FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Soliman v University of Technology, Sydney (No. 2) [2009] FCAFC 173
INDUSTRIAL LAW – demotion of academic for misconduct – power of the Vice-Chancellor to take disciplinary action on receipt of a Committee’s report containing findings of fact including findings as to whether any mitigating circumstances were evident where the report was not unanimous – unanimity not required where public duties were concerned – divergence of opinion amongst Committee members was an important matter for the Vice-Chancellor to consider – propriety of Acting Vice-Chancellor having regard to his briefing by the Vice-Chancellor before assuming his role as Acting Vice-Chancellor
University of Technology, Sydney, Act 1989 (NSW) ss 4 and 5
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 328, 333(c), 340(2), 342(1), 347(1), 347(5), 349, 351, and 418
Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth)
Fair Work (Transitional Provisions and Consequential Amendments) Act 2009 (Cth) s 2(1) and Schedules 1, 3, 8 and 17
Workplace Relations Regulations 2006 (Cth) Reg 8.13)Byrne v Australian Airlines Limited (1995) 185 CLR 410
Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Proprietary Limited v Wardley (1980) 142 CLR 237
Quickenden v O’Connor (2001) 109 FCR 243
Shop Distributive and Allied Employees’ Association v Karellas Investments Pty Ltd (No 2) (2007) 166 IR 51
Bruce v Cole (1998) 45 NSWLR 163
Grindley v Barker (1798) 1 B&P 229; 126 ER 875
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597
SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 232 CLR 189FAWZY IBRAHIM SOLIMAN v UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, SYDNEY
NSD 1705 of 2008
GRAHAM, LOGAN AND FLICK JJ
7 DECEMBER 2009
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
FAIR WORK DIVISION
NSD 1705 of 2008
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: FAWZY IBRAHIM SOLIMAN
Appellant
AND: UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, SYDNEY
Respondent
JUDGES:
GRAHAM, LOGAN AND FLICK JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
7 DECEMBER 2009
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
FAIR WORK DIVISION
NSD 1705 of 2008
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: FAWZY IBRAHIM SOLIMAN
Appellant
AND: UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, SYDNEY
Respondent
JUDGES:
GRAHAM, LOGAN AND FLICK JJ
DATE:
7 DECEMBER 2009
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
This case concerns the demotion of an academic by one classification level from Step 6 Level C to Step 6 Level B.
Background
By s 4 of the University of Technology, Sydney, Act 1989 (NSW) a University was established consisting of:
(a)a Council,
(b)Convocation,
(c) the professors and full-time members of the academic staff of the University and such other members or classes of members of the staff of the University as the by-laws may prescribe, and
(d)the graduates and students of the University.
Section 5…
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- Case
- [2009] FCAFC 173
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the Committee was required to make unanimous factual findings before any disciplinary action could be taken. The primary judge examined the precedent in Bruce v Cole, where it was held that a majority report could still be valid if it included reasons for dissent. The court held that the requirement for unanimity was not absolute and that a majority report could suffice if it contained reasons for dissent. The court further found that the Vice-Chancellor was entitled to consider matters beyond the Committee's findings when deciding on disciplinary action, provided that the Committee's findings were properly made.
Ultimately, the court dismissed Dr Soliman's appeal, holding that the primary judge's findings were correct. The court found that the Committee's findings were valid even if not unanimous, and that the Vice-Chancellor's consideration of additional matters did not render the decision unlawful. The appeal was dismissed, and Dr Soliman's claims were rejected.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GRAHAM, LOGAN AND FLICK JJ
Ground number 5 raised the question of whether it was open to the Vice-Chancellor, when deciding whether or not to take disciplinary action, to take under consideration anything other than, firstly, the findings of the Committee on the facts relating to the alleged misconduct or serious misconduct, including any findings as to whether any mitigating circumstances were evident, and, secondly, matters brought to his attention by the staff member whose conduct was in question.Consideration The primary judge addressed the unanimity issue at [99]-[106] of her reasons for judgment. At [99] her Honour noted the appellant’s submission as follows:‘99 The applicant submitted that the committee was required to make unanimous factual findings (relying on the discussion about the rule in Grindley v Barker (1798) 1 B&P 229; 126 ER 875 [Grindley v Barker] in Bruce v Cole (1998) 45 NSWLR 163 at 205E – 206). As the committee had not made unanimous factual findings there were no findings of the committee and no capacity of the Vice-Chancellor to take disciplinary action.’ In Bruce v Cole a bench of five judges constituted the Court of Appeal in the New South Wales Supreme Court. It considered a challenge by a judge in relation to the validity of a report made by two serving judicial officers and one retired judicial officer who constituted a Conduct Division of the Judicial Commission of New South Wales, appointed under the Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NSW), to examine certain complaints made to the Judicial Commission, concerning the conduct of the plaintiff, then a judge of the Supreme Court. It would appear that the Conduct Division took the view that the statutory report to the Governor should not contain any indication that it was a majority report rather than a unanimous report. Spigelman CJ said at 174-175, in this regard:‘One of the functions of the report is to inform parliament. In my view that function is better performed if reasons for dissent … are made available as part of the report.… The parliament should receive as much assistance as possible in exercising its weighty task of deciding whether to address the Governor.… I do not see anything in the text or subject matter of the Act which warrants the statement that parliament must receive “one finding of fact, one opinion and one expression of reasons”. There is no reason why a Conduct Division when “setting out” its “conclusions” under s 29(1) or its “findings of fact” and opinion under s 29(2), should be prohibited from setting out the reasons by which it reached its conclusions, including a statement of any minority position.…’ Mason P, Sheller and Powell JJA each agreed with Spigelman CJ without adding any additional reasons. At 208 Priestley JA recorded his express explicit agreement with what the Chief Justice has said concerning the opinion formed by the minority member of the Conduct Division and its availability in any consideration of the possible removal of the plaintiff from office as a judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales.