Hynes v Hynes - [2007] VSCA 7

SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

No. 3738 of 2006

DIANE HYNES
	V
PETER HYNES

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JUDGES:	ASHLEY and REDLICH JJA and BELL AJA
WHERE HELD:	MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING:	1 AUGUST 2006
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	8 FEBRUARY 2007
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2007] VSCA 7

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Tort - Statutory construction– Plaintiff injured when defendant motorist released radiator cap and hot water escaped – Not a “transport accident” as defined by Transport Accident Act 1986 because incident not “directly caused by the driving of a motor car” – Section 93 of Transport Accident Act inapplicable to plaintiff’s damages claim – Injury to plaintiff caused by or arose out of the use of a motor vehicle – Transport Accident Commission liable to indemnify negligent motorist under section 94 of Transport Accident Act – Case stated by County Court – Questions whether inhibition upon damages claims imposed by Part VBA of Wrongs Act 1958, and upon awards of damages under Part VB, applied in plaintiff’s case – Held that claim and damages entitlement not so inhibited – Wrongs Act 1958, Sections 28C and 28LC. Transport Accident Act 1986, Sections 93 and 94.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Plaintiff	Mr P G Nash, Q C with Mr D C Pulling	Slater & Gordon
For the Defendant	Mr D F R Beach, S C with Mr D Masel	Solicitor to the Transport Accident Commission

ASHLEY JA for the Court (ASHLEY and REDLICH JJA and BELL AJA) :

Before the Court is a case stated by the County Court pursuant to s 76 of the County Court Act 1958. In the factual setting which we shall outline in a moment, the opinion of the Court is sought as to the interrelationship between Part 6 of the Transport Accident Act 1986 (“the TA Act”) and Parts VB and VBA of the Wrongs Act 1958 – Part VB having been inserted by the Wrongs and Other Acts (Public Liability Insurance Reform) Act 2002[1] (“the 2002 Act”) and Part VBA having been inserted by the Wrongs and Limitation of Actions Acts (Insurance Reform ) Act 2003[2] (“the 2003 Act”). The two questions framed for this Court’s opinion – which enquire, in effect, whether inhibitions imposed upon common law damages claims and awards by Parts VBA and VB respectively apply to the proceeding brought by the plaintiff - arise in the following setting.
[1]No 49 of 2002; and thereafter amended by Acts Nos 60 and 103 of 2003.
[2]No 60 of 2003; and thereafter amended by Act No 103 of 2003.

On 19 November 2002, Peter Hynes (conveniently, “the defendant”) released the radiator cap of his motor vehicle. Hot water escaped from the radiator. It struck Diane Hynes (conveniently, “the plaintiff”) and caused her injury. The incident happened in Euroa.

On 16 May 2005 the plaintiff filed a writ in the Country Court, seeking damages from the defendant for personal injuries suffered by reason of his alleged negligence. The injuries which she alleged were burns on…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Hynes v Hynes

Details

AGLC: Hynes v Hynes [2007] VSCA 7
Case: [2007] VSCA 7
Decision Date: 8 February 2007

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Hynes v Hynes was heard by the Supreme Court of Victoria, where the plaintiff, Hynes, sought damages from the defendant, also Hynes, for injuries sustained when the defendant released the radiator cap of a motor vehicle, causing hot water to escape and injure the plaintiff. The primary dispute was whether the plaintiff's injuries could be classified as a "transport accident" under the Transport Accident Act 1986, which would limit his right to damages against the defendant to those provided by the Transport Accident Commission. The court had to determine the applicability of the statutory provisions, including the interpretation of "transport accident" and the implications for the plaintiff's entitlement to damages under both the Transport Accident Act and the Wrongs Act 1958.

The court examined whether the incident was a "transport accident" as defined by the Transport Accident Act. It held that the injury was not "directly caused by the driving of a motor car," and thus section 93 of the Transport Accident Act did not apply to the plaintiff's claim. The court then considered whether the plaintiff's injury was caused by or arose out of the use of a motor vehicle, concluding that it was. This meant that the Transport Accident Commission was liable to indemnify the defendant under section 94 of the Transport Accident Act. Furthermore, the court addressed whether the plaintiff's entitlement to damages was inhibited by sections 28C and 28LC of the Wrongs Act 1958, finding that it was not.

The Supreme Court found that the plaintiff's claim for damages was not inhibited by the statutory provisions and that he was entitled to pursue his claim under the Wrongs Act 1958. The court's decision clarified the scope of the statutory provisions and the circumstances in which the Transport Accident Commission may be liable to indemnify a negligent motorist. The court ruled that the plaintiff could proceed with his damages claim against the defendant and that the Transport Accident Commission would be liable to indemnify the defendant under the Transport Accident Act. This ruling affirmed the plaintiff's right to seek full compensation for his injuries under the applicable statutory framework.

Orders