State Government Insurance Office v Rees

Link copied
Case Copied 24 min read

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Barwick C.J., Gibbs, Stephen, Mason and Aickin JJ.

STATE GOVERNMENT INSURANCE OFFICE (Q.) v. REES

(1979) 144 CLR 549

12 October 1979

Companies

Companies—Winding up—Priority of payment of unsecured debts—Amounts due in respect of workers' compensation—"In respect of"—Companies Act, 1961-1975 (Q.), s. 292 (1)(c), (8)(a), 9(l) (1979) 144 CLR 549 at pp. 554, 558—Workers' Compensation Act, 1916-1974 (Q), s8(5) (1979) 144 CLR 559 .

Decisions


October 12.
The following written judgments were delivered: -
BARWICK C.J. My brother Mason, in his reasons for judgment in this appeal which I have had the advantage of reading, sets out the statutory provisions which will govern its result. (at p552)

2. In my opinion, the appeal should be dismissed. My reason for holding that opinion is twofold: first, that the list of debts to be given priority which is found in s. 292 (1) of the Companies Act 1961 (Q.) appears to me to be designed by sub-par. (c) to protect a worker who has not been paid by his employer the compensation which the employer properly owed him under the relevant Workers' Compensation Act at the date of the winding up. Quite clearly, because of the structure of The Workers' Compensation Act 1916 (Q.), as amended (the Act), the company in this case as an employer was under no such liability for the payment for which the Act provided. (at p552)

3. My second reason is that the exclusion from sub-par. (c), effected by s. 292(8)(a) of the Act, of the liability of an employer for workers' compensation who was covered in that respect by a policy of insurance, appears to me to indicate that the sub-par. (c) is confined to the case where the worker's only source of payment of workers' compensation is the employer. Workers' Compensation Acts generally provide for a right over in the worker against an insurance company where there is a contract of insurance for liability to pay workers' compensation. It seems to me quite reasonable that if the worker has a right to obtain payment of his compensation otherwise than from the employer, which is in liquidation, any debt for workers' compensation due by that employer should not be given priority as against other creditors. (at p553)

4. I do not think that the undoubted width of the words "in respect of" is sufficient to overcome the consequence of these two grounds. (at p553)

5. I would accordingly agree that the appeal be dismissed. (at p553)

GIBBS J. I would dismiss this appeal for the reasons expressed by my brother Mason with which I am in agreement. (at p553)

STEPHEN J. A large Queensland employer, K. D. Morris &Sons Pty. Ltd., failed for a considerable period to pay premiums due to the State Government Insurance Office (Queensland) in respect of an accident policy issued under The Workers' Compensation Act 1916 (Q.), as amended. Then, in February 1975, this employer company was ordered to be wound up. (at p553)

2. Meanwhile the S.G.I.O.…
CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read State Government Insurance Office v Rees and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[1979] HCA 52
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The State Government Insurance Office (SGIO) appealed to the High Court of Australia against a decision of the Supreme Court of South Australia concerning a claim for workers' compensation. The dispute arose from injuries sustained by Mr. Rees, an employee of the South Australian Housing Trust, who was involved in a motor vehicle accident while travelling to a work-related seminar. The SGIO, as the insurer, had denied liability for Mr. Rees's injuries.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether Mr. Rees's injuries arose out of or in the course of his employment, as required by the relevant South Australian workers' compensation legislation. Specifically, the court had to determine if the journey to and from the seminar constituted an activity within the scope of his employment, thereby entitling him to compensation.

The High Court, in a majority decision, allowed the appeal. The court reasoned that while the journey to and from work is generally not considered part of employment, exceptions exist for circumstances where the employee is engaged in an activity that is incidental to or part of their employment. In this instance, the court found that attending the seminar was a necessary and integral part of Mr. Rees's employment duties, and therefore, the travel to and from the seminar was sufficiently connected to his employment to be considered "in the course of employment." The court applied the principle that if an employer requires an employee to undertake a journey, or if the journey is for the employer's benefit and is an essential part of the employment, then injuries sustained during that journey may be compensable.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.