[2010] FCWA 91
| JURISDICTION | : | FAMILY COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA |
| ACT | : | FAMILY COURT ACT 1997 |
| LOCATION | : | [REGIONAL CENTRE] and PERTH |
| CITATION | : | TRUMAN and CLIFTON [2010] FCWA 91 |
| CORAM | : | THACKRAY CJ |
| HEARD | : | 24, 25 & 26 NOVEMBER 2009, 13 & 27 MAY 2010, 2 SEPTEMBER 2010 |
| DELIVERED | : | 2 SEPTEMBER 2010 |
| FILE NO/S | : | PTW 774 of 2009 |
| BETWEEN | : MR TRUMAN |
Applicant
AND
MRS CLIFTON
Respondent
Catchwords:
FAMILY LAW - Jurisdiction - De facto relationship - Whether relationship "marriage-like" - Evaluation of factors indicating a de facto relationship - When a de facto relationship ends - Serious injustice - Application dismissed.
Legislation:
Family Court Act 1997 Interpretation Act 1984
Category: Reportable
Representation:
Counsel:
| Applicant | : | Mr H Moser and Mr T Clavey |
| Respondent | : | Mr R Hooper |
[2010] FCWA 91
Solicitors:
| Applicant | : | Clavey Legal |
| Respondent | : | O'Sullivan Davies |
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
E and P [2005] FCWA 4
Hibberson v George (1989) DFC 95-064
Hyde v Hyde (1866) LR 1 P & D 130 at 133
Ingamells v Western Australian Trustees Ltd (unreported, Supreme Court of Western
Australia, 5 March 1993)
L and C [2005] FCWA 23
Lynam v Director-General of Social Security (1983) 52 ALR 128 at 131
MW v Director-General, Department of Community Services (2008) 244 ALR 205
R v L (1991) 174 CLR 379
Re Kevin (2003) FLC 93-127
Richardson v Kidd [2002] NSWSC 306
S v B (No 2) (2004) 32 Fam LR 429
Van Jole v Cole (2000) 26 Fam LR 228
W v T (1998) FLC 92 -808
[2010] FCWA 91
ABRIDGED JUDGMENT
WORDS IN SQUARE BRACKETS REPLACE WORDS USED IN THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT
PARTIES’ NAMES HAVE BEEN CHANGED
1 Mr Truman claims he and Mrs Clifton lived in a de facto relationship from 2003 to 2007. If he is right, I have jurisdiction to entertain his application for property settlement filed in February 2009.
2 Mrs Clifton denies she lived in a de facto relationship with Mr Truman. If she is
right, his application must be dismissed. Even if they did live in a de facto relationship, but it endured less than two years, the application must be dismissed unless Mr Truman establishes he made “substantial contributions” and that failure to make the orders sought would result in “serious injustice”. Mrs Clifton concedes Mr Truman made substantial contributions but submits there would not be serious injustice if the application was dismissed.
3 There is a further issue relating to the date on which the de facto relationship
ended (if it ever existed). Mrs Clifton claims any such relationship ended more than two years before proceedings were commenced. If that is so, leave was needed to institute the proceedings. In order to deal with that proposition, Mr Truman sought permission at the commencement of the trial to amend his application to seek leave to file out of time. Mrs Clifton’s counsel opposed the amendment, saying it constituted an entirely different case to the one he had prepared…
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues the court had to address were whether the relationship between the parties was of a nature akin to a marriage, whether the relationship had ended, and if there was sufficient evidence to support a claim of serious injustice. The court was required to evaluate various factors indicating the existence of a de facto relationship, including the degree of financial interdependence, the nature and extent of common residence, the duration of the relationship, and the degree of mutual commitment.
The court conducted a detailed analysis of the evidence presented, focusing on the factors outlined in the Family Law Act. It concluded that the relationship did not meet the threshold for a de facto relationship, primarily due to insufficient evidence of mutual commitment and shared financial responsibilities. The court found that the relationship had ended based on the available evidence. As a result, the application for serious injustice was dismissed. The court's reasoning was grounded in the statutory criteria and the evidence provided, leading to the conclusion that the application did not meet the requirements for relief under the Family Law Act.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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