FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Smith v ACN 101 390 505 Pty Ltd (in liq) [2020] FCA 940
Appeal from: Smith v Sedgwick Callaghan Accountants Pty Ltd [2018] FCCA 3204 File number(s): QUD 874 of 2018 Judge(s): COLLIER J Date of judgment: 7 July 2020 Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – general protections – adverse action – where appellant claimed contraventions of s 351(1) Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and dismissal for reasons of age – where s 361 Fair Work Act creates presumption that adverse action taken for prohibited reason unless employer proves otherwise – whether primary Judge took correct approach – whether appellant required to establish prima facie case within s 361 Fair Work Act – whether Jones v Dunkel inference should be drawn in relation to specific evidence – extent to which trial Judge can assist a litigant in person – allegations of “tainted” evidence – extent to which necessary for primary Judge to refer to all evidence before Court – credit of witnesses – proper approach by appellate Court in considering appeal against findings at first instance
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – appeal unopposed – no contradictor to appellant’s submissions – requirement of judicial function that Court be satisfied as to proper disposition of matter
Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 342, 351, 361(1) Cases cited: Adler v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2003) 179 FLR 1; [2003] NSWCA 131
AFT Pharmaceuticals (AU) Pty Limited v Reckitt Benckiser (Australia) Pty Limited (2020) 143 ACSR 522; [2020] FCAFC 45
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345; [2012] HCA 17
Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay [No 1] (2012) 248 CLR 500; [2012] HCA 32
Bottega Rotolo P/L v Saturno's Colonist Tavern Pty Ltd (2008) 100 SASR 1; [2008] SASC 6
Carlisle Homes Pty Ltd v Barrett Property Group Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 31
Celand v Skycity Adelaide Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 222
Fletcher Construction Australia Ltd v Lines MacFarlane & Marshall Pty Ltd (No 2) [2002] VSCA 189
Fortescue Metals Group v Warrie on behalf of the Yindjibarndi People (2019) 374 ALR 448; [2019] FCAFC 177
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; [2003] HCA 22Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298; [1959] HCA 8
Louth v Diprose (1992) 175 CLR 621; [1992] HCA 61
Millington v Waste Wise Environmental Pty Ltd (2015) 295 FLR 301; [2015] VSC 167
N Johnson (Appellant/Husband) and M L Johnson (Cross-Appellant/Wife) [1997] FamCA 32
New Zealand v Johnston (2011) 274 ALR 509; [2011] FCAFC 2
Rajski v Scitec Corporation Pty Ltd (unreported, 16 June, 1986 (Butterworths Unreported Judgments BC8600928))
Tricarico v Dunn Bay Holdings Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 271
White v R [2017] NZCA 322Date of hearing: Heard on the papers Date of last submissions: 22 April 2020 Registry: Queensland Division: Fair Work Division National Practice Area: Employment and Industrial Relations Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 66 Counsel for the Appellant:
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 940
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the primary judge had correctly applied the law regarding the presumption under section 361 and had not erred in requiring Ms Smith to establish a prima facie case of adverse action. The court held that there was no basis for drawing a Jones v Dunkel inference in relation to specific evidence. Regarding the primary judge's consideration of all evidence, the court found that while it was preferable for the primary judge to refer to all evidence, it was not necessary for the appeal to be determined. The appellate court also noted that the primary judge had given appropriate weight to the witnesses' reliability and credibility. The court concluded that despite some divergences in opinion, the primary judge's findings were not erroneous, and thus the appeal was dismissed.
In light of the above, the court dismissed the appeal and made the following order: 1. The appeal is dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In relation to his Honour’s finding that the decision-makers were reliable witnesses, Ms Smith submitted that, rather, there was evidence that those witnesses were not reliable because (in summary):·His Honour stated, on 19 January 2016, whilst Ms Smith was giving oral evidence under examination by the respondent’s Counsel, Mr Johnson, that the evidence of 6 witnesses for the respondent (including all four of the ‘decision-makers’) was ‘tainted’ as the witnesses had been present in the Court during the testimony of Ms Smith;·All four ‘decision-makers’ lied in their affidavits and their oral evidence;·Mr Sedgwick clearly had concerns about Ms Smith’s age, and in fact was obsessed about it;·Ms Gordon stated incorrectly that Ms Smith had held five different jobs in the five years prior to the interview with the respondent, however the fact was that Ms Smith had held five jobs in the twelve years prior to the interview;·Ms Smith submitted that Ms Gordon lied when she gave evidence that she had misplaced her interview notes from 18 November 2014;·Ms McGarva probably lied about not keeping notes from the earlier interview in 2011, and certainly lied in relation to how she ascertained the date of a telephone call between Ms Smith and a client; and·Mr Callaghan lied about the productivity of Ms Smith both in terms of the quality and quantity of her work.Consideration As the Full Court recently observed in AFT Pharmaceuticals (AU) Pty Limited v Reckitt Benckiser (Australia) Pty Limited (2020) 143 ACSR 522; [2020] FCAFC 45:102.… the appropriate appellate approach was captured by Perram J in Aldi Foods Pty Ltd v Moroccanoil Israel Ltd [2018] FCAFC 93; (2018) 261 FCR 301 (Aldi) at [49]. As his Honour said, the Court’s appellate jurisdiction is an appeal by way of rehearing, and involves the correction of error. In a case like the present, error is not demonstrated merely because the appellate court disagrees with the primary judge and to succeed in the appeal the appellant must establish error. Such error may be shown in a number of ways:On the one hand, error may appear syllogistically where it is apparent that the conclusion which has been reached has involved some false step; for example, where some relevant matter has been overlooked or some extraneous consideration taken into account which ought not to have been. But error, on the other hand, may also appear without any such explicitly erroneous reasoning. The result may be such as simply to bespeak error. Allsop J said in such cases an error may be manifest where the appellate court has a sufficiently clear difference of opinion: Branir at 437-438 [29]. Similarly in Fortescue Metals Group v Warrie on behalf of the Yindjibarndi People (2019) 374 ALR 448; [2019] FCAFC 177, Robertson and Griffiths JJ said:497.As Allsop J explained in Branir, the task of a court in an appeal by way of rehearing is the correction of error rather than redetermination of the question of fact de novo. In fact finding of a certain nature a trial judge enjoys advantages which mean that she or he is in a better position than the appeal court to ascertain the true state of affairs. The court on appeal must account for these advantages in examination of the trial judge’s findings and in its own assessment of the significance of any divergence between its view of the evidence and the conclusions reached by the primary judge. Where the trial judge’s advantages are significant, it may mean that despite a tentative divergence in views based on the record of the evidence, the appeal court may properly conclude that it is not satisfied that any error exists or that a different finding of fact is warranted. In reaching this conclusion, the appeal court still comes to its own view on the facts, but in doing so, it recognises the position of the trial judge as a relevant factor in its assessment of the evidence. The process was described by Allsop J in Branir at [29]:The degree of tolerance for any such divergence in any particular case will often be a product of the perceived advantage enjoyed by the trial judge. Sometimes, where matters of impression and judgment are concerned, giving “full weight” or “particular weight” to the views of the trial judge might be seen to shade into a degree of tolerance for a divergence of views [various authorities] ... In such cases the personal impression or conception of the trial judge may be one not fully able to be expressed or reasoned: see for example Re Wolanski’s Registered Design [1953] HCA 72; (1953) 88 CLR 278, 281 and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs v Charlesworth, Pilling & Co [1901] AC 373, 391. However, as Hill J said in Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Chubb Australia Ltd [1995] FCA 147; (1995) 56 FCR 557 at 573 “giving full weight” to the view appealed from should not be taken too far. The appeal court must come to the view that the trial judge was wrong to interfere. Even if the question is one of impression or judgment, a sufficiently clear difference of opinion may necessitate that conclusion.498.The relevant findings of fact challenged by FMG are ones which attract a significant degree of tolerance, as also was the case in Moses where the Full Court said at [308]-[309] (applied to the “occupy” enquiry by Sebastian at [293]-[294]):The difficulty faced by a party alleging an error in the fact finding process in a proceeding such as the present is formidable. The question whether the applicants for a native title determination have established the necessary degree of connection to land by traditional laws and customs is a matter of judgment involving an assessment of a wide array of evidence. Where the trial has involved 81 hearing days, including 35 days “on country” at 76 sites, hearing from 76 indigenous witnesses, 6 pastoralists and 11 expert witnesses on matters of archaeology, history, linguistics and anthropology, the assessment is a complex process of assimilation of a large and diverse body of material. The conclusions will often necessarily be expressed in a highly summarised form, and in some instances will involve matters of impression. In the present case these factors are evident throughout his Honour’s reasons concerning the degree of connection. The purpose in setting out in such detail earlier in these reasons the approach taken by his Honour is to illustrate the scope of the exercise and the interlocking nature of many of the issues so that findings on the evidence relating to one issue are often applied to other issues as well.Nevertheless, these circumstances, however challenging, do not alter the role of an appellate court , which was explained by Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ in Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; (2003) 214 CLR 118 at [25] thus:Within the constraints marked out by the nature of the appellate process, the appellate court is obliged to conduct a real review of the trial and, in cases where the trial was conducted before a judge sitting alone, of that judge’s reasons. Appellate courts are not excused from the task of “weighing conflicting evidence and drawing [their] own inferences and conclusions, though [they] should always bear in mind that [they have] neither seen nor heard the witnesses, and should make due allowance in this respect” (Dearman v Dearman [1908] HCA 84; (1908) 7 CLR 549 at 564, citing The Glannibanta (1876) 1 PD 283 at 287).In CSR v Della Maddalena [2006] HCA 1; (2006) 80 ALJR 458; 224 ALR 1 at [17], Kirby J (with whom Gleeson CJ agreed) explained some of the limitations on the appellate role inherent in the nature of the function as follows:The “limitations” introduced into the rehearing based on the record of the trial are those necessarily involved in that form of appellate procedure. Such limitations include those occasioned by the resolution of any conflicts at trial about witness credibility based on factors such as the demeanour or impression of witnesses; any disadvantages that may derive from considerations not adequately reflected in the recorded transcript of the trial; and matters arising from the advantages that a primary judge may enjoy in the opportunity to consider, and reflect upon, the entirety of the evidence as it is received at trial and to draw conclusions from the evidence, viewed as a whole.(Footnotes omitted).