Gregg v Northern Midlands Council

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[2004] TASSC 10

CITATION:              Gregg v Northern Midlands Council [2004] TASSC 10

PARTIES:  GREGG, John Patrick

GREGG, Jane Louise
v
NORTHERN MIDLANDS COUNCIL

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
JURISDICTION:  APPELLATE
FILE NO/S:  LCA 3/2003
DELIVERED ON:  26 February 2004
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATE:  18 November 2003
JUDGMENT OF:  Cox CJ

CATCHWORDS:

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Appellants:  S P Estcourt QC, M D Duvnjak
             Respondent:  S B McElwaine
Solicitors:
             Appellants:  Gunson Williams
             Respondent:  Shaun McElwaine

Judgment  Number:  [2004] TASSC 10
Number of paragraphs:  27

Serial No 10/2004
File No LCA 3/2003

JOHN PATRICK GREGG and JANE LOUISE GREGG
v NORTHERN MIDLANDS COUNCIL

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  COX CJ

24 February 2004

  1. The appellants are aggrieved at the decision of the Resource Management and Planning Appeals Tribunal ("the Tribunal") ordering that each party pay their own costs of civil enforcement proceedings.  These proceedings were taken by the appellants in respect of a nuisance of which they no longer complain, as remedial action was taken by the respondent before the conclusion of the proceedings.  They lodged an appeal purportedly under the Resource Management and Planning Appeals Tribunal Act 1993 ("the Planning Appeal Act") on the ground that "the Tribunal if properly directed as to the law could not have come to the conclusion to which the Tribunal came".  Prior to the hearing of the appeal, three additional grounds were included, as follows:

"1   That the Tribunal failed to take into account a relevant consideration, namely that the Respondent remedied the emission of offensive odours in the vicinity of the Applicants' property complained of by the Applicant only after proceedings were instituted.

2    That the Tribunal took into account an irrelevant consideration, namely that it was unable to determine that the Applicants would have succeeded in obtaining an order for 'substantive relief' if the matter had proceed [sic] to a hearing on the merits.

3    The Tribunal erred in law in finding that it was unable to determine that the Applicants actions in obtaining expert evidence and pursuing the proceedings were a substantial cause of the Respondent taking action to prevent the emission of offensive odours in the vicinity of the Applicants' property by moving the main vent outlet to the far side of the Midlands Highway."

  1. The initial proceedings were brought under the Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act 1994 ("the Environmental Act") seeking from the Tribunal an order under s48 "in respect of the environmental harm constituted by the offensive smells and vapours emanating from the Northern Midlands Council's sewerage pump station at Perth in Tasmania and that the vent pipe on the pumping station be extended so as to avoid the danger of an explosion from methane gas".

  1. The Environmental Act, s48, relevantly provides:

"48      (1)       Where –

(a)…

(b)…

(c)a person has caused environmental harm by contravention of this Act, any other Act or the repealed Act –

the Director, a council or a person who has, in the opinion of the Appeal Tribunal, a proper interest in…

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Details
Case
[2004] TASSC 10
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court of Tasmania heard an appeal by John Patrick Gregg and Jane Louise Gregg against the Northern Midlands Council. The appellants were aggrieved by the Resource Management and Planning Appeals Tribunal's decision that each party bear their own costs of civil enforcement proceedings. The initial proceedings were brought under the Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act 1994, seeking an order from the Tribunal for the offensive smells and vapours emanating from the Northern Midlands Council's sewerage pump station at Perth in Tasmania. The Tribunal found that the Council had caused an environmental nuisance and ordered each party to bear their own costs. The appellants argued that the Tribunal failed to take into account relevant considerations and took into account irrelevant considerations, leading to an unreasonable decision. The respondent argued that the appeal was limited to questions of law, and the appellants could not fundamentally alter the nature of their appeal after the conclusion of the case. The court found that the only right of appeal open to the appellants in respect of the order of the Tribunal in respect of costs was that given by the Planning Appeal Act and that only errors of law could be relied upon. The court concluded that the Tribunal's decision was not so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it and thus did not amount to an error of law. The appeal was dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves an appeal by John Patrick Gregg and Jane Louise Gregg against a decision of the Resource Management and Planning Appeals Tribunal. The appellants originally sought an order under the Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act 1994 for an environmental harm caused by offensive smells and vapours emanating from the Northern Midlands Council's sewerage pump station. The appellants claimed that the smells were causing them personal suffering and anxiety and sought compensation for the loss of value of their property. The appellants later abandoned their claims for compensation but sought an order for costs. The Tribunal ordered that each party bear their own costs. The appellants appealed on the basis that the Tribunal's decision was unreasonable and that it failed to take into account relevant facts or took into account irrelevant facts. The appellants also argued that the Tribunal erred in law by not determining that their actions were a substantial cause of the respondent taking action to prevent the emission of offensive odours.

The respondent council admitted that the appellants' property was affected by offensive odours, but maintained that the odours were not generated within the pump station. The council took steps to implement an environmental improvement programme and relocated the vent further away from the appellants' house. The Tribunal rejected the council's contention that it did not generate the odours and concluded that the sewerage system operated by the council was the cause of the odours experienced by the appellants. The Tribunal also found that the council's operation of the system constituted a nuisance amounting to a breach of the Environmental Act. The Tribunal held that the appellants did not succeed in obtaining any order of a substantive nature and that it was unable to determine if the appellants would probably have succeeded in obtaining an order for substantive relief if the matter had proceeded to a hearing on the merits. The Tribunal concluded that the result of the proceedings with respect to the order for compensation for loss of property value was essentially neutral with respect to the issue of costs. The Tribunal also found that the appellants' claim for personal injuries fell within the category of being a frivolous or vexatious issue, but that neither party had unreasonably or unnecessarily extended the proceedings or increased their costs.

The matter of Gregg v Northern Midlands Council came before the Supreme Court of Tasmania as an appeal from the decision of the Resource Management and Planning Appeals Tribunal. The appellants, John Patrick Gregg and Jane Louise Gregg, sought an appeal from the Tribunal's order that each party bear their own costs of the civil enforcement proceedings they had brought against the respondent council. The appellants claimed that the Tribunal erred in its handling of the costs order, alleging various grounds of error. The initial appeal was lodged under the Resource Management and Planning Appeals Tribunal Act 1993, but it was later argued that the appeal should have been brought under the Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act 1994. The Supreme Court considered the nature of the appeal and the applicable statutory provisions, concluding that the appeal was properly brought under the Resource Management and Planning Appeals Tribunal Act 1993 and was limited to questions of law. The Court reviewed the procedural steps taken by the Tribunal and the arguments advanced by both parties, ultimately determining that the Tribunal's decision to order each party to bear their own costs was not an error of law and dismissing the appeal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Was the appeal correctly brought under the Resource Management and Planning Appeals Tribunal Act 1993, or should it have been brought under the Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act 1994?
2. Did the Tribunal err in finding that it could not determine whether the appellants would have succeeded in obtaining an order for substantive relief if the matter had proceeded to a hearing on the merits?
3. Did the Tribunal fail to take into account the relevant consideration that the respondent remedied the emission of offensive odours only after proceedings were instituted?
4. Did the Tribunal take into account an irrelevant consideration in that it was unable to determine that the appellants' actions were a substantial cause of the respondent taking action to prevent the emission of offensive odours?
5. Did the Tribunal err in law in making an order that each party bear their own costs of the proceedings?

Held
1. The appeal was correctly brought under the Resource Management and Planning Appeals Tribunal Act 1993, as the right of appeal in respect of the order for costs was limited to questions of law.
2. The Tribunal did not err in finding that it could not determine whether the appellants would have succeeded in obtaining an order for substantive relief if the matter had proceeded to a hearing on the merits.
3. The Tribunal did not fail to take into account the relevant consideration that the respondent remedied the emission of offensive odours only after proceedings were instituted.
4. The Tribunal did not take into account an irrelevant consideration in that it was unable to determine that the appellants' actions were a substantial cause of the respondent taking action to prevent the emission of offensive odours.
5. The Tribunal did not err in law in making an order that each party bear their own costs of the proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appeal in Gregg v Northern Midlands Council raised several issues, each of which the Court addressed in detail. The first issue was whether the appeal was correctly brought under the Resource Management and Planning Appeals Tribunal Act 1993 or should have been brought under the Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act 1994. The Court held that the appeal should have been brought under the latter Act but was brought under the former. However, since the Planning Appeal Act provides a right of appeal limited to questions of law, the Court found that the appeal was correctly brought in that respect.

The second issue was whether the Tribunal erred in finding that it could not determine whether the appellants would have succeeded in obtaining an order for substantive relief if the matter had proceeded to a hearing on the merits. The Court held that the Tribunal did not err in this regard. The Tribunal had found that the proceedings had become futile and that it could not make a finding on the merits. The Court held that in such circumstances, the Tribunal's discretion to order costs was deprived of much of the material to which regard was normally had. The Court held that the Tribunal's decision to order each party to bear their own costs was not so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it.

The third issue was whether the Tribunal failed to take into account the relevant consideration that the respondent remedied the emission of offensive odours only after proceedings were instituted. The Court held that the Tribunal did not fail to take into account this consideration. The Tribunal had found that the respondent had taken steps to remedy the situation before the proceedings were instituted, and the Court held that there was no error of law in this regard.

The fourth issue was whether the Tribunal took into account an irrelevant consideration in that it was unable to determine that the appellants' actions were a substantial cause of the respondent taking action to prevent the emission of offensive odours. The Court held that the Tribunal did not take into account an irrelevant consideration. The Tribunal had found that the evidence was not sufficient to enable it to make a finding on this issue, and the Court held that there was no error of law in this regard.

The final issue was whether the Tribunal erred in law in making an order that each party bear their own costs of the proceedings. The Court held that the Tribunal did not err in law in this regard. The Court held that the result of the proceedings, the reasonableness of the parties' conduct, the expenditure of the respondent in attempting to alleviate the problem, their respective means so far as they were known, and the inconclusive result, all pointed to an order that each party bear their own costs.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that in proceedings brought under the Planning Appeal Act, the right of appeal is limited to questions of law. The Court also held that where proceedings are terminated before a decision has been made on the merits, the Tribunal's discretion to order costs is deprived of much of the material to which regard is normally had. In such circumstances, the Tribunal's decision to order each party to bear their own costs is not so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it. Finally, the Court held that the Tribunal's failure to take into account relevant considerations or its taking into account irrelevant considerations can amount to errors of law.