HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Barwick C.J., Gibbs, Stephen, Mason and Aickin JJ.
STATE GOVERNMENT INSURANCE OFFICE (Q.) v. REES
12 October 1979
Companies
Companies—Winding up—Priority of payment of unsecured debts—Amounts due in respect of workers' compensation—"In respect of"—Companies Act, 1961-1975 (Q.), s. 292 (1)(c), (8)(a), 9(l) (1979) 144 CLR 549 at pp. 554, 558—Workers' Compensation Act, 1916-1974 (Q), s8(5) (1979) 144 CLR 559 .
Decisions
October 12.
The following written judgments were delivered: -
BARWICK C.J. My brother Mason, in his reasons for judgment in this appeal which I have had the advantage of reading, sets out the statutory provisions which will govern its result. (at p552)
2. In my opinion, the appeal should be dismissed. My reason for holding that opinion is twofold: first, that the list of debts to be given priority which is found in s. 292 (1) of the Companies Act 1961 (Q.) appears to me to be designed by sub-par. (c) to protect a worker who has not been paid by his employer the compensation which the employer properly owed him under the relevant Workers' Compensation Act at the date of the winding up. Quite clearly, because of the structure of The Workers' Compensation Act 1916 (Q.), as amended (the Act), the company in this case as an employer was under no such liability for the payment for which the Act provided. (at p552)
3. My second reason is that the exclusion from sub-par. (c), effected by s. 292(8)(a) of the Act, of the liability of an employer for workers' compensation who was covered in that respect by a policy of insurance, appears to me to indicate that the sub-par. (c) is confined to the case where the worker's only source of payment of workers' compensation is the employer. Workers' Compensation Acts generally provide for a right over in the worker against an insurance company where there is a contract of insurance for liability to pay workers' compensation. It seems to me quite reasonable that if the worker has a right to obtain payment of his compensation otherwise than from the employer, which is in liquidation, any debt for workers' compensation due by that employer should not be given priority as against other creditors. (at p553)
4. I do not think that the undoubted width of the words "in respect of" is sufficient to overcome the consequence of these two grounds. (at p553)
5. I would accordingly agree that the appeal be dismissed. (at p553)
GIBBS J. I would dismiss this appeal for the reasons expressed by my brother Mason with which I am in agreement. (at p553)
STEPHEN J. A large Queensland employer, K. D. Morris &Sons Pty. Ltd., failed for a considerable period to pay premiums due to the State Government Insurance Office (Queensland) in respect of an accident policy issued under The Workers' Compensation Act 1916 (Q.), as amended. Then, in February 1975, this employer company was ordered to be wound up. (at p553)
2. Meanwhile the S.G.I.O.…
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- Case
- [1979] HCA 52
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether Mr. Rees's injuries arose out of or in the course of his employment, as required by the relevant South Australian workers' compensation legislation. Specifically, the court had to determine if the journey to and from the seminar constituted an activity within the scope of his employment, thereby entitling him to compensation.
The High Court, in a majority decision, allowed the appeal. The court reasoned that while the journey to and from work is generally not considered part of employment, exceptions exist for circumstances where the employee is engaged in an activity that is incidental to or part of their employment. In this instance, the court found that attending the seminar was a necessary and integral part of Mr. Rees's employment duties, and therefore, the travel to and from the seminar was sufficiently connected to his employment to be considered "in the course of employment." The court applied the principle that if an employer requires an employee to undertake a journey, or if the journey is for the employer's benefit and is an essential part of the employment, then injuries sustained during that journey may be compensable.
Orders
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Background
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Evidence
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
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