GIBBS C.J. This case, like The Federated Clerks Union of Australia v. The Victorian Employers' Federation, which was heard on the same day, raises for consideration the question what is an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (Vict.), as amended ("the Act").

2. The appellant, Margot Slonim, was, from 1972 to 1983, employed by the General Committee of the Victorian Autistic Children's Association - Southern Centre ("the Committee") as principal or supervisor of the day training centre conducted by the Committee at Mentone in Victoria. On 9 March 1983 the Committee asked her to tender her resignation but she refused to do so. On 15 April 1983 she was notified of the termination of her employment by the Committee to take effect on that day, and (in compliance with the relevant award) was paid four weeks' salary in lieu of notice. She acknowledges that her dismissal was not unlawful, but complains that it was harsh, unreasonable and unjust. On 18 April 1983 a meeting of representatives of the Victorian Teachers' Union (of which the appellant was a member), the Health Commission of Victoria and the Committee was held in an endeavour to resolve the dispute which had arisen between those parties concerning the Committee's decision to terminate the appellant's employment, but no agreement was reached. On 26 April 1983 the Victorian Teachers' Union notified the registrar of the Industrial Relations Commission established under the Act of the existence of an industrial dispute between the Union and the Committee concerning the Committee's decision to terminate the services of the appellant. The notification stated that the matter should be referred to the Teachers (Day Training Centre) Conciliation and Arbitration Board ("the Board") at the earliest opportunity. The notice was given for the purpose of invoking the provisions of s.44 of the Act which provides, inter alia, as follows:

"(1) Where it appears to an employer or to the

proper officer of an association of employers or of employes that an industrial dispute has arisen in which he or his association has an interest he shall inform the registrar of the dispute.

(2) The registrar shall forthwith inform the

President and the chairman of the Board affected and the chairman shall convene a meeting of the Board which shall attempt by conciliation to settle the matter of the dispute.

(3) If the Board is unable to settle the

matter of the dispute by conciliation the chairman shall proceed to determine the matter by arbitration."

The respondent, Julia Fellows, who is the chairman of the Board, convened a number of meetings of the Board to consider the matter. At the initial meeting she told the parties that in her opinion the Board had no power to determine a dispute involving an employee whose services had already been terminated and who was seeking reinstatement, but that frequently parties…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Slonim v Fellows

Details

AGLC: Slonim v Fellows [1984] HCA 51
Case: [1984] HCA 51
Decision Date: 20 August 1984

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria in a dispute between Slonim (the appellant) and Fellows (the respondent). The core of the disagreement concerned the interpretation and enforceability of a written agreement, specifically a deed, entered into between the parties.

The central legal question before the High Court was whether the respondent was entitled to recover damages for breach of the deed, notwithstanding certain alleged deficiencies in the appellant's performance. This involved determining the precise nature of the obligations undertaken by the appellant under the deed and whether those obligations had been breached in a manner that gave rise to a cause of action for damages.

The Court's reasoning focused on established principles of contract law, particularly concerning the construction of deeds and the requirements for establishing a breach of contract. The judges analysed the language of the deed to ascertain the parties' intentions and the scope of the appellant's commitments. They considered whether the respondent had suffered any loss as a result of the appellant's actions or omissions, and whether such loss was causally connected to a breach of the deed. The Court ultimately found that the respondent had not established a breach of the deed that entitled them to damages.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.

Orders