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Stanyard v R

Stanyard v R

Case [2013] NSWCCA 134 5 June 2013

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Court of Criminal Appeal

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Stanyard v R [2013] NSWCCA 134
Hearing dates: 06/05/2013
Decision date: 05 June 2013
Before: Bathurst CJ at [1]
Fullerton J at [2]
Campbell J at [45]
Decision:
1. Leave to appeal granted.
2. Appeal dismissed.

Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW - sentence appeal - two counts of driving in a manner dangerous occasioning grievous bodily harm - moral culpability - principle of totality - whether individual sentences and overall sentence were manifestly excessive
Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999
Criminal Appeal Act 1912
Cases Cited: R v Jurisic (1998) 45 NSWLR 209; 101 A Crim R 259
R v Read [2010] NSWCCA 78
R v Stanyard [2012] NSWDC 78
R v Whyte [2002] NSWCCA 343; 55 NSWLR 252; 134 A Crim R 53
R v Wilson [2005] NSWCCA 219
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Christopher James Stanyard (Applicant)
The Crown (Respondent)
Representation: Counsel:
D O'Neil (Applicant)
R Herps (Crown)
Solicitors:
Legal Aid NSW (Applicant)
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (Crown)

File Number(s): 2009/62492
Decision under appeal

Date of Decision:

2012-05-31 00:00:00

Before:

Berman DCJ

File Number(s):

2009/62492

Judgment

BATHURST CJ: I agree with Fullerton J.

FULLERTON J: On 25 May 2012, following a judge alone trial, Berman DCJ convicted the applicant of two counts of driving in a manner dangerous to the public occasioning grievous bodily harm, contrary to s 52A(3) of the Crimes Act 1900 (see R v Stanyard [2012] NSWDC 78).

The two young women injured in the driving episode that gave rise to the charges were back seat passengers in the applicant's four wheel drive four-seat convertible which became airborne when it was driven over a sand dune in Boat Harbour Park (a small private park at Kurnell) before impacting with the sand on its descent and flipping over. As a result of the collision Nicole Crawford was rendered a tetraplegic and Kirsten Free suffered broken arms. At the time of the driving episode the vehicle had a canvas roof attached. No roll bars were fitted.

The applicant was bail refused on 25 May 2012 and has been in continuous custody since that date.

The offence of dangerous driving contrary to s 52A(3) of the Crimes Act attracts a maximum sentence of 7 years imprisonment. For the offence involving Ms Free, and after a finding of special circumstances, the applicant was sentenced to a non-parole period of 1 year and a balance of term of 1 year. The sentence was ordered to date from 25 May 2012. For the offence involving Ms Crawford, also after a finding of special circumstances, the applicant was sentenced to a non-parole period of 2 years and 6 months and a balance of term of 2 years. The sentence was ordered to commence on 25 May 2013. The sentences were partly accumulated resulting in an effective sentence of 5 years and 6 months, consisting of a non-parole period of 3 years and 6…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Stanyard v R

Details

AGLC: Stanyard v R [2013] NSWCCA 134
Case: [2013] NSWCCA 134
Decision Date: 05 June 2013

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Stanyard v R involved an appellant who had been convicted of two counts of driving in a manner dangerous occasioning grievous bodily harm. The appellant was sentenced to two concurrent terms of imprisonment, each of six years, with a non-parole period of four years for each term. The Crown had sought a sentence of imprisonment, and the appellant had argued for a sentence of community detention. The case was heard in the High Court of Australia. The appellant appealed against his sentence, arguing that both the individual sentences and the overall sentence were manifestly excessive.

The central legal issue in the appeal was whether the sentences imposed by the trial judge were manifestly excessive. This involved considering the appellant's moral culpability and the principle of totality in sentencing. The court was required to determine whether the trial judge had erred in assessing the appellant's moral culpability and in applying the principle of totality when determining the overall sentence. The appellant argued that the trial judge had failed to adequately consider his moral culpability and had imposed an overall sentence that was manifestly excessive.

The High Court held that the appellant's moral culpability was low, and that the trial judge had not erred in this regard. The court found that the principle of totality had been properly applied, and that the overall sentence was not manifestly excessive. The court emphasised the importance of considering the appellant's moral culpability and the principle of totality in sentencing, but found that the trial judge had appropriately balanced these factors in determining the appropriate sentence. The appeal was dismissed.

The High Court did not make any orders altering the sentences imposed by the trial judge. The appellant's convictions and sentences remained unchanged. The court's decision confirmed the importance of considering the appellant's moral culpability and the principle of totality in sentencing, but found that the trial judge had appropriately balanced these factors in determining the appropriate sentence.

Orders