Smyth & Pappas - [2011] FamCA 434

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SMYTH & PAPPAS

[2011] FamCA 434

FAMILY LAW – DE FACTO RELATIONSHIP – Where applicant seeks declaration that a de facto relationship existed under s 90RD of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) – Where parties disputed the date that the de facto relationship ended – De facto relationship began in 1999 and finally ended in December 2009. Between December 2005 and July 2006 and December 2007 and December 2008 the relationship was suspended but had not ended in any permanent sense.

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 4AA, s 90RD

Barry v Dalrymple [2010] FamCA 1271
Jonah and White [2011] FamCA 221
Moby and Schulter [2010] FamCA 748
Truman and Clifton [2010] FCWA 91

APPLICANT:

Ms Smyth

RESPONDENT:

Mr Pappas

FILE NUMBER:

MLC

10514

2010

DATE DELIVERED:

9 June 2011

PLACE DELIVERED:

Melbourne

PLACE HEARD:

Melbourne

JUDGMENT OF:

Cronin J

HEARING DATE:

5 AND 6 May 2011

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT:

Mr Mort

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT:

Berger Kordos Lawyers

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT:

Mr Duckett

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT:

Michael T Helman

Orders

IT IS DECLARED THAT

Pursuant to sections 90RD and 4AA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) a de facto relationship existed between the applicant and the respondent during the following periods:
(a) 1999 until December 2005;
(b)July 2006 until December 2009 noting that during the 12 months between December 2007 and December 2008, the de facto relationship was suspended but not ended.

IT IS ORDERED THAT

That all extant applications for final orders be otherwise referred to the Registrar to await the allocation of a hearing in accordance with the declaration referred to in paragraph 1 hereof.
That liberty be reserved to either party to apply for any order consequent upon these orders.

IT IS CERTIFIED THAT

Pursuant to Rule 19.50 of the Family Law Rules 2004 this matter reasonably required the attendance of Counsel.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Smyth & Pappas is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE

FILE NUMBER: MLC 10514 of 2010

Ms Smyth

Applicant

And

Mr Pappas

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

This is an application by Ms Smyth (“the applicant”) for a declaration pursuant to s 90RD of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) that she was in a de facto relationship with Mr Pappas (“the respondent”) on and after 1 March 2009 but also for specific periods prior to that date generally.
Section 90RD of the Act is relevant because the applicant filed an application on 12 November 2010 inter alia seeking orders under s 90SM of the Act and asserting at the same time, that the parties were in a de facto relationship.

The legal issues

It was common ground between the parties that of the two questions, the critical one was whether the parties were in a de facto relationship on 1 March 2009. It is a jurisdictional matter.
In Jonah & White [2011] FamCA 221 at para 39, Murphy J said:
In my view, the making of a declaration of the type contemplated by s 90RD of the Act does not involve the exercise of a judicial discretion. The question of whether a de facto relationship exists is a determination of fact (albeit based on findings in relation to a non-exclusive number of statutory considerations) which founds the jurisdiction to make orders of the type contemplated by that part of the Act. The ultimate question is in the nature of a jurisdictional fact. In Corporation of the City Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135 at 148 the High Court held:
The term “jurisdictional fact” (which may be a complex of elements) is often used to identify that criterion, satisfaction of which enlivens the power of the decision maker to exercise a discretion.
I agree with the views of his Honour.
The relevant law otherwise is contained in a number of provisions as follows:
(1)A person is in a de facto relationship with another person if:
(a)the persons are not legally married to each other; and
(b)the persons are not related by family (see subsection (6)); and
(c)having regard to all the circumstances of their relationship, they have a relationship as a couple living together on a genuine domestic basis.
Paragraph (c) has effect subject to subsection (5).
Working out if persons have a relationship as a couple
(2)Those circumstances may include any or all of the following:
(a)the duration of the relationship;
(b)the nature and extent of their common residence;
(c)whether a sexual relationship exists;
(d)the degree of financial dependence or interdependence, and any arrangements for financial support, between them;
(e)the ownership, use and acquisition of their property;
(f)the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life;
(g)whether the relationship is or was registered under a prescribed law of a State or Territory as a prescribed kind of relationship;
(h)the care and support of children;
(i)the reputation and public aspects of the relationship.
(3)No particular finding in relation to any circumstance is to be regarded as necessary in deciding whether the persons have a de facto relationship.
(4)A court determining whether a de facto relationship exists is entitled to have regard to such matters, and to attach such weight to any matter, as may seem appropriate to the court in the circumstances of the case.
Of particular significance in this case is s 4AA(1)(c) and the legislature’s use of the words “all of the circumstances of their relationship”. Relationships appear in many forms but the legislature required the parties “have” a relationship “as a couple” living “together” on “a genuine domestic basis”. All of the indicea just mentioned were present and apparent at various times during the period that the applicant and the respondent knew one another. There is sufficient evidence to be satisfied that an at an identifiable point, the parties commenced a de facto relationship. The more difficult factual, and indeed legal question is, whether and when, the de facto relationship (as distinct from some other form of relationship) ended. The process to an ending can be sudden or it can be slow. Either way, the relationship ends and, in my view, that means, permanently. That requires an examination of what the parties were doing and saying over the life of the relationship as well as after it.
As to what sort of relationship satisfies the legislative definition, little in the authorities is helpful. In Jonah and White (supra) Murphy J at para 66 described the nature of the union as the merger of two individual lives into life as a couple. It is also conceivable however, that two people could live very individual lives as a couple preferring not to merge their existences. As Coleman J said in Barry & Dalrymple [2010] FamCA 1271:
237The terms of s 4AA (2), and inclusion of provisions such as s 4AA (3) and (4) make clear the legislative intention that each case be assessed on its own facts and circumstances. To the extent that logic and commonsense suggest the drawing of an inference, there does not appear to be any prohibition upon doing so. Inferences reliant upon gendered assumptions or social stereotyping cannot be countenanced. In that sense, the absence of jurisprudence in relation to what may constitute a same sex de facto relationship may be a benefit.
It is conceivable that just as peoples’ lives merge or just join together, there is also a waning of interest in their joint relationship to a point at which the lives become distinctly individual again. The end is not often clear or finite. In Moby & Schulter [2010] FamCA 748, Mushin J observed that under the legislation, the parties were required to live together at some time but there was nothing in the section that required any concept of proportion of time nor that the time be full time in the sense of unbroken periods.
Provided the parties have lived together for some period on a domestic basis, they may be found to have been in a de facto relationship. If it is not necessary for there to be a constant common residence right throughout, as the relationship changes, the living arrangement is just one facet of their relationship; physical separation does not necessarily mean that the de facto relationship is ended.
In Truman and Clifton [2010] FCWA 91 Thackray CJ considered the ending of a de facto relationship and said:
358I adopt, with respect, the observations of Mahoney JA in Hibberson v George (1989) DFC 95-064, where his Honour said (at 75,766) in considering the time of cessation of a de facto relationship:
There is, of course, more to the relevant relationship than living in the same house. But there is, I think, a significant distinction between the relationship of marriage and the instant relationship. The relationship of marriage, being based in law, continues notwithstanding all of the things for which it was created have ceased. Parties will live in the relationship of marriage notwithstanding that they are separated, without children, and without the exchange of incidents which the relationship normally involve. The essence of the present relationship lies, not in law, but in a de facto situation. I do not mean by this that cohabitation is essential to its continuance: holidays and the like show this. But where one party determines not to “live together” with the other and in that sense keeps apart, the relationship ceases, even though it be merely, as was suggested in the present case, to enable the one party or other to decide whether it should continue.
359 In Hibberson & George, the trial Judge had said:
In the absence of any overt act or indication by the defendant to the plaintiff that she was staying away only temporarily and intended to return, it seems that I must find that the relationship had ceased by 1 July [i.e. the date of which the NSW De Facto Relationships Act 1984 commenced].
I am also not convinced that “indications” necessarily conclusively end a relationship. There can be uncertainty about the future while living apart but the de facto relationship goes on even though the partners are not doing all of the things together that they had previously done. The keeping apart has to have finality about it and that is best seen where the de facto relationship has none of its previous characteristics any longer. For example, some parties whose de facto relationship has ended, continue to parent children and perpetuate financial interdependence but they do so in a way which can only be objectively described as different from what had occurred previously when to a large degree, the relationship was a functional one. The ending of the relationship must have a permanence about it rather than a temporary suspension.
It is also difficult to grapple with the concept of a series of de facto relationships where there are suspensions. The legislation contemplates a variety of periods (see s 90RD(2)(a)).
With those uncertainties and little legislative guidance, I embark on looking at what the parties did, how they behaved and what they said, to decide when their de facto relationship came to an end and if there was more than one ending, what the relevant periods were.

Credibility of Witnesses

In disputes involving these sorts of relationships, it is conceivable that two people intimately connected to each other in one way or another, can see the same thing in entirely different ways. That leads to the question of the Court endeavouring to assess credibility of witnesses.
The acceptance of the truthfulness of a witness can have a marked effect on whether the applicant establishes that the de facto relationship existed at the relevant time thereby giving rise to the jurisdiction or the absence of jurisdiction to resolve the property issue. When the de facto relationship ends is an objective rather than subjective test. As will be seen, there is a difference between physically leaving the relationship, suspending it and ceasing it. Behaviour is therefore an important corroborating factor relating to stated intentions.
In this case, I am satisfied that the applicant was a more reliable witness than the respondent. In respect of one particular event which was referred to as the X Hotel incident, on the balance of probabilities not only do I accept the applicant’s version but I find the respondent was untruthful. Many pieces of the evidence suggest that the applicant was truthful. Accordingly but with some hesitation, wherever there is a conflict in the evidence, I accept the applicant’s version unless otherwise stated. Even allowing for the subjectivity with which the parties approached the matter, I am satisfied about the overall picture that there was a de facto relationship and that it continued after 1 March 2009.

Onus of proof

It must be said at the outset that the onus of proving the de facto relationship and its subsistence on 1 March 2009 lies with the applicant. The respondent does not have to negative the existence of that. On the balance of probabilities, I find that the applicant has satisfied that onus.

The affidavits

Each party relied upon a number of affidavits but only the applicant and the respondent were required for cross-examination. The absence of cross-examination of the applicant’s witnesses was explained in pragmatic terms by the respondent who said he made the decision to truncate the proceedings but that left me with corroborating material that supported the applicant’s case. The applicant too did not call for the respondent’s witnesses for cross-examination purposes but for the reasons shown below where I set out the evidence of those witnesses, they added little to the factual matrix. I turn then to the respective cases.

Background

The parties met in 1995 at which time the applicant had a child, T, from a previous relationship who was then 5 years of age.

The relationship begins

The parties began “dating” in July 1997. At that time, the applicant was involved in a relationship with a sportsman by the name of L. In cross-examination of the applicant, the respondent’s counsel put, no doubt on instructions, that between 1999 and 2001, the applicant was in a sexual relationship with both the respondent and L and that the last time the applicant “saw” L was in 2002. The “seeing” was an euphemism for having some form of sexual relationship. How the respondent knew either of these things is unclear because no probative evidence was presented that would have convinced me that the assertions were true even if they may have made some difference to the substantive issue in dispute.
I accept that any association with L ended in 1998.
Counsel for the respondent put to the applicant that she commenced dating the respondent in 1999. She said that was wrong. In cross-examination of the respondent by the applicant’s counsel, it was put that the dating began in 1997 and he replied “kind of”. The ambivalent answer is a sufficient reason for me to accept the applicant’s version.
Cohabitation began between the applicant and the respondent in 1999. Precisely when is unclear but I accept it was in 1999.
Either before or after 1999 (and I am unable to make any finding on the evidence) the applicant fell pregnant with the respondent’s child. The pregnancy was terminated. The applicant claimed that she had been pressured by the respondent to terminate the pregnancy but he denied that. However, his evidence on the point was telling. He said he was not ready to settle down. That suggests the relationship was serious even if in its infancy.
The applicant alleged that between 1999 and 2001 the parties were “de facto”. When the respondent was asked whether the parties had been in a de facto relationship at all, he said “not really”. When asked about his description in evidence of them being in a relationship for 41 months in total, he simply said they were “seeing each other”. That distancing of himself was inconsistent with his counsel’s concession that the 41 months as his client saw the duration, was a de facto relationship.
The respondent’s counsel put to the applicant that there were three periods of the de facto relationship. He put “mid 2000 to November 2001”, September 2004 to February 2005 and October 2006 to October 2007. It is hard to see 41 months in that but it depends on what months or parts of months were included. The applicant denied there were three discrete periods maintaining the de facto relationship began in 1999 and ended in March 2010. In response to that answer, counsel asked her whether her position took into account “6 months relationship with [Mr N]”, to which she responded “Yes, it was a fling”. That exchange highlights the difficulty of defining a de facto relationship because it does not mean the same thing to the parties within it.
The applicant maintained that the respondent moved into her house towards the end of 1999 and remained there even after she left to come to Australia. The respondent said that he did not live in the applicant’s house as he had his own residence and that the applicant spent as much time at his house as he did at hers. I reject that for the reasons that follow.
The “Official Poll Cards” for the relevant Greater London Assembly elections in May 2000 showed the applicant and the respondent living at the applicant’s address. The respondent when shown the documents, which he appeared not to have seen before, maintained that he had not signed them nor had he voted. His explanation was that the applicant had “done it”. These were tendered as business records so there can be no doubt about their authenticity.
In June 2000, a firm of lawyers wrote to the respondent at the address of the applicant. This related to money held in their trust account and made reference to them holding the money on trust for the applicant.
There are a number of inferences that strongly suggest in those documents that the respondent was living at or at least giving the public perception of living at, the applicant’s address. I accept on the balance of probabilities that the applicant’s version is correct and that the relationship was a de facto relationship in 1999 and that the respondent had permitted the commercial and political world know that that was where he was living.
A further indication of the nature of the relationship was that in about July 2000, the applicant and the respondent owned and operated the business known as D Company. The respondent’s financial position was not sound and his corporate entity went into liquidation and there were substantial losses. In respect of the operation of the business with the applicant, the respondent said there was no sharing of profits. Rather, he set up the business and the applicant invested in it. I accept the applicant’s version that she financed the commencement of the venture. No other answer seems plausible given the financial position of the respondent.
The applicant produced evidence that she “re-mortgaged” her London home and used funds to purchase a lease on a “pub” and a van. Other money was invested in the business. Further, in 2000, her London home was sold and the proceeds were used to buy another home. Into this home, both the applicant and the respondent moved. Surplus funds went into the business as well. The respondent maintained that the second property was not his home but I reject that for the reasons that follow.

The applicant moves to Australia

In about November 2001, the applicant came to Australia. Two disputes arose out of this move. First, what was the purpose of the move and secondly, where was the respondent?

The applicant maintained the move to Australia was to start a new life as a family. She said that the purpose was to establish their lives in Australia because the respondent had issues with his “ex” including problems with contact to his son and had felt that he could be the person he wanted to be in Australia. The child T was calling him “Dad”. Much of this was denied by the respondent. He maintained that he had no problems with his former partner nor was he having difficulty obtaining time with the child of that relationship. When asked about where he was when the applicant came to Australia, he said he stayed and operated the D Company business. I accept he remained behind not only because of the business which belonged to both parties but also to await the sale of the applicant’s home. The respondent claimed that their relationship ended in 2001 with the applicant’s move to Australia. On the balance of probabilities, that is improbable having regard to not only the applicant’s evidence of her intentions but also what happened next.
In Australia, the applicant began looking for business opportunities and “sourced” products. The respondent denied all of this saying that the way for the applicant to obtain a visa was to export from Australia and that was what she was doing. He conceded however that there was communication through email and telephone although denied it was constant.
In a probing cross-examination of the respondent, counsel for the applicant put that he had not told the applicant that the relationship was over. In a bizarre answer, he said that it was she who had told him of that fact. All of that was inconsistent with the actions of both parties. He came from the United Kingdom to Australia three times in each of the years 2002 and 2003 and a joint bank account was set up. Whilst visiting Australia, the respondent said he lived some of the time with the applicant and some time in hotels. He agreed he “invested” in her business.
When asked why he visited the applicant, the respondent said “because I cared for her” and “I was trying to get her back”. That is not consistent with a purely business partnership.
Ms F whose evidence was not challenged by any cross-examination, notwithstanding the respondent said in evidence that he disputed what she said, had the following to say. Ms F described herself as a close friend of the applicant and met both parties in or about the middle of 2002. She said that she had only known them as a couple until they separated in or about March 2010. She said her initial impression was that they were married and she did not know of the contrary until the applicant returned from the United Kingdom following the death of her niece. She said she also thought that the respondent was T’s father as he always presented himself that way and treated T as his daughter. It is clear that the public perception of the parties was that they were a couple.
It is not unusual for couples to live separately for reasons such as employment, business opportunities and even imprisonment. The critical question is the nature of their commitment to an ongoing relationship. Signs of an ongoing relationship are often seen in visits and correspondence along with activities such as business development. I find all of the hallmarks of that here.
One such factor disputed by the respondent, related to a business venture in the United Kingdom. In July 2003, the Bank of Cyprus (London) Ltd wrote to both the applicant and the respondent at a London address relating to a joint loan application. The parties were shown on the correspondence at the one address but not the residence of the applicant who was then in Australia. When asked about that, the respondent said that he did not know whose address it was and when it was put to him that it was that of his brother, he said he did not know his brother’s address. More importantly, his position was that he did not sign any application for a loan. He went further and said that he had not sought the money. Taking into account the election cards, the lawyer’s letter and this correspondence, I cannot accept that all of these things were orchestrated by the applicant without the knowledge and consent of the respondent. How did the letter addressed to both parties in England come to be in the possession of the applicant? The only inference open is that the respondent gave it to her. I find in the circumstances that this was all part of the ongoing de facto relationship of the applicant and the respondent.

The respondent comes to Australia

In about September 2003, the applicant said that the respondent travelled to Australia to live. The respondent said that it was 2004 and that he “moved in with” the applicant.
The evidence on this issue, although not crucial to my determination, was confusing. In her affidavit filed 11 November 2010, the applicant said the respondent moved permanently to Australia in September 2003. In his affidavit filed 10 December 2010, the respondent referred to both 2003 and 2004. The respondent produced his passport. It showed his movements as follows:
·    Arrived Australia 24 July 2003 and departure on 17 September 2003;
·    Arrived Australian 3 December 2003 and departure on 25 January 2004;
·    Arrived Australia 12 June 2004 and departure on 6 August 2004;
·    Arrived Australia 4 September 2004 and departure on 29 November 2004.
Whilst the record speaks for itself, it could only be relied upon to show when the parties were physically together. To the extent that any of this might go to the applicant’s credit, she said that she did not know what periods the respondent was in Australia. The evidence shows the physical separation but the communication and business activity went on as did the financial support of the applicant and T by the respondent.
I accept the applicant’s evidence, elicited in cross-examination, that she set up the house for them as a family in Australia. That was certainly the public face of their relationship as was evidence from the perspective of Ms F.
Neither party led any significant evidence about what happened during the next period until early 2005. In cross-examination, counsel for the respondent put to the applicant that the second period of the “de facto relationship” was from September 2004 to February 2005 but the applicant denied that. She made reference to the fact that there were no breaks in the relationship. In his evidence, the respondent said that once he arrived in Australia, he worked long hours as “consultant …” making about $1000 per week.
It was put to the applicant that she was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis in 2004 but her response was that it was February 2005. That is inconsistent with her affidavit evidence which asserted that it was in about November 2004. It matters little except that it was common ground that in 2005, the respondent found out that the applicant had been married previously. How this became significant to the respondent was unusual. He said he “found” that the applicant had been “seeing other people” so he looked for other evidence and found amongst her papers, a marriage certificate. No evidence was led about who these other people were with whom the applicant was supposed to be “seeing” but the respondent said that he confronted the applicant who at that particular moment was with a Mr M. An argument ensued, the precise details of which are irrelevant. What is relevant is that in cross-examination of the applicant, the respondent’s counsel put to her that she had had a sexual relationship with Mr M in 2005, an allegation which the applicant denied. This matter had earlier been probed by the respondent’s counsel who put to the applicant that she was presently in a relationship with Mr M and again, it was a suggestion she denied.
I have presumed that these allegations were put on instructions but when he was cross-examined, the respondent said that he thought at the time of the confrontation that such an “affair” “was” occurring but immediately thereafter, he and Mr M had a discussion during which Mr M denied the affair. The respondent said that he believed Mr M. That evidence did not sit at all comfortably with his counsel’s cross-examination. The current position between Mr M and the applicant for the determination of the matters before me is irrelevant.
The issue of the applicant’s perceived infidelity to the respondent took on some significance in the hearing. Presumably to show that the relationship between the applicant and the respondent was not a de facto relationship, counsel for the respondent probed the applicant about her marriage. She was disarmingly candid saying that she could recall very little about it because it occurred in Mexico on a weekend when she was “drunk on tequila”. She later described it as a meaningless weekend. She volunteered that the marriage was not “consummated” and she “thought” a divorce had “gone through”.
This troubled period of the relationship from the respondent’s perspective did not end there. He said he was staying on the couch but in the house of the applicant.
Jealousy is a curious creature. In the respondent’s case one can see the manifestation of behaviour where trust had faltered and his concern arose to protect his relationship with the applicant. When challenged about why he was upset if there was no relationship, he said “she disrespected me”. He valiantly tried to link that concept only to their business activities but the indignation he disclosed when he found out about the marriage, the association with Mr M and the “seeing other people”, all smack of a concern to protect his interest in the relationship. His reaction indicated he thought the de facto relationship had not ended but, additionally, he did not stay away.
In March 2005, the applicant left Australia and went to Hong Kong. In cross-examination of the applicant, the respondent’s counsel put that the third period of the “de facto” relationship began in October 2006 and ended in October 2007. That allegation was denied but it is therefore important to look at what happened between March 2005 and at least from the respondent’s perspective, October 2006.
It was common ground that by May or June 2005, the applicant was in the United Kingdom. Her evidence was that she went to the United Kingdom to spend time with her sisters. She said the Australian business activities continued in her absence but so did the de facto relationship. She said there were regular telephone calls and email correspondence with the respondent. The respondent agreed but said it was either minimal or non-existent.
There was certainly a strained relationship in this period. The applicant’s view was that there was no break in the continuity of the de facto relationship from 1999 onwards but I do not accept that to be the case. In early 2006, the applicant went from the United Kingdom to the United States of America where she worked in what she described as a “PR capacity”. At that time, she commenced some form of a relationship with a sportsman named Mr N. I accept she did not live with him in any sense of a genuine domestic relationship. As she described it, it was “friendship with benefits”. Vague as that concept might be, her evidence which I accept, was that it was casual sex for her but something more serious for Mr N.
Importantly, at this time, there was no commitment by the applicant to a future with Mr N and that became evident when in July 2006, a date earmarked by Mr N’s birthday, she said an excited Mr N wanted to procreate with her and although she was “fascinated”, it was not something she was willing to pursue. The relationship therefore came to an abrupt end.
The respondent disputed much of the evidence of the applicant about this period and relied upon a typed letter which he had found. The letter was written to a person whom the applicant identified as “probably” T’s godmother. Watching her demeanour in the witness box, I am satisfied she was genuinely puzzled about when the letter was written. One might be sceptical about that if the witness had had ample time to peruse all of the evidence of the respondent but the disjointed affidavit and missing pages created confusion. In a broad-sweeping and totally unhelpful statement in his affidavit, the respondent annexed “documents” regarding his relationship with the applicant and her relationship with other people.
The respondent commenced the numerous emails with a list of them and asserted that these were all the emails. That turned out to be incorrect because there was another email account but he dismissed that as not significant. When challenged about these extra but unidentified emails, he said he could produce them. The applicant also produced some emails which had not been produced by the respondent despite the fact that they were written in the relevant period. Interestingly, what the applicant produced would suggest that there was an ongoing relationship with the respondent well after he maintained that it was finished from his perspective. One email from the applicant had attached to it, a picture of the applicant in a suggestive pose. When cross-examined about that picture, the respondent said in an off-handed way that he had “just slept with her” and then added, “once”. All of this gives rise to the problems of what indicea show the existence of, continuation of, and ending of, a de facto relationship.
The other annexures to the respondent’s affidavit were voluminous, unpaginated and, as with the one just mentioned, largely unsourced. That was troubling because the applicant said she was unable to produce documents from her computer because it was “hacked into” in 2010. How the respondent got those documents was unexplained. I say in passing, that lawyers drawing affidavit material must know they are leading evidence of witnesses and had this been done on a viva voce basis, what the respondent did would never have been allowed. It added to the complexity of the trial.
The letter to which I had earlier referred, which was not entirely clear to the applicant, looked like a candid statement of the feelings of the applicant but I will not give it any weight because it was not unconditionally adopted by her. The evidence shows, and I so find, during the period from January 2006, the applicant was dating other people but then according to the applicant, the respondent was “seeing” Ms Q.
In cross-examination of the applicant, counsel for the respondent put that in June 2005, she knew the respondent “had girlfriends”. The applicant’s plausible response, which I accept, was that that was not so. She said she was shocked when she read about that in these proceedings. She volunteered that she would not have “bothered” to “come back” had she known. This was a reference to the next phase to which I shall shortly turn. In the midst of all these probing questions about relationships, the applicant volunteered that she had at that time wanted the respondent to marry her and to have children with him.
Whilst it might seem that the applicant had walked away from any commitment to the respondent, despite the protestations of the respondent, I accept the applicant continued an interest in the business commenced by both of them in Australia. During the physical separation, the applicant continued to assist the respondent with business proposals and activities whilst she was in the United Kingdom. That assertion was made by her in her affidavit. When he responded, the respondent said that the applicant had no such involvement before returning to Australia in October 2006. Neither party expanded on those general statements but I have found the applicant a more reliable and accurate reporter of facts and as such, I accept that there was a discussion and she was involved in the Australian business.
Accordingly, I am satisfied that from January 2006 until around July or August 2006, the de facto relationship was suspended but certainly not ended in any permanent sense.
For some independent observers of relationships, questions might be asked about how a de facto relationship can continue when one party is indulging in an extra-relational affair. However, the legislation contemplates that very thing occurring because parties to a de facto relationship can be seen to be in such a relationship despite also being married to someone else.
Around the time of concluding the relationship with Mr N, the respondent went to the United States and met up with the applicant. Even on this issue, there was disagreement. The applicant thought that it was June 2006 but if I accept she ended the Mr N relationship in July 2006, it is more likely to have been around then. No evidence of precise dates was proffered as to when the respondent arrived in the United States.
It was put to the applicant that there was no sex during the respondent’s visit. She agreed but maintained it was because she had just finished with Mr N and “it was a bit too soon”. She conceded she was in financial trouble but that was just one of the aspects of why the parties met up. Whilst the respondent claimed that the applicant sought his financial help, I find the respondent had been providing financial assistance either for T or just by way of funds from the business at that time. It must be remembered that both parties were involved in the corporate entity. There was clearly a financial tie between the parties even though they suspended the de facto relationship for the period in 2006 to which I have earlier referred.
In their meeting in 2006 in the United States, agreement was reached that the applicant and T would return to Australia. The applicant specifically said that there was a planned return for the following October. She said, and I accept because of what followed, she did not have the money for an immediate return. In addition, T was in school. When asked about what happened between the applicant and the respondent upon his arrival in the United States, the applicant said that they did a little sightseeing and their relationship was strained. They made a decision in Los Angeles for her to come home and when asked why that decision was made, she said she made the commitment because she loved the respondent and it felt right. The only significant plan otherwise was that they would put T back in school and they would move into the respondent’s home in Melbourne. Everything revolved around their joint activity which was not confined just to business or financial matters.
By his cross-examination of the applicant putting that the third period of the de facto relationship began in October 2006, I conclude that the agreement reached in the United States was to resume the de facto relationship which I have earlier found had been suspended. Despite his counsel’s concession and cross-examination of the applicant, the respondent maintained in his evidence that the applicant had not been well and it was her decision to want to give the relationship one last try. If I was asked to infer that it was only the applicant who wanted to try, I reject that. All of the indications are that the respondent went to the United States and there was a genuine agreement about the nature of the future relationship which amounted to a continuation of what had previously been a de facto relationship.
The parties resumed living together in October 2006 and for the ensuing year, the relationship was a de facto one. In July 2007, the parties went to counselling because of what the applicant described as their dysfunctional life affecting the child, T. Much attention was then paid to the period thereafter until October 2007 which is the time the respondent maintained everything came to a permanent end. That assertion was denied by the applicant.
During the period that the applicant was away from Australia in 2006, the respondent commenced a business which was conducted by S Pty Ltd. When incorporated, the respondent was the sole director but upon returning to Australia, the applicant worked in the business alongside the respondent. I accept that on both parties’ evidence, by October 2007 or November 2007, the relationship was again strained. I accept the applicant’s evidence that her focus was on marriage and the respondent was resistant to that concept.

It is noteworthy that during this period, the respondent regularly gave the applicant money which he said he did not claim on tax as a business expense. Clearly therefore, the money came directly out of the resources of the respondent. I find therefore that this was an indication of the financial interdependence of the parties.
During the controversial period after October 2007 when the respondent said the de facto relationship had ended, a health fund wrote to the applicant enclosing a business card endorsed with the names of the applicant, the respondent and T as patients. This came in a letter dated 31 January 2008. Clearly, this was outside the period that the respondent conceded was part of the relationship. The respondent’s evidence was that he had never been to that practitioner, knew nothing about it and had not paid bills for any treatment done. He had seen this annexure to the affidavit of the applicant but said nothing about it in his affidavit. The applicant was not cross-examined about it. In isolation, the evidence of the joint nature of the family card might be self-serving but as part of the total circumstances, it adds weight to the fact that the de facto relationship was not only continuing from the applicant’s perspective but that she was specifically promoting the parties as a family. The respondent’s consistent line was that whilst the applicant might have not only wanted that but persistently said so, his response had always been to say “no – it is over”. I do not accept that that was correct. The respondent’s behaviour indicates a conflicted mind about the nature of the relationship but he did not stay away from the applicant nor did he permanently conclude the relationship.
According to the applicant, the respondent became aggressive around October 2007. Although the respondent would have me accept otherwise by his answers to questions about the applicant associating with other people, his conduct towards Mr M earlier mentioned, and the evidence of Ms F about the respondent’s aggression towards the applicant, satisfies me that he did behave that way towards the applicant.
On 23 October 2007, the respondent sent an email to the applicant in which he said he was at “boiling point” and although financial and business interests had contributed to that problem, it was his view that the applicant’s refusal to “share” the bed, not talk to him and for her to “go out” with “[sportsmen]” was the cause. Sadly, the discussion or confession from his heart, really confirms unhappiness but more importantly that both parties were struggling with the attributes of their relationship. Having said what his complaints were, the respondent added that he did not know where that “left” them both. The applicant’s response was to dispute the assertions about sportsmen and said that her love for the respondent had become platonic. She went on to say that she would not “stay around” for him to vent his dark thoughts. As for where this “left” them, the applicant said they did not have to argue just because there was no way forward. What followed was a clear offer to “move out”. It was clearly not a statement of having already moved out. All of that evidence was a clear indication that the de facto relationship had not ended at that point in time.
The applicant then said that she moved to nearby rented accommodation. She continued to dine with the respondent and they shared T. The respondent maintained they did not speak to each other for some time and that the relationship was finished. I reject that. I accept the applicant’s evidence that the move to the rental accommodation was temporary. T had rooms in both residences and when the move occurred, the applicant took very few possessions.
By 23 November 2007, the parties were not talking to each other but were certainly communicating about business commitments. The communication was cordial.
On 25 December 2007, the respondent wrote an email along similar lines to that written in October which was very emotive. It was clearly soul-searching. He ended the missive with a comment that there were many more things he could say but it seemed pointless. When cross-examined, the applicant said she acknowledged that she wanted to be out of the life of the respondent that very day and upon reading the email, it “sounded like” the relationship was over. But over the following days, there were more notes that might be described as atypical of two people struggling to justify their positions but also to work out whether their relationship had ended. They began negotiating about changing the rental bond and the Foxtel account arrangements. These are all signs of a de facto relationship coming to an end.
Over the year 2008, the parties lived apart and conducted competing businesses. Their separation and competitiveness however did not mean that their relationship had come to an end. They did see each other and had a limited sexual relationship.
In late 2008, the applicant went to the United Kingdom because of a family member’s terminal illness. The respondent helped her by conducting her own business in her absence. In her evidence, the applicant said she and the respondent agreed that upon her return, they would move in together but because of what she found out about his activities in her absence in the United Kingdom, she decided not to do so. In his affidavit in reply to that assertion, the respondent made no mention of that agreement but rather, simply denied the relationship “recommenced” in January 2009.
Despite the respondent’s view, it was not disputed that in February 2009, the parties resumed sending each other emotional emails. On 19 February 2009, the applicant referred to herself as the “loving girl” the respondent had met “and had then lost for awhile” but she said he had never gone out of her heart. The applicant was cross-examined about sexually intimacy with the respondent in 2009 and she described it as regular until possibly August around the respondent’s birthday and that it stopped when she learned of the pregnancy of Ms Q. The sentiments of least the applicant were clear in March 2009. This was obvious from an email produced by the respondent. The de facto relationship had either resumed or had never ended.
The parties also spent some intimate time together at an hotel in February 2009 in Melbourne. There, the applicant wore specifically chosen lingerie. This incident took on significant prominence. Ms F who was not called upon for cross-examination but whose evidence was challenged by the respondent, said that she booked the X Hotel on 17 February 2009 for arrival that same day. Ms F said that the applicant had asked her to make the booking with a credit card as she did not have one and the applicant had wanted to surprise the respondent with an afternoon together. This incident had not been mentioned by the applicant until cross-examination when she was asked about what functions she attended with the respondent. She said that the February 2009 incident occurred at the hotel and the parties there “made love”. The incident was raised again because of an email dated 19 February 2009. In a paragraph of that email, the applicant wrote referring to a previous conversation with the respondent that it was good to talk through things rather than let them build up but she was scared of being too open by exposing her feelings. She was asked to explain what that meant and she said that the respondent at that time was all “sweetness and light” but he was also seeing Ms Q. She said at the time she thought they were “rebuilding, talking, communicating” but that the “whole [Ms Q] thing was unfinished business for him”. She said she was trying to hold on to the relationship and she thought that it was “definitely on”.
The applicant was not cross-examined about what Ms F said but when the respondent gave evidence, he denied that he went to X Hotel at all on 17 February. He said the applicant made it up. However, in the email to which I have just referred, the applicant wrote that she had a mixture of feelings from the Tuesday by which I understood her to be referring to 17 February 2009 which was when the X Hotel incident occurred. She said she was grateful that the respondent “even cared” and at the same time she was shocked “at the level of intensity we reached”. There was then a reference to sexual activity. The respondent said that the contact happened at his home and that there was some hugging but no sexual intercourse.
Whilst that sort of activity might not be unusual for a couple who were contemplating commencing a committed relationship, it is different where there has been an established de facto relationship which had soured if not ended. Such activity suggests a rekindling of the attributes of a de facto relationship particularly, as here, it was one of the respondent’s complaints about lack of affection in 2007. Here, I find, both parties were making a conscious effort to rekindle the suspended, rather than ended, relationship.
This is a critical period of time because the legislation requires the parties not to have ended their relationship as at 1 March 2009 if the Court is to have jurisdiction. To assess that, one has to look at what occurred thereafter.
In May 2009, the applicant went to Fiji. On 25 May 2009, there was a significant dispute about the trip. An email from the applicant to the respondent and relied on by the respondent, showed clear mistrust but the applicant made clear that she had done nothing wrong in Fiji because she had not wanted to “jeopardise finding peace” between them. She went on to say that the respondent was her “world”. This email said:
I accept we are over forever…goodbye my ex.
In cross-examination, the respondent was asked why he was upset about the applicant’s behaviour if the relationship had long ended. He said that the applicant “disrespected” him at a time when he was helping her by doing her product delivery. He said she was “abusing” his friendship.
But, on 11 June 2009, in an abject apologetic way, the applicant in an email, acknowledged having given up on the relationship. To all intents and purposes, that might have been the end of the de facto relationship because prior to June, they went to the movies and lunch together on Mother’s Day. In May 2009 in addition to the Fiji trip by the applicant, the parties had a family breakfast at …. The relationship was rekindled in July 2009, when they ate together at the respondent’s house.
On 20 July 2009, the parties went to the Palais Theatre together and the respondent provided the ticket. The respondent was dismissive of that example saying that he was given complimentary tickets. He said the applicant wanted to go to the show and he had the ticket, so he took her. There were other people known to them both who were present.
It will be seen that this was well after the 1 March 2009 but it was not isolated. In August 2009, the parties went to Crown Cinema for the respondent’s birthday. His explanation was that T “brought her mum” but the applicant’s nephew, H Smyth, was there too.
In September 2009, there was a “going away” party for T at the home of the respondent but he said he was only there for a short time because of his product deliveries. Ms F saw the parties at that gathering and described them as a couple. This was another example of the evidence being unchallenged.
Throughout all of the relationship from 1999, the applicant acted as a father towards T. One of the legislative indicea of a de facto relationship is the care and support of children. On 14 October 2009, the respondent wrote to T:
I am supposed to be your Dad, I have been in your life for 12 to 13 years, I have cared and LOVED you as mine, you are everything I wanted in my little girl, I am proud to be your Dad, I find myself showing off the picture of you and I and I take great pride when people say we have the same eyes. I am proud of you, it’s a shame you do not feel the same of me.
What then followed was nothing short of fatherly advice if not criticism for T’s behaviour. The respondent clearly cared for T and provided support for her throughout the relationship with the applicant. Those are also seen as attributes of parents in relationships which have ended but it would seem that T was the constant throughout the entire period from 1999 until at least 2009.
In December 2009, the respondent’s mother died. He explained an email he wrote as being written in a distressed state because of his mother’s death but the sentiments are clear. He said he was critical of the applicant for not being at his side at that difficult time. However, there was a strong email only weeks before where he made his position about not wanting to be with the applicant very clear. He was critical of her attitude about other relationships but the whole tenor of the email was to indicate that the respondent was quite hurt by what he perceived as the infidelity of the applicant. He went on to say:
Even though I have been in your life for the last 12/13 years, I have always been there for you!! So I do now (sic) know and accept (sic) where I stand, you say one thing but your actions say the truth. This is what I was trying to stop, by going away, but its done, which is a shame.
The respondent went on to make reference to the business activities and to the extent that it could be inferred that he was simply ending the commercial arrangement between them, I reject that. There are too many personal issues intermingled with the business activities to isolate the business matters.
The sentiments in the 2009 email were written similarly on 11 March 2010 when he said amongst other things:
As for us, when my mum died, it made me realise how much you meant to me, while I was waiting to lay my mum to rest I did alot (sic) of soul searching, I realised that I always loved you, I loved you then, I love you now and I will always love you, irrespective of what has happened in the past, what is happening now and whatever you do in the future, and yes I wanted us to be as one, a family, I had this crazy idea that we could try to have a baby or adopt, because the sparkle in your eye when your (sic) around the baby is just mind-blowing.
The respondent was asked about those sentiments bearing in mind his earlier explanation that the December email was written in a state of distress. When asked why he sent this one, he said:
I wanted to piss her off.
The parties went to T’s parent teacher interviews together but according to the respondent, not as a couple. When eventually the relationship did come to an end, the applicant told the school accordingly.
Much of what I have set out above examines the parties’ subjective positions but each also relied upon the objective views of their witnesses particularly concerning the public reputation of their relationship.

Ms P

Ms P was a witness for the applicant. Her affidavit was filed on 18 February 2011. She said she met the respondent in the United Kingdom in or about 1998 and she came to live in Melbourne in 2008. She regularly saw the parties in and around Melbourne where they dined together and had coffee and sometimes she joined them. She described the respondent as being affectionate towards the applicant and holding her hand. Her perception was that they were a couple. She said she also went to the respondent’s home and saw clothing and toiletries belonging to the applicant.
Ms P swore that she was married in April 2009 and the applicant was her bridesmaid as was T. She said she asked the respondent in the presence of the applicant to attend her wedding but the respondent said he was unable to attend. This last point was put to the respondent in cross-examination and he denied that he was invited. That suggestion was not put to the applicant and Ms P was obviously not challenged. Furthermore, Ms P said that she wore a wedding dress that the applicant had bought in or about September 2008 in anticipation of marrying the respondent. That evidence too had not been challenged.
Ms P overheard personal conversations between the parties and her perception was that they were clearly in a relationship.
I accept the evidence of Ms P. Importantly, as I earlier mentioned in relation to credibility of the parties, this is one example where the evidence of the respondent was improbable.

H Smyth

H Smyth is the nephew of the applicant. He was not required for cross-examination. He knew the respondent in the United Kingdom where he stayed with the parties from time to time and went on holidays with them. He said he came to Australia in 2008 and lived with the applicant in the flat to which she had moved after separating from the respondent. He described the respondent as indicating a willingness to help him and included him “as family”. This was conceded by the respondent but he added that he had been substantially let down by Mr Smyth for helping him. The evidence was called by the applicant to establish reputation but it also had the benefit for her of supporting the fact that the relationship with the respondent after March 2008 was still ongoing although it was in an altered fashion from that which it had been when both applicant and respondent were living under the one roof.
Mr Smyth observed the various activities over the period of time that they lived in separate households and said that he never doubted they were in a committed relationship. He referred to the social activities that they attended and the appearance of happiness. All of the matters that Mr Smyth spoke about were put to the respondent and he simply denied them. In relation to the business activities of deliveries, the respondent explained that he was doing jobs that the applicant would otherwise have been doing. However, things such as him staying overnight with the applicant or dinner engagements once per week were described as simply not true. The absence of cross-examination of Mr Smyth made it more probable that I should accept Mr Smyth’s evidence and I do.

Ms Q

Ms Q’s name was mentioned periodically throughout the proceedings but the affidavit filed on 24 January 2011 was remarkably short. Ms Q described herself as an acquaintance of the respondent whom she saw particularly after Christmas 2008 but with whom she was not intimate. She recalled that a week after her birthday in January 2009, she and the respondent “slept together” for the first time and then for the ensuing two months, she spent most nights at the home of the respondent. I am not at all sure what that evidence establishes.

Mr Y

Mr Y worked at the same establishment as the respondent. His evidence was limited to not seeing the applicant at the house of the respondent when a vehicle was dropped off at the end of an evening. That did not assist me.

Mr B

An affidavit was filed on behalf of Mr B on 25 March 2011. His evidence was limited to the fact that he could not recall seeing the applicant at the home of the respondent. That evidence had no relevance.

Ms C

Ms C filed an affidavit on 25 March 2011. She worked at the same establishment as the respondent and she saw the applicant come into the premises on a regular basis when the respondent was there working. She noticed the applicant was friendly with the respondent and that he put drinks on the “tab” for her. She also noticed a girl called “[Ms Q]” and that the respondent was close with her. She did not see the applicant come into the house when she lived with the respondent for a few months in late 2008. All of this evidence was directed to the state of the residence of the respondent which is only one aspect of the nature of a relationship let alone a de facto relationship.

Mr W

Mr W filed an affidavit on 25 March 2011. He too had worked for the respondent in Melbourne and said that when he went to the home of the respondent, he saw the applicant move out and thereafter, assisted her with her business. He said he noticed the relationship between the applicant and the respondent to be rather tense and he could not remember the applicant going inside the house. That evidence did little to help me.

Ms O

Ms O filed an affidavit on 1 February 2011. She had known the respondent for six or seven years and rented a room from him at his house. This room-renting was in late 2008 during which period of time, she did not see the applicant. She made reference to the fact that during the period of time she was in the respondent’s house, Ms Q stayed with the respondent. Again, this is only one aspect of the nature of the relationship and it took the matter no further.

The legislative provisions

Section 4AA of the Act provides that in relation to the existence of a de facto relationship, the Court is entitled to have regard to such matters, and to attach such weight to any matter, as may seem appropriate in the circumstances of the case. Before listing the factors in the section to assist in working out if persons have a relationship as a couple, the legislature provided that the Court may have regard to all the circumstances of the relationship and then said that it may include any or all of those factors so listed. The list cannot therefore be seen as exhaustive.
However, the list is helpful because most of the usual attributes of a personal relationship can be seen. I turn then to the factors.
In this case, the relationship is long-standing. It had it ups and downs but neither party ever kept away from the other permanently. Their relationship could not be described as just business-like. It could not be described as just one of acquaintanceship. In the respondent’s case, there were expressions of love for the applicant as late as whilst giving evidence even though it was he who maintained there was no de facto relationship. His expression of loving the applicant but not being in love with her was an acknowledgment of an attachment to the applicant which was of significant duration. That attachment was not just as a result of his love for the child, T.
The legislature distinguished between the nature and extent of the common residence of the parties. The nature of their residence, when common, was in a variety of places. Initially, it was in the applicant’s home in the United Kingdom and in Australia, the applicant initially had premises to which the respondent came. I accept that in both, the applicant set up a home for them both. Later in Australia, it was the respondent who ultimately had the residence but there were discussions between the parties about the respondent taking responsibility for utilities which indicates that at least for some time, there was a common home. The extent of the common residence must mean the use to which the parties made of it. When the applicant left the common residence to occupy a flat, she left many of her personal items behind. The extent to which she used the common residence thereafter would indicate that the relationship was conducted in two different premises.
There is no doubt a sexual relationship existed. It waxed and waned. In 2008, the absence of sexual encounter was a bone of contention for the respondent who saw that as a refusal of the applicant to commit to him and his jealous disposition about the applicant’s association with other men indicates he had a commitment to the relationship with the applicant. The applicant’s vivid description of the sexual activity indicated it was not just some fleeting moment but something that she saw as important. That too can be seen as far back as about July 2006 when the applicant’ described the absence of sexual activity with the respondent in the United States as being too soon after ending the affair with Mr N. The evidence of both parties suggests that sexual activity was not just satisfying of a need but a facet of a commitment to one another.
There can also be no doubt that the financial interdependence was present at varying times. Early in the relationship, the respondent relied upon the applicant. Later, the reverse was true. The degree of dependence varied throughout the duration of the relationship and that is unsurprising. I do not accept that the respondent’s assistance was just because of his love for T. There was a distinct mix of personal financial assistance and the sharing of business benefits. Financial interdependence does not just relate to money; it can be seen in the support each of the parties gave each other about business activities even in circumstances where on the face of it, they were competitors.
The last point gives rise to questions of the ownership and use of property and whilst the finer details will become evident in any future property proceedings, there is no doubt that each party used the property of the other and helped the other. For example, when the applicant was first in Australia, she resourced opportunities for the respondent back in the United Kingdom.
Section 4AA asks the court to consider the degree of mutual commitment of the parties to a shared life. The use of the word “degree” suggests that there does not need to be an absolute nor possibly a wholehearted commitment but at least, it must be some aspect of mutuality. The respondent’s jealousy and the applicant’s indignation and hurt at his allegations and criticism strongly suggest that there was varying degrees of commitment to each other. The applicant’s exasperation when she found out about the respondent’s asserted “girlfriends” might be seen as hypocritical having regard to her affair with Mr N but by the same token, it also suggests she had come back to a commitment to the respondent and expected him to be doing the same. The respondent’s emails to which I have referred indicate his anger at being left out of her life when she went to Fiji.
The child, T, participated in this relationship but unlike many step-parenting families, the relationship between the child and the respondent was often indistinguishable from that of a biological parent and child. The respondent’s statement at the end of the life of the relationship about the longevity of his role in T’s life indicates it was a very important aspect of his relationship with the applicant. So too, when the applicant moved to the flat from the respondent’s residence, it was T who enjoyed the benefit of a shared parenting experience notwithstanding she was a very young teenager. To the outside world, the behaviour of the parties with T in public strongly suggests a family committed relationship. Separated parents can behave civilly in the presence of their children but in this case, the outside world saw the devotion of the respondent as very much an indicator of a de facto relationship.
Finally, the unchallenged evidence of the applicant’s witnesses points to the fact that as far as appearances were concerned, the parties were content for the world at large to consider them in a relationship notwithstanding the troubles they were having from time to time. From the earliest part of the relationship, the respondent was content to be seen as living with the respondent and at the end of the relationship, the utilities’ providers and the medical practitioner all viewed the parties as a family. That strongly suggests that they were in a de facto relationship.
There can be no doubt that there was a de facto relationship. There can be no doubt that it had troubled times but I am satisfied that there was never a permanent ending or conclusion to it until well after 1 March 2009.
I am satisfied on the evidence that the parties were in the de facto relationship for the following periods:
(a) 1999 until December 2005;
(b)July 2006 until December 2009 noting that during the 12 months between December 2007 and December 2008, the de facto relationship was suspended but not ended.

I certify that the preceding One Hundred and Eighteen (118) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Cronin delivered on 9 June 2011.

Associate:

Date: 9 June 2011