Hutton v RLX Operating Company Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Hutton v RLX Operating Company Pty Ltd & Ors  [2016] QSC 248

PARTIES:

SHAUN HUTTON

(Plaintiff/First Respondent)

v

RLX OPERATING COMPANY PTY LTD (ABN 90 129 963 935)
(First Defendant/Applicant)

ROCKHAMPTON PERFORMANCE HORSE INC (ABN 25 486 898 870)

(Second Defendant/Second Respondent)

TRACEY MUSCAT

(Third Defendant)

FILE NO/S:

S 46/16

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court Rockhampton

DELIVERED ON:

31 October 2016

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

10 October 2016

JUDGE:

McMeekin J

ORDERS:

  1. Judgment for the first defendant on that part of the plaintiff’s claim alleging a breach of a statutory duty by the first defendant;
  2. That paragraphs 2h, 6a and 6g of the Amended Statement of Claim so far as they relate to the first defendant be struck out;
  3. That the plaintiff have leave to re-plead;
  4. That the plaintiff file and serve any amended Statement of Claim on which he seeks to rely on or before 4pm on 14 November 2016;
  5. That the parties have liberty to apply on the giving of three days’ notice to the other;
  6. That the plaintiff pay the first defendant’s costs of the application on the standard basis.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND – PROCEDURE UNDER UNIFORM CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES AND PREDECESSORS – SUMMARY JUDGMENT – where the defendant applies for summary judgment or in the alternative to strike out paragraphs in the plaintiff’s Statement of Claim – where the plaintiff’s vehicle collided with six horses which had strayed from a saleyards complex - where the plaintiff suffered personal injuries – where the first defendant was the sublessee of the saleyards complex – where the plaintiff claims the first defendant with knowledge of the presence of animals on the land brought there by another is under a duty at common law to take reasonable care to prevent harm to passers-by from those animals escaping – where the plaintiff claims the first defendant was under a statutory duty to fence in animals that others brought onto its land – whether the plaintiff has no real prospects of success – whether paragraphs of the statement of claim disclose no reasonable cause of action or have the tendency to prejudice or delay the fair trial of the proceeding

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 149, r 154, 157, r 171, r 292, r 293, r 443, r 444

Local Government Act 2009 (Qld), s 9, s 28, s 60

Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552
Australian Iron & Steel Ltd v Ryan  (1957) 97 CLR 89
Australian National Railways Commission v Scott’s Transport Industries Pty Ltd (1985) 2 MVR 417
Bennett v Chemical Construction (GB) Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 1571
Commonwealth Dairy Produce Equalisation Committee Ltd v Hansen [1944] St R Qd 95
Deen v Davies (1935) 2 KB 282
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo [2005] 2 Qd R 232

Electrical and General Contract Corporation v Thomson-Houston Electric Co [1893] 10 TLR 103

Fabian v Welsh [1999] QCA 365
General Steel Industries…

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Details
Case
[2016] QSC 248
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Hutton v RLX Operating Company Pty Ltd, Mr Hutton, the plaintiff, sought damages for personal injuries sustained in a collision with horses that had strayed from the Gracemere Saleyards Complex onto the Capricorn Highway. The first defendant, RLX Operating Company Pty Ltd, was the sublessee of the saleyards at the time of the incident. The plaintiff argued that the first defendant had a common law duty to prevent harm to passers-by from animals on its land, and that it had a statutory duty to fence in animals brought onto its land by others. The first defendant applied for summary judgment or, in the alternative, to strike out certain paragraphs of the plaintiff's Statement of Claim. The court had to determine whether the plaintiff had no real prospects of success and whether certain paragraphs of the Statement of Claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action or had the tendency to prejudice or delay the fair trial of the proceeding.

The court considered the plaintiff's claims against the first defendant under both common law and statutory duty. Regarding the common law duty, the court found that the plaintiff had no real prospects of success because the first defendant, as a sublessee, did not have a duty to take reasonable care to prevent harm to passers-by from animals on its land. The court also determined that the plaintiff's reliance on statutory duty was misplaced, as the relevant local laws did not apply to the first defendant. The court found that paragraphs 2h, 6a, and 6g of the Amended Statement of Claim so far as they related to the first defendant should be struck out. The plaintiff was granted leave to re-plead and was required to file and serve any amended Statement of Claim by 4pm on 14 November 2016. The plaintiff was also ordered to pay the first defendant's costs of the application on the standard basis.

The court's decision highlights the importance of accurately pleading causes of action and ensuring that all relevant laws and duties are correctly attributed to the appropriate parties. The first defendant was successful in having the plaintiff's claims against it dismissed, and the plaintiff was given an opportunity to amend their pleadings to better align with the applicable legal principles. The court's ruling underscores the need for careful consideration of the legal duties owed by sublessees in relation to animals on their land, and the necessity of adhering to procedural requirements when making applications to strike out pleadings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Judgment for the first defendant on that part of the plaintiff’s claim alleging a breach of a statutory duty by the first defendant;

2. That paragraphs 2h, 6a and 6g of the Amended Statement of Claim so far as they relate to the first defendant be struck out;

3. That the plaintiff have leave to re-plead;

4. That the plaintiff file and serve any amended Statement of Claim on which he seeks to rely on or before 4pm on 14 November 2016;

5. That the parties have liberty to apply on the giving of three days’ notice to the other;

6. That the plaintiff pay the first defendant’s costs of the application on the standard basis.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Judgment for the first defendant on that part of the plaintiff’s claim alleging a breach of a statutory duty by the first defendant; That paragraphs 2h, 6a and 6g of the Amended Statement of Claim so far as they relate to the first defendant be struck out; That the plaintiff have leave to re-plead; That the plaintiff file and serve any amended Statement of Claim on which he seeks to rely on or before 4pm on 14 November 2016; That the parties have liberty to apply on the giving of three days’ notice to the other; That the plaintiff pay the first defendant’s costs of the application on the standard basis. McMeekin J: At about 4am on 11 November 2013, Mr Hutton, the plaintiff, suffered serious physical injuries when he drove into and struck a small group of horses that had escaped from the Gracemere Saleyards Complex (“the saleyards”) onto the Capricorn Highway. The horses belonged to the third defendant and she had brought them to the saleyards a few days before for the purposes of a camp drafting and quarter horse event organised by the second defendant. The first defendant (RLX Operating Company Pty Ltd) was the sublessee of the saleyards at the relevant time. Mr Hutton claims damages for the personal injuries suffered. The first defendant applies for summary judgement pursuant to r 293 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR) or in the alternative to strike out certain paragraphs of the Amended Statement of Claim pursuant to r 171 UCPR. A preliminary point was taken that the latter application, at least as argued, came within the purview of rr 443 and 444 UCPR and that the necessary letter had not been written as r 444 required. I am satisfied that there was no requirement to write such a letter. Rule 443 does not apply - this is not an application made for further and better particulars of the opposite party’s pleading under rule 161, nor under Chapter 10 Parts 1 or 2 UCPR, nor is it an application relating to a failure to comply with an order or direction of the court. Relevantly in paragraph 2 (various matters are pleaded which apparently concern the second and third defendants and which I do not mention) the following is alleged (and I here summarise the effect): Paragraph 2 h of the pleading asserts (and here I quote verbatim): Reference is then made to various laws having been made by the Rockhampton Regional Council pursuant to s 28 of the Local Government Act 2009 (Qld). Those laws, so far as they seem to apply to the first defendant, are Local Law No 2 (Animal Management) 2011, Subordinate Local Law No 2 (Animal Management) 2011, and Local Law No 1 (Administration) 2011. No reference is made to the terms of those laws or why they apply to the first defendant. Paragraph 2A then pleads: What particular “circumstance pleaded above” is relied on is not apparent from the pleading. Many of the matters “pleaded above” have nothing to do with the first defendant. In the course of submissions reliance was placed on the matters I have outlined in paragraphs [4] and [5].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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