Stack v AMP Financial Planning Pty Limited (No 2)

Case [2021] FCA 1479


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Stack v AMP Financial Planning Pty Limited (No 2) [2021] FCA 1479

File number: VID 489 of 2020
Judgment of: BEACH J
Date of judgment: 25 November 2021
Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – representative proceeding – practice and procedure – de-classing action – s 33N of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – s 33N(1)(c) – whether representative proceeding an efficient and effective means of dealing with claims – commonality concerning claims under ss 961B, 961J, 961L and 965 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – nature of AMP authorised representatives – relationship with AMP licensees – personal advice – breach of fiduciary duty – sufficient commonality – balance between individual issues and common issues – application refused
Legislation:

Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) ss 12CB, 12GF

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 917E, 961B, 961J, 961L, 961M, 965

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 33C, 33N, 33Q

Cases cited:

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd (No 2) (2020) 377 ALR 55

Earglow Pty Ltd v Newcrest Mining Ltd (2015) 230 FCR 469

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance
Number of paragraphs: 243
Date of hearing: 11 October 2021
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr A Martin SC with Mr T Bagley, Mr E Olivier and Mr B O’Connor
Solicitors for the Applicants: Piper Alderman and Shine Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms W Harris QC with Ms E Bathurst

Solicitor for the Respondents:

King & Wood Mallesons

ORDERS

VID 489 of 2020
BETWEEN:

NIGEL PETER STACK

First Applicant

MELITA ANNA WINTERTON

Second Applicant

JOHN LESLIE BROTTON (and another named in the Schedule)

Third Applicant

AND:

AMP FINANCIAL PLANNING PTY LIMITED (ACN 051 208 327)

First Respondent

CHARTER FINANCIAL PLANNING LIMITED (ACN 002 976 294)

Second Respondent

HILLROSS FINANCIAL SERVICES LIMITED (ACN 003 323 055) (and others named in the Schedule)

Third Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

BEACH J

DATE OF ORDER:

25 NOVEMBER 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The respondents’ application under s 33N(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) be dismissed.

2.The parties’ costs of and incidental to such application be their costs in the cause.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BEACH J:

  1. In this representative proceeding the applicants and group members seek compensation for commissions and premiums paid in relation to financial products acquired on the advice of their financial advisers, who were at the relevant time authorised representatives of the first to third respondents.

  2. The respondents have applied for an order under s 33N(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) that the proceeding no longer continue as a representative proceeding. They have invoked s 33N(1)(c) as the condition upon which they rely to trigger the power to de-class.

  3. In support of their s 33N(1)(c) argument the respondents say that the applicants’ central…

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AGLC
Stack v AMP Financial Planning Pty Limited (No 2) [2021] FCA 1479
Case
[2021] FCA 1479
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Stack v AMP Financial Planning Pty Limited (No 2) involved a dispute before the Federal Court of Australia. The plaintiffs sought to bring a representative proceeding against AMP Financial Planning, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty and other claims under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The defendants opposed the representative proceeding, arguing that it was not an efficient and effective means of dealing with the claims due to the individual nature of the alleged breaches. The core issue before the court was whether the representative proceeding could proceed under section 33N of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), particularly considering the commonality of the claims and the nature of the relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendants.

The court examined whether the representative proceeding was an efficient and effective means of dealing with the claims, focusing on the commonality of the claims under sections 961B, 961J, 961L, and 965 of the Corporations Act. The court balanced the commonality of the claims against the individual issues that would need to be addressed. It found that there was sufficient commonality in the claims concerning the nature of the relationship between the authorised representatives and the licensees, which was central to the alleged breaches of fiduciary duty. The court concluded that the representative proceeding was an efficient and effective means of dealing with the claims and dismissed the application to de-class the proceeding.

The court ordered that the respondents' application under section 33N(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act be dismissed. Additionally, the court ordered that the parties' costs of and incidental to the application be their costs in the cause. The court noted that while the applicants had been successful, some of their propositions were overly ambitious or lacked clarity, and some arguments only succeeded due to late proposed amendments. The court also acknowledged that many of the respondents' points had provided useful considerations for the architecture and staging of the first stage trial.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The respondents’ application under s 33N(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) be dismissed.

2. The parties’ costs of and incidental to such application be their costs in the cause.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

In my view, no prejudice to the respondents can arise from the amendments. I will allow them subject to the applicants paying any costs thrown away.Conclusion I will dismiss the respondents’ s 33N application and make the appropriate orders to reflect these reasons. Finally, as the respondents have made some good points, I am favourably disposed to do two things. First, I will not make an order under s 33N(2) barring the respondents from making a further application without leave. They are free to make a further application if matters crystallise more in their favour than they have to date. Indeed, they could leverage off the applicants’ present argument of prematurity to justify my tolerance of such a freedom. Second, I will order that all parties’ costs concerning the present application be their costs in the cause. Notwithstanding that the applicants have been successful, some of their propositions whether put to me or earlier to the respondents were overly ambitious or at the least lacked clarity. Further, some of their arguments only succeeded by reason of their late proposed amendments to the consolidated proceeding. Further, many of the matters raised by the respondents have quite properly given me food for thought concerning the architecture and staging of the first stage trial. That is of advantage to all.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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