Smith v ACN 101 390 505 Pty Ltd (in liq)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Smith v ACN 101 390 505 Pty Ltd (in liq) [2020] FCA 940

Appeal from: Smith v Sedgwick Callaghan Accountants Pty Ltd [2018] FCCA 3204
File number(s): QUD 874 of 2018
Judge(s): COLLIER J
Date of judgment: 7 July 2020
Catchwords:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – general protections – adverse action – where appellant claimed contraventions of s 351(1) Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and dismissal for reasons of age – where s 361 Fair Work Act creates presumption that adverse action taken for prohibited reason unless employer proves otherwise – whether primary Judge took correct approach – whether appellant required to establish prima facie case within s 361 Fair Work Act – whether Jones v Dunkel inference should be drawn in relation to specific evidence – extent to which trial Judge can assist a litigant in person – allegations of “tainted” evidence – extent to which necessary for primary Judge to refer to all evidence before Court – credit of witnesses – proper approach by appellate Court in considering appeal against findings at first instance

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – appeal unopposed – no contradictor to appellant’s submissions – requirement of judicial function that Court be satisfied as to proper disposition of matter

Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 342, 351, 361(1)
Cases cited:

Adler v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2003) 179 FLR 1; [2003] NSWCA 131

AFT Pharmaceuticals (AU) Pty Limited v Reckitt Benckiser (Australia) Pty Limited (2020) 143 ACSR 522; [2020] FCAFC 45

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345; [2012] HCA 17

Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay [No 1] (2012) 248 CLR 500; [2012] HCA 32
Bottega Rotolo P/L v Saturno's Colonist Tavern Pty Ltd (2008) 100 SASR 1; [2008] SASC 6
Carlisle Homes Pty Ltd v Barrett Property Group Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 31
Celand v Skycity Adelaide Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 222
Fletcher Construction Australia Ltd v Lines MacFarlane & Marshall Pty Ltd (No 2) [2002] VSCA 189
Fortescue Metals Group v Warrie on behalf of the Yindjibarndi People (2019) 374 ALR 448; [2019] FCAFC 177
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; [2003] HCA 22

Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298; [1959] HCA 8

Louth v Diprose (1992) 175 CLR 621; [1992] HCA 61
Millington v Waste Wise Environmental Pty Ltd (2015) 295 FLR 301; [2015] VSC 167
N Johnson (Appellant/Husband) and M L Johnson (Cross-Appellant/Wife) [1997] FamCA 32
New Zealand v Johnston (2011) 274 ALR 509; [2011] FCAFC 2
Rajski v Scitec Corporation Pty Ltd (unreported, 16 June, 1986 (Butterworths Unreported Judgments BC8600928))
Tricarico v Dunn Bay Holdings Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 271
White v R [2017] NZCA 322

Date of hearing: Heard on the papers
Date of last submissions: 22 April 2020
Registry: Queensland
Division: Fair Work Division
National Practice Area: Employment and Industrial Relations
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 66
Counsel for the Appellant:
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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 940
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Smith v ACN 101 390 505 Pty Ltd (in liq) involved an appeal by Ms Smith, a 63-year-old career accountant, against the termination of her employment by the respondent company. Ms Smith alleged that her dismissal constituted adverse action under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and was motivated by her age. The primary judge found in favour of the respondent company, concluding that Ms Smith had not established a prima facie case of adverse action and that the decision-makers were reliable witnesses. The legal issues before the court included whether the primary judge took the correct approach in relation to the presumption under section 361 of the Fair Work Act, whether Ms Smith was required to establish a prima facie case, and whether the Jones v Dunkel inference should apply to specific evidence. Additionally, the court examined the extent to which the primary judge should refer to all evidence before the court and the appropriate approach for an appellate court when considering an appeal against findings at first instance.

The court found that the primary judge had correctly applied the law regarding the presumption under section 361 and had not erred in requiring Ms Smith to establish a prima facie case of adverse action. The court held that there was no basis for drawing a Jones v Dunkel inference in relation to specific evidence. Regarding the primary judge's consideration of all evidence, the court found that while it was preferable for the primary judge to refer to all evidence, it was not necessary for the appeal to be determined. The appellate court also noted that the primary judge had given appropriate weight to the witnesses' reliability and credibility. The court concluded that despite some divergences in opinion, the primary judge's findings were not erroneous, and thus the appeal was dismissed.

In light of the above, the court dismissed the appeal and made the following order: 1. The appeal is dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

It is clear that the Court may determine an appeal notwithstanding that the appeal is unopposed and the respondent does not enter an appearance: see for example Millington v Waste Wise Environmental Pty Ltd (2015) 295 FLR 301; [2015] VSC 167 at [7]. However where a proceeding is unopposed, it is a requirement of the judicial function that the Court itself be satisfied, one way or another, as to the disposition of the matter – in this case either allowing or dismissing the appeal (see discussion of this issue by McKerracher J in Tricarico v Dunn Bay Holdings Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 271 at [6]; Bottega Rotolo P/L v Saturno's Colonist Tavern Pty Ltd (2008) 100 SASR 1; [2008] SASC 6 at [5]).BACKGROUND The background facts to these proceedings are summarised by the primary Judge in his decision. It is convenient to set them out as follows:5.The applicant is currently 63 years of age and a career accountant.6.On 18 November, 2014, she attended at the respondent’s office in Toowoomba for the purposes of a job interview. She was interviewed by May McGarva and Angie Gordon, two directors of the respondent company.7.She attended a second interview on 27 November, 2014 and on this occasion she was interviewed by Mark Callaghan and John Sedgwick, two other directors of the respondent company. Ms Smith claims that during that interview the directors asked her questions relating to her age. In particular, she says that Mr Sedgwick asked her how long she intended to continue to work. Ms Smith says that she replied that she intended to work until she reached pension age and “possibly beyond that”. She says that Mr Callaghan asked her how long it was before she reached “pension age” and she told him that it was about seven years. She further claims that Mr Sedgwick said that he had “one of those” on his team and that “they slowed down to the point where they couldn’t do the job anymore.”8.Despite this, in December, [2014] the applicant received and accepted an offer of employment from the respondent and commenced working on 5 January, [2015].9.Ms Smith continued to work for the respondent until 22 April, 2015 when her employment was terminated. Her evidence is that she was unaware of any issue with her work and that she had completed about 10 “large jobs” and “several smaller ones” during the period of her employment.10. On a day-to-day basis, Ms Smith’s work was subject to an initial review by her manager, Jodie Weiting. Her work would be returned to her with Ms Weiting’s “review points” and any requirements that Ms Weiting had of Ms Smith in relation to the particular job that was under review. Upon completion of the review points and any additional requirements from Ms Weiting, the job would pass to Mr Callaghan for his review. If he had changes, which according to Ms Smith’s written evidence was usual, the work would come back to her via Ms Weiting for completion.11.On 22 April, 2015 Ms Smith was summoned to the respondent’s boardroom. When she attended, she found that Mr Callaghan, Ms Weiting and Ms Lynda Steffens were there. She was asked to sit down and she was handed a letter of termination, expressed to be of immediate effect. Ms Smith says that she had no indication that her employment was at risk and that she was facing the termination of her employment. She says that she was not given any counselling about her work performance or given any type of warning, either verbal or written. Nor was she given advance notice of the meeting. She asked for the opportunity to have a support person with her, but that was denied.12.Ms Smith says that she asked why the decision to terminate her employment had been made. She says that Mr Callaghan said that no reason needed to be given because she was still within her probationary period. Ms Smith disputed that, but still no reason was given. She also alleges that Ms Weiting said that her performance had been unsatisfactory and referred to some issues early in Ms Smith’s employment about work papers for certain work that she had completed. He [sic] also said that one of the directors had overheard her talking to a client on the telephone and did not think that she was “confident enough”.13.Ms Smith asked to keep her employment and expressed a willingness to overcome whatever issues her employer had with her performance, but her requests were rebuffed. Ms Smith left the workplace and has not returned.14.Following termination, as required by her employment contract, the respondent paid Ms Smith one week’s pay in lieu of notice, as well as her leave and other statutory entitlements. It is uncontroversial that at Ms Smith’s request, based on a claim of alleged financial hardship made by her and despite the fact she was not entitled to it, the respondent also paid Ms Smith an additional week’s wages, on compassionate grounds.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In summary, ground of appeal 4 is not substantiated.CONCLUSION The appropriate order is to dismiss the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In relation to his Honour’s finding that the decision-makers were reliable witnesses, Ms Smith submitted that, rather, there was evidence that those witnesses were not reliable because (in summary):·His Honour stated, on 19 January 2016, whilst Ms Smith was giving oral evidence under examination by the respondent’s Counsel, Mr Johnson, that the evidence of 6 witnesses for the respondent (including all four of the ‘decision-makers’) was ‘tainted’ as the witnesses had been present in the Court during the testimony of Ms Smith;·All four ‘decision-makers’ lied in their affidavits and their oral evidence;·Mr Sedgwick clearly had concerns about Ms Smith’s age, and in fact was obsessed about it;·Ms Gordon stated incorrectly that Ms Smith had held five different jobs in the five years prior to the interview with the respondent, however the fact was that Ms Smith had held five jobs in the twelve years prior to the interview;·Ms Smith submitted that Ms Gordon lied when she gave evidence that she had misplaced her interview notes from 18 November 2014;·Ms McGarva probably lied about not keeping notes from the earlier interview in 2011, and certainly lied in relation to how she ascertained the date of a telephone call between Ms Smith and a client; and·Mr Callaghan lied about the productivity of Ms Smith both in terms of the quality and quantity of her work.Consideration As the Full Court recently observed in AFT Pharmaceuticals (AU) Pty Limited v Reckitt Benckiser (Australia) Pty Limited (2020) 143 ACSR 522; [2020] FCAFC 45:102.… the appropriate appellate approach was captured by Perram J in Aldi Foods Pty Ltd v Moroccanoil Israel Ltd [2018] FCAFC 93; (2018) 261 FCR 301 (Aldi) at [49]. As his Honour said, the Court’s appellate jurisdiction is an appeal by way of rehearing, and involves the correction of error. In a case like the present, error is not demonstrated merely because the appellate court disagrees with the primary judge and to succeed in the appeal the appellant must establish error. Such error may be shown in a number of ways:On the one hand, error may appear syllogistically where it is apparent that the conclusion which has been reached has involved some false step; for example, where some relevant matter has been overlooked or some extraneous consideration taken into account which ought not to have been. But error, on the other hand, may also appear without any such explicitly erroneous reasoning. The result may be such as simply to bespeak error. Allsop J said in such cases an error may be manifest where the appellate court has a sufficiently clear difference of opinion: Branir at 437-438 [29]. Similarly in Fortescue Metals Group v Warrie on behalf of the Yindjibarndi People (2019) 374 ALR 448; [2019] FCAFC 177, Robertson and Griffiths JJ said:497.As Allsop J explained in Branir, the task of a court in an appeal by way of rehearing is the correction of error rather than redetermination of the question of fact de novo. In fact finding of a certain nature a trial judge enjoys advantages which mean that she or he is in a better position than the appeal court to ascertain the true state of affairs. The court on appeal must account for these advantages in examination of the trial judge’s findings and in its own assessment of the significance of any divergence between its view of the evidence and the conclusions reached by the primary judge. Where the trial judge’s advantages are significant, it may mean that despite a tentative divergence in views based on the record of the evidence, the appeal court may properly conclude that it is not satisfied that any error exists or that a different finding of fact is warranted. In reaching this conclusion, the appeal court still comes to its own view on the facts, but in doing so, it recognises the position of the trial judge as a relevant factor in its assessment of the evidence. The process was described by Allsop J in Branir at [29]:The degree of tolerance for any such divergence in any particular case will often be a product of the perceived advantage enjoyed by the trial judge. Sometimes, where matters of impression and judgment are concerned, giving “full weight” or “particular weight” to the views of the trial judge might be seen to shade into a degree of tolerance for a divergence of views [various authorities] ... In such cases the personal impression or conception of the trial judge may be one not fully able to be expressed or reasoned: see for example Re Wolanski’s Registered Design [1953] HCA 72; (1953) 88 CLR 278, 281 and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs v Charlesworth, Pilling & Co [1901] AC 373, 391. However, as Hill J said in Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Chubb Australia Ltd [1995] FCA 147; (1995) 56 FCR 557 at 573 “giving full weight” to the view appealed from should not be taken too far. The appeal court must come to the view that the trial judge was wrong to interfere. Even if the question is one of impression or judgment, a sufficiently clear difference of opinion may necessitate that conclusion.498.The relevant findings of fact challenged by FMG are ones which attract a significant degree of tolerance, as also was the case in Moses where the Full Court said at [308]-[309] (applied to the “occupy” enquiry by Sebastian at [293]-[294]):The difficulty faced by a party alleging an error in the fact finding process in a proceeding such as the present is formidable. The question whether the applicants for a native title determination have established the necessary degree of connection to land by traditional laws and customs is a matter of judgment involving an assessment of a wide array of evidence. Where the trial has involved 81 hearing days, including 35 days “on country” at 76 sites, hearing from 76 indigenous witnesses, 6 pastoralists and 11 expert witnesses on matters of archaeology, history, linguistics and anthropology, the assessment is a complex process of assimilation of a large and diverse body of material. The conclusions will often necessarily be expressed in a highly summarised form, and in some instances will involve matters of impression. In the present case these factors are evident throughout his Honour’s reasons concerning the degree of connection. The purpose in setting out in such detail earlier in these reasons the approach taken by his Honour is to illustrate the scope of the exercise and the interlocking nature of many of the issues so that findings on the evidence relating to one issue are often applied to other issues as well.Nevertheless, these circumstances, however challenging, do not alter the role of an appellate court , which was explained by Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ in Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; (2003) 214 CLR 118 at [25] thus:Within the constraints marked out by the nature of the appellate process, the appellate court is obliged to conduct a real review of the trial and, in cases where the trial was conducted before a judge sitting alone, of that judge’s reasons. Appellate courts are not excused from the task of “weighing conflicting evidence and drawing [their] own inferences and conclusions, though [they] should always bear in mind that [they have] neither seen nor heard the witnesses, and should make due allowance in this respect” (Dearman v Dearman [1908] HCA 84; (1908) 7 CLR 549 at 564, citing The Glannibanta (1876) 1 PD 283 at 287).In CSR v Della Maddalena [2006] HCA 1; (2006) 80 ALJR 458; 224 ALR 1 at [17], Kirby J (with whom Gleeson CJ agreed) explained some of the limitations on the appellate role inherent in the nature of the function as follows:The “limitations” introduced into the rehearing based on the record of the trial are those necessarily involved in that form of appellate procedure. Such limitations include those occasioned by the resolution of any conflicts at trial about witness credibility based on factors such as the demeanour or impression of witnesses; any disadvantages that may derive from considerations not adequately reflected in the recorded transcript of the trial; and matters arising from the advantages that a primary judge may enjoy in the opportunity to consider, and reflect upon, the entirety of the evidence as it is received at trial and to draw conclusions from the evidence, viewed as a whole.(Footnotes omitted).