FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Smith v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2016] FCA 1558
Appeal from: Smith v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2015] AATA 343 File number: TAD 20 of 2015 Judge: TRACEY J Date of judgment: 22 December 2016 Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appeal from decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal concerning quantum of payments to which appellant entitled – Tribunal concerned with period between 29 May 2001 and 30 June 2009 – Tribunal held that no “increments” applied to appellant within the meaning of s 8(6)(c) of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) – whether Tribunal erred in law in so holding – no appealable error – appeal dismissed Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 44
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth), ss 8(6), 8(9), 8(9)–(9D)
Cases cited: Chun v Comcare (2009) 209 FCR 399
Engida v Linfox Australia Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 793
Smith v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2015] AATA 343
Date of hearing: 21 July 2016 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 37 Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Mr D Wilson Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
TAD 20 of 2015 BETWEEN: STUART M G SMITH
Appellant
AND: MILITARY REHABILITATION AND COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Respondent
JUDGE:
TRACEY J
DATE OF ORDER:
22 DECEMBER 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
TRACEY J:
The appellant, Mr Stuart Smith, appeals from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”): see Smith v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2015] AATA 343. The decision relates to Mr Smith’s entitlement to incapacity payments arising from military service. More specifically, it is concerned with the quantum of the payments to which Mr Smith is entitled.
On 25 May 1989 Mr Smith enlisted in the Army Reserve. He sustained an injury to his back during an exercise on 10 November 1992 and was discharged from the Reserve on 12 July 1996 at his own request. At the time at which he sustained the injury, Mr Smith was employed as a joiner by Joinery Products Sales Pty Ltd (“Joinery Products”). He continued his employment with that company until 1998.
There was no dispute that, by reason of the injury which he suffered, Mr Smith had an entitlement to be paid compensation pursuant to the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) (“the Act”). What was in issue was the amount of compensation to which he was entitled. The calculation of that amount was to be undertaken in part by reference to Mr Smith’s “normal weekly earnings” (“NWE”) in his civilian employment at the time he sustained the injury. In order to understand how the issues that confronted the Tribunal arose it is necessary first to set out the…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 1558
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Tribunal’s decision hinged on its interpretation of s 8(6)(c) of the Act, which pertains to the adjustments of normal weekly earnings in light of increments in salary, wages, or pay. Mr Smith argued that he should have received an increment in his pay, as he would have been appointed as a foreman with Joinery Products and would have earned $33 per hour. However, the Tribunal found that there was insufficient evidence to support Mr Smith’s claim for such increments. It concluded that Mr Smith's weekly compensation should only be increased by reference to the index prescribed for the purposes of s 8(9B). The Tribunal referred to a previous case, Chun v Comcare, which emphasized that the provision only operates if there is an increase in salary, wages, or pay due to an increment in the applicable wage range. Since Mr Smith had already reached the highest level in his wage range, the Tribunal found that he was not entitled to any further increments.
The appeal to the court was based on whether the Tribunal had erred in law by not considering the increments to which Mr Smith might have been entitled. However, the court found no appealable error in the Tribunal’s decision. The lack of detailed information regarding Mr Smith’s terms and conditions of employment at relevant times made it difficult to substantiate his claim for increments. The court upheld the Tribunal’s conclusion that wage increases achieved through promotions did not fall within s 8(6)(c). Consequently, the appeal was dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It contended that the Tribunal’s reasons demonstrated that it was aware that s 8(6) continued to apply after the commencement of the indexation provisions. It argued that the Tribunal correctly applied the provision by considering whether the material before it satisfied the criteria set out in s 8(6). It maintained that the Tribunal had correctly concluded that wage increases achieved because of promotions did not fall within s 8(6)(c).CONSIDERATION There was a paucity of information before the Tribunal relating to Mr Smith’s terms and conditions of employment at relevant times. The uncontentious finding that the correct hourly rate for the purposes of calculating the civilian component of the NWE as at 29 May 2001 was $15.36 was founded on a letter, dated 25 July 2001, from the paymaster of Joinery Products in which the paymaster certified that, if Mr Smith had still been employed by the company on that day, his hourly pay rate would have been $15.36. No explanation was provided as to the basis on which this sum had been determined. In particular, no reference was made to any industrial award or instrument which prescribed such a figure or to the capacity in which it was assumed Mr Smith would have been employed on that day. Mr Smith nonetheless told the Tribunal that he accepted the accuracy of this amount. Mr Smith’s claim that, had he remained employed, he would have received an increment of $1.00 per hour per year was based on a letter written by a Manager of Joinery Products on 10 November 2010. In that letter the Manager advised that: “I also believe he [Mr Smith] should have received regular increases since 2002 as pay rates climbed upwards of $1.00 per hour per year in the market to reach what they are today.” This was plainly an estimate, but the basis on which it was made was not further explained. Although the Tribunal was not provided with any relevant industrial instrument, it did have before it a letter from the Manager of Joinery Products to Mr Smith dated 27 August 2008. In that letter the Manager referred to the National Building & Construction Industry Award and then set out “our current hourly rates of pay from joiner level 1 through to foreman.” There were ten joiner levels. The Manager did not specifically say that the hourly rates which he placed next to each level were those prescribed by the Award. It is probable that they were not. The Manager said that none of the company’s employees at that time were paid the minimum Award rate because nobody would work for that rate. A later letter, dated 7 July 2010, from the same Manager to the Department of Veterans’ Affairs, said that Joinery Products paid employees under the National Building and Construction Award with an average premium of 10 per cent above the Award. In neither letter was there information concerning the basis upon which workers progressed from one level to the next. The Manager did not say whether the Award (or an earlier version of it), its classification of joiner, and the ten incremental pay levels within that classification would have applied to Mr Smith had he still been employed by the company in 2001—although this may be inferred from a full reading of the text of the letter.