appellant could avail itself of a general right of appeal under section 25 of that Act. The court also considered whether the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993, section 65, was exhaustive concerning appeals and if section 64(11) of the same act deemed the appellant's application as an appeal for the purposes of section 25 of the Planning Appeal Act.

Firstly, the court addressed the issue of whether the appeal tribunal's decision to adjourn proceedings without making an order was appealable under the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act 1993. The court concluded that the tribunal's decision to adjourn was not an order within the contemplation of the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993, section 65, which specifically provides for appeals against orders made by the tribunal. The court reasoned that the tribunal's power to adjourn proceedings under section 64(9) did not constitute an order, and hence, the right of appeal under section 65 did not apply. The court relied on the principle that specific provisions in a statute should prevail over general ones where there is any repugnancy between them, adhering to the principle of generalia specialibus non derogant.

Secondly, the court considered whether section 65 of the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 was exhaustive concerning appeals or if a residual right to appeal was available under section 25 of the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act 1993. The court found that the specific provisions of section 65, which detail the right of appeal against orders made by the tribunal, suggested that Parliament intended this provision to be exhaustive. The court noted that the presence of a specific power of appeal in section 65 evinced an intention to exhaustively govern the subject matter of the right to appeal, thereby excluding any residual right of appeal under the general provision in section 25 of the Planning Appeal Act.

Thirdly, the court examined whether section 64(11) of the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 deemed the appellant's application as an appeal for the purposes of section 25 of the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act 1993. The court held that while section 64(11) deemed the application to be an appeal, it did not extend to incorporating the general right of appeal under section 25 of the Planning Appeal Act. The court reasoned that the intention of Parliament, as evidenced by the specific provisions in section 65, was to make the right of appeal governed solely by the special provisions in the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act.

Fourthly, the court addressed whether the word "decision" in section 25 of the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act 1993 included the tribunal's decision to adjourn proceedings without making an order. The court interpreted the term "decision" narrowly, following the reasoning in Milner v Prima Construction & Development Pty Ltd, where the court held that "decision" referred to a determination that irrevocably affected the legal rights of a party. The court concluded that the tribunal's decision to adjourn did not irrevocably affect the appellant's rights and thus did not constitute a "decision" within the meaning of section 25.

Finally, the court considered whether the appeal was premature and should be dismissed for incompetency. The court found that the appeal was premature because the tribunal had not yet made any order under section 64 that would irrevocably affect the appellant's rights. The court held that it was not the function of the court to give advisory opinions where there was no real contest between the parties. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal for incompetency.

In summary, the court held that the appeal tribunal's decision to adjourn proceedings without making an order was not appealable under the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act 1993, that the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993, section 65, was exhaustive concerning appeals, and that the word "decision" in section 25 of the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act 1993 did not include the tribunal's decision to adjourn. The appeal was dismissed for incompetency as it was premature.