Sonenco (No 77) Pty Ltd v Silvia

No judgment structure available for this case.

Re: LESLIE PAUL JOHNSON
And: R. BEITSEEN; C. FRIZZIERO; G. GRUNDY; E. HILL; E. JENKINS;
B. JUDGES; J. MAVRODIS; C. MUSCAT; T. RUSSO; D. SHERRY;
S. SKIDMORE; T. SPITERI; A. SPEZZIGU AND J. STEVENS
Nos. VI 2, VI 6 of 1989
FED No. 89
Industrial Law

COURT

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
INDUSTRIAL DIVISION
Gray J.(1)

CATCHWORDS

Industrial Law - registered organisation - rules - performance and observance - office - casual vacancy - whether power to fill by appointment - whether person appointed eligible - whether doctrine of implied resignation by assuming incompatible office applied - whether appointment made - failure to follow correct meeting procedure - whether appointment rescinded by inconsistent resolution at later meeting - whether later meeting validly called - consent of officer procured by deception - all members present and waiving defect - motion ruled out of order - whether can be passed by meeting without resolution dissenting from chairman's ruling - effect of invalid closure of meeting and departure of members - whether revocation of appointment amounted to dismissal from office - whether intention to revoke appointment - whether discretion should be exercised.

Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 ss. 133, 171G

Industrial Relations Act 1988 s. 3(g), 196(c), 200, 255, 257

Industrial Relations (Consequential Provisions) Act 1988 s.5

HEARING

MELBOURNE

#DATE 21:3:1989

Counsel for the applicant: Mr. H. Borenstein
Instructing solicitors: J.N. Zigouras & Co.

Counsel for respondents Hill, Jenkins, Judges, Sherry,
Skidmore and Spiteri: Mr. P. Harris
Instructing solicitors: Maurice Blackburn & Co.

Counsel for the respondents Beitseen, Frizziero, Grundy,
Mavrodis, Muscat, Russo, Spezzigu and Stevens:

Mr. Kenzie Q.C. with Mr. Kimber

Instructing solicitors: Gill, Kane and Brophy.

ORDER

No. VI2 of 1989

THE COURT ORDERS THAT the respondents and each of them perform and observe the rules of The Confectionery Workers Union of Australia by:

1. treating the applicant as having been appointed validly to the office of assistant secretary of the Victorian Branch of The Confectionery Workers Union of Australia by resolution of the committee of management of the Victorian Branch of The Confectionery Workers Union of Australia on 8th November 1988;

2. treating as null and void and of no effect the following resolutions, purportedly passed by a meeting of the committee of management of the Victorian Branch of The Confectionery Workers Union of Australia on 25th November 1988:

(a) "That the Secretary be instructed to contact the Industrial Registrar to arrange an election of members by the Australian Electoral Office for the position of Assistant Secretary upon the expiration of the period of notice of Eileen Jenkins";

(b) "That the Secretary have power to call a special meeting of the Committee of Management at a time and place to be determined by the Secretary".

No. VI 6 of 1989

THE COURT ORDERS THAT the respondents and each of them perform and observe the rules of The Confectionery Workers Union of Australia by treating as null and void the purported resolution of the committee of management of the Victorian Branch of The Confectionery Workers Union of Australia on 5th July 1988:

"That Romina Beitseen be appointed as a member of the committee of management until such time of an election",

provided that no act of the committee of management of the Victorian Branch of The Confectionery Workers Union of Australia at any of its meetings up to and including its meeting on 25th November 1988 shall be treated as null and void merely by reason of the fact that Romina Beitseen attended, participated in and voted at any such meeting.

NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with by O.36 of the Federal Court Rules.

JUDGE1

The Confectionery Workers Union of Australia ("the Union") was an organization of employees, registered pursuant to the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 ("The C and A Act"). It is now an organisation, registered under the Industrial Relations Act 1988 ("the Industrial Relations Act"); see s.5 of the Industrial Relations (Consequential Provisions) Act 1988 ("the Consequential Provisions Act"). By virtue of rule 10 of the rules of the Union ("the federal rules"), branches of the Union may be formed in each State of Australia. There is in fact a branch of the Union in the State of Victoria ("the branch"). By rule 32A of the federal rules, branches have power to make rules for the proper conduct of their business. Such rules "shall not be inconsistant (sic) with the rules of" the Union. Rule 32B(a) of the federal rules also provides for the making of branch rules, with a proviso that branch rules "are not contrary to any of" the federal rules. There are in fact branch rules for the conduct of the branch ("the branch rules").

It is necessary to set out some provisions of the branch rules:

" 9 - OFFICERS AND COMMITTEE OF MANAGEMENT

(a) The Officers of the Branch shall consist of a President, 2 Vice-Presidents, Secretary, an Assistant Secretary and 2 Trustees.

(b) Committee of Management shall consist of all Officers as per Sub-Clause (a) together with eight other members. Eight present shall form a quorum.

(c) The Committee of Management (with the exception of the Secretary and Assistant Secretary) shall be elected biennially and shall hold office until their successors have been duly elected. The first election to be held in accordance with this Rule shall be the election for the Committee of Management in 1981. 10 - PLACE, TIME AND CONDITION OF MEETING The General Meeting of the Branch shall be held on the first Tuesday in the months of April, August, and December at the Trades Hall, Victoria Street, Melbourne for the transaction of business from 7.30 pm until 9.30 pm or at such other time and place as the Branch Committee of Management or a Special or General meeting of the Association may determine. The first meeting after December first of each year shall be called the Annual General Meeting.

......

11 - MEETING OF BRANCH MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE Meetings of the Branch Management Committee shall be on the first Tuesday of February, March, May, June, July, September, October, and the second Tuesday in November or when called by the Branch President and Branch Secretary.

12 - NOMINATION AND ELECTION OF OFFICERS

(a) The President, Vice-Presidents, the Secretary, the Assistant-Secretary, the Trustees and the Members of the Committee of Management shall be elected by secret postal ballot in the manner set out in these Rules.

All candidates for the aforementioned offices must be financial members of the Association for 12 months immediately preceding the date of their nomination.

(b) The Secretary and Assistant Secretary shall hold office for four years and all other officers and the Federal Delegates shall hold office for two years. ......

(e) If casual vacancies occur in any of the positions specified in sub-rule (a) of this Rule, the position shall be filled by the election procedures set out in these Rules. The Committee of Management shall determine the date for the closing of nominations and the date for the ballot provided, however, that if the unexpired portion of the term of office is twelve months or less, the Committee of Management shall have the power to appoint a member to fill the vacancy. Any person elected in accordance with this sub-rule to fill a casual vacancy shall hold office until the expiration of the term of the person who he or she replaces."

By rule 13, the president "shall preside at all meetings of the branch and preserve order so that the business may be conducted in due form and with propriety". The president "shall have a deliberative vote only and in the case of parity shall declare the question negatived." Rule 14 provides:

" 14 - VICE-PRESIDENT A Vice-President shall preside in the absence of the President, and in the event of the resignation or otherwise of the latter, shall fill the office of President during the remainder of the term of office, with the full powers of President. In the event of the President and Vice-Presidents being absent, the Management Committee shall elect one of their number to act as Chairman."

Rule 15 specifies the duties of the branch secretary, among which are a requirement that the branch secretary shall attend all meetings of the branch and all committee meetings and keep a correct record of those meetings. Rule 16 provides:

"16 - ASSISTANT SECRETARY The Assistant Secretary shall be under the control of the Secretary and shall perform such duties as the Secretary shall assign to him. The Secretary shall at all times report to any meeting the work performed by the said Assistant Secretary and he shall take Minutes of any General or Special Meeting as directed by the Secretary and shall render the Secretary all assistance in his power. The Secretary may assign organisational duties to the Assistant Secretary and such organisational duties shall include the work of endeavouring to build up the financial and numerical strength of the Branch. The Assistant Secretary shall be a full contributing member of the Branch."

Rule 17 deals with the duties of trustees; it provides that all orders for the withdrawal of money be signed by the secretary and president and at least one of the trustees. There is a special requirement that a vacancy in the office of one of the trustees shall be filled within four weeks after its occurrence. Further provisions of the branch rules are as follows:

"24 - SPECIAL MEETINGS

(a) A Special Meeting of the Branch may be held on any night that may be arranged by:

(1) Resolution at any ordinary meeting of the Branch, the date and hour for commencing business to be fixed when such resolution is before the chair; or

(2) The President and Secretary in cases of emergency, when the meeting shall be called by a notice placed upon the notice board in the factories 14 days prior to such meeting;

(3) The Secretary having received a request in writing from at least 100 members provided that the Secretary shall call the meeting within 21 days The business at such Special Meeting shall be confined to reading the notice convening the meeting and the consideration of the subject for which the meeting was called.

(b) Every special resolution passed at a Special Meeting shall be read and confirmed at the termination of such meeting and therefore will become binding upon all members of the Branch. 25 - RESOLUTIONS Any motion agreed to or negatived by the Branch cannot again be discussed unless sufficient notice of the proposed recommittal be given to the Branch through the Secretary, to enable a notification to be sent to each Shop Steward at each factory at least fourteen

(14) days prior to the date set down for the consideration of such motion. ......

29 - RESIGNATION OF OFFICERS All resignations of officers must be given in writing two week's notice to be given by all officers except the Secretary and Assistant Secretary, who shall give one month's notice. ......

31 - QUORUM

No business shall be transacted at a General Meeting unless sixteen members are present, or at an Executive Meeting unless eight members are present.

......

37 - REMOVAL FROM OFFICE

(a) The Committee of Management may remove from office or suspend from office any officer at a meeting of a Committee of Management to which the person concerned has been summoned in writing to show cause why he/she should not be removed, provided that such persons shall not be removed or suspended from office unless he/she has been found guilty of misappropriation of the funds of the Union, a substantial breach of these Rules or gross misbehaviour or gross neglect of duty or has ceased according to these Rules, to be eligible to hold office. The period of any such suspension referred to in this sub-rule shall not exceed 3 months.

(b) A person summoned to show cause pursuant to (a) of these Rules shall be given at least 14 days notice of the time and place of the Meeting of the Committee of Management to which he/she is summoned and the notice summoning the person shall also specify the ground or grounds upon which it is proposed to consider such removal. The Committee of Management may proceed to hear and determine the matter under this Rule notwithstanding the absence of the person summoned if due notice of the hearing is given in accordance with this Rule.

(c) The summons referred to in this Rule may be signed by the President or by either one of the Vice Presidents. ......

39 - VACANIES Any of the following acts or events shall cause an extraordinary vacancy in the position of an Officer or member of the Committee of Management:

(a) Death or lunacy.

(b) Resignation by notice, posted or delivered to the President or Secretary, and accepted by the Association."

Rule 44 contains rules of debate; amongst these are:

"The Chairman shall decide the point of order promptly without discussion. When a motion is moved and seconded; "That the Chairman's ruling be disagreed with", the Chairman shall forthwith leave the chair and the debate on the original motion then before the chair shall be suspended. Another Chairman shall then be appointed by the meeting, and the question, "That the Chairman's ruling be disagreed with" shall be discussed and decided, after which the former Chairman shall resume the chair and the debate on the original motion shall be proceeded with as if the same had not been suspended, having respect for the decision of the meeting on the point at issue.

......

An amendment being carried becomes the motion, and then is subject to amendment. ......"

Rule 44 also contains reference to the chairman having a deliberative vote only.

Rule 31 of the federal rules contains a provision that "The declaration of the election of Branch Officers shall take place at the annual meeting of the Branch".
The applicant is a member of the Union, attached to the branch. He claims to have been appointed by the committee of management of the branch, at a meeting on 8th November 1988, to fill a casual vacancy in the office of assistant secretary, pursuant to rule 12(e). The respondents are, or purport to be, the members of the committee of management other than the applicant. In matter No. VI 2 of 1989, the applicant seeks an order pursuant to s.141 of the C and A Act that the respondents perform and observe the rules of the Union, by giving effect to and abiding by what the applicant alleges is a resolution of the committee of management of the branch on 8th November 1988 that he be appointed to the position of assistant secretary, and by treating as null and void a subsequent purported meeting of the committee of management of the branch held on 25th November 1988 and any resolution passed at that meeting. In matter No. VI 6 of 1989, the applicant seeks an order that the respondents perform and observe the rules of the Union, by treating as null and void the purported appointment in or about June or July 1988 of the respondent Romina Beitseen by the committee of management of the branch as a member of the committee of management of the branch. Although each application was made under s.141 of the C and A Act, s.52(1) of the Consequential Provisions Act now requires that it be dealt with as if it had been made under s.209 of the Industrial Relations Act.
Mr. Borenstein of counsel appeared for the applicant. The respondents were represented in two groups. Six of them, namely the respondents Hill, Jenkins, Judges, Sherry, Skidmore and Spiteri were represented by Mr. Harris of counsel; they supported the applicant's claims. The remaining eight, namely the respondents Beitseen, Frizziero, Grundy, Mavrodis, Muscat, Russo, Spezzigu and Stevens appeared by Mr. Kenzie Q.C. and Mr. Kimber of counsel to oppose the applications. The two proceedings were heard together. In order to understand the nature of the applicant's claims, it is necessary to set out the facts in some detail.
In accordance with the branch rules, in 1985, the respondent Eileen Jenkins was elected as assistant secretary of the branch. It is common ground that her term of office was four years, by virtue of rule 12(b) of the branch rules, and that it dated from the annual general meeting of the branch, on the first Tuesday in December 1985, by virtue of rule 10 of the branch rules and rule 31 of the federal rules. At the time of the election, the office of assistant secretary was a full time salaried position. In 1986, Ms. Jenkins suffered a decline in her health, to the extent that she did not feel able to continue on a full time basis. By decision of the committee of management of the branch, she ceased to receive a salary, and ceased to be required to perform duties on a full time basis. She continued to hold the office of assistant secretary.
Also in 1985, the respondent Carlo Frizziero was elected to the office of branch secretary. Regular elections for the remaining offices and for members of the committee of management were held in 1987, in accordance with the branch rules. Among those elected as a member of the committee of management was one Morgan Davis. At some time during 1988, Morgan Davis resigned as a member of the committee of management. On 5th July 1988, at a meeting of the committee of management, a resolution was passed, "That Romina Beitseen be appointed as a member of the committee of management until such time of an election." Thereafter, Ms. Beitseen attended meetings of the committee of management, and purported to act as a member of it.

On 5th November 1988, Ms. Jenkins wrote a letter of resignation from her office of assistant secretary. The letter was addressed "to the President and/or Secretary" of the branch. In it, Ms. Jenkins said that she wished her resignation to take effect one month from the notification of the November 1988 committee of management meeting. The letter was posted to the branch office on Saturday 5th November 1988. It arrived in the office on Monday 7th November, but was not brought to the notice of the branch secretary until the following day. This was because a person employed in the office saw the letter first, and telephoned Ms. Jenkins to ask her to withdraw the letter. The letter was brought to the attention of the branch secretary at about 1.00 p.m. on Tuesday 8th November. In accordance with rule 11 of the branch rules, the ordinary meeting of the committee of management was to take place that evening. Reminder notices had been sent to all members of the committee of management. It was not usual to send an agenda, and none was sent at that time.
The ordinary meeting of the committee of management took place that evening. Four of those who were entitled to be there were absent, namely the respondents Grundy, Muscat, Skidmore and Spezzigu. In addition to the committee of management, there were in attendance two full time employees of the branch, Bronwyn Halfpenny and Marissa D'Amicis. The last-mentioned person took notes for the purpose of preparing the minutes.
Early in the meeting, Mr. Frizziero gave a secretary's report. The first item in this report was the resignation of Ms. Jenkins from the position of assistant secretary. Mr. Frizziero indicated that this did or would leave a vacancy in that office. He proposed three alternatives for dealing with the vacancy. These were to find someone to fill the position of assistant secretary on an honorary basis, to leave the position vacant, or to ask the Industrial Registrar for the conduct of an election to fill the vacancy. It should be noted that Mr. Frizziero did not propose that a full time assistant secretary be appointed. After some further discussion, in which tributes were paid to Ms. Jenkins for her work as assistant secretary, and an announcement was made of her pending installation as an honorary member of the Union, Mr. Frizziero moved "that E. Jenkins's resignation from the position of assistant secretary be accepted." This motion was seconded by the respondent Elsie Hill, a vice-president of the branch, and was carried. It is common ground that the resignation of Ms. Jenkins from the office of assistant secretary was thereby perfected under rules 29 and 39(b) of the branch rules, and that her resignation would become effective on 8th December 1988. There is also no dispute that, once the resignation took effect on 8th December, the unexpired portion of Ms. Jenkins's term of office would be less than twelve months. It is accepted by all parties to the proceedings that rule 12(e) of the branch rules gave to the committee of management power to appoint a member to fill the vacancy. In dispute are questions whether the committee of management was entitled to make an appointment on 8th November 1988, whether it did in fact make an appointment of the applicant, whether the applicant was eligible to be appointed, and whether any appointment, if made, was revoked by a subsequent meeting of the committee of management.
It is by no means easy to discern what actually happened following the acceptance of Ms. Jenkins's notice of resignation by the meeting of 8th November. The applicant gave evidence, and Ms. Jenkins and the respondent Barbara Judges, the branch president, gave evidence on his behalf. Their accounts of the meeting were substantially similar. They conflict at some points with the versions of Ms. D'Amicis, given in her contemporaneous notes, her later hand-written draft of the minutes, and her final typewritten version of the minutes. Ms. D'Amicis was not called to give evidence. The Court was informed that she was ill. Mr. Frizziero in his evidence adopted the version of the minutes, but departed from it in some important respects. His version was also supported by Ms. Beitseen. As a result of the conflict of evidence, submissions were made about the credit of witnesses, and it is important that some comment should be made on that issue.
At the conclusion of the evidence, I am left with a clear impression that, prior to the events of 8th November, the committee of management of the branch was not divided into factions or other camps. Following upon the events of November 1988, a division has occurred between the applicant and his supporters, and Mr. Frizziero and his supporters. Such a division is a matter to be regretted deeply. The conduct of full scale litigation, in which each side necessarily accuses the other of lying, can only exacerbate the division which has occurred. It is unlikely that the previous harmony will be regained. From the point of view of the trial of these proceedings, the atmosphere has become one in which people have felt compelled to defend particular positions. The result is that each side has been able to point to motives of the other side for giving false evidence, and to detail inconsistencies in the evidence given by various witnesses, and between their evidence and other events, as indicating such falsity. Mr. Kenzie submitted that I should not accept the evidence of Mr. Johnson and his witnesses. He emphasised inconsistencies between Mr. Johnson's evidence in Court and his submission to the Industrial Registrar, made earlier, and his reluctance to admit the form that submission took. He pointed to the fact that Ms. Jenkins did not tell the truth about the fate of some notes which she took at a meeting of the committee of management on 25th November 1988, for the purpose of taking minutes. He also characterised Ms. Judges as a conspirator, misleading Mr. Frizziero into thinking that his plan had her support, and as determined to put the applicant into office as assistant secretary. That these inconsistencies and events existed is true, but they do not establish conclusively that the whole of the evidence of Mr. Johnson, Ms. Jenkins and Ms. Judges should be rejected. Rather, they show a keenness by these persons to defend a particular position and to appear to have acted consistently. That sort of keenness is well able to produce witnesses whose recollections are moulded unconsciously to a shape which is consistent with their positions, or to a deliberate attempt to suppress evidence about particular aspects, whilst telling the truth about others.
On the other hand, it is plain that Mr. Frizziero has been the most active person in seeking to prevent any appointment of Mr. Johnson from taking effect. Mr. Frizziero's own evidence is that he was dissatisfied with the outcome of the meeting on 8th November 1988, and immediately began to think of irregularities which had occurred. He canvassed support amongst the committee of management members, particularly those who had not attended the meeting of 8th November. As will be seen, he announced that he would be unable to work with Mr. Johnson, and began alleging irregularities in vague terms, many of which have never been particularised or substantiated as part of these proceedings. He has adopted a position that no valid appointment of Mr. Johnson ever took place, a position in which he has exhibited a profound interest, and has done a great deal to try to ensure that all events are consistent with that position. Ms. Beitseen is clearly a protege of Mr. Frizziero's. She was working in a confectionery factory at the time of her purported appointment as a member of the committee of management; she has since undertaken a secretarial job in the office of the branch.
The final resolution of conflicts of evidence in a case such as this is difficult. Not the least difficulty has been the fact that the disputed events occurred at meetings at which a number of other people were present, but those other people have not been called to give evidence of their versions of the events. It is obvious that each side could have called more witnesses to support its version, if indeed the evidence of those witnesses would have done so. Naturally, the cost of proceedings would be a powerful disincentive to the calling of such evidence. The absence of evidence does make the ascertainment of the truth more difficult. In all of the circumstances, as will be seen, in a number of areas where conflicts have occurred, I prefer the evidence of Mr. Johnson, Ms. Jenkins and Ms. Judges. Their evidence seems to me to accord with the probabilities, and to have more of a ring of truth than that of Mr. Frizziero and Ms. Beitseen.
Having made these comments about credit, I now return to the events at the meeting of 8th November 1988. After the motion to accept Ms. Jenkins's resignation was passed, the secretary informed the meeting that he had had discussions with both Ms. Judges and the respondent John Stevens. He claimed that he had offered Ms. Judges the position of assistant secretary on a non-working basis. Ms. Judges challenged this assertion, and told the meeting, as was the fact, that Mr. Frizziero had offered the position on a full time basis. In any event, she had declined to accept the position, and this was reported to the meeting. Mr. Frizziero then said he had approached Mr. Stevens, who was willing to accept the position on an honorary basis until the following year, when the committee of management could assess the financial situation. At some stage, Mr. Frizziero moved that Mr. Stevens fill the position of assistant secretary on an honorary basis. In the course of discussion, he drew attention to a possible reduction in membership of the branch arising from the impending closure of a confectionery factory. In the course of further discussion, the applicant raised the fact that Ms. D'Amicis had resigned her full time job, and suggested that funds were now available for a wage for the assistant secretary. The secretary said that he had only received Ms. D'Amicis's resignation that evening, and had had no time to think about it. At some stage during the discussion, the applicant moved for the opening of nominations for a full time position of assistant secretary. Further discussion took place, involving the state of the branch's finances and the advisibility of what seemed to have become two competing proposals for the filling of the position of assistant secretary. After this discussion, the minutes of the meeting record that the applicant's motion was moved and was seconded by the respondent Debra Sherry. This motion was in the form:

"That nomination now be opened and voted for the position of full time Assistant Secretary, including J. Stevens as per Carl's nomination."

The minutes also record at this point that it was moved by Mr. Frizziero and seconded by Ms. Beitseen:

"That John Stevens be appointed on honorary basis as Assistant Secretary until such time that the Committee of Management determine during the year 1989 after assessing its financial situation whether the branch can afford a working full time Assistant Secretary."

On the evidence, I am satisfied that these motions were not moved at that point of time. Rather, they had been moved and seconded earlier, and the wording of each motion was clarified at a point immediately before a vote was taken.

In her contemporaneous notes, Ms. D'Amicis described the applicant's motion as an amendment, inserted the word "Amendment" as a heading, before recording the words of the applicant's motion, and then described the vote as being "Amendment Voting". The result of her having done this was that the references to amendment recurred in her handwritten version of the minutes and in the typed version. The words "Voting on Amendment" appear in the minutes immediately before a record of the numbers of votes cast. Mr. Frizziero then took up the proposition that the applicant's motion was an amendment, as the foundation for an argument that the business of the meeting had not been handled regularly. The applicant, in his submission to the Industrial Registrar at a later date, described his motion as an amendment, no doubt because he felt constrained to try to fit within the official description of the meeting in the minutes as far as possible. I accept his evidence, and that of Ms. Jenkins and Ms. Judges, that the applicant's motion was not described as an amendment during the course of the meeting.
A vote was then taken. Mr. Frizziero's evidence was that a vote was taken on the applicant's motion and his own motion simultaneously, with the chairman asking for votes in favour of one and then votes in favour of the other, and not asking for negative votes. Again, I reject this evidence in favour of the account given by the applicant, Ms. Jenkins and Ms. Judges. That account is that a vote was taken on the applicant's motion. Ms. Judges as chairman called for votes in favour. Four persons raised their hands. She then called for votes against and another four persons raised their hands. This meant that the voting was equal, and that only eight of the eleven persons at the meeting eligible to vote had done so.
There is conflict as to what occurred next. The applicant, Ms. Jenkins and Ms. Judges all gave evidence that Mr. Frizziero turned to Ms. Judges and said, "It's up to you, Babs." Mr. Frizziero's evidence was that the applicant said to Ms. Judges, "What about your casting vote?" Again, I find the account given by the applicant and his witnesses more credible than Mr. Frizziero's account. I do not accept that the words "casting vote" were used in the course of the meeting. After being prompted by the secretary, Ms. Judges raised her hand and said, "I vote in favour of Les's motion."
The meeting then proceeded on the assumption that the applicant's motion had been carried. Nominations were received. The applicant was nominated by the respondents Tony Spiteri and Elsie Hill and accepted nomination. Mr. Stevens was nominated by Mr. Frizziero and Ms. Beitseen and accepted. The minutes then record the applicant as moving and Ms. Sherry as seconding a motion that a secret ballot be held with "L" standing for the applicant and "J" standing for John Stevens, and that this motion was carried. Whether or not the process was done as formally as that, it was agreed that such a secret ballot should be held and that it should be conducted in that manner. Mr. Frizziero went and obtained several sheets of blank A4 paper, which he tore in half. He handed to each member of the committee of management present half a sheet of paper and a pen if necessary. The ballot papers were completed and passed to Ms. Judges. Mr. Frizziero sat immediately on her right and she counted them in front of her but slightly to the right, in a position in which Mr. Frizziero could see what was written on each piece of paper. She counted them first by unfolding them, looking at them and placing them in two separate piles, one for those bearing the letter "L" and one for those "J". When she had completed this task, Mr. Frizziero commented that it was obvious that the applicant had won. The applicant asked for a formal count and Ms. Judges counted the papers in each pile. There were seven in the pile marked "L" and four in the pile marked "J". Ms. Judges then declared the result of the ballot seven to four in favour of the applicant. In the minutes, the result is recorded as having been seven votes for the applicant and five for Mr. Stevens. This is the foundation for one of the irregularities urged by the respondents for whom Mr. Kenzie appeared. I am satisfied that it is an error in the minutes, and that Ms. Judges at no stage declared the result as seven votes to five. It would have been extraordinary if she had done so and no-one had complained that there was one more vote than the number eligible to vote who were present.
When the result of the ballot was announced, Mr. Frizziero stood up, walked to where the applicant was sitting, shook his hand and congratulated him. Mr. Stevens did likewise. A motion in the following form was then moved by Ms. Jenkins and seconded by Ms. Hill:

"That Les Johnson takes up the full time position of Assistant Secretary when the date of Eileen Jenkins resignation falls due."

This motion was carried without dissent.

Soon after that motion was carried, Mr. Frizziero informed the meeting that one Shirley Whidbourne was in attendance, and reminded the committee of previous discussions about the replacement of members of the committee of management. It appears that some discussions had taken place at an earlier date, concerning the number of members of the committee of management who were no longer employed in the industry in which the Union was involved. The committee of management had a general agreement that, when suitable persons employed in the industry could be found, who were willing to become members of the committee of management, those who were no longer in the industry would resign and their places would be taken by those persons. Mr. Frizziero then moved:

"That Shirley Widbourne (sic.) was to replace Andrea Spezzigu, but now the vice-president position available, Shirley Whidbourne can replace Les Johnson's position as vice-president."

This was seconded by the respondent Jim Mavrodis and was carried.

The meeting then proceeded to other business. This other business included a discussion about fringe benefits tax in respect of expenses incurred by full time employees of the branch. A motion was moved that expenses incurred by Mr. Frizziero, Ms. Halfpenny and the applicant be incorporated into wages. This was seconded and carried.
After the meeting ended, Mr. Frizziero reflected upon what had occurred. There is no doubt that he thought that the committee of management had done the wrong thing in rejecting his advice that the position of assistant secretary should continue to be honorary, at least until the committee of management could take stock of the branch's financial situation in 1989. According to Mr. Frizziero's evidence, he reviewed the events of the meeting in his mind, and began to question the propriety of some of those events. In the following day or two, he contacted two of the members of the committee of management who had been absent from the meeting of 8th November, and sought and obtained their support for his opposition to the appointment of the applicant. When the applicant came to the office of the branch, and asked to be permitted to work with Ms. D'Amicis, to learn her job as the person responsible for Workcare claims on behalf of members, Mr. Frizziero refused this request. Initially, he allowed the applicant to have access to files of industrial agreements to which the Union was party, but subsequently he reversed this decision and refused to allow any more such inspections. He told the applicant that he could not work with him, and took steps to prevent the applicant gaining access to the branch office.
On 10th November 1988, Mr. Frizziero sent a letter to Ms. Judges (wrongly dated 10th October 1988), in which he alleged non-observance of a number of the branch rules, and the creation of divisions within the branch. Subsequently, at Mr. Frizziero's invitation, the applicant, Ms. Judges, and Ms. Jenkins attended a meeting at which Mr. Frizziero was present. Also present was Mr. David Grove, an industrial officer from another trade union, who acted as industrial officer for the Union on occasions, and held a position of high respect within the branch. According to Mr. Frizziero, the purpose of this meeting was to see if some agreement could be reached. According to the applicant, Ms. Judges and Ms. Jenkins, much of the meeting was devoted to personal abuse by Mr. Frizziero of the applicant and other persons. Mr. Frizziero seems to have attempted to persuade the others present that the applicant did not have the support of a majority of the committee of management. He did this by drawing up two "teams" on a blackboard. He suggested that some of the members of the committee of management would not have known what they were voting for.

Another of Mr. Frizziero's acts was to telephone Ms. Judges and to ask for her consent, presumably pursuant to rule 11 of the branch rules, for the calling of a special meeting of the committee of management. Again, there is substantial conflict on the evidence as to what took place in this conversation. I am satisfied that Ms. Judges was unwilling to agree to a special meeting if it was to be called to question the appointment of the applicant as assistant secretary. She received an assurance from Mr. Frizziero that the meeting was intended to hear a report on the position of assistant secretary, and that the position may be discussed as a result of that. Ms. Judges thought about the request, and in a subsequent conversation told Mr. Frizziero that she would consent to calling a meeting if the validity of the appointment would not be challenged at it.
On 23rd November, Mr. Frizziero sent a telegram to each of the members of the committee of management in the following form:

"I HAVE CONSULTED WITH THE BRANCH PRESIDENT AND WE HAVE AGREED THAT A SPECIAL MEETING OF THE BRANCH C.O.M. SHALL BE CALLED. THE BUSINESS OF THE MEETING SHALL BE A REPORT FROM THE BRANCH SECRETARY RE THE POSITION OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY AND BUSINESS ARISING THEREFROM.

THE MEETING WILL BE HELD AT 10AM FRIDAY 25 NOVEMBER AT ROOM F 54 VICTORIA STREET CARLTON SOUTH.

CARLO FRIZZIERO

SECRETARY."

On 24th November, he telephoned all of the members of the committee of management to ensure that they knew about the special meeting.

On 25th November, all fifteen members of the committee of management attended at the appointed place at the appointed time. Mr. Frizziero handed out folders containing copies of the agenda for the meeting, the telegram containing the notice of meeting, the letter which he had sent to Ms. Judges on 10th November 1988, the branch rules and the minutes of the meeting held on 8th November 1988. Ms. Jenkins attempted to seize the initiative by moving that the last committee of management meeting was valid. This was seconded by Ms. Sherry. Mr. Frizziero objected that the motion was premature and stated that he wished to give his report. Ms. Judges stated that the motion was valid and that she intended to put it to a vote. After some discussion, the mover and seconder of the motion purported to withdraw it, and the chairman permitted this. Mr. Frizziero then began delivering a report. This was interrupted by interjections and discussion, with various persons contributing views as to what had taken place at the meeting on 8th November. On two separate occasions, Ms. Judges ruled the secretary out of order, but after the first of these rulings she allowed him to continue with his report. After about an hour and a half, Ms. Hill stated that she had other commitments and asked to be excused. Two motions were then moved and seconded. The first was moved by Ms. Jenkins and seconded by Mr. Spiteri and was in the following terms:

"That this Committee of Management meeting supports and endorses the spirit and the intention of the decision in regards the position of fulltime Assistant Secretary made at the Committee of Management meeting held on 8th November 1988, those intentions being that Les Johnson be installed as Assistant Secretary commencing the 8th December 1988 and he remain in that position until the expiration of that term at which time the position should become available for election.

(sic.) At the same time as the forthcoming committee of management election by the members through the Australian Electoral Office."

The second motion was moved by the applicant and seconded by the respondent Shirley Skidmore. It was as follows:

"That following "forthcoming committee of management elections" instructs Les Johnson to give a commitment in writing that he Les Johnson will work in harmony with Carlo Frizziero and give a commitment on the provision that Carlo Frizziero abides by his commitment as per instruction following all things being equal Les Johnson fails to adequately perform his duty as Assistant Secretary that he, Les Johnson will stand aside and not contest the election for the position of Assistant Secretary at the end of

1989. The Branch Committee of Management further instructs that Carlo Frizziero accepts the appointment of Les Johnson to the position of Assistant Secretary as per the decision of the Committee of Management meeting of the 8th November 1988 and that he Carlo Frizziero gives the commitment in writing that he will work in harmony, allow fair and free opportunity to perform the normal duty of Assistant Secretary."

Mr. Frizziero requested that both of these resolutions be photocopied so that each member of the committee of management would have copies of them. He undertook the copying, and also distributed copies of a motion which he intended to move. That motion was in this form:

"That the Secretary be instructed to contact the Industrial Registrar to arrange an election of members by the Australian Electoral Office for the position of Assistant Secretary upon the expiration of the period of notice of E. Jenkins."

It was seconded by the respondent George Grundy. Ms. Judges ruled that this motion was out of order and stated that a vote would not be taken on it. Mr. Frizziero said that his motion was moved and seconded and that he did not wish to withdraw it. At this point, Ms. Hill left the meeting.

A vote was then taken on the second of the motions, that moved by the applicant and seconded by Ms. Skidmore. The vote was six in favour and eight against, and the motion was declared lost. A vote then took place on the first resolution, namely that moved by Ms. Jenkins and seconded by Mr. Spiteri. On that motion, six voted in favour and seven were counted as voting against. Mr. Mavrodis stated that he had voted against the motion but had not been counted. The motion was declared lost. Mr. Frizziero then asked if his motion could be put to a vote. Ms. Judges refused to do this. The applicant then read to the meeting that part of rule 24 of the branch rules which requires that a special meeting of the branch be called by notice placed on the notice board in the factories fourteen days prior to the meeting. He raised the point of order as to the manner of calling the meeting. Mr. Frizziero objected that the provisions of rule 24 dealt with general meetings, and not with meetings of the committee of management.
There is a dispute as to what then occurred. The applicant's case is that Ms. Judges ruled on the applicant's point of order that the meeting was not properly called, and declared it closed. Mr. Frizziero's evidence was that Ms. Judges, the applicant, Ms. Jenkins, Ms. Sherry, Ms. Skidmore and Mr. Spiteri simply walked out of the meeting. Again, on this matter, I accept the evidence of the applicant and Ms. Jenkins and Ms. Judges that the applicant raised a point of order, Ms. Judges ruled on it and declared the meeting closed. The six persons named then left the room.
There remained eight members of the committee. They purported to continue the meeting. Both vice-presidents having left, they purported to elect Mr. Grundy to chair the meeting. Mr. Grundy purported to act as chairman. There was a resolution to appoint Ms. Beitseen as minutes secretary. Mr. Frizziero then resumed his report about the events of the previous meeting. He made a number of allegations of irregularities in the previous meeting of the committee of management. Discussion followed, and a motion was moved by the respondent Charlie Muscat and seconded by Mr. Stevens in the following terms:

"That the Secretary be instructed to contact the Industrial Registrar to arrange an election of members by the Australian Electoral Office for the position of Assistant Secretary upon the expiration of the period of notice of Eileen Jenkins."

This motion was put and declared carried unanimously. Mr. Muscat then moved and Mr. Mavrodis seconded:

"That the Secretary have power to call a special meeting of the Committee of Management at a time and place to be determined by the Secretary."

This motion was also declared carried unanimously. The chairman then read all the resolutions carried at the meeting and a resolution that they be confirmed was carried.

By letter dated 28th November 1988, Mr. Frizziero conveyed to the Industrial Registrar the request to conduct an election for the position of assistant secretary. The applicant made a written submission to the Industrial Registrar, who sought further information from Mr. Frizziero. This information was supplied by a letter from the solicitors for the branch dated 20th December 1988. On 5th January 1989, the Deputy Industrial Registrar decided not to accede to the request to conduct an election, on the ground that no vacancy existed in the office of assistant secretary of the branch. On 23rd January 1988, Mr. Stevens applied for leave to appeal from that decision.
In the meantime, Mr. Johnson had made attempts to attend at the branch office and to take up the duties of assistant secretary. He had been excluded from the office and from duties, by the direction of Mr. Frizziero.
On 7th February 1989, the next regular meeting of the committee of management occurred. At the meeting, the committee of management resolved:

"The Committee of Management being aware that there is a legal challenge to the appointment of Romina Beitseen on the 5th July 1988 as a member of the Committee of Management, and with a view to facilitating the effective functioning of the branch and of this Committee of Management, hereby resolves that, inasfar as it might be necessary to ensure of the validity of Romina Beitseen appointment to and membership of this committee, Romina Beitseen is hereby appointed as a member of the Committee of Management until November 1989, that is for the remainder of term of the office of Morgan Davis."

Central to the issues in both proceedings is the nature and extent of the power of the committee of management to fill casual vacancies by appointment, pursuant to rule 12(e) of the branch rules. In the first place, the question arises whether the committee of management had power to appoint Ms. Beitseen to the position formerly occupied by Mr. Davis. In the end, none of the respondents sought to uphold the validity of Ms. Beitseen's original appointment. It is plain that, at the time when she was appointed, the unexpired portion of the term of Mr. Davis's office was more than twelve months. Neither rule 12(e), nor any other rule, gives power to the committee of management to fill a casual vacancy by appointment pending an election. It follows that no basis existed for the appointment.
Mr. Kenzie did submit that, in the exercise of its discretion, the Court should refuse to make an order in matter No. VI 6 of 1989. The basis of this submission was the resolution of 7th February 1989, under which Ms. Beitseen was purportedly appointed. In my view, however, that resolution was also invalid. Rule 12(e) contains a mandatory provision, requiring that casual vacancies "shall be filled" by election. The proviso enabling appointment by the committee of management operates only if the unexpired portion of the term of office is twelve months or less. The question whether the unexpired portion of a term of office is twelve months or less must be determined at the time when a casual vacancy arises. It is not open to the committee of management, where the unexpired portion of the term of office exceeds twelve months, to wait until some time when the remainder of the unexpired portion of the term of office is twelve months or less, and then to make an appointment. The mandatory requirement to fill a casual vacancy by election operates at the moment the casual vacancy comes into existence, and does not cease to operate when so much of the unexpired portion of the term has run as to reduce the balance to twelve months or less. The casual vacancy created by Mr. Davis has been, and remains, a vacancy which must be filled by election. Accordingly, an order should be made in matter No. VI 6 of 1989, substantially in the form in which it is sought, but making it clear, for reasons which will appear from my examination of the effect of s.255 of the Industrial Relations Act, that no past act of the committee of management is liable to be overturned on the basis that Ms. Beitseen was purporting to act as a member of it.
Section 255 of the Industrial Relations Act provides, so far as is relevant, as follows:

"255 (1) Subject to this section and section 257, all acts done in good faith by a collective body of an organisation or branch of an organisation, or by persons purporting to act as such a collective body, are valid in spite of any invalidity that may later be discovered in:

(a) the election or appointment of the collective body, any member of the collective body or the persons or any of the persons purporting to act as the collective body; or ......

(3) (b) a person shall not be treated as purporting to act as a member of a collective body of a branch of an organisation or as the holder of an office or position in the branch unless the person has, in good faith, purported to be, and has been treated by officers or members of the branch as being, such a member or the holder of the office or position. ......

(4) (a) an act is to be treated as done in good faith until the contrary is proved;

(b) a person who has purported to be a member of a collective body of an organisation or branch is to be treated as having done so in good faith until the contrary is proved;

(c) knowledge of facts from which an invalidity arises is not of itself to be treated as knowledge that the invalidity exists;

......

(d) an invalidity in: ......

(ii) the election or appointment of the persons or any of the persons purporting to act as a collective body of a branch; ......

shall not be treated as discovered before the earliest time proved to be a time when the existence of the invalidity was known to a majority of the members of the committee of management of the branch or to a majority of the persons purporting to act as the committee of management; ......

(5) This section applies:

(a) to an act whenever done (including an act done before the commencement of this section); ......".

Similar provisions to these were found formerly in s.171B of the C and A Act.

Ms. Beitseen purported to act as a member of the committee of management of the branch, which is a collective body of the branch for the purposes of s.255. There was no evidence that she did so otherwise than in good faith. She was treated by the other members of the committee of management as being a member of it, and there is no evidence that they acted otherwise than in good faith in so doing. Although they might be said to have known the facts giving rise to the invalidity of her appointment on 5th July 1988, the members of the committee of management were not aware that any invalidity existed, at least until the commencement of the proceeding in matter No. VI 6 of 1989. Accordingly, all of the necessary elements of s.255 of the Industrial Relations Act existed with respect to Ms. Beitseen's membership of the committee of management. In his closing address, Mr. Borenstein attempted to assert that a case could be made out under s.171G of the C and A Act, that substantial injustice might be done by the application of the validating provision. Provisions similar to s.171G are now found in s.257 of the Industrial Relations Act. They require a finding of substantial injustice "on an application for an order under this section". No such application has ever been made to the Court, and counsel's final address on behalf of the applicant, coming after Mr. Kenzie's final address on behalf of the respondents for whom he acted, was not an appropriate time to attempt to make it. Section 255 therefore applies to validate anything that the committee of management did on 8th November and 25th November 1988, to the extent to which there might have been invalidities resulting from Ms. Beitseen's presence and the exercise of her vote.
The second point at which the construction of rule 12(e) of the branch rules becomes relevant is with respect to the proceedings of the meeting of the committee of management on 8th November 1988. Mr. Kenzie's submission was that at that stage the committee of management had no power to appoint anyone to fill the position of assistant secretary. He drew attention to the opening words of rule 12(e), namely "If casual vacancies occur...". The submission was that the occurrence of a casual vacancy in a position was a condition precedent to the exercise by the committee of management of any power to appoint, and that no vacancy could occur in any position until the expiration of the period of notice required by rule 29. In the case of the assistant secretary, that period of notice was one month.
There can be no doubt that no vacancy occurred in the position of assistant secretary until 8th December. Under rule 29(b) of the branch rules, resignation by notice, posted or delivered to the president or secretary and accepted by the association causes an extraordinary vacancy. Under rule 29, the period of notice required in the case of the assistant secretary's position is one month. Ms. Jenkins's notice was received by the secretary on 8th November, and accepted by the committee of management on the same day. The resultant vacancy arose at the expiration of the notice, on 8th December. So much is not disputed between the parties to these proceedings.
The fact that the vacancy did not arise until the expiration of the period of notice does not necessitate the construction put on rule 12(e) by Mr. Kenzie. At least once the committee of management had accepted Ms. Jenkins's notice, that notice could not be revoked by her. Compare Birrell v. Australian National Airlines Commission (1984) 5 FCR 447, especially at pp 457-459. Reading rule 12(e), there is nothing to suggest that the actual occurrence of a casual vacancy is a condition precedent in a temporal sense to the power of the committee of management to appoint a person to fill it. The power of appointment is dependent upon the unexpired portion of the term of office being twelve months or less. Provided that condition is met, there is no barrier to the committee of management acting to fill the casual vacancy prior to its commencement. Mr. Kenzie conceded that it is open to the committee of management to take steps towards the conduct of an election before the period of notice of a retiring officer expires. He argued that, where appointment is possible, the committee of management may select a person provisionally to take up the vacancy, but the actual appointment must be made after the casual vacancy has begun. Such a construction of rule 12(e) would be inconvenient; it might require the holding of a special meeting of the committee of management. A person selected provisionally might resign from another job, and prepare to take up office, only to be told that the committee of management has changed its mind and appointed someone else. A rule might require such inconvenience, but rule 12(e) should not be construed so as to produce inconvenience, unless the wording is clear. The wording is not so clear as to require the construction for which Mr. Kenzie contends. The scheme of the rules is to require one month's notice of resignation from the secretary and assistant secretary of the branch. Since rules 10 and 11 require either a general meeting or a meeting of the committee of management in every month except January, one month's notice gives time for a casual vacancy to be filled in advance, so that the new holder may take up the position immediately upon the expiration of the notice of the officer resigning.

A construction which enables the filling of a casual vacancy in anticipation does not cause rule 12(e) to run foul of s.200 of the Industrial Relations Act. That section prohibits the rules of a registered organisation from permitting the filling of a casual vacancy by appointment where the balance of the term of office is less than twelve months. The mere fact that an appointment might be made outside the twelve month period, by virtue of rule 12(e), does not cause that rule to offend. Again, the crucial requirement of the section is a requirement as to the length of the casual vacancy, and not as to the date of appointment.
Mr. Kenzie argued that, unless rule 12(e) were construed so as to require an appointment to be made after the casual vacancy had actually begun, it would permit the making of an appointment at any time before the casual vacancy. An example was given of a person elected to hold office for a four year term who, immediately upon election, announces an intention to resign at the end of three years. The committee of management could appoint someone immediately to fill the casual vacancy, and this appointment would be valid. I see no serious difficulty arising from a construction of rule 12(e) which would permit such an appointment. If a committee of management were prepared to resolve in that manner, there is no difficulty. There may even be advantage in a prospective appointee knowing that he or she would take up an appointment at a particular time, and being able to be groomed for office. In my view, rule 12(e) gave to the committee of management power to appoint a replacement for Ms. Jenkins at its meeting on 8th November 1988.
Mr. Kenzie's second argument was that the applicant was not eligible to fill any vacancy, either on 8th November, or on 8th December. As at 8th November, the applicant held office as a vice-president of the branch. Mr. Kenzie's argument was that the rules contained an implication that the committee of management should consist of fifteen persons, i.e. that one person should not hold more than two of the positions on that committee. He relied upon the provisions of rule 19(a) and (b), and the separate duties of the various officers found in rules 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17. These rules do contain very clear indications that each of the offices is to be held by a separate person, and no argument to the contrary was put. Mr. Kenzie relied on Mellor v. Horn (Federal Court of Australia, Gray J., 24th June 1988, unreported), especially at pp 8 to 10; in that case, the implication was drawn from the rules of the organization concerned that no one person could hold more than one position on the committee of management of a branch.
The next step in the argument was by reference to rule 29. Mr. Kenzie drew attention to the mandatory terms of that rule, and to authorities which establish that a purported resignation which does not comply with such requirements is ineffective. See Hassett v. Harding (1976) 27 FLR 457, especially at pp 460-461. The contention was that the applicant could not become eligible to be appointed to the office of assistant secretary unless and until he had resigned from the office of vice-president, giving two weeks notice. He never did resign, so never became eligible to be appointed to the casual vacancy.
One way in which questions such as this have been resolved has been by application of the doctrine of incompatible offices. Under this doctrine, where the rules of an organization do not permit a person to hold more than one office, assumption of a second office will vacate the first by implied resignation. This doctrine was applied in Egan v. Maher (No. 2) (1978) 35 FLR 252, was referred to in Sherrif v. Townsend (1980) 48 FLR 20, at p 54 in the judgment of Northrop J., and was applied in Mellor v. Horn (above), at pp 7-11. In each of those cases, it appears that there was no express provision in the rules of the organization concerned which could be construed as excluding the operation of the doctrine of incompatible offices. Mr. Kenzie argued that the mandatory provisions of rule 29 of the branch rules exclude the doctrine in the present case. He referred to the proposition in the passage cited earlier from Hasset v. Harding, to the effect that a provision prescribing the giving of twenty-eight days' notice of intention to resign from office excluded any implied right to resign which an officer might otherwise have.
The doctrine of incompatible offices applies to a registered organisation by way of implication arising from the rules. It is an implication which arises by operation of law, where incompatible offices exist. Like all implications, it may be excluded by the express terms of the rules. It is not, however, to be regarded as an implied term, arising from the presumed intention of all parties to the rules. A party asserting that the branch rules contain an implication that more than one office cannot be held validly may find that such an implication is only to be found together with an implication that the assumption of a second office vacates the first. In accordance with the doctrine of incompatible offices, this must be so, unless it is excluded by clear words. The words of rule 29 do not refer to the doctrine of incompatible offices. They contemplate an express attempt to resign, rather than one which arises by operation of law. They may operate to prevent a resignation from taking effect where the person resigning simply states an intention to refuse to continue to hold the office. That was the position in Hasset v. Harding. Rule 29 does not have the appearance of a complete code, governing all types of resignation, including those arising by operation of law. In my view, rule 29 does not exclude the doctrine of incompatible offices. Indeed, exclusion of that doctrine in circumstances where the rules do make it impossible to hold more than one office may lead to difficulties of validity of rules under s.196(c) of the Industrial Relations Act, on the ground that the rules would impose on members conditions, obligations or restrictions which, having regard to the objects of the Industrial Relations Act and the purposes of the registration of organisations under that Act, are oppressive, unreasonable or unjust. To require that a person resign by notice from one office, before being eligible to stand for another, may place unreasonable restrictions on the right of that person to seek office, and on the rights of other members to elect that person to office. Mr. Kenzie pointed out that such a restriction operates in respect of a senator who wishes to contest a seat in the House of Representatives in the Australian Parliament. Be that as it may, rules imposing a restriction of that kind in the context of an organization may fall foul of an Act one of the chief objects of which is to encourage the democratic control of organizations; see s.3(g) of the Industrial Relations Act.
The view which I have formed is that the applicant was eligible on 8th November to be appointed to the casual vacancy which was to arise upon the expiration of Ms. Jenkins's period of notice. It was unnecessary for him to resign by notice under rule 29 from his office of vice-president. If he were validly appointed as assistant secretary, upon his taking up of that office, he would cease to hold the position of vice-president, and a casual vacancy would thereby arise in that office. It should be noted that this is the only possible view upon which the committee of management could have acted in purporting to appoint Ms. Whidbourne as vice-president on 8th November. The question then arises whether the applicant was appointed on 8th November.
Not surprisingly, the applicant claimed to have been appointed as assistant secretary by virtue of the motion, which was carried without dissent, to the effect that he should take up that office on the expiration of Ms. Jenkins's notice of resignation. Mr. Kenzie argued that this was not a substantive motion, but merely a procedural one, fixing the date of commencement of the appointment. On his argument, no previous act of the meeting of 8th November amounted to a valid resolution actually appointing the applicant to the office. He suggested that a number of things were amiss in the procedure of the meeting. In the first place, at the time when the applicant's motion to the effect that nominations be called for was put to the vote, there was already before the meeting Mr. Frizziero's motion that Mr. Stevens be appointed, and no vote was ever taken on Mr. Frizziero's motion. Mr. Kenzie drew attention to the provision in rule 44 of the branch rules that motions, when seconded, cannot be withdrawn without the consent of the chairman and the meeting. In the second place, Ms. Judges purported to vote after votes had been counted on the applicant's motion, and her vote was counted as deciding the question in favour of the motion. Mr. Kenzie drew attention to the provision in rule 13 of the branch rules that the chairman shall have a deliberative vote only and in the case of parity shall declare the question negatived. Finally, Mr. Kenzie challenged the procedure adopted to choose the successful candidate. The instruction to place the letter "L" or "J" on a piece of paper did not include an instruction that the letters were required to be capitals. It was argued that confusion could occur between a lower case "l" and a lower case "j", if they were written in the form in which they are often written in running script. This was supported by evidence that, upon receiving the votes, Ms. Judges turned the papers round once or twice, apparently in an endeavour to decipher the letters on them. The ballot papers were never produced in evidence; each side alleged that the other must have had access to them after the meeting had closed.
The question whether the vote cast by Ms. Judges, after she had counted the other votes on the applicant's motion, was a "deliberative vote" within the meaning of rule 13 of the branch rules, or a casting vote is not easy. The Macquarie Dictionary defines "deliberative vote" as "the ordinary vote of a member of a committee or meeting, as distinct from the casting vote of a chairman". The same dictionary defines "casting vote" as "the deciding vote of the presiding officer when votes are equally divided". The Oxford Dictionary gives a meaning of the adjective "casting", "that turns the scale, deciding, decisive...as in casting voice, vote, weight". Mr. Borenstein referred to a passage from Shackleton, Law and Practice of Meetings, 7th ed. at p 70, in which a casting vote is defined as a second vote exercisable by the chairman of a meeting in addition to his or her own vote as a member. In my view, and having regard to the dictionary definitions, that definition is too narrow. The rules of a particular association or body may deprive a chairman of a first vote, by reason of the perceived need for impartiality in a chairman, and yet give to the chairman a casting vote in the event of equality of votes. The fact that Ms. Judges exercised only one vote is not decisive of the question whether that vote was a casting vote or a deliberative vote. The real question is whether a chairman exercising a deliberative vote is obliged to vote prior to the completion of the counting of the other votes. In this respect, a passage from the judgment of the Divisional Court in Nell v. Longbottom (1894) 1 QB 767, at p 771 is of significance:

"It is true that very often he does not vote until it has been ascertained that the other votes are equal; but, when that is the case, the chairman votes, not because he is chairman, and as such has a vote only in the case of an equal division among the other members of the meeting, but by reason of his right to vote as a duly qualified member of the meeting."

This passage indicates that it is recognised that, for reasons of the perceived need for impartiality in a chairman, it is permissible for a chairman to refrain from voting while the votes for and against are being counted, and then to disclose his or her vote in the event of equality. The Court in Nell v. Longbottom went on to describe how, after the chairman's vote has been exercised in that manner, a chairman's casting vote, if he or she has one, may then be used. If the reasoning in that case is applied, the vote exercised by Ms. Judges was her deliberative vote; as chairman of the meeting, she had the priviledge of delaying the exercise of her vote until after the other votes had been counted. Once her vote was counted, the votes were no longer equal, and rule 13 did not oblige her to declare the question negatived.

With respect to the election, I have no difficulty. The possibility of confusion arising from the use of the letters "L" and "J" was negligible. If anything, possible confusion might have arisen from the fact that the applicant's surname begins with the letter "J". Such confusion could only have been to the advantage of Mr. Stevens. I accept the evidence of Ms. Judges that she had no difficulty in deciphering which letter each voter had placed upon his or her ballot paper. The mere fact that Ms. Judges turned the ballot papers around in her hands is not indicative of confusion; rather, it shows a desire to place the ballot paper in such a position as to show the letter concerned upright. Further, I am satisfied that Mr. Frizziero was in a position to see and did see, what was written on each of the ballot papers. He was sitting close by Ms. Judges on her right, and she put the ballot papers in two piles towards her right hand side. It was Mr. Frizziero who made the preliminary announcement of the result; he could only have done so if he knew which pile contained those ballot papers with the letter "L" and which pile contained those with "J".
In one significant respect, the meeting did not follow the accepted rules of meeting procedure. This was in ignoring Mr. Frizziero's motion, and dealing with that of the applicant first. It is accepted as correct meeting procedure, and is conducive to the orderly conduct of meetings, that only one motion is allowed to be debated at a time, and that that motion must be disposed of by the meeting before the meeting considers another. Under rule 44 of the branch rules, a motion cannot be withdrawn without the consent of the chairman and the meeting. No step was taken to withdraw Mr. Frizziero's motion. It was simply never put to the vote.
What are the consequences of the failure of the meeting to observe the correct procedures? The rules of meeting procedure are an accepted method of conducting meetings in an orderly fashion, so as to ascertain the will of each meeting on each proposal. They are not in any sense part of the common law. Much less are they a series of mandatory rules, invalidating all of the proceedings of a meeting if one essential step is not followed. It is a wise chairman who uses the accepted rules of meeting procedure. In the event that a chairman does not follow the rules, it is open to any participant in the meeting, by way of point of order, to correct the chairman, and to put the meeting on course. If the chairman rules incorrectly on a point of order, the meeting may resolve to disagree with the rule. Rule 44 of the branch rules contains a procedure for a motion of dissent from the chairman's ruling. The rules of meeting procedures are ideal as servants in the hands of a meeting, seeking to ascertain its will. As masters, they would be tyrannical.
Section 194(2) of the Industrial Relations Act makes it clear that rules of an organisation may be either mandatory or directory. In my view, those provisions of the branch rules which deal with the procedures to be adopted at meetings are not mandatory, in the sense that anything done in contravention of them is rendered a nullity. The essence of their operation, as with the traditional rules of meeting procedure, is that they enable the meeting, by raising points of order, and by voting to disagree with a chairman's ruling on such points of order if necessary, to achieve its aims in an orderly fashion.
The crucial point about the meeting of 8th November is that, at no stage did anyone object, by point of order or otherwise, to the steps which were taken. Mr. Frizziero, or anyone else, might have called upon Ms. Judges to put Mr. Frizziero's motion to the vote before putting that of the applicant. No-one did. Anyone might have asked for a division on any question, to make clear the numbers voting on that question. No-one did.
Had no step been taken, other than the passage of the applicant's motion and the conduct of the election between him and Mr. Stevens, the respondents who contend that the meeting of 8th November did not appoint the applicant might have been on stronger ground. The reality is, however, that after any procedural error occurred, the meeting took steps which indicated clearly its will. A clear majority of those present voted in favour of the applicant as the candidate for assistant secretary. The motion that he take up the position was carried without dissent. This motion fixed the time at which the applicant's holding of the office would commence, and settled any controversy over whether he would hold the office on a full time basis. In my view, it was an effective appointment of the applicant to the office of assistant secretary. By that stage, whatever had gone before, the will of the meeting plainly was that the applicant hold the office upon the expiration of Ms. Jenkins's notice of resignation, and on a full time basis. The will of the meeting in this respect was confirmed by the subsequent appointment of Ms. Whidbourne as vice-president, and the decision with respect to the applicant's remuneration and fringe benefits tax. Mr. Kenzie argued that some members may have voted for the motion, or failed to vote against it, only because they believed that what had gone before was valid. No-one gave evidence to this effect. Even if it were the case, those (if any) opposed to the applicant's appointment failed to object to any procedural irregularity in the meeting, and did not carry the day when a vote was taken on the final question. These facts are enough to dispose of the argument that is now put. By its resolution of 8th November 1988, the committee of management validly appointed the applicant to the office of assistant secretary on a full time basis, upon the expiration of the period of notice of resignation given by Ms. Jenkins.
The next issue is whether what occurred on 25th November revoked the appointment of the applicant as assistant secretary. Rule 11 of the branch rules requires that a meeting of the committee of management, other than a meeting on any of the days specified in that rule, must be called by the branch president and the branch secretary. Ordinarily, one would expect to find a notice of such meeting bearing the name and designation of each of these officers. Such a notice is not necessary, however. The telegram sent by Mr. Frizziero to all members of the committee of management on 23rd November stated that the meeting had been called as a result of agreement between the branch president and Mr. Frizziero. In that respect, the notice was adequate. It was perhaps less than adequate in advising the members of the committee of management as to the nature of the business to be conducted at the meeting. The branch rules, however, do not make provision restricting the business to be discussed at meetings of the committee of management on dates other than those specified in rule 11. By comparison, rule 24 of the branch rules makes detailed provisions for special meetings of the branch (i.e. general meetings), and specifically confines those meetings to consideration of the subject for which the meeting was called. Where a rule such as branch rule 11 makes provision for a meeting of a defined body such as the committee of management, it is ordinarily the duty of each member of that body to attend if notified of a meeting, or if a regular meeting specified in the rules is to be held. No specific notice of the business to be discussed at any such meeting is required. A member of the committee of management remains absent from a meeting at his or her peril. Although the notice could have been more specific if it was desired to revoke the appointment made on 8th November, having regard to the provisions of the branch rules, no breach of rule was involved.

Accepting as I do the evidence given by Ms. Judges of her conversations with Mr. Frizziero before the calling of the meeting of 25th November, I am of the view that her consent to such a meeting was procured by deception on the part of Mr. Frizziero. Ms. Judges sought and received some sort of undertaking that a special meeting would not be used to undo what had been done with respect to the applicant on 8th November. It is now argued that that is precisely what the meeting of 25th November did. Further, I am satisfied that Mr. Frizziero sought to hold the meeting, and sought to obtain Ms. Judges's consent for it, with the intention of asking the meeting to pass his motion requesting the Industrial Registrar to conduct an election for the office of assistant secretary. Had he informed Ms. Judges of this intention, she would not have consented to a special meeting. The deception vitiated the consent of Ms. Judges, so that the meeting was not "called" by both the branch president and the branch secretary, within the meaning of rule 11 of the branch rules.
There is, however, an important factor which overcomes any invalidity in the calling of the meeting of 25th November. All of the members of the committee of management assembled for the meeting, and no-one raised objection initially to its having been called, on the ground of any irregularity. In particular, Ms. Judges did not raise the question of her consent to the meeting having been procured by deception. Indeed, even when it became apparent that Mr. Frizziero was putting forward a motion inconsistent with the appointment of the applicant on 8th November, Ms. Judges remained silent on this question. In the case of a body like the committee of management, if all members gather together in one place and agree to waive any formal requirements for the calling of a meeting, they may conduct a meeting validly. This is not one of those cases involving mandatory requirements for the protection of the members generally, such as procedures for the amendment for the rules, which cannot be waived by members of a committee. Lawrence v. Porter (Full Court, Federal Court of Australia, 5th May 1988, not yet reported) is one of those cases, and others are listed in the judgment of Northrop J. in that case, at p 9. The ordinary business of a body like the committee of management can be transacted at a meeting by the consent of all of its members. By attending at the meeting on 25th November, and by not taking a point of order at the outset as to the calling of the meeting, all members waived any irregularity in its calling. The meeting therefore began as a properly constituted meeting.
It was not the full meeting of the committee of management that passed Mr. Frizziero's motion concerning the request of the Industrial Registrar. By the time that motion was passed, seven of the members of the committee of management had left. Ms. Hill was the first to go, having excused herself to attend to other commitments. The remaining six walked out after Ms. Judges upheld a point of order and declared the meeting closed. Mr. Kenzie argued that, by the time anyone left, all were aware that Mr. Frizziero had put forward his motion. The eight who remained in the meeting constituted a quorum, pursuant to rule 9(b) and rule 31 of the branch rules. Mr. Kenzie argued that the resolution concerning the request to the Industrial Registrar was necessarily inconsistent with any resolution to appoint the applicant as assistant secretary at the previous meeting, and thereby repealed or revoked any such resolution. For this doctrine of implied repeal, Mr. Kenzie was unable to find any direct authority. It is true that there are many authorities establishing that the enactment of a later inconsistent statute is taken to show the intention of Parliament to repeal an earlier statute. Further, Renton, Guide for Meetings and Organisations, 4th ed., para. 434 imports such a doctrine of implied repeal into the proceedings of meetings. The passage is as follows:

"Generally speaking, a Chair should not accept a motion which is inconsistent with a resolution previously adopted. The existing resolution should first be formally rescinded. If, however, an inconsistent motion is passed, the original resolution becomes void to the extent of the inconsistency (unless Rules in regard to notice or other technical requirements have not been complied with). This is called rescission by implication or rescission by inference."

As a matter of logic, implied revocation must be possible. A body such as the committee of management cannot bind its successors. A clear decision, validly made by a meeting of the committee of management, must prevail over an earlier resolution, especially if made in ignorance of the earlier resolution. If the meeting is aware of the earlier resolution, but takes no action to revoke it expressly, questions may arise whether the later resolution was intended to prevail.
In the present case, Ms. Judges acted in accordance with the general rule laid down in the passage from Renton, already cited. She ruled the motion concerning the application to the Industrial Registrar out of order, it being inconsistent with the resolution of 8th November, appointing the applicant as assistant secretary, which resolution had not been repealed or revoked. The motion was ruled out of order when it was first moved. It could not therefore be debated at any stage of the meeting unless there were first a resolution of the meeting disagreeing with the chairman's ruling. No dissent from the chairman's ruling was ever moved. Mr. Kenzie argued that the unanimous passage of Mr. Frizziero's motion after seven people had left the meeting was an indication of the will of the meeting, and that the will of the meeting should prevail. The seven persons left the meeting at their own risk, provided that a quorum remained behind. If Ms. Judges's ruling was correct, however, it was an occasion on which a point was taken as to procedural matters. In my view, it was correct. It was therefore not open to the meeting thereafter to consider that motion. The seven who left the meeting were entitled to do so, confident that that motion could not be put before the meeting. In the absence of a ruling by the chairman that the motion was out of order, the seven may have been induced to stay and to press their point in debate, seeking to win the day on a vote. It is therefore my view that the meeting of 25th November had no power to pass Mr. Frizziero's motion.
There was also some argument about whether Ms. Judges acted correctly in declaring the meeting closed. Plainly, the point of order raised by the applicant and based on rules 24 and 25 was incorrect. Those rules relate to general meetings of members of the branch, and not to meetings of the committee of management. It is unnecessary under the branch rules to give fourteen day's notice of a committee of management meeting, whether on notice boards in factories or otherwise. Mr. Borenstein argued that a point of order was raised by the applicant, and Ms. Judges was obliged by rule 44 to rule upon it immediately. She did so rule and declared the meeting closed. Even if she acted otherwise than in accordance with the rules in doing so, the meeting was nonetheless closed, no-one having moved dissent from the chairman's ruling, and no order having been sought under s.141 of the C and A Act or s.209 of the Industrial Relations Act that anyone disregard the ruling as being in breach of the rules. In response, Mr. Kenzie relied on a number of authorities indicating that, where a chairman purports to close a meeting without authority to do so, it is proper for the meeting to continue. See Wishart v. Henneberry (1962) 3 FLR 171, at pp 173-174, Rowling v. Harding (1976) 27 FLR 369, at pp 377-378, Rochfort v. Ryan (1965) 8 FLR 283, at p 290, National Dwelling Society v. Sykes (1894) 3 Ch 159, at p 162 and Ward v. Williams (1982) 4 IR 78, at pp 81-82. In none of those cases is there anything said as to the position of people who, hearing the chairman close a meeting, depart in reliance on that closure. If a person attending a meeting cannot rely upon the statement by the chairman that the meeting is closed, all sorts of business might be done after such a statement, in the absence of persons who would have remained had they known business was to be discussed. This is particularly so in circumstances where no-one present moves a motion of dissent from the chairman's ruling. The evidence is clear that no-one attempted to move such a motion. Those who left were, therefore, entitled to leave, in the view that no further business could be transacted validly.
Assuming this conclusion to be incorrect, and that the meeting had power to continue, the subsequent events need to be examined. Since both vice-presidents had left the meeting, it was obliged to elect another chairman, in accordance with rule 14 of the branch rules. Mr. Grundy was properly elected as chairman. It was not open to him, however, to put Mr. Frizziero's motion to the vote, in the light of the ruling of the previous chairman that the motion was out of order. As I have said, those who had left the meeting were entitled to believe that the motion could not be dealt with. The fact that it was moved and seconded afresh after they left does not overcome this problem.
There is a further reason why the meeting of 25th November did not have power to pass Mr. Frizziero's motion. Section 133(1)(f) of the C and A Act provided that the rules of an organization:

"shall not provide for the dismissal from office of a person elected to an office within the association or organization unless he has been found guilty, in accordance with the rules of the association or organization, of misappropriation of the funds of the association or organization, a substantial breach of the rules of the association or organization or gross misbehaviour or gross neglect of duty or has ceased, according to the rules of the association or organization, to be eligible to hold the office."

A similar provision is now to be found in s.195(1)(c) of the Industrial Relations Act. Section 133AB(4) of the C and A Act provided:

"Where a vacancy in an office is filled by virtue of rules making provision as described in sub-section (2) otherwise than by an ordinary election, the person so filling the vacancy shall be taken, for the purposes of the provisions of this Act (other than this section) and the provisions of the rules of the organization (other than the first-mentioned rules), to have been elected to that office in accordance with those provisions."

Sub-section (2) of that section provided for the filling of casual vacancies in an office according to the rules. Similar provisions are now found in s.200(3) of the Industrial Relations Act. The purpose of s.133AB(4) was clear. Just as a person who was elected to an office, which he or she would actually take up at a later date, could not be removed in advance of taking up the office, without the safeguards provided by s.133(1)(f), so also a person who was appointed to take up an office could not be so removed. Mr. Kenzie argued that an appointee to fill a casual vacancy only had the benefit of the protection of s.133AB(4) when the vacancy "is filled", i.e. when the person actually took up the office. Such a construction would defeat the purposes of the sub-section. In my view, a vacancy "is filled" when the relevant body has made an appointment to it, even though the appointee will not actually take up the office until some later date. The vacancy which was to occur when Ms. Jenkins's notice of resignation expired was filled by the committee of management on 8th November, by its appointment of the applicant. The applicant was thereafter protected by the statutory provisions from being ousted unless the conditions provided for in s.133(1)(f) of the C and A Act were met. Those provisions are reflected in rule 37 of the branch rules, which speaks of a power in the committee of management to "remove from office", and provides that persons shall not be "removed...from office" unless the conditions detailed in s.133(1)(f) of the C and A Act are met. That rule must be construed as protecting a person who has been appointed to fill a casual vacancy in an office, but has not yet assumed the position, because the office is still held by the person retiring from it. To construe it otherwise would be to have brought the rules into contravention of s.140(1)(a) of the C and A Act, by reason of their inconsistency with s.133(1)(f). It was not open to the committee of management to revoke the applicant's appointment, without complying with all the provisions of rule 37 of the branch rules, including giving him at least fourteen days' notice of a meeting to which he was summoned and specifying the ground or grounds upon which it was proposed to consider his removal from office.

If the question whether the resolution of 25th November should be taken to have repealed the appointment made on 8th November should depend upon intention, I am satisfied that there was no intention to repeal. The resolution of 25th November was plainly passed on the basis that no valid appointment had been made on 8th November, and there was therefore no need to revoke it. It was passed on the assumption, incorrect as I have held, that a vacancy would exist in the office of assistant secretary once Ms. Jenkins's notice of resignation expired. If the eight persons who purported to continue the meeting of 25th November had been advised that the applicant was appointed validly, some may have been reluctant to vote for a motion inconsistent with that position.
I am therefore of the view that the applicant was appointed as assistant secretary of the branch by the meeting of 8th November, on a full time basis, and from 8th December 1988. He remains the holder of that office, never having been validly removed from it. Subject to an exercise of discretion against him, he is entitled to an order substantially in the terms sought in the rule to show cause in matter No. VI 2 of 1989.
Mr. Kenzie did seek the exercise of the Court's discretion against the making of any order in favour of the applicant in matter No. VI 2 of 1989. In a case in which someone has been dismissed from an office, or expelled from membership of an organisation, and seeks an order overturning the decision to dismiss or expel an exercise of discretion against the making of an order is workable. Such a case was Cook v. Crawford (1982) 62 FLR 34. The exercise of the discretion means that the Court refuses to order that the decision to dismiss or expel be treated as null and void; that decision therefore remains operative, and the person whom the Court refuses to assist remains dismissed or expelled. The exercise of discretion poses greater difficulties in a case such as the present. The applicant seeks an order that he be recognised as having been appointed validly to the position of assistant secretary in the branch. If the Court were to refuse to make such an order in the exercise of its discretion, the result would be an impasse. Since the position of assistant secretary has been filled by resolution of the committee of management on 8th November, there is no vacancy remaining to be filled by any subsequent appointment, or by election. A refusal to make an order in favour of the applicant would therefore leave the branch without an assistant secretary, and without any means of filling that office. From the point of view of the branch, that would be a most undesirable situation. On this ground alone, I must refuse to exercise the discretion against the applicant.
Even if I were not compelled to that conclusion, I should be reluctant to exercise any discretion against the applicant on the facts of the present case. There can be little doubt that Mr. Frizziero's decision that he was unhappy about the result of the meeting on 8th November has led to the catalogue of supposed irregularities in that meeting, to the events of 25th November, and to this litigation. Had the outcome of the meeting of 8th November been the appointment of Mr. Stevens as assistant secretary, it is safe to assume that no allegations of irregularities in that meeting would have been raised. It would be wrong to decline to assist the applicant in the enforcement of his legal rights, simply on the basis that Mr. Frizziero does not want the applicant to be assistant secretary. This is nonetheless so because a majority of the committee of management may have decided to follow Mr. Frizziero's line, after 8th November.
No attempt was made to contend for any validity of the resolution of 25th November, purporting to give the branch secretary power to call a special meeting of the committee of management. That resolution is clearly inconsistent with rule 11 of the branch rules, and cannot stand. The respondents will be ordered to treat it as null and void.
Accordingly, an order will be made in each of the two proceedings before the Court. I have made some remarks earlier in this judgment about the effect of these incidents and of this litigation upon the manner in which the branch is administered. No doubt the wounds which have been opened in recent months will not be healed easily. Certainly, the making of an order compelling the recognition of the applicant as assistant secretary will not heal any personal conflict between him and Mr. Frizziero. It is to be hoped that both the applicant and Mr. Frizziero, and all members of the committee of management, can put aside recent events and strive to achieve something approaching harmony in the conduct of the affairs of the branch, for the benefit of its members.

Actions

Download as PDF Download as Word Document

Citations

Johnson, L.P. v. Beitseen, R. & Ors [1989] FCA 89

Most Recent Citation

Commissioner of State Revenue v Abbotts Exploration Pty Ltd [2014] WASCA 211

Cases Citing This Decision

2

Raphael Shin Enterprises Pty Ltd v Waterpoint Shepherds Bay Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 743

Commissioner of State Revenue v Abbotts Exploration Pty Ltd [2014] WASCA 211

Cases Cited

4

Statutory Material Cited

0

Birrell v Australian National Airlines Commission [1984] FCA 419

Cholosznecki, in the matter of an application for an inquiry relating to an election for an office in the Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union [2006] FCA 452

Sherrif v Townsend [1980] FCA 44

[1989] FCA 89

21 MARCH 1989