Staley v Hill Family Holdings Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 25 min read

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Staley v Hill Family Holdings Pty Ltd [2025] QCA 95

PARTIES:

KERIN ANNE STALEY
(first appellant)
STALEY MANAGEMENT PTY LTD as trustee of the HILL FAMILY TRUST
ACN 678 146 202
(second appellant)
v
HILL FAMILY HOLDINGS PTY LTD in its own right and as (purported) trustee of the HILL FAMILY TRUST
ACN 099 638 105
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 12196 of 2024
SC No 8456 of 2024

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


Supreme Court at Brisbane: [2024] QSC 176 (Muir J)

DELIVERED ON:

3 June 2025

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

4 March 2025

JUDGES:

Bond JA, Gotterson AJA and Bradley J

ORDERS:

1.   Appeal dismissed.

2.   The Appellants are to pay the Respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal on the standard basis.

CATCHWORDS:

EQUITY – TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES – DISCRETIONARY TRUSTS – CREATION AND EFFECT GENERALLY – where the Trustee of a discretionary trust executed a Deed of Variation to remove and substitute the Appointor under the Trust Deed – where the appellants seek a declaration that the Deed of Variation dated 28 March 2024 and executed by the respondent is invalid – where the first appellant, as Appointor, subsequently executed a Deed of Removal and Appointment of Trustee dated 19 June 2024 – where the trial judge refused the appellant’s application for declaratory and auxiliary relief against the respondent – where the Trust Deed conferred a broad power of amendment on the trustee under Clause 14.01 – where the appellants contended that the amendment impermissibly altered the substratum of the trust – where the appellants relied on an implied limitation on the trustee’s power to amend the Trust Deed based on other provisions regulating the Appointor’s role – where the trial judge found the Deed of Variation to be a valid exercise of the power to amend the Trust Deed – whether the trial judge erred in construing Clause 14.01 of the Trust Deed as authorising the insertion of a clause permitting the trustee to remove and replace the Appointor – whether the power to vary the Trust Deed was impliedly limited by provisions conferring specific powers on the Appointor – whether the insertion of clause 22.04 and the removal of the Appointor constituted an impermissible alteration to the substratum of the trust – whether the Deed of Variation was invalid as contrary to the structure or scheme of the Trust Deed

Cachia v Westpac Financial Services Ltd (2000) 170 ALR 65; [2000] FCA 161, cited
Jenkins v Ellett [2007] QSC 154, considered
Mercanti v Mercanti (2016) 50 WAR 495; [2016] WASCA 206, cited
Palmer v Palmer [2018] QSC 217, cited

COUNSEL:

C C Heyworth-Smith KC, with M E B Williams, for the appellants
G Beacham KC, with K J Kluss, for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Thynne & Macartney for the appellants
Bartley Cohen for the respondent

  1. BOND JA:  I agree with the reasons for judgment of Gotterson AJA and with…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Staley v Hill Family Holdings Pty Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2025] QCA 95
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Staley v Hill Family Holdings Pty Ltd, the appellants, represented by Staley, sought a declaration that a Deed of Variation executed by the respondent, Hill Family Holdings Pty Ltd, was invalid. The Deed of Variation aimed to remove and substitute the Appointor under the Trust Deed. This appeal followed the trial judge's refusal to grant the appellants' application for declaratory and auxiliary relief against the respondent. The Trust Deed contained Clause 14.01, which conferred a broad power of amendment on the trustee. The appellants argued that the amendment impermissibly altered the trust's substratum and that the trustee's power to amend was implicitly limited by other provisions that regulated the Appointor's role. The trial judge found that the Deed of Variation was a valid exercise of the power to amend the Trust Deed.

The legal issues that the court had to decide were whether the trial judge erred in construing Clause 14.01 of the Trust Deed as authorising the insertion of a clause permitting the trustee to remove and replace the Appointor, whether the power to vary the Trust Deed was impliedly limited by provisions conferring specific powers on the Appointor, and whether the insertion of clause 22.04 and the removal of the Appointor constituted an impermissible alteration to the trust's substratum. The court concluded that the trial judge did not err in his interpretation of Clause 14.01. The court found that the power to vary the Trust Deed was not implicitly limited by the provisions conferring specific powers on the Appointor, and the insertion of clause 22.04 and the removal of the Appointor did not constitute an impermissible alteration to the trust's substratum.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellants pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the appeal on the standard basis. The court found that the appellants had not established that the trial judge's orders should be set aside for error. The appeal was dismissed, and the costs were awarded to the respondent. The court concluded that it was unnecessary to consider the contention advanced by the respondent in support of the orders made.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal dismissed.

2. The Appellants are to pay the Respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal on the standard basis.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case revolves around a discretionary trust established under a Trust Deed, with a specific clause (Clause 14.01) conferring broad powers of amendment on the Trustee. The first Appointor under the Trust Deed executed a Deed of Variation on 28 March 2024, which aimed to remove and substitute the Appointor. This action was contested by the appellants, who sought a declaration that the Deed of Variation was invalid. Following this, the first appellant, as Appointor, executed a Deed of Removal and Appointment of Trustee on 19 June 2024. The trial judge dismissed the appellants' application for declaratory and auxiliary relief against the respondent, affirming that the Deed of Variation was a valid exercise of the power to amend the Trust Deed. The appellants argued that the amendment impermissibly altered the substratum of the trust and that there was an implied limitation on the trustee’s power to amend the Trust Deed based on other provisions regulating the Appointor’s role.

The matter came before the court as an appeal against the decision of the trial judge who dismissed the appellants' application for declaratory and auxiliary relief. The trial judge had ruled that the Deed of Variation executed by the respondent was a valid exercise of the power to amend the Trust Deed. The appellants contended that the trial judge erred in construing Clause 14.01 of the Trust Deed as authorising the insertion of a clause permitting the trustee to remove and replace the Appointor. They also argued that the power to vary the Trust Deed was impliedly limited by provisions conferring specific powers on the Appointor. Additionally, the appellants claimed that the insertion of clause 22.04 and the removal of the Appointor constituted an impermissible alteration to the substratum of the trust. The appeal was heard and determined by the court, which upheld the trial judge's decision.

Decision

Reasons for decision

For these reasons, I do not accept the Appellants’ submissions that on its proper construction, Clause 14.01 did not empower the Trustee to execute the Deed of Variation.Conclusion The Appellants have not established that the orders of Justice Muir should be set aside for error. It is unnecessary for this Court to consider the contention advanced by the Respondent[51] otherwise in support of the orders made.[51]Notice of Contention filed on 24 January 2025. In these circumstances, the appeal should be dismissed with costs. I would propose the following orders.Orders1.Appeal dismissed.2.The Appellants are to pay the Respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal on the standard basis. BRADLEY J: I agree with the proposed orders and reasons given by Gotterson AJA.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined Clause 14.01 of the Trust Deed, which granted the trustee a broad power of amendment. The appellants argued that this clause did not authorise the trustee to execute a Deed of Variation to remove and replace the Appointor. However, the court found that the clause clearly empowered the trustee to make such changes. This conclusion was based on the plain meaning of the clause, which did not limit the trustee’s power to amend the Trust Deed in any way that was necessary for the proper administration of the trust.

The court also considered whether the power to vary the Trust Deed was impliedly limited by provisions conferring specific powers on the Appointor. The appellants relied on other provisions of the Trust Deed that outlined the Appointor’s role and responsibilities, suggesting these provisions impliedly restricted the trustee’s amendment power. However, the court rejected this argument, finding that the specific powers conferred on the Appointor did not restrict the trustee’s broader power to amend the Trust Deed as provided for in Clause 14.01.

Regarding the alteration to the substratum of the trust, the court determined that the insertion of clause 22.04 and the removal of the Appointor did not change the fundamental nature or purpose of the trust. The court held that the changes were within the scope of the trustee’s power to amend the Trust Deed and did not alter the trust’s underlying purpose.

Finally, the court assessed whether the Deed of Variation was invalid as contrary to the structure or scheme of the Trust Deed. The court found that the Deed of Variation was consistent with the overall structure and scheme of the Trust Deed and did not contravene any of its provisions. Therefore, the Deed of Variation was valid.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a trustee’s broad power to amend a Trust Deed, as outlined in Clause 14.01, permits the removal and replacement of an Appointor, even if specific provisions confer particular powers on the Appointor. Furthermore, changes that do not alter the fundamental nature or purpose of the trust are not considered alterations to the trust’s substratum. Finally, a Deed of Variation is valid if it aligns with the overall structure and scheme of the Trust Deed.