Stanford v DePuy International Ltd (No 6)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Stanford v DePuy International Ltd (No 6) [2016] FCA 1452

File number(s): NSD 213 of 2011
Judge(s): WIGNEY  J
Date of judgment: 1 December 2016
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – representative proceeding – application for court approval of settlement of proceedings under s 33V of the Federal Court of Australia Act  1976 (Cth) – where settlement has occurred after trial judge reserved judgment – whether the settlement is fair and reasonable and in the interests of the group members as a whole – factors relevant to the reasonableness of the settlement – whether the proposed settlement scheme is fair and reasonable – whether the eligibility criteria for participating in the settlement scheme are fair and reasonable – where exclusion criteria would preclude some group members from participating in the settlement scheme – whether the settlement approval costs and administration costs are reasonable – whether the releases and indemnities that the group members will be bound by are reasonable – whether the reimbursement costs for the lead applicants are reasonable – where the Court has received objections from some group members
Legislation:

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33V

Manufacturers Warranties Act 1974 (SA)

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), Pt VIB, ss 74B, 74D, 74AC, 74AD

Cases cited:

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Chats House Investments Pty Limited (1996) 71 FCR 250

Camilleri v The Trust Company (Nominees) Limited [2015] FCA 1468

Courtney v Medtel Pty Ltd (No 5) [2004] FCA 1406

Darwalla Milling Co Pty Ltd v F Hoffman-La Roche Ltd & Ors (No 2) [2006] FCA 1388

Foley v Gay [2016] FCA 273

Kelly v Willmott Forests Ltd (in liquidation) (No 4) [2016] FCA 323

Lopez v Star World Enterprises Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 104

Mercieca v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 204

Modtech Engineering Pty Ltd v GPT Management Holdings Ltd [2013] FCA 626

P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltdv Brookfield Multiplex Limited (No 4) [2010] FCA 1029

Pharm-a-Care Laboratories Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (No 6) [2011] FCA 277

Rod Investments (Vic) Pty Ltd v Abeyratne [2010] VSC 457

Williams v FAI Home Security Pty Ltd (No 4) [2000] FCA 1925

Date of hearing: 24 June, 29 June 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Regulator and Consumer Protection
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 166
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr J C Sheahan SC with Ms Z M Hillman
Solicitor for the First Applicant: Maurice Blackburn Lawyers
Solicitor for the Second Applicant: Shine Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr R A Dick SC with Ms S Mirzabegian
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Herbert Smith Freehills
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Norton Rose Fulbright
Table of Corrections
7 February 2017 The file number on the cover page and the orders page be amended to “NSD 213 of 2011”

ORDERS

NSD 213 of 2011
BETWEEN:

TAMMY MAREE STANFORD

First Applicant

JAMIE DUNSMORE

Second Applicant

AND:

DEPUY…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 1452
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Federal Court of Australia was asked to approve a settlement in a class action brought by Mrs Stanford and others against DePuy International Ltd and Johnson & Johnson Medical, concerning defective ASR hip implants. The applicants sought damages for negligence and breaches of the Trade Practices Act, among other claims. The settlement was made after the trial judge reserved judgment, and the applicants sought the court’s approval under section 33V of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976. The court had to decide whether the settlement was fair, reasonable, and in the interests of the group members.

The court examined various aspects of the settlement, including the eligibility criteria for participating in the settlement scheme, the reasonableness of the settlement approval and administration costs, the fairness of the releases and indemnities, and the reasonableness of the reimbursement costs for the lead applicants. The court noted that some group members had objected to the settlement, primarily on the basis that it was not as generous as a settlement reached in the United States. However, the court held that it must assess the reasonableness of the settlement based on the specific facts and circumstances of this case, rather than comparing it to a foreign jurisdiction. After considering all the evidence and submissions, the court found the settlement to be fair and reasonable.

The court approved the settlement on the terms set out in the Settlement Deed and the Amended Settlement Scheme, dismissing the proceeding as a defence and absolute bar to any further claims by the applicants or group members. The court also approved the applicants’ costs and reimbursement payments, and appointed administrators for the settlement scheme. The court ordered that a Further Notice to Group Members be given to all group members, with specific instructions on the distribution and display of the notice. The court approved the costs of administering the notice as part of the settlement costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Approval of the Settlement

1. Pursuant to section 33V and 33ZF of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (Act), the settlement of the proceeding is approved on the terms set out in:

(a) the Settlement Deed dated 31 March 2016 (Deed) which is Annexure JKS-92 to the affidavit of Julian Klaus Schimmel affirmed on 17 June 2016;

(b) the Amended Settlement Scheme dated 17 June 2016 (Amended Settlement Scheme) which is Annexure JKS-93 to the affidavit of Julian Klaus Schimmel affirmed on 17 June 2016.

2. The proceeding be dismissed:

(a) on the basis that the dismissal is a defence and absolute bar to any claim or proceeding by any Applicant or Group Member with respect to ASR Claims as defined in the Deed;

(b) with no order as to costs; and

(c) without prejudice to the Parties’ ability to relist the matter for the purpose of seeking orders consequential to the Deed or Amended Settlement Scheme.

3. Pursuant to section 33ZF of the Act:

(a) The Applicants’ Costs (as defined in clause 1.1 of the Deed) are approved in the amount certified as reasonable and recommended for approval in the report of Ross Nicholas dated 15 June 2016 (admitted as exhibit 4 on the hearing of the Amended Interlocutory Application) and are to be paid in accordance with clause 5.1 of the Deed and clause 3.1 of the Amended Settlement Scheme;

(b) The following payments are approved as Reimbursement Payments (as defined in clause 1.1 of the Deed) and are to be paid in accordance with clause 5.1 of the Deed and clause 3.1 of the Amended Settlement Scheme:

(i) Tammy Stanford - $40,000;

(ii) Jamie Dunsmore - $40,000;

(iii) Mary Bentjees - $10,000;

(iv) Robert Webb - $10,000;

(c) Maurice Blackburn Pty Limited (Maurice Blackburn) and Shine Lawyers Pty Limited (Shine Lawyers) are jointly appointed as Administrators of the Amended Settlement Scheme;

(d) The Applicants are authorised to enter into and give effect to the Deed nunc pro tunc for and on behalf of the Group Members as defined in the Third Further Amended Statement of Claim.

Further Notice to Group Members to Group Members

4. The form and content of a Further Notice to Group Members (Further Notice to Group Members) which is annexed as Annexure JKS-136 to the affidavit of Julian Klaus Schimmel affirmed on 23 June 2016 (with the date 29 June 2016 inserted in the first sentence of the second paragraph of the Further Notice to Group Members) is approved for the purposes of sections 33X and 33Y of the Act.

5. Pursuant to sections 33Y and 33ZF of the Act, the Further Notice to Group Members is to be given to Group Members according to the following procedure:

(a) By 15 July 2016, the parties are to cause the Further Notice to Group Members to be sent by Crawford & Company (Australia) Pty Ltd (Crawford) to all Group Members in the proceeding for whom Crawford has contact details;

(b) By 15 July 2016:

(i) Maurice Blackburn is to cause the Further Notice to Group Members to be displayed on the website www.depuyclassaction.com.au;

(ii) Maurice Blackburn is to display the Further Notice to Group Members on its website;

(iii) Shine Lawyers is to display the Further Notice to Group Members on its website;

(iv) Duncan Basheer Hannon is to display the Further Notice to Group Members on its website;

(v) Lempriere Abbott McLeod is to display the Further Notice to Group Members on its website;

(c) By 15 July 2016, each of Maurice Blackburn, Shine Lawyers, Duncan Basheer Hannon and Lempriere Abbott McLeod are to send the Further Notice to Group Members to the Group Members for whom they (respectively) have postal and/or email addresses.

6. Distribution of the Further Notice to Group Members if done in compliance with order 5 is deemed to be satisfactory notice to all Group Members and the Further Notice to Group Members need not otherwise be given personally to each Group Member in accordance with sub-section 33Y(5) of the Act.

7. Pursuant to section 33ZF of the Act, Crawford’s reasonable costs of giving effect to paragraph 5(a) above:

(a) are approved as “Administration Costs” for the purpose of clauses 1.1, 6.5(a) and 9.3(b) of the Deed; and

(b) are to be paid by Maurice Blackburn within 14 days of presentation of an invoice with respect to such costs.

8. Pursuant to section 33ZF of the Act, the reasonable costs of distributing the Further Notice to Group Members in accordance with paragraph 5(b) above are approved as Administration Costs as defined in the Deed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

These are the Court’s reasons for approving the settlement.FACTUAL BACKGROUND It is unnecessary to spell out the facts in great details. Following is a simplified summary of the facts that were material to the question whether the settlement should be approved. The ASR implants the subject of the representative proceedings were manufactured by DePuy, a company based in Leeds in the United Kingdom. They were imported into Australia and distributed by the Australian based company Johnson & Johnson Medical. Both DePuy and Johnson & Johnson Medical were subsidiaries of Johnson & Johnson Inc, a company based in the United States of America. The ASR implants were imported into Australia for use in hip surgery between about late 2003 and late 2009. They were the subject of a worldwide recall by DePuy in late August 2010. Detailed records of surgery involving hip prostheses, including ASR implants, were maintained by the Australian Orthopaedic Association. From those records, it was ascertained that approximately 5,500 ASR implants were implanted in approximately 5,000 patients. Some patients were surgically implanted with an ASR implant in both of their hips. In some instances, patients who had received an ASR implant had that implant surgically removed or “revised” and replaced by another ASR implant.Commencement of the representative proceeding Mrs Stanford commenced representative proceedings in this Court against DePuy and Johnson & Johnson Medical on 28 February 2011. Mrs Stanford was one of the many patients who had an ASR implant surgically implanted and later revised. She claimed that DePuy and Johnson & Johnson Medical had been negligent and were liable pursuant various provisions of the Trade Practices Act. The allegations that formed the basis of those causes of action will be considered in some more detail later. Mrs Stanford sought damages, both on her own behalf and on behalf of group members comprising other persons who had undergone hip replacement surgery involving ASR implants. Mr Dunsmore, who was represented by different lawyers, also commenced representative proceedings in this Court against DePuy and Johnson & Johnson Medical. Mr Dunsmore’s action, which he commenced in September 2011, was based on essentially the same causes of action as those alleged by Mrs Stanford. The group members were also relevantly the same. In April 2012, Mr Dunsmore’s proceeding was consolidated with Mrs Stanford’s proceeding. To complicate matters further, in October 2011 Ms Mary Beentjes and Mr Robert Webb each commenced separate representative proceedings against DePuy and Johnson & Johnson Medical in the Supreme Court of South Australia. Their cases were commenced on behalf of South Australian patients who had received ASR implants. Ms Beentjes’ case concerned patients who had received an ASR implant system in hip resurfacing surgery, while Mr Webb’s case concerned patients who had received an ASR implant system in an operation involving total hip replacement. Their claims alleged causes of action in negligence and under the Trade Practices Act, as well as under South Australian legislation: the Manufacturers Warranties Act 1974 (SA). Those proceedings were in due course transferred to this Court and consolidated with Mrs Stanford’s and Mr Dunsmore’s proceedings. The Court ordered that the South Australian patients who were group members in Ms Beentjes’ and Mr Webb’s action were to be sub-group members in respect of their claims under the South Australian Act.The causes of action and defences

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The trial was complex, hard-fought and difficult. There was little common ground. Over 6,500 documents were tendered by the parties. Many of the documents concerned highly technical matters. The applicants alone tendered 52 expert reports across a range of specialist disciplines. They also read 21 affidavits from lay witnesses, though many those affidavits also concerned highly technical matters. Ultimately 19 of the applicants’ witnesses gave oral evidence and were cross examined. For its part, DePuy and Johnson & Johnson Medical tendered 23 expert reports and read seven affidavits from lay witnesses. Of the respondents’ witnesses, 13 gave oral evidence and were cross examined. The transcript of the oral evidence at trial exceeded 5,000 pages. The parties’ closing submissions ran to over 2,000 pages.Evidence and issues in the proceeding It is plainly neither necessary nor desirable to discuss the evidence and issues that emerged at trial in any great detail. That said, it is important to address that topic, if only to emphasise that the litigation involved considerable complexity and risk for the applicants and group members, both in relation to liability and the quantum of damages. While at an intuitive level the case against DePuy and Johnson & Johnson Medical may have appeared to be fairly straightforward and strong, it in fact gave rise to a number of complex factual and legal issues. The applicants were by no means assured of success, or complete success. The applicants’ case relied fairly heavily on data recorded by the Australian Orthopaedic Association in relation to the outcome of all hip replacements performed in Australia. That data revealed that ASR implants required earlier and more frequent revision than other hip replacement prostheses in their class. For example, in relation to complete hip replacements, the ASR implants had a revision rate at 7 years of 37.1 percent, whereas other comparable implants had a revision rate of 14 percent. There was also evidence of a similar high revision rate for ASR implants found in comparable registries overseas, in particular in the United Kingdom. The applicants also relied on evidence that revealed that DePuy’s own internal health hazard evaluation led to its decision to initiate a worldwide recall of ASR implants in August 2010 because they were defective and could cause health problems. The applicants contended that the grossly increased rate of revision in relation to the ASR implants, together with DePuy’s decision to recall the ASR implants in 2010, was enough to demonstrate that the ASR implants were not fit for purpose and were not of merchantable quality. The applicants led evidence from a number of epidemiologists, biostatisticians and other witnesses in relation to the reliability of the revision data and the conclusions that could properly be drawn from it. Those witnesses included: Professor Ross Crawford, an orthopaedic surgeon and Professor of Orthopaedic Research and Queensland University of Technology; Professor Lyn March, Professor of Rheumatology and Musculoskeletal Epidemiology at the University of Sydney; Professor Kerrie Mengerson, Professor in the Science and Engineering Faculty at the Queensland University of Technology; and Professor Stephen Graves, a trained orthopaedic surgeon and director of the relevant registry at the Australian Orthopaedic Association.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Second, many objecting group members pointed to the United States settlement as evidence that this settlement was unreasonable. It was again perfectly understandable that group members would see the United States settlement as setting some sort of benchmark against which the reasonableness of this settlement should have been measured. For the reasons already given, however, the Court was required to consider the fairness and reasonableness of the settlement having regard to the particular facts and circumstances of this matter, not having regard to a case in a foreign jurisdiction involving different laws, a different justice system, and most likely different facts and circumstances. In any event, it was difficult to compare the settlement in the United States with the settlement reached in this proceeding. On the limited facts available, it seemed that the settlement achieved in the United States may not have been significantly more generous to the settlement reached in this matter, other than perhaps insofar as the United States class action attorneys were concerned. The United States settlement did not provide a proper or reasonable reason for not approving the settlement reached in this proceeding.CONCLUSION AND ORDERS For all the above reasons, the Court decided to approve the settlement. The approval orders proposed by the applicants were accordingly made, along with a number of uncontentious ancillary orders, including confidentiality orders in respect of some of the evidence.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.