Smith v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Smith v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2016] FCA 1558

Appeal from: Smith v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2015] AATA 343
File number: TAD 20 of 2015
Judge: TRACEY J
Date of judgment: 22 December 2016
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appeal from decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal concerning quantum of payments to which appellant entitled – Tribunal concerned with period between 29 May 2001 and 30 June 2009 – Tribunal held that no “increments” applied to appellant within the meaning of s 8(6)(c) of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) – whether Tribunal erred in law in so holding – no appealable error – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 44

Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth), ss 8(6), 8(9), 8(9)–(9D)

Cases cited:

Chun v Comcare (2009) 209 FCR 399

Engida v Linfox Australia Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 793

Smith v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2015] AATA 343

Date of hearing: 21 July 2016
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 37
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr D Wilson
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

TAD 20 of 2015
BETWEEN:

STUART M G SMITH

Appellant

AND:

MILITARY REHABILITATION AND COMPENSATION COMMISSION

Respondent

JUDGE:

TRACEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

22 DECEMBER 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

TRACEY J:

  1. The appellant, Mr Stuart Smith, appeals from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”):  see Smith v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2015] AATA 343. The decision relates to Mr Smith’s entitlement to incapacity payments arising from military service. More specifically, it is concerned with the quantum of the payments to which Mr Smith is entitled.

  2. On 25 May 1989 Mr Smith enlisted in the Army Reserve.  He sustained an injury to his back during an exercise on 10 November 1992 and was discharged from the Reserve on 12 July 1996 at his own request.  At the time at which he sustained the injury, Mr Smith was employed as a joiner by Joinery Products Sales Pty Ltd (“Joinery Products”).  He continued his employment with that company until 1998.

  3. There was no dispute that, by reason of the injury which he suffered, Mr Smith had an entitlement to be paid compensation pursuant to the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) (“the Act”). What was in issue was the amount of compensation to which he was entitled. The calculation of that amount was to be undertaken in part by reference to Mr Smith’s “normal weekly earnings” (“NWE”) in his civilian employment at the time he sustained the injury. In order to understand how the issues that confronted the Tribunal arose it is necessary first to set out the…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 1558
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Smith v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission, the appellant, Mr Smith, sought a recalculation of his incapacity benefit entitlements for the period between 29 May 2001 and 14 June 2012, after a review by a delegate of the Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission. He was dissatisfied with the basis upon which the recalculation had been undertaken and appealed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The Tribunal confined the appeal to two issues: the correct hourly rate for calculating the civilian component of Mr Smith's normal weekly earnings as at 29 May 2001, and the adjustments to that amount during the period 29 May 2001 to 30 June 2009. The Tribunal found that there was no evidence that Mr Smith was entitled to receive any incremental adjustment to his salary, wages, or pay under s 8(6)(c) of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth). The Tribunal held that any wage increases which might have occurred following a promotion to foreman could not constitute an increase of the kind contemplated by s 8(6)(c).

The Tribunal’s decision hinged on its interpretation of s 8(6)(c) of the Act, which pertains to the adjustments of normal weekly earnings in light of increments in salary, wages, or pay. Mr Smith argued that he should have received an increment in his pay, as he would have been appointed as a foreman with Joinery Products and would have earned $33 per hour. However, the Tribunal found that there was insufficient evidence to support Mr Smith’s claim for such increments. It concluded that Mr Smith's weekly compensation should only be increased by reference to the index prescribed for the purposes of s 8(9B). The Tribunal referred to a previous case, Chun v Comcare, which emphasized that the provision only operates if there is an increase in salary, wages, or pay due to an increment in the applicable wage range. Since Mr Smith had already reached the highest level in his wage range, the Tribunal found that he was not entitled to any further increments.

The appeal to the court was based on whether the Tribunal had erred in law by not considering the increments to which Mr Smith might have been entitled. However, the court found no appealable error in the Tribunal’s decision. The lack of detailed information regarding Mr Smith’s terms and conditions of employment at relevant times made it difficult to substantiate his claim for increments. The court upheld the Tribunal’s conclusion that wage increases achieved through promotions did not fall within s 8(6)(c). Consequently, the appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The effect of the amendment was that employees’ NWE would be adjusted on each “indexation date” by reference to an index prescribed under s 8(9B). The first indexation date was 1 July 2002.BACKGROUND FACTS After he left Joinery Products in 1998, Mr Smith moved from one job to another with periods of unemployment occasionally interspersed between them. Much of this work was performed on a part-time basis. For most of this time he was rendered partially incapacitated for work by his 1992 injury and that incapacity was, for some periods, total. At various times between 1998 and 2012, Mr Smith applied, under the Act, for a review of the quantum of compensation he was being paid. The most recent review was undertaken by a delegate of the Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (“the Commission”) early in 2013. As a result of that review the delegate revoked the then-extant determination, made in 2011, and substituted a recalculated amount of benefits. Mr Smith was dissatisfied with the basis upon which the recalculation had been undertaken and appealed to the Tribunal. He sought a recalculation of his incapacity benefit entitlements for the period between 29 May 2001 and 14 June 2012.THE TRIBUNAL DECISION Mr Smith’s appeal raised multiple issues. Following discussions between the parties it was agreed that the appeal be confined to two issues. They were:(1)What was the correct hourly rate to be used for the purposes of calculating the civilian component of Mr Smith’s NWE as at 29 May 2001?(2)What adjustments to that amount should be made during the period 29 May 2001 to 30 June 2009? The parties agreed that, for the purposes of calculating the civilian component of Mr Smith’s NWE, the commencement amount was an hourly rate of $15.36, as from 29 May 2001. Mr Smith contended that this amount should be adjusted in accordance with s 8(6)(c) of the Act. He said that, but for his injury, he would have been appointed as foreman with Joinery Products and would, at the time of the Tribunal hearing, have been earning $33 per hour. The Tribunal found that there was no evidence that Mr Smith was entitled, from May 2001, to receive any incremental adjustment to his salary, wages or pay under s 8(6)(c). It held that any wage increases which might have occurred following a promotion to foreman could not constitute an increase of the kind contemplated by s 8(6)(c). Although it did not do so explicitly, the Tribunal must further be taken to have held, accepting the Commission’s contention recorded at [35], that Mr Smith was classified (under the relevant industrial instrument) as a joiner level 10 at the time of ceasing work with Joinery Products and that he was, therefore, not entitled to any further increments within his wage range. This conclusion was to be inferred from the fact that, by 1998, Mr Smith had worked for the company for 10 years and was based on the assumption that he had had the benefit of annual incremental increases. The Tribunal referred to Chun v Comcare (2009) 209 FCR 399, in which Robertson J said, at [61], that:“In my opinion the condition for the operation of s 8(6)(c) has not arisen. The provision only operates if the minimum amount per week payable is increased or would have been increased because of the receipt of an increase in salary, wages or pay by way of an increment in a range of salary, wages or pay applicable to the employee or to his or her office, position or appointment. Absent that condition “normal weekly earnings” is not increased under that provision. In light of the unchallenged finding of fact by the Tribunal that the applicant had already reached the highest level in the range of salary for the position he held for the purposes of s 8(6)(c), it follows, as the Tribunal held, that the applicant’s weekly compensation should be increased only by reference to the index prescribed for the purposes of s 8(9B).”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Mr Smith was dissatisfied with the basis upon which the recalculation had been undertaken and appealed to the Tribunal. He sought a recalculation of his incapacity benefit entitlements for the period between 29 May 2001 and 14 June 2012.THE TRIBUNAL DECISION Mr Smith’s appeal raised multiple issues. Following discussions between the parties it was agreed that the appeal be confined to two issues. They were:(1)What was the correct hourly rate to be used for the purposes of calculating the civilian component of Mr Smith’s NWE as at 29 May 2001?(2)What adjustments to that amount should be made during the period 29 May 2001 to 30 June 2009? The parties agreed that, for the purposes of calculating the civilian component of Mr Smith’s NWE, the commencement amount was an hourly rate of $15.36, as from 29 May 2001. Mr Smith contended that this amount should be adjusted in accordance with s 8(6)(c) of the Act. He said that, but for his injury, he would have been appointed as foreman with Joinery Products and would, at the time of the Tribunal hearing, have been earning $33 per hour. The Tribunal found that there was no evidence that Mr Smith was entitled, from May 2001, to receive any incremental adjustment to his salary, wages or pay under s 8(6)(c). It held that any wage increases which might have occurred following a promotion to foreman could not constitute an increase of the kind contemplated by s 8(6)(c). Although it did not do so explicitly, the Tribunal must further be taken to have held, accepting the Commission’s contention recorded at [35], that Mr Smith was classified (under the relevant industrial instrument) as a joiner level 10 at the time of ceasing work with Joinery Products and that he was, therefore, not entitled to any further increments within his wage range. This conclusion was to be inferred from the fact that, by 1998, Mr Smith had worked for the company for 10 years and was based on the assumption that he had had the benefit of annual incremental increases. The Tribunal referred to Chun v Comcare (2009) 209 FCR 399, in which Robertson J said, at [61], that:“In my opinion the condition for the operation of s 8(6)(c) has not arisen. The provision only operates if the minimum amount per week payable is increased or would have been increased because of the receipt of an increase in salary, wages or pay by way of an increment in a range of salary, wages or pay applicable to the employee or to his or her office, position or appointment. Absent that condition “normal weekly earnings” is not increased under that provision. In light of the unchallenged finding of fact by the Tribunal that the applicant had already reached the highest level in the range of salary for the position he held for the purposes of s 8(6)(c), it follows, as the Tribunal held, that the applicant’s weekly compensation should be increased only by reference to the index prescribed for the purposes of s 8(9B).” The other available reading of the Tribunal’s reasons is that it did not consider it necessary to deal with the Commission’s contention that Mr Smith was already at joiner level 10, because, more fundamentally, there was an insufficient evidential basis in the material before it for finding that Mr Smith would have had the benefit of any increment in applicable wages (cf the first sentence of [48] of the Tribunal’s reasons).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It contended that the Tribunal’s reasons demonstrated that it was aware that s 8(6) continued to apply after the commencement of the indexation provisions. It argued that the Tribunal correctly applied the provision by considering whether the material before it satisfied the criteria set out in s 8(6). It maintained that the Tribunal had correctly concluded that wage increases achieved because of promotions did not fall within s 8(6)(c).CONSIDERATION There was a paucity of information before the Tribunal relating to Mr Smith’s terms and conditions of employment at relevant times. The uncontentious finding that the correct hourly rate for the purposes of calculating the civilian component of the NWE as at 29 May 2001 was $15.36 was founded on a letter, dated 25 July 2001, from the paymaster of Joinery Products in which the paymaster certified that, if Mr Smith had still been employed by the company on that day, his hourly pay rate would have been $15.36. No explanation was provided as to the basis on which this sum had been determined. In particular, no reference was made to any industrial award or instrument which prescribed such a figure or to the capacity in which it was assumed Mr Smith would have been employed on that day. Mr Smith nonetheless told the Tribunal that he accepted the accuracy of this amount. Mr Smith’s claim that, had he remained employed, he would have received an increment of $1.00 per hour per year was based on a letter written by a Manager of Joinery Products on 10 November 2010. In that letter the Manager advised that: “I also believe he [Mr Smith] should have received regular increases since 2002 as pay rates climbed upwards of $1.00 per hour per year in the market to reach what they are today.” This was plainly an estimate, but the basis on which it was made was not further explained. Although the Tribunal was not provided with any relevant industrial instrument, it did have before it a letter from the Manager of Joinery Products to Mr Smith dated 27 August 2008. In that letter the Manager referred to the National Building & Construction Industry Award and then set out “our current hourly rates of pay from joiner level 1 through to foreman.” There were ten joiner levels. The Manager did not specifically say that the hourly rates which he placed next to each level were those prescribed by the Award. It is probable that they were not. The Manager said that none of the company’s employees at that time were paid the minimum Award rate because nobody would work for that rate. A later letter, dated 7 July 2010, from the same Manager to the Department of Veterans’ Affairs, said that Joinery Products paid employees under the National Building and Construction Award with an average premium of 10 per cent above the Award. In neither letter was there information concerning the basis upon which workers progressed from one level to the next. The Manager did not say whether the Award (or an earlier version of it), its classification of joiner, and the ten incremental pay levels within that classification would have applied to Mr Smith had he still been employed by the company in 2001—although this may be inferred from a full reading of the text of the letter.