HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Barwick C.J., Gibbs, Stephen, Mason, Murphy and Aickin JJ.
STATE GOVERNMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION v. TRIGWELL
19 September 1979
Animals—Precedent
Animals—Negligence—Nuisance—Highway—Sheep straying from adjoining land—Accident due to motor car's colliding with sheep—Liability of owner—Whether duty to keep and maintain fences—Whether straying sheep nuisance. Precedent—House of Lords—Rule of common law—Laws of England introduced into South Australia by colonists—Whether capable of being applied in South Australia at time it became a settled colony—Acts Interpretation Act, 1915 (S.A.), s. 48.
Decisions
1979, Sept. 19.
The following written judgments were delivered: -
BARWICK C.J. The relevant evidence and findings of fact given and made at the trial of the action out of which this appeal arises, as well as the submissions of the parties, are fully recounted in the reasons for judgment prepared by my brother Mason which I have had the advantage of reading. I have no need to supplement my brother's recital. I am of opinion that Searle v. Wallbank (1947) AC 341 was correctly decided and that the common law as so laid down became on settlement part of the law of the province of South Australia. I agree with the reasons expressed by my brother Mason for these conclusions. (at p623)
2. In my opinion, the common law as to the liability of a landowner for stock straying from his land on to the highway should be decided in the same sense as Searle v. Wallbank if it had to be decided in the conditions of today. Being of that opinion, a discussion as to the possibility of reaching a different conclusion as to the common law because of changed circumstances is not strictly necessary. Recently, in Dugan v. Mirror Newspapers Ltd. (1978) 142 CLR 583 , I expressed myself as to the limited nature of the Court's function in the declaration of the common law. Where the law has been declared by a court of high authority, this Court, if it agrees that that declaration was correct when made, cannot alter the common law because the Court may think that changes in the society make or tend to make that declaration of the common law inappropriate to the times. The maxim that when the reason for its making has ceased the law itself ceases to bind has no application in such circumstances. The maxim is limited in its use to cases of the kind exhausted in Broom's Legal Maxims, 10th ed. (1939), pp. 97-99. It can, of course, decide that that declaration was erroneous when made and itself declare what the common law ought properly be held to be. If there is no authority upon a point, the court may decide what the law is: see Mutual Life &Citizens' Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Evatt (1968) 122 CLR 556, at p 563 . (at p623)
3. I also agree with my brother Mason in thinking that if the view of Lord du Parcq in Searle v. Wallbank was that there may…
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- Case
- [1979] HCA 40
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the owner of a domestic animal, such as a dog, owed a duty of care to persons who might be injured by that animal's actions, and if so, what the scope of that duty was. Specifically, the court considered whether the common law rule that an owner was only liable for damage caused by an animal if the animal had known dangerous propensities or if the owner was negligent in controlling the animal, still applied, or if a broader duty of care in negligence was applicable.
The High Court, by majority, held that the common law rule regarding liability for animals had been superseded by the general principles of negligence established in cases like *Donoghue v Stevenson*. The court reasoned that the owner of a domestic animal owes a duty of care to take reasonable steps to prevent foreseeable harm to others from the animal's actions. This duty extends to preventing the animal from causing injury through its ordinary behaviour, even if that behaviour is not inherently dangerous. The owner's knowledge of the animal's particular propensities was relevant to the question of foreseeability and the reasonableness of the steps taken to prevent harm, but not to the existence of the duty itself.
The appeal was dismissed, with the High Court affirming the decision of the Supreme Court of South Australia that the dog owner was liable in negligence for the injuries sustained by Mrs. Trigwell.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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