Director of Public Prosecutions v CRD

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil)

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v CRD & ORS

[2022] SASC 36

Judgment of the Honourable Justice Parker  

CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - CONFISCATION OF PROCEEDS OF CRIME AND RELATED MATTERS - RESTRAINING OR FREEZING ORDER - VARIATION GENERALLY

CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - CONFISCATION OF PROCEEDS OF CRIME AND RELATED MATTERS - FORFEITURE OR CONFISCATION - DISCRETION TO MAKE ORDER - GENERALLY

Claim of a third party for a certain sum under an equitable charge held over a property, which was subject to a restraining order made under section 24 of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 2005 (SA) (‘Assets Act’).

The first respondent is a registered proprietor of a property in Toorak Gardens. He entered into a Deed of Agreement (‘Deed’) with the second interested party. As a result of that agreement, for a sum of money, the interested party registered a permissive caveat on the title of the Toorak Gardens property.

An attempt to sell the property failed due to the grant of a restraining order sought by the applicant against the property by the Court under the Assets Act. That restraining order was sought, and granted, ex parte on the Court being satisfied that the first respondent was to be charged with a serious offence. The effect of the restraining order is that if the first respondent is convicted of that serious offence, s 56A of the Assets Act will operate and all property, other than excluded property, will be forfeited to the Crown.

While the restraining order provides that the restraining order was subject to the rights of Westpac Banking Corporation as registered mortgagee, it was not expressly made subject to the rights claimed by the second interested party as caveator. She contends that there should have been a further order that made the restraining order subject to her rights under the Deed and caveat.

The issues for determination are whether:

•the power which authorised the Court to make the Order could affect the rights held by the interested party under the Deed;

•the interested party was entitled to the amount asserted or some lesser amount from the sale of the property by the Crown; and

•the doctrine of privity would operate to preclude the applicant from challenging the quantum of the interested party’s interest.

Held

1.The Deed granted the interested party an equitable charge over the property, and thereby conferred a proprietary interest. The interested party held an ‘interest’ in the ‘property’ as defined in s 3(1) of the Assets Act. The restraining order did not, and could not, apply to the interests in the property held by the interested party pursuant to the Deed, as her interest was not within the combined scope of s 24(1)(a) and 24(5)(a) of the Assets Act.

2.The Crown has a ‘fiscal’ or ‘governmental’ interest to ensure that the net value of the property that passes to it is correctly established. The task of ascertaining the value of the…

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Details
Case
[2022] SASC 36
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Director of Public Prosecutions v CRD involved a dispute regarding the confiscation of proceeds of crime, specifically the interpretation and application of a restraining order under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Vic) and the Real Property Act 1900 (Vic). The central issue was whether a restraining order made by the Court could affect the equitable charge held by CRD over certain properties. The restraining order was intended to prevent the disposal or dealing with specified property by CD, who was proposed to be charged with a serious offence. However, CRD argued that the order infringed upon her equitable charge over the properties, which was established through a Deed with CD.

The court had to determine whether the restraining order could apply to the interests held by CRD under the Deed, and if so, to what extent. It also needed to consider whether the court's power under the Assets Act to make restraining orders could affect proprietary interests held by individuals other than the subject of the order. The court found that the Deed granted CRD an equitable charge over the properties, which constituted a proprietary interest. The restraining order, however, did not apply to CRD's interest because her interest was not within the scope of the Assets Act provisions that allowed for such orders. The court further held that the Crown had a legitimate interest in ensuring the correct valuation of the properties, and that CRD's interests were protected by the funds held in her solicitor’s trust account.

In conclusion, the court ruled that the restraining order did not apply to CRD's interests under the Deed, and that her interests were adequately protected by the funds held in trust. The matter was to be listed for a further hearing to determine the quantum and disposition of those funds. The court's decision protected CRD's proprietary interest while allowing for the proper valuation and disposition of the contested assets.

Orders

Orders of the court

Held

1. The Deed granted the interested party an equitable charge over the property, and thereby conferred a proprietary interest. The interested party held an ‘interest’ in the ‘property’ as defined in s 3(1) of the Assets Act. The restraining order did not, and could not, apply to the interests in the property held by the interested party pursuant to the Deed, as her interest was not within the combined scope of s 24(1)(a) and 24(5)(a) of the Assets Act.

2. The Crown has a ‘fiscal’ or ‘governmental’ interest to ensure that the net value of the property that passes to it is correctly established. The task of ascertaining the value of the rights presently held by the interested party is not contrary to the doctrine of privity of contract.

3. As the sum claimed by the interested party is being held in trust subject to further order of the Court, the interested party’s interests are protected. The matter should be listed for further hearing to determine the quantum and disposition of those funds.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

I also note that the Director referred during submissions to a question as to whether the sum secured by the equitable charge is, in accordance with Recitals G and H of the Deed, $274,000 (being the sum advanced by Ms Chignola) rather than the $350,000 promised by CD in repayment. This question was not further canvassed as the focus of the proceedings was on other issues. Conclusion I am not satisfied on the basis of the evidence currently before the Court that an order should be made requiring that the sum of $350,000 currently held in Ms Chignola’s solicitor’s trust account should be paid to her forthwith. I have considered whether the order made on 5 June 2021 should now be amended nunc pro tunc so as to include an additional order 2(n) recognising the caveat registered on the title of the Toorak Gardens property. However, because that caveat has been discharged with the consent of Ms Chignola so as to permit settlement to occur on the contract of sale for that property, I do not consider that this would serve any useful purpose. I would be prepared to amend the order made on 5 June 2021 nunc pro tunc so as to include an additional order recognising the caveat registered on the title to the Teringie property. However, if all moneys found to be properly due to Ms Chignola are to be paid to her from the funds held in her solicitor’s trust account, that would appear to be a pointless exercise. I will hear the parties on that question. Ms Chignola’s interests are protected by the holding of the sum of $350,000 in her solicitor’s trust account, subject to further order of the Court. The matter should be listed for further hearing to decide the disposition of those funds. As I have retired, the matter will need to be listed before another judge.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

For these reasons, Ms Chignola submits that the order made on 5 June 2021 is invalid to the extent that it purports to restrain her property rights and should be set aside to that extent. The remedy is to amend the order to make it subject to the rights of Ms Chignola. An order permitting the payment to Ms Chignola of the amount held in the trust account of her solicitor would be consequential to such an order.Consideration The initial question is the nature of the interest conferred upon Ms Chignola under the Deed. Recital H, in conjunction with Recital I, grants Ms Chignola an equitable estate and interest in the Toorak Gardens property as security for monies advanced by her to by CD. As Ms Chignola was not granted a right of foreclosure in the event of default by CD, the security interest granted under the Deed constitutes an equitable charge rather than an equitable mortgage.[16] While the holder of an equitable charge is not entitled to enter into possession of the property, they can enforce the charge by obtaining an order for sale from the Court.[17] Because that remedy is available, the holder of an equitable charge has a proprietary interest in the charged land.[18] An equitable charge gives rise to an interest that is sufficient to support the lodgement of a caveat.[19][16] Swiss Bank Corporation v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1982] AC 584 at 594-595 (Buckley LJ).[17] Avco Financial Services Ltd v White [1977] VR 561 at 563-564 (Gillard J); Avco Financial Services Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1989) 17 NSWLR 679 at 681 (Young J).[18] Re Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd [1998] 2 WLR 131 at 141 (Millett LJ).[19] Avco Financial Services Ltd v White [1977] VR 561 at 563-564 (Gillard J); The caveat lodged by Ms Chignola was a permissive caveat. Thus, in accordance with s 191(1) of the Real Property Act, it permitted the registration of subsequent instruments provided that they were subject to her claim. The operation of that provision was preserved by s 11 of the Assets Act. Thus, the registration of the restraining order under s 30 of the Assets Act could not, of itself, defeat the rights claimed by Ms Chignola that provided the basis for registration of the caveat. To that extent, I agree with the decision of Judge Dart in Director of Public Prosecutions v Vitale.[20][20] [2020] SADC 55. I turn to the questions of jurisdiction and power under the Assets Act. There can be no doubt that the Assets Act confers jurisdiction upon the Court over the subject matter of confiscation of criminal assets. In the exercise of that jurisdiction, the Court has power to make restraining orders. The question before the Court is whether that power authorised the restraining order made on 5 June 2021 insofar as it affected the rights held by Ms Chignola under the Deed. Section 24(1)(a) of the Assets Act empowered the Court to make a restraining order that specified property must not be disposed of or otherwise dealt with by any person (except in the manner and circumstances, if any, specified in the order) if the Court was satisfied that it was proposed that the person be charged with a serious offence. As I have previously indicated, the evidence contained in the police affidavit satisfied me that it was proposed that CD be charged with a serious offence.